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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation offers an investigation of the discursive function of national identity in the 
project of European integration. Its focus is the discursive dynamics created in the context 
of European Union Enlargement to the former communist states, and its geographical 
locus is the Balkan region. Exploring the transformations of national identity narratives in 
two Balkan states – Bulgaria and Macedonia – the analysis aims to uncover the discursive 
mechanisms of accommodating national identity in the process of empowering 
Europeanization.  
In the theoretical and meta-theoretical frame of poststructuralist discourse theory and 
within the structure of a small-number comparative case study, the investigation selects 
six narrative groups. They are centred around key elements in the narration of national 
identity: nationhood, territory, purpose, statehood, language, minorities. Traditionally 
interpreted within the hegemony of nationalism, these elements are identifiable in the 
national identity constructs of both of the studied states. Using qualitative methodology 
based on discourse analysis, the empirical study traces variations in these narratives in the 
course of the democratic transition and the preparation for EU membership at the macro 
level – the state. The purpose of the investigation is to reveal the logic of reading national 
identity within the empowering discourse of Europeanization.  
The findings demonstrate that the discursive space of the European project upholds a 
positive, emancipatory, optimistic vision of national subjectivity. Marginalizing antagonistic 
interpretations of national identity narrated in the discourse of nationalism, 
Europeanization reveals the potential to significantly increase the credibility of national 
identity as a source of collective self-iden tification at the level of the state. This can 
stabilize the discursive space of European integration and ensure the political relevance of 
the European project. Where nationalist readings of identity succeed in challenging the 
hegemony of Europeanization, national identity appears more antagonistic and less 
compatible with the progress of integration in Europe. In this sense reading national 
identity emerges as the touchstone of the integration project. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION:  
NATIONALISM, NATIONAL IDENTITY, AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
 
This dissertation offers an investigation of the discursive function of national identity in the 
project of European integration. It confronts an empirical puzzle continually troubling 
political scientists and practitioners working in the field of Europeanization: the perpetual 
salience of national identity narratives within the realm of European politics. Pointing to 
the national stories are discussions on the ‘crisis’ of legitimacy in the European Union1, the 
transforming norm of sovereignty2, the notion of community3, the rise of populist politics4. 
The puzzle arises from the seeming incompatibility between the divisive function of 
national identity and the non-antagonistic space of commonality which the European 
project claims to have created. Seeking to make sense of this puzzle, the dissertation 
explores national identity’s antagonistic potential to understand the recurrence of identity-
based conflictuality. Particularly interested in the discursive space of ‘Europe’5, the analysis 
aims to investigate the mechanisms of accommodating national identity narratives within 
the discourse of Europeanization. This investigation has been inspired by the suggestion 
1 Lene Hansen and Michael Williams, ‘The Myths of Europe: Legitimacy, Community and the ‘Crisis’ of the 
EU’, Journal of Common Market Studies 37(2), (1999): 233-49. 
2 Rob Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993), particularly Chapter VII and VIII.  
3 For example, Markus Thiel, The Limits of Transnationalism: Collective Identities and EU Integration (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), Jonathan White, Political Allegiance after European Integration (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical 
Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), etc. 
4 Petr Kopecky and Cas Mudde (eds.) Uncivil Society? Contentious Politics in Post-Communist Europe 
(London: Routledge, 2002), Petr Kopecky and Cas Mudde, ‘The Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions 
on European Integration in East Central Europe’, European Union Politics, 3(3), (2002): 297-326. 
5 When used in inverted commas here, the term is meant to signify the Europeanization discourse. 
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that Europeanization can uphold national identity narratives in a reconciliatory manner, 
increasing their credibility as a source of collective self-identification with the state.  
Suggesting a link between the European project and the possibility of avoiding identity-
based antagonisms is, indeed, inspiring. The return of violence to the periphery of Europe 
– outside the realm of Europeanization – in the years following the end of the Cold War 
seemed to confirm this link. Indeed, against the unique achievements of European 
integration based on the moral superiority of liberal democracy6 and 
supragovernmentalism, the ethno-national conflicts occurring in the Balkans and 
elsewhere in the former communist space looked inexplicable. In the immediate aftermath 
of events, abundant analytical output attempted to make sense of what was happening by 
reaching for the academic arsenal of Nationalism Studies and Area Studies7, ascribing the 
disturbing fact of ethnic cleansing8 to cultural specificities of the people inhabiting the 
ends of Europe and to unfortunate string of events occurring in Europe’s periphery.9 The 
notion of ‘national identity’ quickly returned to the active academic (and political) 
vocabulary as pertaining to explanations in this vein. 
This academic inertia is telling. Neither International Relations theory, nor European 
Studies, nor even the very sub-discipline of Nationalism Studies, could readily 
accommodate the concept of national identity in such a way as to account for its sudden 
‘recurrence’ as a basis for conflictual politics: they were not equipped for this task either 
methodologically or conceptually. International relations theory, particularly in its realist 
6 Liberal peace theory based on Kant’s philosophy (Perpetual Peace) is an expression of this position. See 
Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), John M. Owen, 
‘How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace’, International Security, 19 (2), (1994): 87-125, Christopher Lane, 
‘Kant or Cant: the Myth of the Democratic Peace’, International Security, 19 (2), (1994): 5-49. 
7 In the context of violence in the Balkans, studies customarily summoned a ‘Balkan civilization’ whose 
historical peculiarities pre-determined the type of conflict, see Hugh Poulton, The Balkans: Minorities and 
States in Conflict (London: Minority Rights Publications, 1991), Misha Glenny, The Balkans: 1804-1999: 
Nationalism, War and the Great Powers (London: Granta Publications 1999). For an analysis challenging this 
position, see Lene Hansen, ‘Past as Preface: Civilizational Politics and the ‘Third’ Balkan War’, Journal of 
Peace Research 37 (3), (2000): 345-362. 
8 Even though the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ was introduced into the vocabulary of international politics in the 
context of the early 1990s developments in Yugoslavia (from Serbo-Croatian), it does not describe a new 
phenomenon: for a useful overview, see Jennifer Jackson Preece, ‘Ethnic Cleansing as an Instrument of 
Nation-State Creation: Changing State Practices and Evolving Legal Norms’, Human Rights Quarterly, 20, 
(1998): 817-842.  
9 Very thorough in this analytical vein, Victor Roudometof, Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy: the 
Social Origins of Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001). 
 
3 
 
                                                            
N. Nancheva                                                                                                                                        Transforming Identities in Europe 
mainstream, customarily focused on the system level, conceptualizing states as rational 
actors who aimed to maximize gains.10 But the system level does not allow much room for 
analysis of the factors and actors at state and sub-state level which influence the 
international outcomes and play important roles in causing and understanding identity-
based conflict. The assumption of rationality, too, excludes by default the powerful engine 
of identity-driven behaviour which lies in the heart of conflictual politics. In the sub-
discipline of European Studies, which also developed on a solid rationalist mainstream11, 
integration was traditionally seen as a successful attempt to transcend identity-based 
controversies from the violent past by shifting the political attention to the rationality of 
mutual interest and gain. Peace was seen as a universally logical goal predicated on 
economic cooperation, not on the existence of a community of like-minded actors.12 The 
notion of identity was thus ascribed to non-rational influences from the past which rational 
actors could eventually transcend in order to achieve their logical goals. In the Study of 
Nationalism the same idea suggested that a non-civic (hence, ’non-civilized’13) approach to 
politics led to the atrocious consequences of aggressive nationalism, thus marginalizing the 
phenomenon to certain communities and certain territories which customarily hosted 
conflict. The very language of Nationalism Studies suggests such marginalization: in its 
mainstream it discusses the phenomenon from a distance, either in time (as do post-war 
accounts of Nazi ideology14) or in space (as do Western analyses of identity-based conflicts 
occurring everywhere else but in Europe15). The Study of Nationalism thus failed to 
address those aspects of the phenomenon which made it relevant to the discursive 
construction of political realities – and to Europe’s political present.   
10 For reference to key realist positions on that, Jack Donnelly, Realism and International Relations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).  
11 Ben Rosamond, Theories of European Integration (Basingstoke: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), Chapter V. 
12 For a critical analysis on this assumption, see Michael Williams and Morten Kelstrup, ‘Integration and the 
Politics of Community in the New Europe’ in their edited volume International Relations Theory and 
European Integration: Power, Security and Community (London: Routledge, 2000), 1-14. 
13 The value-laden distinction between ‘civic’ nationalism as a signifier of civilizational progress and ‘ethnic’ 
nationalism as a signifier of backwardness will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter. 
14 In classical works for the discipline, nationalism is often analysed as a historical phenomenon incompatible 
with the rationality of the present, see Edward Hallett Carr, Nationalism and After (London: Macmillan, 
1945). 
15 Even when they do occur in geographical Europe, they are relegated to its periphery: ‘the New Europe’, 
‘the former communist Europe’, or more specifically ‘the Balkans’, etc.  
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But a more careful analysis of the discursive space of Europeanization reveals that the core 
of integrating Europe, just like Europe’s periphery, has not been freed of national identity. 
Quite to the contrary, national identity narratives permeate the entire realm of European 
politics16 and are visible around every key step in the integration process17. Minority-
majority relations, as well as resistance to the deepening and widening of the integration 
project all together, are some of the most visible loci for national identity rhetoric. Its 
recurring political relevance suggests that approaching national identity in Europe from the 
distance of time and space is counter-productive. Therefore, a more accurate 
understanding of the role of national identity in European politics and the function of 
national identity narratives in the discursive realm of Europeanization is called for.  
 
Three Academic (Sub-)Disciplines on National Identity  
In the discipline of International Relations reflectivist-minded scholars have long begun to 
talk about how identity ‘mattered’.18 They quickly gained advantage over rationalist 
accounts of international politics which took identities as pre-given and never 
problematized them when analyzing the international game.19 Initially taken up by 
constructivists, who conceptualized national identity as a factor in defining interests and 
thus conditioning behaviour20, in the discipline of International Relations the theme was 
further elaborated by postmodernists and critical writers, who argued that identity was 
much more than a factor in analyzing international politics. It was, rather, the framework 
within which politics occurred.21 By fixing the meanings of political antagonisms (‘us’ 
16 The volume on Euroscepticism by Robert Harmsen and Menno Spiering (eds.), Euroscepticism: Party 
Politics, National Identity and European Integration (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi: 2004) offers an overview 
of the phenomena which illustrate this point. 
17 See for instance the argument put forward by Checkel on the way national governments are socialized into 
European norms on minority protection, Jeffrey Checkel, ‘Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in 
Contemporary Europe’, International Studies Quarterly 43 (1), (1999): 83-114. 
18 Wendt as a classic example: Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
19 Their explanations operated at the systemic level (anarchy) and its constraints, see John Vasquez, 
‘Neorealism and the Power of Power Politics’ in John Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics: from Classical 
Realism to Neotraditionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 197-202 
20 Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornel University Press, 1996). 
21 Groundbreaking in the field of international relations theory, and particularly foreign policy analysis, has 
been David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Minneapolis: 
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versus ‘them’), identity established the very limits of the worlds actors inhabited. In 
European Studies interest towards the theme of an emerging ‘European identity’ increased 
and started intervening with traditional neofunctionalist and intergovernmentalist 
accounts of integration which explained the European project in purely rationalist terms.22 
Reflectivist approaches started showing how the normative space created by European 
integration interfered with national spaces, providing new meanings to categories of ‘Self’ 
and ‘Other’ and ultimately changing the boundaries of established collective identities.23 In 
the field of Nationalism Studies contemporary approaches offered new insights into the 
place of national identity in the structure of the modern state system, which undermined 
mainstream views of nationalism as an extreme phenomenon only visible in times of 
extraordinary crises. Work appeared questioning the silently established division between 
‘good’ patriotic nationalism and ‘bad’ ethnic nationalism24, and re-examining nationalism’s 
conceptualization as a peripheral ideology of extremism. They provided convincing 
evidence that upholding nationalism as a state ideology legitimized on the basis of the 
Westphalian world order conditioned our thinking of the world of nations as the natural 
world.25 It is in view of these ideas and in the cross-section of the (sub-)disciplines of 
International Relations, European Studies and Nationalism Studies that this dissertation 
analyses national identity in Europe. 
University of Minnesota Press, 1998), applied to a particular Balkan context (Bosnia) in his later David 
Campbell, National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1998). 
22 Chapter II will further elaborate on this.  
23 Writings on those processes in the Nordic states: Hansen, Lene and Ole Wæver, European Integration and 
National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States (Routledge: London and New York, 2002), Christine 
Ingebritsen and Susan Larson, ‘Interest and Identity: Finland, Norway and European Union’, Cooperation and 
Conflict, 32 (1997): 207-222. 
24 Established in the classical works in the field Carlton J.H. Hayes, The Historical Evolution of Modern 
Nationalism (New York, Richard R. Smith, 1931), Hans Kohn, Nationalism: Its Meaning & History (Princeton: 
D. Van Nostrand, 1955). 
25 Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (Sage: London, 
1995), Craig Calhoun, Nationalism (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997), Umut Özkırımlı, Theories of 
Nationalism: a Critical Introduction (Oxford: Palgrave, 2000). 
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Figure 1. Research Problematique and Inter-Disciplinarity of the Dissertation. 
 
Discourse Theory and National Identity 
The conceptual and methodological frame of the analysis offered here is poststructuralist 
discourse theory. Transcending the limitations of rationalist accounts of national identity in 
politics, poststructuralist discourse theory offers stimulating analytical possibilities for 
fuller understanding of the political significance of national identity in European politics. By 
focusing on the systems of signification which condition the (re-)construction of social 
meaning, discourse theory demonstrates that identities emerge on the basis of excluding 
‘otherness’26. They are thus inherently divisive, necessarily relational, and contingent upon 
the dominant discursive systems. This conceptualization offers exciting new ways of 
approaching the above problematique.   
Discourse theory sees national identity as upheld by the hegemony of the discourse of 
nationalism, which was conditioned by political outcomes in 17th century Europe. National 
identity provided legitimacy to the organization of the political world into sovereign 
26 There is no other essence to subjectivity to be ‘rescued’ beyond  its relational positioning towards what it 
excludes, argues Chantal Mouffe in her ‘Citizenship and Political Identity’, The Identity in Question 61 
(Summer, 1992): 28-32, 28. 
International 
Relations Theory 
Conflict/ Reconciliation 
Nationalism 
Studies 
Nationhood/ 
Statehood 
Europeaniza 
tion Studies 
European identity/ 
European identities 
National 
Identity 
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nation-states, interpreting state power as emanating from the nation27. As other identities 
in discourse, its emergence was made possible through discursive articulations of 
difference based on relations between various discursive elements. Within the discursive 
formation28 of nationalism, difference was fixed along national borders. The ‘Self’-‘Other’ 
dialectic (re-)produced upon these divisions served the purpose of determining and over-
determining national identity but it also re-enforced the antagonistic potential of the 
divisions.29 Since this political organization of the international system remained 
unchallenged over a long period of time, national identities were gradually stabilized to 
appear natural and fixed.  
Discourse theory’s ontological frame proves particularly relevant for the study of national 
identity for three reasons. First, it demonstrates national identity’s contingent nature, 
addressing the inability of rationalist mainstream to explain its renewable salience. The 
assumption of contingency also reveals that national identities are not ‘fixed’ but are 
subject to re-negotiation and change, which addresses academic (and political, for that 
matter) uncertainty as to what to make of identity-based conflict.30 Second, by 
conceptualizing meaning as relational, discourse theory suggests that the constitution of 
identity is necessarily dependent upon a constitutive ‘Other’. This assumption offers an 
insight into the divisive potential of national identity. It also enables a fuller understanding 
of the logic of antagonization or reconciliation of national identities, depending on the 
particular interpretation of relations with the ‘Other’. By uncovering the mechanisms for 
re-construction of identities, discourse theory offers a valuable perspective on identity 
change. Third, by explaining the dynamics of articulating meaning through social 
antagonisms and struggles for power, discourse theory directly links the construction of 
27 ‘Nation’ here is used broadly to signify a community of people. Chapter II will focus in greater detail on 
how this community has been conceptualized.  
28 Michel Foucault, ‘The Order of Discourse’ in Robert Young, Untying the Text: a Post-Structuralist Reader 
(London: Routledge, 1981), 48-78. 
29 In this sense the ultimately arbitrary construction of national borders in turn began to shape the 
construction of the identities they encapsulated. Thus we can talk of multi-dimensiality of borders, see for 
instance David Newman, ‘The Lines that Continue to Separate Us: Borders in Our ‘Borderless’ World’, 
Progress in Human Geography 30, 2 (2006): 143-161, David Newman, ‘Borders and Bordering: towards an 
Interdisciplinary Dialogue’, European Journal of Social Theory 9, 2 (2006): 171-186.  
30 It discredits the idea that particular nations are simply more prone to conflict than others and sheds light 
on the political struggles which antagonized them.  
 
8 
 
                                                            
N. Nancheva                                                                                                                                        Transforming Identities in Europe 
identities to the realm of the political. In this way it addresses the biggest puzzle of 
rationalist accounts: a persistent relevance of national identity to (all) politics. 
Epistemologically, poststructuralist discourse theory also proves particularly suited for the 
analytical purposes of this dissertation, which investigates national identity change in the 
inter-section of three disciplines and from multiple perspectives. Conceptually drawing 
from a number of disciplines itself, discourse theory’s methodological frame easily 
accommodates the model of inter-disciplinarity which this study operates in. Discourse 
theory’s methodological emphasis on contextuality, on the other hand, permits 
approaching the object of analysis from various perspectives taking into account 
interactions on different levels, which promises a fuller understanding of the 
interpretation of national identity within the studied political contexts. This is what 
indicates the applicability of poststructuralist discourse theory as a unifying frame of this 
investigation. 
 
Nationalism and National Identity 
The general theme of this investigation is conflictual national identity: not nationalist 
conflict. The distinction is important both in view of the basic conceptual assumptions of 
the study and of its research goals. As a fundamental self-identification category linking 
the individual to sovereign power, national identity constructed in a conflictual fashion can 
be extremely dangerous. The necessary boundaries it demarcates between collective ‘Self’ 
and ‘Other’ become loaded with antagonistic potential, which leads directly to exclusion, 
the rhetoric of submission-domination, and violence. At the same time, the discursive 
construction of identity and the socio-cognitive process of self-identification do require the 
demarcation of boundaries between ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ and condition their inherent 
opposition. Thus, even in its most benign and inclusive formulations, national identity pre-
supposes the exclusion of an ‘Other’. This ever-present opposition precisely is what 
suggests national identity’s conflictual potential. It also makes national identity narratives 
relevant to even the most peaceful of nations.  
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Nationalist discourses thrive on national identity narratives. The systems of meanings they 
uphold are organized around stories of the nation. Relating key social categories to the 
story of the nation – interest, justice, legality, culture, custom – nationalist discourses link 
the social realm to individual experiences, making these categories familiar and intelligible. 
It is this ability of nationalist discourses to translate the foreign into the private which 
determines their powerful populist potential. Sustained by the institutionalized division of 
our political world into nation-states, it makes discourses of nationalism the habitual 
discursive space for the operation of politics.31  
This is why the dissertation did not select as its case studies states which have actually 
come into open conflict. They would have offered, indeed, extreme cases of nationalism. 
The investigation is interested instead in the conflictual potential of what Billig called 
‘banal’ nationalism: the nationalism of everyday politics which is not even called 
‘nationalism’ for it has been taken for granted ‘by every citizen of every state in the 
world’32. As Billig observes in the introduction to his study, gaps in political language are 
rarely innocent and ‘banal’ does not necessarily mean ‘benign.’33 Even though 
unnoticeable, this type of nationalism carries its conflictual potential and, given the 
circumstances, could politicize national identity and place it back on the security agenda of 
the state. This type of nationalism is implicitly propagated by every politician who speaks 
of the interests of ‘the nation’, claiming to act in its name. It is precisely the taken-for-
granted quality, the ‘banality’ of this political rhetoric that provokes interest in it.  
Taken up by students of contemporary Nationalism such as Craig Calhoun34 and Umut 
Özkırımlı35, this conceptualization has removed nationalism from the periphery of modern 
politics and placed it in its centre. Nationalism is not studied here as the exception to the 
rule. It is analyzed, quite to the contrary, as an integral element to politics, the fundament 
which enables the functioning of the modern state system. The division into national 
territories separated by borders, the assumption that they designate self-governed, 
31 This thesis is elaborately presented by Michael Billig in his Banal Nationalism (London: SAGE, 1995). 
32 Billig, Banal Nationalism, 5. 
33 Ibid., 6. 
34 Calhoun, Nationalism. 
35 Özkırımlı, Theories of Nationalism, also Umut Özkırımlı, Contemporary Debates on Nationalism: a Critical 
Engagement (Oxford, Palgrave, 2005). 
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internationally recognized living spaces of clearly defined nations, the significance of 
symbols of belonging such as national flags, anthems, emblems and names, the very 
language we use to speak of political events36, re-produce nationalist discourses in all 
defining features of political life, making them integral to our understanding of the world. 
This is why studying their powerful potential to antagonize national identities in everyday 
politics is essential to our understanding of politics but is also essential to understanding 
nationalist conflict. Exploring the mechanisms of neutralizing this potential, on the other 
hand, can prove indispensible to avoiding it.  
 
Europeanization and National Identity  
Unlike other social identities, national identity links the personal not simply to a social 
group but to the very organization of the political world, thus re-enforcing in a categorical 
manner its fundamental quality as source of collective self-identification. National identity 
also links the present to a story of shared past, positioning the individual as participant in a 
meaningful plot spanning through history and time. Attached to particular political and 
historical contexts, social subjects find themselves ‘entrapped’ within the boundaries of 
discourses upholding their stories of national identity. They are unable to challenge the 
discursive hegemony of nationalism from within. This is how national identity narratives 
begin to sediment and be taken for granted. Their intertwinement with the division of the 
political world into nation-states justifies this condition.  
The project of European integration was the first legitimate challenge in Europe’s modern 
history to the inevitability of this politico-legal organization. Born out of the horror of the 
worst international conflict the world had seen and the firm will to prevent its return to 
Europe, European integration was initially launched precisely as a pragmatic way to 
appease conflictual national identities. Devising a plan for mutual economic 
interdependence, it meant to reconcile defeated Germany with its neighbours by engaging 
36 Personifying states by using their capital names as actors, the presumption of an existing ‘we’ as opposed 
to a clear ‘they’ in public addresses, etc., as Billig, Nationalism, 46, 105 points out. 
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them into a common decision-making procedure and tangible economic bonds.37 
Modifying the notion of sovereignty in significant ways, the project created a form of 
supra-national government which shifted the focus of state politics, for the first time, from 
the national to the supra-national space (Figure 2). This inevitably affected the stories of 
national identity told in the participating states by transforming the ‘Self’-‘Other’ dialectic 
these stories (re-)produced. Its focus shifted beyond the boundaries of the nation-state 
traditionally separating the collective national ‘Self’ from ‘Other(s)’, and delineated a space 
of commonality between several nation-states. National identity narratives began to 
transform in order to make allowance for the states’ new roles in the Communities. The 
processes of Europeanization gradually generated a powerful discourse capable of 
accommodating many of the meanings articulated through national identity narratives, 
which had traditionally been sustained by the discourse of nationalism.38 This created the 
conditions of possibility for hegemonic empowerment of the former and partial dislocation 
of the latter.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Dynamics of Europeanization: Spatial and Temporal Shifts. 
The Europeanization project also implied another important political shift: it was designed 
to enable transcending national antagonisms of the past by harnessing political effort in 
the present and for the future. It emphasized the possibilities offered by the present and in 
the future, unlike nationalism which focused on past dependencies. Europeanization 
37 See historical overview and legal basis of the European Community at http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-
history/index_en.htm and http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm#founding. 
38 Membership in the Community meant being part of a unique identity on the international arena (Art.B of 
the Treaty on European Union), while at the same time the project provided institutional mechanisms which 
ensured that national identities of the member states were ‘respected’ (Art.F of the Treaty on European 
Union). 
Past Present & future 
Supranational 
space 
National spaces 
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discourse enabled the gradual depoliticization of historically determined antagonisms, 
which allowed their removal from the immediate political agenda of the state to the 
benefit of pragmatic politics and material interpretations of national interest.  
As its focus was in the future, Europeanization did not offer alternative interpretations of 
the past. It was therefore unable to challenge the powerful interpretations of nationalism. 
They remained part of the discursive spaces of national politics as elements of the national 
identity narratives. Every key step in the process of Europeanization continued to be 
influenced by them because it called for a renewed interpretation of the national interest, 
attached to narratives of identity: what we want is integral to who we are39. This is what 
prevented the dislocation of the discourse of nationalism from the discursive space of 
Europe. On the one hand, it remained always already relevant as interpreting part of the 
national story – the past. On the other hand, its deeply sedimented meanings were 
difficult to supplant by the novel interpretations of Europeanization. In times of crisis, 
national identity narratives in Europe can still all too easily revert back to conflictual 
interpretations of nationalism, despite their partial engagement by the European 
integration discourse.40 This is what stimulated the dissertation’s interest in exploring the 
mechanism of interaction between the discourse of nationalism and the discourse of 
Europeanization on interpretations of national identity narratives. This mechanism, it 
seems, is key to understanding the place of national identity in the European project, the 
dynamics of Europeanization, as well as the role of nationalism in it. It is what this 
dissertation sets out to investigate.  
 
Why Study Conflictual National Identity in ‘Europe’ from the  
Periphery of Europe?  
Discourses of nationalism and of Europeanization uphold national identity in profoundly 
different ways. Nationalism re-enforces difference along national lines while 
39 This is a classical constructivist thesis: a useful summary and references to key texts offers Michael Barnett 
in his chapter on Social Constructivism in John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, The Globalization of 
World Politics: an Introduction to International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 163. 
40 The ongoing discussion on how the current Euro crisis can be harnessed showcases precisely this dynamics.  
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Europeanization shifts its focus beyond them. Nationalism emphasizes the past while 
Europeanization focuses on the present and the future. The inevitable tension between 
the two grand discourses comes from their different foci in time and space, conditioning 
perpetual undecideability between the two. The largely successful course of European 
integration for the first decades of its lifetime significantly empowered and stabilized 
Europeanization discourse. But every new step towards deepening and widening 
integration required re-articulation of the central meanings upholding the discourse, which 
temporarily challenged its stability. In times of change, the ever-recurring relevance of 
nationalism unremittingly threatened the hegemony of Europeanization. The discursive 
power of nationalism came from its interpretation of national identity narratives, whose 
central elements – purpose, interest, role, responsibility – were also signifiers of 
Europeanization.  
No greater change had confronted the logic of Europeanization than the fall of the ‘Iron 
Curtain’ in Europe and the prospect of enlargement towards the former communist space. 
A major new phase of integration (marked significantly by the establishment of the 
European Union in 1992) caught up with the prospect of enlargement (marked by the 
former communist states’ ambitions to (re-)turn to Europe) and created a context of 
utmost uncertainty for the future of the European project.41 
The uncertainty was caused not only by the technical difficulties in re-writing the founding 
institutional framework, evidenced by the consistent attempts for legislative reform of the 
Amsterdam Treaty (1997), the Nice Treaty (2001), the abandoned project for a 
Constitutional Treaty (2004) and the subsequent Lisbon Treaty (2007). Uncertainty was 
also caused by the fact that the candidate states were so different from the core members. 
Yes, Europe had admitted before states emerging out of democratic transitions during the 
so called Southern Enlargement to Spain and Portugal. But it had never admitted states 
which were undergoing such fundamental processes of complex transition not only to 
41 See, for instance, Didier Bigo, ‘When Two Become One: Internal and External Securitisations in Europe’ in 
Michael Williams and Morten Kelstrup (eds.) International Relations Theory and European Integration: 
Power, Security and Community (London: Routledge, 2000), 171-205 
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democracy, but also to market economy, to consolidating statehood and to re-thinking 
nationhood.42 Nor had it ever enlarged to such a large number of states at a time.  
The task of dealing with difference proved a difficult one for the Europeanization 
discourse. Unable to readily accommodate it within its discursive boundaries without 
major re-writing of its founding texts, it saw its ‘hegemony’ challenged from within, as well 
as from without. On the one hand, the stable attachment of the notion of integration to 
the overall benefits from it came under question. Divergent interpretations of the signifiers 
of national interest in the different member states began to detach from the discourse of 
Europeanization. They became available, ‘floating’43, which enabled competing 
articulations of meaning, significantly within the discourse of nationalism which 
traditionally dominated the interpretation of national interest. On the other hand, the 
community of nations which the Europeanization project claimed to represent was 
challenged from outside its borders. The emergence of its previous ‘Other(s)’, the ‘non-
European’ part of Europe, as prospective members dramatically contested the image of 
the European ‘Self(ves)’. This put additional stress on the relation between the idea of 
integration and the formulations of national interest, and shifted political focus back to the 
well established ‘Self’-‘Other’ boundary demarcated by national spaces, thus re-enforcing 
nationalist discourse. It also brought forward the debate on the future course of 
integration, problematizing many aspects of it.44  
Empowered by these changes, nationalism re-appeared as a political agenda. Though often 
implicitly, it challenged the hegemony of the European discourse and threatened to 
dislocate it, if it did not manage to accommodate the new interpretations of the key 
42 On the complexity of the transitions in South-Eastern Europe see the theses of ‘triple’ (Claus Offe, 
‘Capitalism by Democratic Design?’ Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe’, 
Social Research 58(4), (1991): 865-881) and ‘quadruple’ transitions (Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of 
Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996)), also Taras Kuzio, ‘Transition in Post-Communist States: 
Triple or Quadruple?’ in Politics 21(3), (2001): 168-177. 
43 In the term established by Claude Lévi-Strauss, see Jeffrey Mehlman, ‘The “Floating Signifier”: from Lévi-
Strauss to Lacan’, Yale French Studies 48 (1972): 10-37. 
44 Divergent visions of ‘Europe’ in effect questioned normative aspects of the integration process which had 
not been completely stabilized discursively, see Marchus Jachtenfuchs, Thomas Diez and Sabine Jung, 'Which 
Europe? Conflicting Models of a European Political Order', European Journal of International Relations 4 (4), 
(1998): 409-445. 
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signifiers of role, purpose, responsibility, interest, within its contours.45 This prompted re-
thinking of the original idea of integration in light of the new political realities. The failed 
ratification of the Constitutional Treaty (2005) is evidence for the ‘soul-searching’ which 
accompanied this process. So, it was from the periphery of Europe that the successful 
accommodation of conflictual national identity was challenged. It is of key importance 
then to analyse the way Europe relates to its periphery in view of articulating national 
identity, in order to fully understand the current dynamics of European integration and the 
sense of belonging to and participation in the European project of the individual states.  
 
National Identity Narratives in Bulgarian-Macedonian Relations 
Motivated by the belief that the way Europe deals with its former ‘Other(s)’ can become 
the touchstone of the European project, this study investigates Europeanization in the 
Balkans, a region habitually thought of as the periphery of Europe. 46 It explores the 
transformations of (conflictual) national identity narratives in Bulgaria and Macedonia. It is 
specifically interested in the way conflictuality evolves along the lines of Bulgarian-
Macedonian relations during the process of empowering the ‘Europe’47 discourse in the 
two states. Structured by nationalist interpretations of national identity deeply 
sedimented in dominant historical narratives in both states, Bulgaria and Macedonia 
experienced a type of cold conflict which completely blocked their relations for the best 
part of the 1990s. Formulating their desire to become part of the European space as an 
45 The term of dislocation is used here as per Laclau and Mouffe’s notion, central to their conceptualization 
of hegemony, see Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics (London: Verso, 1985). 
46 The assumption of ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ within Europe is not novel. Taking up an element of Wallerstein’s 
‘World-System Theory’ and postulating a driving ‘North’ and a lagging ‘South’ as the European integration 
fault line, it has been extensively theorized in economic, security, and other aspects of Europeanization 
Studies. See Martin Rhodes (ed.), The Regions and the New Europe: Patterns in Core and Periphery 
Development (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), also  Ole Wæver, ‘Aberystwyth, Paris, 
Copenhagen. New ’Schools’ in Security Theory and their Origins between Core and Periphery’, paper 
presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association (Montreal: 17th March 2004), 
etc. The divisions between ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ in Europe is visible again in the current fiscal crisis, when 
the ‘South’ is seen as failing and in need of assistance, whereas the North-West is portrayed as arrogant and 
restrictive.  
47 ‘Europe’ used here to designate the discourse upheld by the idea of the common European home which 
lies in the heart of the integration process. It therefore is directly linked to the process of Europeanization 
(narrowly defined as EU-ization) and will be used interchangeably with it henceforward in this study.  
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overall strategic goal, however, the two states subscribed to the ‘Europe’ discourse and 
enabled gradual marginalization of conflictual interpretations of identity perpetuated by 
nationalism’s hegemony. In this sense they showcase the interaction between discourses of 
nationalism and of Europeanization in their interpretations of national identity. This is the 
principal subject of this study. Exploring this interaction in the two case studies, the 
dissertation aims to uncover the discursive mechanisms of reading national identity by 
comparing and contrasting key elements of it displayed in the two states.  
Looking at national identity narratives, the analysis operates at the level of the state. It 
conceptualizes national identity as a source of collective self-identification at state level, 
even though ‘nation’ and ‘state’ signify different things.48 The constitutive role of 
nationalist discourse in the construction of the modern international system justifies such 
conceptualization. Traditionally, national/state identity has been upheld primarily by the 
nationhood narratives. In this sense, the stories of the collective national ‘Self’ as opposed 
to the national ‘Other(s)’ have been realigned with narratives of statehood, re-enforcing 
the divisive role of state borders between different national spaces. European integration 
challenged this realignment by transforming the purpose and role of state borders. But 
calling into question the boundaries between different national spaces, Europeanization in 
effect increased the political relevance of the ‘Self’-‘Other’ dialectic along national lines – 
by placing it back on the current political agenda. This politicization emphasized the 
divisive potential of national identity and uncovered the inherent tension between the 
grand discourses of nationalism and of Europeanization in its interpretation. The outcome 
of this tension, as will be argued here, has the potential to ultimately determine the course 
and dynamics of the integration project. This dissertation suggests that the progress of 
European integration depends on the credible reading of national identity narratives.  
By exploring the transformations of national identity narratives structuring bilateral 
relations between Bulgaria and Macedonia in the course of Europeanization, the analysis 
sets out to establish the place and the function of national identity in the discursive space 
of ‘Europe’. What it observed is reduced conflictuality of national identity narratives linked 
48 More will be said on this in Chapter II. 
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to establishing a discursive space of commonality over the two formerly conflictual 
national spaces. This observation suggested two things. First, that Europeanization has the 
potential to re-tell the national stories in a reconciliatory manner, marginalizing 
conflictuality as an illegitimate political strategy. Second, that in doing so, Europeanization 
ensures its own political relevance as a hegemonic discourse. The task of this study is to 
explore these suggestions by uncovering the mechanisms of accommodation of national 
identity narratives within the discourse of Europeanization. This research goal has been 
motivated by an analytical interest in the possibility of transcending identity-based 
conflictuality in Europe, which could ultimately determine the future of the integration 
project.  
 
National Identity Narratives and the Hegemonic Struggle between Nationalism 
and Europeanization 
Despite the perception of ‘return’49 of national identity to European politics after the 
break-up of communism, narratives of national identity never left Europe’s discursive 
space. As noted above, European integration was originally conceived as a means to 
reconciling conflictual national identities antagonized by aggressive nationalism. 
Conflictual interpretations of national identity upheld by nationalist discourse had caused 
two world wars and had profoundly compromised nationalism as an ideology of the state. 
European integration was thought up to provide an alternative. It captured key signifiers 
from the national identity narratives and positioned them into a new context, re-
interpreting their contents. The foundation of this new context was shared national 
interest: a key element in the construction of national identity. Initially viewed as purely 
economic and limited to integrating three specific industries, it gradually evolved into 
other areas such as the single market50, justice and home affairs51, border control52. 
49 This is the context which national identity was habitually placed in as an object of academic enquiry in the 
early post-communist years, particularly against the  background of ethno-national conflict in the 
disintegrating Soviet and Yugoslav federations, see Ted R. Gurr, ‘Peoples against States: Ethnopolitical 
Conflict and the Changing World-System’, International Studies Quarterly 38(3), (1994): 347–77. 
50 With the Single European Act in 1986. 
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Pursuing shared interest re-produced the similarities which it had been based on and 
gradually created a space of commonality marked by common institutions, norms and 
practices. Their operation articulated unified meanings attached to social reality, bringing 
closer together narratives of national identity of the participating states. The 
establishment of the common space, therefore, re-formulated categories of ‘Self’ and 
‘Other’ at state level. It opened up national spaces to non-members, emphasizing 
commonality of identity, which gradually re-defined the meaning of ‘otherness’. Upholding 
more inclusive narratives of national identity, European integration pushed the boundary 
between ‘Self’ and ‘Other(s)’ beyond the limits of the national spaces towards the borders 
of the Community. With its coming into being, however, this common discursive space 
challenged existing notions of nationhood and statehood.  
On the one hand, it problematized the limits of the national space. No longer demarcated 
by state borders, its delimitation became much more arbitrary. Facilitating everyday 
interaction between different national identities at state level did help normalize the 
presence of ‘otherness’, while the pursuit of common interest marginalized identity 
differences and reproduced identity similarities. But at the same time this dynamics 
subverted established national identities precisely because it blurred the boundaries 
separating them. This prompted re-thinking of national identity narratives, bringing them 
back to the political agenda, in the meanwhile re-activating nationalist discourse which 
had traditionally upheld them. This outcome was also greatly facilitated by the political 
interpretation of the common European space as upholding a common European identity 
antagonistic to national identity. The subversive effects of such interpretation on the 
future of integration are illustrated by the emerged platform of euro-scepticism. 
Propagated by movements and political parties from all EU member states, it 
instrumentalized the notion of national interest to call for securitization53 of national 
identity and justify anti-integrationist policies. Britain’s reluctance, for instance, to commit 
51 Initiated as early as 1975 with the TREVI forum established at the European Council summit in Rome, 
which evolved into the Maastricht’s Union pillar of Justice and Home Affairs. 
52 Cooperation started in 1985 with the signing of the Schengen agreement, which was later to be 
incorporated into the acqui communautaire with the Amsterdam Treaty.  
53 In the conceptualization of the Copenhagen School, see Barry Buzan et al., Security: a New Framework for 
Analysis (London: Lynne Rienner, 1998). 
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to major communitarian undertakings could be defeated only through creative 
articulations of ‘Britishness’ and assurances that this would be given priority along every 
step of the integration process.54 Conflictually positioning European identity against 
national identity only re-enforced the political precedence of the latter, thus destabilizing 
the discourse of Europeanization upholding the emerging European identity. This created 
the conditions of possibility for a renewed hegemony of the discourse of nationalism. 
On the other hand, the common discursive space created by European integration 
challenged traditional notions of statehood. Unlike other regional organizations, the 
European Community (later the European Union) was referenced55 by identity markers 
similar to those characteristic of a state. Most prominently, they included sovereignty in 
certain areas (specified by the states and transferred by them to the Community), common 
borders (demarcated by the territories of an increasing number of participating states), 
legislation (which had supremacy over national legislations and was directly applicable in 
the national legislative space). In this sense the supranational structure established by the 
integration project took over important functions of the state and carried them out at the 
supra-national56 level. This posed a challenge to the Westphalian international order 
guaranteeing the sacrosanctity of state sovereignty57. And because modern statehood had 
traditionally been organized on the basis of nationhood, supranational government also 
problematized narratives of nationhood, whose embeddedness in the discourse of 
nationalism renewed its political relevance.  
The above reveals the basis of the inherent tension between the grand discourses of 
nationalism and of Europeanization, generated by their divergent interpretations of 
national identity. The prospect of enlargement of the European Community to the former 
communist states dramatically increased this tension. Faced with the task of having to 
54 John Major’s speeches on ratification of the Maastricht Treaty are an example par excellence, see for 
instance John Major, Commons Statement on the Maastricht Treaty – Social Policy Protocol (made in the 
House of Commons on 22nd Jul 1993), http://www.johnmajor.co.uk/page1302.html. 
55 Identity as a ‘frame of reference’,  Yves Surel, ‘The Role of Cognitive and Normative Frames in Policy-
Making’, Journal of European Public Policy  7 (4), (2000): 495-512 on the role of normative and cognitive 
frames in policy-making. 
56 I.e. supra-state level. 
57 For references, e.g. Andreas Osiander, ‘Sovereignty, International Relations and the Westphalian Myth’, 
International Organization 55, (2001): 251-287. 
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accommodate its previous ‘Other(s)’, European political space saw a resurgence of 
nationalist rhetoric. At the same time the normative fundament of European integration 
interpreted enlargement as an imperative. This represented a major test to the stability of 
the Europeanization project as it required re-writing of the founding treaties and triggered 
a process of re-thinking of key signifiers of the Europeanization discourse: ‘interest’, 
‘purpose’, ‘responsibility’, ‘Self’, ‘Other’. This complex re-arrangement exposed the original 
logic of accommodation of national identity into the Europeanization project, revealing the 
delicate balance which had been found between commonality and difference in Europe. 
The renewed political salience of nationalist interpretations of identity threatened this 
balance by securitizing difference58 and increasing national identities’ conflictuality. 
Therefore, the discursive stability and the political relevance of the project of European 
integration depends very much on its ‘reading’ and re-interpreting of national identity 
narratives and accommodating them in the common discursive space of ‘Europe’. A 
credible reading of national identity can restore the balance between commonality and 
difference within the discursive contours of ‘Europe’ and stabilize them. Having accounted 
for the empowerment of the discourse of Europeanization in the first decades of 
integration, this can also determine its prospective hegemony or marginalization (and 
eventual dislocation) in favour of nationalism. European Union’s enlargement towards the 
former communist space offers a context for investigating these problems.  
 
The Logic of Reading National Identity within the Discourse of ‘Europe’ 
The central claim of this study has been formulated on the basis of the above assumptions. 
Empowering the discourse of Europeanization has the potential to offer a credible reading 
of national identity. By modifying the meaning of central identity signifiers, 
Europeanization can accommodate national identity narratives in a reconciliatory manner, 
upholding an optimistic, emancipatory vision of the national ‘Self’. The discursive space of 
commonality which Europeanization upholds interprets national identity in inclusive terms, 
decreasing the relevance of national/state borders as divisive lines between ‘Self’ and 
58 The term implies ‘problematizing’ and placing on the political agenda. 
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‘Other’ and transcending the limits of past dependency. Europeanization interprets the 
national ‘Self’ in a positive, self-enhancing manner as belonging to a supra-national 
community focused on the optimistic possibilities of the future. It thus enables the 
marginalization of conflictual interpretations of identity, which in turn re-enforces the 
discursive hegemony of ‘Europe’ as a grand discourse and ensures the political relevance 
of integration. The discursive logic of interaction between the divergent readings of 
national identity can be seen as linear (Figure 3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Nationalism, Europeanization, and Reading National Identity – Logic 1. 
 
The first three stages (A to B, B to C, C to D) of the process suggested in Figure 3 are 
illustrative of the historical evolution of the European project. The fourth stage (D to E1) 
describes an ongoing condition which has not yet been stabilized. It is hypothetical and 
suggests one possible outcome (E1), which can ensure the progress of the integration 
project. 
Should Europeanization discourse fail to offer a credible reading of national identities 
narratives, it could become vulnerable to dislocation. National identities’ inherent 
divisiveness could be re-enforced by traditional nationalist interpretations, which could 
renew the political relevance of the discourse of nationalism and could lead to discursive 
marginalization of Europeanization. This logic suggests that the interaction between the 
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discourse of Europeanization and the discourse of nationalism can also be of a circular 
kind, as illustrated in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4. Nationalism, Europeanization and Reading National Identity – Logic 2. 
 
The first three stages (A to B, B to C, C to D) of the cycle suggested in Figure 4 are the same 
as described in Figure 3. The fourth stage (D to E2) is also hypothetical. It should occur if 
Europeanization fails to provide a credible reading of national identity narratives. This 
outcome could lead to renewed political relevance of the discourse of nationalism, 
traditionally dominant in interpreting national identity, which could seriously destabilize 
the discursive power of ‘Europe’. Should the Europeanization discourse be successfully 
dislocated, then going back to the beginning of the cycle (A to B) would be highly 
problematic because the historical constellation which enabled it originally could not 
repeat itself.  
These logics take us back to the relevance of the subject of study and research goals of this 
dissertation. An analytical interest in the process of transcending identity-based 
antagonisms in Europe and the future of integration leads to investigating the readings of 
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national identity within the discourse of Europeanization. Exploring Europeanization’s 
mechanism of capturing central identity signifiers from the discourse of nationalism and 
re-articulating their contents opens an analytical avenue for assessing its potential to offer 
a credible reading of national identity. It also uncovers the inability of nationalist discourse 
to uphold non-antagonistic politics, thus pointing to the political advantages of 
Europeanization’s hegemony as a grand discourse. Understanding national identity 
accommodation within Europeanization, therefore, promises to reveal a lot about the 
future of both nationalism and Europeanization in Europe. Studying the discursive 
mechanisms of accommodation of national identity narratives from Europe’s periphery 
showcases the hegemonic struggle between the two grand discourses in a region – the 
Balkans – which in the post-communist period witnessed empowering both. Selecting 
identity narratives from two largely peaceful Balkan states – Bulgaria and Macedonia – 
reflects the understanding that nationalist discourse needn’t have culminated in war to be 
politically unsettling. Its divisive potential can antagonize politics even when it takes place 
in formal international peace. Investigating the discursive effects of Europeanization 
discourse therefore also promises to shed more light on the functioning of European 
politics as an enterprise of the European national states.  
 
Analytical Plan of the Dissertation 
In setting out to do this, this dissertation is divided in two main parts. Beside the 
introductory chapter, Part I contains three further chapters laying out the theoretical and 
meta-theoretical framework of the analysis. Part II is also made up of four chapters 
presenting the empirical investigation and its findings. The final part of the dissertation 
contains the concluding chapter which aims to apply the analytical argument to the 
empirical outcomes, summarize and synthesize the achieved, and point to the future 
research agenda which this analysis opens. 
Chapter II takes up the key concepts which the analysis works with – national identity, 
nationalism, Europeanization, conflict and reconciliation, political change. It looks to see 
how they have been theorized in relevant academic literature and to establish where the 
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current investigation stands in relation to existing academic work. Positioning 
poststructuralist discourse theory as the analytical frame promising fuller understanding of 
national identity and its centrality in the European project, Chapter II fixes the main 
reference points which sustain the conceptual scaffolding of the dissertation. 
Building upon these, Chapter III unfolds the central claim of this study within the unifying 
frame of discourse theory. It starts by laying out the key tenets of discourse theory which 
have been operationalized into the analysis, and proceeds to highlight the advantages – as 
compared to other more traditional perspectives – which make it a suitable approach to 
the studied problematique.  The chapter then demonstrates how discourse theory is 
applied to develop the specific argumentative structure of the dissertation. The final 
section of this chapter focuses on the novelty of the particular approach adopted in the 
investigation and its key research contributions. 
Chapter IV presents the methodological skeleton of the dissertation. Its purpose is to 
clarify the methodological steps which enabled the investigation. It discusses the 
advantages of comparative analysis, the analytical basis upon which the case studies have 
been selected, and the comparability of the cases they offer. The chapter then introduces 
discourse analysis as the key methodological tool of the analysis, offers justification of the 
research design of the investigation carried out, and explains the methods used to collect 
and select empirical data and to compare and contrast the findings. 
Chapter V is the first from the empirical part of the dissertation. Its purpose is to map out 
the discursive contexts which structured the studied cases – the selected narrative units – 
at the beginning of the analysed period. The chapter discusses the specific historical 
constellation which re-activated nationalism as hegemonic discourse but also points to the 
political conditions which challenged this hegemony and opened its discursive space to 
alternative – ‘European’ – interpretations. On the one hand this chapter relates to the 
building of the argument and the justification of the research cases: it presents the 
hegemonic struggle between two grand discourses over the meaning of a central 
discursive element – national identity. On the other hand Chapter V relates to the 
empirical investigation because it presents the dominant discursive contexts which shaped 
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the meaning of the studied narratives.  In this sense the chapter functions as the link 
between the two parts of the dissertation. 
Chapter VI, VII and VIII contain the empirical investigation. The analysis selects six narrative 
units as its cases and explores their modifications in the two case studies over the specified 
timeframe. The narrative units are selected on the basis of their salience: they are 
narrative groups containing key stories of national identity told at the level of the state, 
and are identifiable in both states. Conceptualizing the identity building dynamics as 
discursively positioning the collective national ‘Self’ against ‘otherness’, the analysis 
conditionally splits it in two narrative streams: narratives predominantly occupied with 
determining the discursive position of ‘Self’, and narratives predominantly focused on 
determining the discursive position of ‘Other’. Fixing their meanings in the perpetual over-
determination of subject positions, these two narrative streams produce the ‘Self’-‘Other’ 
dialectic which upholds collective identities. On the basis of these assumptions, the 
investigation selects three narratives of the first type and three narratives of the second 
type. The narratives of ‘Self’ are thought of as more stable and less prone to modification, 
which is why they are studied over a longer period of time. They are investigated in 
Chapter VI – at the beginning of transition – and in Chapter VIII – towards the end of 
transition. The comparative analysis of the two case studies helps highlight and understand 
the identified modifications within the narrative units. The narratives of ‘Other’ are more 
dependent on the political factors which condition state behaviour – such as intensified 
relations with a particular state or group of states. This is why they are analyzed in the 
context of bilateral relations and in the chronological sequence in which they gain 
prominence. The analysis traces modification within and across the unit, before moving on 
to the next narrative group. Since they follow the chronological evolution of bilateral 
relations, these narratives have been grouped together in one chapter – Chapter VII.  
Having identified modifications in the studied narratives, the analysis summarizes them 
and synthesizes them in order to draw conclusions. Applying the analytical frame of the 
investigation to the findings, Chapter IX aims to demonstrate how these findings relate to 
the central argument: Europeanization has the potential to offer a credible reading of 
national identity narratives, which can stabilize the discursive hegemony established with 
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the project of European integration by transforming the divisive function of national 
identity in European politics. The chapter concludes by highlighting the original research 
contributions of the dissertation as an outcome of the completed analytical and empirical 
work, and pointing to their possible application to future research.  
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND DEFINITIONS:  
NATIONAL IDENTITY CHANGE IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONALISM AND EUROPEANIZATION 
 
This dissertation offers an inter-disciplinary approach to investigating the place of national 
identity in Europe and understanding the discursive dynamics of identity change, 
examining a particular aspect of Balkan politics. It operates at the intersection of the study 
of International Relations, Nationalism Studies and European Studies, determined by their 
interest in national identity. National identity is thus the pivotal point of the analysis, 
organized around which are the other key concepts: nationalism, Europeanization, conflict, 
reconciliation, change (Figure 5).  
 
                                          Europeanization 
conflict              national identity change              reconciliation 
                                            nationalism 
 
Figure 5. Studying National Identity in Context: Key Concepts. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to review academic literature on national identity in Europe 
and the questions it raises, as well as to lay out the definitional framework for the 
concepts of nationalism and Europeanization and the way they have been academically 
approached so far. Highlighting theoretical possibilities and limitations in existing research, 
the chapter presents this dissertation’s conceptualization of national identity. Thinking 
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about national identity from a discourse theoretical perspective reveals the process of 
identity change in Europe as a struggle between the hegemonic discourses of nationalism 
and Europeanization. The dominant meanings eventually attached to the narratives of 
identity within the discursive system determine national identity’s coordinates along the 
axis of conflict and reconciliation. Analyzing identity change from this perspective is also 
relevant to the literature on conflict and reconciliation. This chapter demonstrates how.  
 
The Concept of National Identity 
The notion of ‘identity’ has been a much analyzed concept in a broad range of academic 
disciplines: 59 as John Shotter observes, it has become the ‘watchword of the times’.60 
Drawing on psychology’s and sociology’s significant insights, especially social identity 
theory61 and identity theory62, identity has widely been conceptualized as a socio-cognitive 
category which comes into being through socio-cognitive processes of self-identification 
and categorization and has different salience63 depending on the social roles it designates. 
These traditional ways of seeing social identity established the idea that identity is 
predicated upon membership in a group which one falls into or feels one belongs to64. 
Thus it outlines simultaneously both the links and the boundaries between the individual 
and the social. Even this reltively uncontroversial conceptualization reveals identity as 
59 Rogers Brubaker and Federic Cooper, ‘Beyond Identity’, Theory and Society 29 (1), (2000): 1-47 on the 
various meanings the concept of identity has across the academic disciplinary spectre. 
60 John Shotter, The Cultural Politics of Everyday Life (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1993), 188; see 
also Astrid von Busekist, ‘Uses and Misuses of the Concept of Identity’, Security Dialogue 35 (1), (2004): 81-
98, problematizing this condition (‘everything today is a question of ‘identity’, 81). 
61 Originally formulated by Henri Tajfel (Henri Tajfel, Human Groups and Social Categories  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981) but also Henri Tajfel (ed.), Social Identity and Intergroup Relations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982)), further developed by Michael Hogg and Dominic Abrams, 
Social Identifications (London: Routledge, 1988), Donald M. Taylor and Fathali M. Moghaddam, Theories of 
Intergroup Relations (Westport: Praeger, 1994), etc.  
62 E.g. Peter Burke, ‘The Self: Measurement Requirements from an Interactionist Perspective’, Social 
Psychology Quarterly 43 (1980): 18-29, Ralph Turner, ‘The Role and the Person’, American Journal of 
Sociology 84 (1978): 1-23. 
63 The likelihood that the identity will be invoked in diverse situations, see George McCall and Jerry Simmons, 
Identity and Interactions (New York: Free Press, 1978), Sheldon Stryker, ‘Identity Salience and Role 
Performance: The Importance of Symbolic Interaction Theory for Family Research’, Journal of Marriage and 
Family 30 (1968): 558-64, Mary Wiley, ‘Gender, Work, and Stress: The Potential Impact of Role-Identity 
Salience and Commitment’, Sociological Quarterly 32 (1991): 495-510. 
64 Michael Hogg, Deborah Terry and Katherine White, ‘A Tale of Two Theories: A Critical Comparison of 
Identity Theory with Social Identity Theory’, Social Psychology Quarterly 58 (4), (1995): 255-269. 
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inherently divisive: it enables the division of the social world between ‘Self(ves)’ and 
‘Other(s)’. This is what pre-conditions its conflictual potential, as will be discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter III. As Mole synthesizes in the introductory chapter to his edited 
volume on the discursive constructions of identity in European politics, identity outlines 
‘who we are or are perceived to be’ and where we ‘locate ourselves’ in the social world 
with regard to others, either as individuals or groups.65 This formulation, which points to 
the subjective, relational and contingent quality of identity articulation, has served as a 
reference point in forging the conceptualization of national identity in this dissertation.  
National identity increased its academic relevance in view of understanding identity-based 
conflict66 and the politics of aggressive nationalism. Following the conceptualization of 
social identity in general, national identity has customarily been treated as another type of 
collective identity. It is also predicated upon membership in a social group – the nation – 
as a source of collective self-identification. Thus, as per Mole’s definition, it outlines who 
‘we’ are as a nation and where ‘we’ locate ourselves in the world of nations. This 
understanding is useful in that it highlights the centrality of the concept of ‘nation’ in 
upholding national identity. But since the political relevance of nations and nationhood has 
traditionally been investigated within the study of nationalism, it is this academic field 
which has established the dominant framework for analysis of national identity.67 This has 
left an imprint on the mainstream take on national identity: its salience has been 
associated with aggressive nationalism as the traditional object of analysis of Nationalism 
Studies. As shall be argued below, such conceptualization of national identity overlooks 
significant aspects of its political relevance.  
Within the study of nationalism, the central clash has been that between primordialists (or 
essentialists) and modernists (or constructionists), divided by their different ontological 
approaches to seeing the nation68. Primordialists see nations as organic communities 
65 Richard Mole (ed.), Discursive Constructions of Identity in European Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007), 3. 
66 In IR theory usually referred to as ‘ethno-political conflict’. 
67 The habitual connotational usage of the terms ‘nationalism’ and ‘national identity’ in the same context 
confirms this.  
68 Various authors have classified views on nationhood along these lines, for a good overview see e.g. Umut 
Özkırımlı, Theories of Nationalism, e.g. 5-8. 
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united by shared culture, history and biology formed over centuries of common past. This 
conceptualization, characterizing most of the earlier scholarship on nationalism, treats the 
nation as an objective phenomenon and analyzes it scientifically as the basic human 
community that has survived through history.69 The idea that nations can be reified and 
studied as an objective phenomenon has quickly been put to doubt by more contemporary 
studies questioning the credibility of the nationhood narratives and suggesting that 
nations, just as all other social categories, are constructed and their study should focus on 
identifying the social practices and contexts which called them into existence.70 Ethno-
symbolists, represented prominently by Anthony Smith, have attempted to respond, 
claiming that even though modern nations are constructed, they have stable historical 
roots in the ethnic communities (‘ethnies’) providing the ‘myths, memories, values and 
symbols’71 as the basis of commonality necessary for the formation of nations. Though 
elaborately laid out, this argument fails to provide convincing theoretical justification for 
seeing the category of ‘ethnies’ as less constructed than that of ‘nations’.72 Modernist 
conceptualizations, on the other hand, claim that nations are a product of modernity and 
their ancient histories have been constructed by political élites as a means to various 
political aims. These ‘constructionist’ conceptualizations, however, do not address the fact 
that, even though the idea of the constructed nature of nations has more or less been 
generally established in today’s social sciences, the social groups that they reify are still 
treated as real by their members and still constitute the basis for political agency.73 These 
issues have opened the way for alternative approaches to theorizing the nation and 
studying national identity, one of the most challenging of which is through discourse.  
The discursive conceptualization of national identity refers in many ways to a piece of 
academic work which first appeared in the early 1980s and significantly changed the way 
69 Representative for this approach is Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (Basic Books: New York, 
1973), or Pierre Van der Berghe,. 'Race and ethnicity: a sociobiological perspective', Ethnic and Racial Studies 
1 (4), (1978): 401-411, as well as Pierre Van der Berghe, The Ethnic Phenomenon (New York: Praeger, 1987).   
70 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983), Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), in the Marxist vein Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  1990). 
71 Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 15. 
72 The omission noted by Mole in Mole (ed.), Discursive Constructions of Identity, 7. 
73 As Mole observes, ibid., 8. 
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nations and nationalism had been studied: Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities. 
Claiming that nations are ‘imagined’74, since its members were convinced of each other’s 
allegiance to the community without knowing even a small number of its representatives, 
raised important questions about their social construction as a community. What made 
the ‘imagining’ possible, according to Anderson, was the development of printing and the 
consequent standardization of vernacular languages, which offered profoundly new ways 
of communication and identification. Radically transforming the power relations, this 
created common discursive spaces demarcated by standardized languages.75 Establishing 
the link between the political community of the nation and standardized language is 
significant. People have always spoken in different ways. But the idea that languages are 
different across specified territorial units is, perhaps, the first of the ‘invented 
permanencies’76 which allowed the division of the world into a world of nations. 
Moreover, printed standardized language established the means of communication for 
large groups of people, enabling them to share their stories of who they are and where 
they stand with regard to others, thus perpetuating the narratives of their collective 
subjectivity and forging the stories of nationhood.  
If nations are ‘imagined communities’, then national identity is also ‘imagined’. It is not 
determined by ‘real’ circumstances or objectifiable reference points. Within mainstream 
interpretations of nationhood, many authoritative definitions have attempted to establish 
the various elements which identify the nation as a human collectivity in order to 
determine national identity’s fundament. Smith lists historical territory, common myths 
and historical memories, common mass public culture, common legal rights and duties, 
common economy.77 Bloom stresses the importance of internalized national symbols.78 
Hall underlines the significance of national culture.79 Rennan elaborates on the elements 
74 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 6. 
75 Ibid., 36-37. 
76 As per Billig’s original phraseology (Billig, Banal Nationalism, 29). On nations and languages, see also Billig, 
ibid., 13-36. 
77 Anthony Smith, National Identity (Penguin Books: London, 1991), 9-14. 
78 William Bloom, Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), 52. 
79 Stuart Hall (ed.), Questions of Cultural Identity (London: Sage, 1996), 612. 
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of remembering and forgetting in forging the story of the nation.80 In this vein of thought 
even Karl Deutsch’s witty remark on the ‘common error about ancestry and common 
dislike of neighbours’ could designate elements uniting the group.81 In their attempts to be 
thorough in establishing what defines the nation, however, many students of nationalism 
(from the primordialist and the modernist schools alike) commit an analytical error which 
plagues the field to this day. As Brubaker observes in his 1994 work on rethinking 
nationhood, they ‘adopt categories of practice as categories of analysis’82. They take ‘a 
conception inherent in the practice of nationalism and in the workings of the modern state 
and state-system [...] namely the reifying conception of nations as real communities’ and 
make it central to the theory of nationalism.83 Although Brubaker makes the point within 
his critique of the ‘substantialist’ (or realist) view of the nation and goes on to question 
that, he actually uncovers a weakness that is also common to constructionist 
conceptualizations studying the role of agency in constructing the meanings of 
nationhood. This weakness is namely the focus on defining nations and reifying national 
identity. Focusing on the material dimensions of nationhood is missing the point. After all, 
the story of the nation can be imagined out of anything and people with the same ethnic 
origins can have different ideas about their nationhood. The same is true for analyses 
attached to misleading notions of agency. Despite the unquestionable role of élites in 
articulating the meanings of nationhood, it is not élites who make people believe that 
dying for their fatherland is dulce et decorum84. It is this powerful imperative which 
suggests that national identity cannot be theorized simply as one type of social identity 
among many. 
Critical analyses, on the other hand, do not attempt to define national identity itself. 
National identity is ‘not a thing, it is not a particular psychological condition, nor is it an 
80 Ernest Renan, ‘What Is a Nation?’, Homi K. Bhabha (ed.), Nation and Narration (London: Routledge, 1990), 
11 – forgetting as a ‘crucial element in the creation of nations’, a form of ‘collective amnesia’. 
81 Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Its Alternatives (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1969), 3. 
82 Rogers Brubaker, ‘Rethinking Nationhood: Nation as Institutionalized Form, Practical Category, Contingent 
Event’, Contention 4 (1), (1994): 3-14, see also, Rogers Brubaker, ‘The Manichean Myth: Rethinking the 
Distinction Between 'Civic' and 'Ethnic' Nationalism’ in  Hanspeter Kriesi et al., Nation and National Identity: 
The European Experience in Perspective (Zurich: Ruegger, 1999), 55-71. 
83 Brubaker, Rethinking Nationhood, 5. 
84 In Horace’s immortal words, poeticized by Wilfred Owen after the First World War. Wilfred Owen, The War 
Poems of Wilfred Owen/ edited and introduced by Jon Stallworthy (London: Chatto & Windus, 1994). 
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inward emotion’85. It is rather a way of thinking and talking about the ‘Self’, which upholds 
the discourse essentializing the division of the world into nations, and it is a way of being 
within this world of nations.86 National identity can thus be thought of as a collection of 
narratives which inhabit a particular discursive space. This discursive space has customarily 
been demarcated by borders encapsulating the nation into the state and essentializing the 
historical invention of the nation-state as the organizing unit of the political world. By 
focusing on the meanings attached to the narratives of national identity, critical analyses 
set out to uncover the mechanisms of establishing the powerful discourse which structures 
our world in a hegemonic manner: the discourse of nationalism.  
A discursive approach reveals the ontological peculiarity of national identity as a form of 
collective self-identification87. As Billig observes in his study of everyday nationalism, ‘if we 
think of national identity as equivalent to any other form of identity, then we overlook the 
historical particularities of nationalism and its links to the world of nations.’88 Indeed, it 
seems obvious that the human individual has recourse to a series of collective identities: a 
person can be simultaneously British, of Caribbean descent, mixed-race, male, 
heterosexual, Christian, an entrepreneur, an immigrant and a music-lover. Obviously again, 
these group identities do not have the same personal significance: an individual is rarely 
willing to die for their profession or hobby but it is conceivable that they are for their 
nation or, say, religion. This suggests that even though simultaneously available, group 
identities are organized hierarchically and have different salience. At first glance, the 
salience of national identity may seem deceivingly unimportant: in the globalized world of 
today the stories of the nation may pass unnoticed and unacknowledged. But even when 
not invoked on a daily basis, these stories always remain in the background because the 
discourse they are part of binds the social individuals in many powerful ways, both legal 
and cultural, to the political world they inhabit. Unlike any other identity, even the most 
85 Billig, Banal Nationalism, 60. 
86 Billig formulates this observation with reference to critical approaches to theorizing identity, see John 
Shotter and Kenneth Gergen (eds.), Texts of Identity (London: Sage, 1989), Kum-Kum Bhavnani and Ann 
Phoenix, ‘Shifting Identities, Shifting Racisms: an Introduction’, Feminism and Psychology 4, (1994): 5-18. 
87 Mole distinguishes between ‘identity’ and ‘identification’ in order to include the notion of agency in the 
construction of identity (ibid., Chapter 1). Acknowledging this approach as useful, this dissertation adopts a 
different definition of identity and uses the two terms interchangeably.  
88 Billig, Banal Nationalism, 65. 
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salient ones such as gender, race, religion, national identity links the individual to the 
essentialized order of the political with bonds that are pre-given and cannot be individually 
renounced. Structuring the basic meanings upon which all other discourses operate, the 
discourse of nationalism upholds national identity as a background to all other sources of 
self-identification. This is what determines its profound effects on human life. But being 
‘imagined’, at the same time, national identity needs to be perpetually determined and 
over-determined in order to appear natural and stable. Within the discourse of 
nationalism, stability is achieved through categorical acts of exclusion denying the 
contingent nature of the ‘national’ world. Thus national identity is necessarily antagonistic: 
it perpetuates the tension between the national ‘Self’ and its constitutive ‘Other(s)’ in 
order to exist. A discursive approach has the potential to reflect these peculiarities, being 
able to account for the ever recurring salience of national identity as a source of collective 
self-identification, to explain its binding relevance to the realm of the political, and to 
theoretically address its conflictual charge. 
 
The Discourse of Nationalism 
Approaching the phenomenon of nationalism from a discursive perspective also proves 
particularly apt for understanding its peculiarities. It allows transcending rationalist 
conceptualizations of nationalism as violent ideology of nationalist conflict and reveals 
nationalism’s role as upholding the dominant modern ideology of the state. Studying 
nationalism through a discursive perspective promises to overcome the limitations of 
traditional approaches and to offer a fuller understanding of its political relevance.  
Nationalism has long been a subject of scientific enquiry. The term ‘nationalism’ 
(Nationalismus) is ascribed to Herder and his philosophy of history89. Rooted in the 
programme for human emancipation of the Enlightment90, nationalism became a 
legitimate political project with the French Revolution. Upholding the idea of popular 
89 Frederick Barnard, Herder’s Social and Political Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967). 
90 Rousseau and Kant (see Victor Gourevitch (ed.) Rousseau: ‘The Social Contract’ and Other Later Political 
Writings (Cambridge, Camridge University Press, 1997), Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on 
Politics, History and Morals (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983)). 
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sovereignty, the Revolution asserted for the first time the claim that the legitimacy of the 
state is determined by its people. The intellectual effort to conceptualize the people as a 
community led to the idea of a ‘nation’ as a natural fact. Embodied by German 
romanticism and French naturalism, nationalism is first theorized as an integrative 
movement of identifying the nation as a cultural community and unifying it as a territory.91 
Establishing the link between nation and territory is a key tenet of nationalism and one 
that highlights its recurring political relevance. After the Westphalian peace, territory in 
Europe was ascribed to sovereign states. Their borders demarcated physically and 
politically inviolable spaces with equal standing before the law. Re-thinking sovereignty as 
stemming from popular will (rather than divine right) ‘populated’ these spaces with 
communities of like-minded people92 and the idea of nations came to personify them. 
Treating nations as objective realities on the other hand justified this arrangement and 
gradually essentialized it. The factual discrepancy between the ‘natural’ national 
communities and existing state borders was addressed by mobilizing movements of 
disruptive nationalism, which characterized the best part of the 19th century in Europe.  
The period marked by the two world wars prompted a new conceptualization of 
nationalism as an ideology of aggression. Building up on the idea of the constructive, state-
building function of nationalism of the previous century, 20th century scholars contrasted it 
to the destructive aggressive nationalism which had caused the wars. This duality in seeing 
nationalism characterizes key academic work from the period. Carlton Hayes speaks of 
patriotism and nationalism.93 Hans Kohn differentiates between civilized and barbarian 
nationalism.94 Louis Snyder contrasts ‘old’ nationalism and ‘new’ nationalism.95 
Conceptualizing the dichotomy of nationalism placed historical and geographical limits to 
the phenomenon which were largely arbitrary. The implied ethical superiority of one type 
of nationalism over the other established clear hierarchies between different nations, 
91 Fichte, Herder, Michelet, Renan (see Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Addresses to the German Nation (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), Herder, ibid. emphasizing the ethnic dimension of nationalism, Jules 
Michelet, History of the French Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008) emphasizing the civic 
dimension of nationalism, also Renan, ‘What Is a Nation?’). 
92 Because they had presumably expressed the same will to be governed. 
93 Hayes, The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism, Hayes, Nationalism: A Religion. 
94 Kohn, Nationalism. 
95 Louis Snyder, The New Nationalism (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1968). 
 
36 
 
                                                            
N. Nancheva                                                                                                                                        Transforming Identities in Europe 
justifying politics of ‘legitimate’ domination. Moreover, the dichotomy suggested that one 
type of nationalism is peaceful and liberating, while another is aggressive and subjugating. 
This is problematic because it overlooks the fact that nationalism’s antagonistic potential 
comes from the necessary acts of exclusion, without which identifying the contours of the 
nation would be impossible. In this sense, all types of nationalism are antagonistic. Yet 
another problem with these conceptualizations is their assumption of pre-existing nations, 
which ignores the constitutive effect of the concept of the nation-state over the notion of 
the nation. Treating nations as ‘natural’ contains a pre-supposed assumption about the 
political world, structuring it an ideological manner, which should be theoretically 
acknowledged. Nevertheless, nationalism scholarship from this period makes certain 
conceptual advances which are still relevant. Kohn conceptualizes nationalism as a 
sentiment, a ‘state of mind’, referring to and pertinent in politics. In this way he suggests 
its significance in linking the personal to the political96. Snyder expands on the 
dichotomous conceptualization and identifies seven categories of nationalism97, thus 
opening the way to problematizing the dichotomy all together.   
Interest in the subject of nationalism, understandably, subsided with the rise of 
communism. Taking up key assumptions of Marxist social theory, Trotsky and Lenin re-
worked them into an alternative state ideology challenging the legitimacy of the nation-
state. The Cold War and the bloc opposition which it established globally diverted political 
attention to international politics, marginalizing the national problematique and 
nationalism. Key contribution from this period is modernization theory’s conceptualization 
of surging nationalist movements in the world periphery98 as protest against Western 
domination and exploitation.99 This approach perpetuated the arbitrary dichotomy of good 
and bad nationalism but its novelty, establishing the relation between capitalism and 
96 Kohn, Nationalism. 
97 Unifying the historical dimension with geographical: European-fissiparous, African-black, Asian-
anticolonial, Middle Eastern politico-religious, Latin American-populist, Soviet Union-messianic, the United 
States-‘melting pot’ nationalism) in Louis Snyder, The New Nationalism. 
98 Africa, Asia, Latin America, as per Lenin’s idea of world ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ developed into Wallerstein’s 
world-systems theory (see Immanuel Wallerstein, the Modern World-System (New York, Academic Press, 
1974).  
99 Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (NY: Free Press of Glencoe, 
1964), Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: an Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966). 
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peripheral nationalism, opened up the way for theorizing nationalism as a modern 
phenomenon.  
Prompted by the decline of communism, the 1980s ushered in new scholarship on 
nationalism which differed in method, scale and quantity100. Referenced prominently by 
the work of John Breuilly101, Ernest Gellner102, Benedict Anderson103, and Eric 
Hobsbawm104, it outlined the modernist view of nationalism which to a large extent made 
previous scholarship obsolete105. Most significantly, it problematized the assumption of 
nationalism as primordial attachment to the natural entity of the nation. It theorized the 
nation as a by-product of modern conditions (the decline of former centres of authority 
such as the church and the feud, the invention of printing, industrialization and the rise of 
capitalism, etc.) and confirmed its recent appearance and contingent nature. In other 
words, nationalism was now seen as neither inherent in human nature, nor deep-rooted in 
history.106 It was conceptualized as a political project of modernity, which managed to 
embody its key dialectic – the tension between differentiation and integration107, as well 
as its key markers – state formation, democratization, capitalism, intellectualization of 
culture108. This conceptualization accounted for the vast typology of nationalisms, 
depending on the particularities of the processes of modernization109. Most importantly, 
by renouncing the primordial ties of nationalism, it enabled imagining a world without it. 
Indeed, an analysis of nationalism in the context of globalization seemed to promise its 
gradual decline.110 Centring the analysis on the Western hemisphere, however, modernist 
scholars were largely unable to transcend the normative implication of ‘failed’ modernity 
100 As B.Anderson reflects in retrospect in the preface to his second edition of Imagined Communities. 
101 John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982). 
102 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983). 
103 Anderson, Imagined Communities. 
104 Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1788. 
105 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 2nd ed., xii. 
106 See for instance Youssef M. Choueiri, Arab Nationalism: a History. Nation and State in the Arab World 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000). 
107 Gerard Delanty and Patrick O’Mahony, Nationalism and Social Theory (London: Sage, 2002), 35. 
108 Delanty and O’Mahony, Nationalism and Social Theory, 9. 
109 Listed among the types of nationalism are state patriotism, liberal nationalism, reconstructive, integral, 
irredentist, secessionist, cultural, religious, transnationalism, etc, see Delanty, ibid., 120. 
110 Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1788. 
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when theorizing nationalism in the developing world111 and do not offer convincing 
explication of what the key similarity is between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ nationalisms. Entrapped 
within their analytical framework of rationality, modernists were also puzzled by the 
recurrent relevance of ‘bad’ nationalism not only to the periphery but to the very core of 
the ‘West’. Thinking of nationalism simply as a political project112, they fail to factor in the 
link between the personal micro-level and the political macro-level which national identity 
signifies. Furthermore, modernists link nationalism to a reified image of the nation, even 
though they theorize it as ‘imagined’. Their project of appeasing conflicting nationalisms, 
therefore, focuses on the material dimension of conflict and does not address its 
underlying drive of irrationality. These deficiencies raised criticism and called for re-
thinking of mainstream conceptualizations of nationalism.   
Within the wider criticism of modernity raised by critical theory, and poststructuralist and 
postmodernist approaches in the social sciences, the study of nationalism was dramatically 
challenged because of its traditional embeddedness in positivist ontologies and its 
traditional aspiration to epistemological rationality. Uncovering the constraining effects of 
dominant discourses as totalizing systems of meaning113 over political reality and our 
knowledge of it, these approaches suggest new ways of theorizing the role of the state, 
power relations and social control.114 They uncover the mechanisms for establishing 
hierarchies of domination through appropriating hegemonic control over social 
meanings115: the meanings of nationhood, of belonging, of responsibility, of otherness. In 
the heart of this conceptualization is postpositivist epistemology of subjectivism assuming 
the detachment of social meaning from objective reality116. Thus, the idea of nationhood 
as ‘imagined’, already put forth by modernists, was further developed into a thorough 
111 E.g. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism. 
112 Breuilly, Nationalism and the State. 
113 This approach to seeing ‘discourse’ follows Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on 
Knowledge (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). 
114 Ben Agger, ‘Critical Theory, Poststructuralism, Postmodernism: Their Sociological Relevance’, Annual 
Review of Sociology 17 (1991): 105-131. 
115 Foucault’s seminal works on punishment (Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison 
(New York: Random House, 1995)) and sexuality (Michel Foucault, The Will to Knowledge: the History of 
Sexuality (London: Penguin Books, 1998)). 
116 Baudrillard calls it ‘hyper-reality’ – simulated reality created by symbols of mass consumption which 
people fail to recognize as simulated, see Jean Baudrillard, Simulations (New York: Semiotext(e), 1983). 
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conceptual framework of seeing national identity and its elements as subjective and 
contextual. Poststructuralists also reveal the central role of language in constituting social 
reality, meanings and subject positions, which suggests that any relevant understanding of 
social phenomena, such as nationalism, should start from studying the language used to 
speak of them.117 Postmodern studies of nationalism, therefore, focus on nationalist 
rhetoric and the meanings it articulates in order to establish the contours of the nation. 
This completely reverses the logic of previous conceptualizations which started from 
studying the material dimensions of nationhood and attempted to work out its meaning 
upon this basis. Rejecting totalizing perspectives on knowledge, students of nationalism 
working in the postmodern vein did not produce any one general theory of nationalism. 
They maintain that one can only tell ‘small stories’ about the world from the heterogenous 
‘subject positions’ of individuals and social groups.118 This epistemological fragmentism 
they have been criticized for. Operating on both micro- and macro-levels and from 
multiple perspectives, however, postmodern scholarship on nationalism has offered ways 
to transcend many of the limitations of mainstream approaches, such as their Westo-
centrism, their preoccupation with typologies, their inability to account in a convincing 
manner for the fluctuating salience of national identity, their intimidation by the mobilizing 
power of nationalist rhetoric.  
It is on this challenging conceptual background that the dissertation conceptualizes 
nationalism. Nationalism is treated here as a totalizing grand discourse119 which emerged 
and was empowered within the historical constellation that led to the political 
organization of the world into nation-states. The hegemony of this grand discourse is 
maintained by the stability of the signifiers which uphold it: the idea of popular 
sovereignty, the constitution of the populus as a nation, the objectification of nationhood, 
the attachment of nationhood to statehood, the inviolability of nation-state’s sovereignty, 
etc. The meaning of social reality is established within this totalizing system, so any subject 
117 This is the link between language and ‘its other’, which Derrida speaks of, see Jacques Derrida, Margins of 
Philosophy, translated by Alan Bass (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982), also Jacques Derrida, Positions, 
translated by Alan Bass (London: Athlone, 1981).  
118 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition. 
119 Not much unlike Lyotard’s conceptualization (and criticism) of Marxism as per Agger, ‘Critical Theory, 
Poststructuralism, Postmodernism’. 
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position or social identity will be meaningful only within it. The centrality of the 
nationhood signifier in the hegemonic discursive structure and its function as a source of 
self-identification determines the special status of national identity among all other social 
identities. As any discursive system, however, nationalism should be seen as contingent 
upon the historical circumstances which enabled its emergence, and vulnerable to the 
political forces which its empowerment excluded. Therefore, a new historical constellation 
brought to existence by these forces could challenge its hegemony. This would depend on 
the successful articulation of alternative meanings of the upholding signifiers. The grand 
discourse of Europeanization attempted to do just that.  
 
The Discourse of Europeanization 
The theory on the concept of Europeanization is immense, as the notes below suggest. 
This dissertation makes use of the term as a discipline when discussing the place of 
national identity in Europeanization literature and makes references to it as a political 
project when naming the process of European integration. The analysis also makes 
observations on the term as a political phenomenon when discussing the way 
Europeanization has affected the political salience of national identity. This threefold 
usage of the term ‘Europeanization’ has been so overwhelming in academic literature that 
it has prompted authors to speak of ‘the many faces of Europeanization’120 and 
‘Europeanization [...] as a problem’121. It is not surprising then that defining the concept of 
Europeanization has not been particularly straightforward. 
Since it is more or less unproblematic what Europeanization as a discipline analyzes and 
what Europeanization as a political project represents, the difficulty must come from 
conceptualizing Europeanization as a political phenomenon. Most definitions of 
Europeanization as phenomenon make reference to the notion of change.122 But they also 
120 Johan Olsen, 'The Many Faces of Europeanization', Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (5), (2002): 921-
52. 
121 Claudio Radaelli, 'Europeanization: Solution or Problem?', European Integration Online Papers 8 (16), 
(2004) at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-016a.htm. 
122 Kevin Featherstone and Georgios Kazamias, Europeanization and the Southern Periphery (London: Frank 
Cass Publishers, 2001), Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (eds.), The Europeanization of Central 
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raise a series of problems. The immediate problem that follows concerns the dynamics of 
the definition: whether we should define Europeanization as the process of change or the 
causal result thereof. The implications of each variant are different. In the former case any 
response to the forces of change will still constitute Europeanization, while in the latter 
Europeanization will be only convergence. A further specification is needed here: whether 
the results are reversible or not. In this case we are discussing the quality of the invoked 
change: some analysts add the adjective ‘structural’ to qualify it.123 Another problem in 
defining Europeanization is the level of analysis: whether we discuss phenomena at the 
supra-national level, the state level or the sub-state level. Again, the implications of each 
lead us to different research approaches, different research foci, and ultimately, different 
research results. This point is to address the proliferation of various ‘top-down’ and 
‘bottom-up’ approaches measuring compliance, socialization and convergence in the 
functioning of the European institutions or in the domestic institutional practices. A fourth 
problem arising from attempting to define Europeanization is the scope of the definition. 
One aspect of it is whether we treat Europeanization as an internal phenomenon to the 
members of the European Union or as a phenomenon that could also concern the states 
that are linked in one way or another to it (candidate members, associated members, 
neighbour states, etc.). Although some analysts do include non-member states in their 
studies of Europeanization,124 most authors exclude states that are not closely linked to 
the EU as candidate members. Another aspect of the definitional scope problem is where 
we look for the sources of Europeanization: are we just talking about the effects of the EU 
enlargement and the EU integration process, or do we also consider the potential that 
European international organizations such as the Council of Europe or the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe might have for invoking change.125 
and Eastern Europe (Cornell University Press, 2005), Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli (eds.), The 
Politics of Europeanization (Oxford University Press, 2003), Vivien A. Schmidt, ‘Europeanization and the 
Mechanics of Economic Policy Adjustment’, European Integration Online Papers 5 (6), (2001) at 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2001-006.pdf. 
123 Featherstone and Kazamias, Europeanization and the Southern Periphery, Featherstone and Radaelli, The 
Politics of Europeanization. 
124 For instance, Featherstone and Kazamias, Europeanization and the Southern Periphery, in their third 
dimension of Europeanization.  
125 Even though thinking of Europeanization only in terms of the effects caused by the process of EU 
integration is obviously a EU-centric view that overlooks the identity of the non-participating European states 
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It is obvious that there are many aspects of the Europeanization phenomenon which need 
to be taken into consideration in order to agree on a thorough definition and thus 
establish a clear basis for any research attempt. Students of Europeanization from 
different schools have necessarily had to leave out certain aspects of it, depending on the 
research perspective they start from. In the field of International Relations theory, the 
main clash has been that between realists, liberalists and constructivists. As the dominant 
paradigm during the period witnessing the first steps towards integration in Europe, 
realism conceptualized the reasons behind the inception of the European project, the 
formulation of its founding treaties and the actual functioning of its institutions, in terms 
of its limiting understanding of national interest and its dominant focus on anarchic 
environment. Starting from this intellectual fundament, neofunctionalist126 and 
intergovernmentalist127 theories of European integration provided much more detailed 
accounts of the integration dynamics. Even though they remained within the rationalist 
camp, neofunctionalists addressed the self-fulfilling intertia generated by the originally 
controlled processes of integration, thus clearing the way for the claim that the European 
project is more than a peculiar intergovernmental initiative. Diverting analytical attention 
from the regional to the global context and focusing on domestic rather than international 
politics, liberal intergovernmentalists128 added new insights into understanding the 
phenomenon of Europeanization by exploring state behaviour. The profound changes 
which the end of the Cold War brought to Europe, however, could not be easily 
accommodated by rationalist accounts of integration. Neither could be the opening up of 
the Europeanization project towards the former communist states and the re-thinking 
which it required. Despite the convincing attempts of realists to explain the changes 
and the commonality between them and the rest of Europe, it is the approach adopted by this research 
project. This limitation is necessary in terms of the project’s analytical goals and research interest: studying 
the interactions between narratives of nationhood and the Europeanization discourse in view of the place of 
national identity within the integration project and its future. 
126 Taking Mitrany’s functionalist ideas, Ernst Haas develops these into an integral theoretical perspective, 
see Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950–1957 (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1968). 
127 See as a reference point Stanley Hoffmann, ‘The European Process at Atlantic Crosspurposes’,  Journal of 
Common Market Studies 3 (1964): 85–101, also Stanley Hoffmann, ‘Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the 
Nation State and the Case of Western Europe’, Daedalus 95 (1966): 862–915. 
128 Building up on Hoffmann’s theses, Moravcsik’s ideas are mostly associated with this approach, see 
Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (New 
York: Ithaca, 1998). 
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occurring both within and outside the EU as a result of political interest and political 
conditionality, an increasing number of constructivist accounts started demonstrating that 
there was a very powerful normative aspect to the process of Europeanization which 
defied realist explanations.129 Both norm entrepreneurship on behalf of the EU and norm 
compliance on behalf of the applicant states represented political positions that could not 
be grounded in the simple logic of consequences, but seemed to be governed by a logic of 
appropriateness. But while constructivists produced compelling analytical insights into the 
normative dimension of Europeanization, they remained analytically constrained by the 
presumed duality between objective and subjective reality, between the consequential 
and the appropriate. Moreover, their perspective in explaining normative change 
remained consistently élite-centred, which prevented them from producing convincing 
accounts of the powerful popular narratives of euro-enthusiasm and euro-scepticism 
capable of enabling or disabling political action. This left constructivist scholarship 
analytically vulnerable. It was more radically critical approaches to studying European 
politics, which dissociated their analyses from epistemological rationalism, that could 
address this vulnerability in a convincing manner. Reflectivist accounts of Europeanization 
aimed to demonstrate that the distinction between ‘interest-driven’ and ‘norm-driven’ 
behaviour is analytically futile. Actors are bound by the discourses which structured the 
meaning of their identities and cannot transgress their limits. So the contents of all 
categories they instrumentalize should be analyzed as contingent upon these discourses 
and within their contextual frames.  
This dissertation treats the phenomenon of Europeanization, much like the phenomenon 
of nationalism, as a grand discourse. Europeanization also emerged in the context of a 
particular historical constellation. The devastation of the post-war period and the traumas 
left by Nazism gave rise to the idea of ensuring peaceful coexistence through mutual 
interdependence beyond traditional forms of cooperation and laid the foundations of 
European integration. Unlike the discourse of nationalism, Europeanization did not re-
produce the centrality of the signifier of nationhood, even though it made allowance for it. 
129 See for an overview of this argument Jeffrey Checkel, ‘Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in 
Contemporary Europe’, International Studies Quarterly 43 (1), (1999): 83-114 or Jeffrey Checkel, ‘Social 
Construction and Integration’, Journal of European Public Policy 6(4) Special Issue (1999): 545-60. 
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Most significanlty, it modified the contents of the signifier of sovereignty, detaching it from 
the domain of the nation-state and articulating it as a negotiable category. It took over the 
notion of popular sovereignty but attached it to a community of populi, transcending the 
limits of the nation. Consequently, within the discourse of Europeanization the narratives 
of national identity were re-worked to ‘reveal’ shared past (Christianity, secular statehood, 
intellectualized culture) and predict common destiny on the basis of the values which 
these narratives upheld (‘interest’, ‘responsibility’, ‘rule of law’, ‘liberal democracy’, 
‘market economy’, ‘human rights’, etc.). In this sense, the discourse of Europeanization 
captured key signifiers of nationalism and rendered them with modified meanings, 
changing the way the national stories were told. This provided the conditions of possibility 
for the dislocation of the discourse of nationalism in Europe. Sovereignty, however, was 
only partially modified and the nation-state continued to prerogatively dispose of it. This 
perpetuated the political relevance of the national narratives and prevented the actual 
dislocation of nationalism. Even though the community of the ‘European’ states was 
positioned as a subject, trivial collective affiliation remained with the nation-state. The 
nationhood narratives might have been updated but their historical sedimentation was not 
questioned. This is why the challenge Europeanization posed to the hegemony of 
nationalism was only partial. The chronological longevity of the latter furnished it with 
precedence over meaning.  
As demonstrated above, the discursive conceptualization of ‘Europeanization’ agrees with 
the general definitional line which sees Europeanization as ‘change’: a change in the 
established discursive order. Its perpetuation and over-determination involves a 
continuous process of hegemonic articulations between the subjects and objects that are 
part of the discourse at the supranational, national and sub-national levels. As a result of 
these articulations, meanings are constantly re-defined. A discursive conceptualization of 
‘Europeanization’ therefore also implies that change is never qualitatively irreversible: the 
hegemony of a discourse rests upon a necessary exclusion of other political options, which 
always constantly threaten it with subversion. In this sense the empowerment of 
Europeanization could always be reverted to either give way to a renewed hegemony of 
nationalism or to an alternative totalizing discourse. This is why studying the divergent 
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interpretations of national identity narratives as central discursive elements promises to 
shed light on the power of the Europeanization discourse in Europe.  
This analysis has been ultimately inspired by the possibility for marginalization and 
eventual dislocation of the discourse of nationalism. Taking into account its historical 
contingency, however, and the foreseeable inability to transcend the political context of 
the nation-state, the dissertation does not attempt to study this possibility. Instead, it 
focuses on the empowerment of Europeanization within the context of hegemonic 
nationalism. Setting out to uncover the mechanisms of accommodation of the central 
signifying element of the hegemonic discourse – national identity – the current piece of 
research attempts to establish the possibility for co-existence of the two discourses. In a 
different historical constellation, such co-existence might enable a world without 
nationalism.  
 
Conflict and Reconciliation 
The possibility looks desirable because of the strong association of nationalism with 
violence, aggression and conflict. This association was established historically during the 
era of world war and Germany’s war-prone ethnic nationalism. It was re-enforced by the 
belligerent justification in all participating states. The Ottoman and Habsburg empires 
went to war to block state-subverting ethnic nationalism.130 Their defeat asserted the 
cause of ‘national self-determination’ through war: one of the proclaimed principles of 
liberal democracy.131 The Western Allies went to both wars precisely to defend liberal 
democracy but the idea of liberal democracy was inextricably linked to the Western form 
of civic nation-states, upholding a notion of civic nationalism. Against the background of 
more immediate threats and a different type of antagonism during the Cold War, the link 
between nationalism and conflict was briefly released. Civic nationalism became the 
Western norm, while ethno-nationalism began to seem redundant with decolonization. 
With the end of the bloc opposition, it became clear that nationalist conflict had not 
130 John Breuilly’s overview in Baylis, Smith and Owens, The Globalization of World Politics, 404. 
131 See Woodrow Wilson 14 Points at http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=62. 
 
46 
 
                                                            
N. Nancheva                                                                                                                                        Transforming Identities in Europe 
remained in history. The disintegration of the communist federations witnessed a 
resurgence of state-subverting ethnic nationalism, while the consolidation of statehood in 
the newly independent states called up state-strengthening civic nationalism (which, 
however, was based on monolithic ethnic identities).132 The politicization of ethnic identity 
as legitimating the nation-state saw the demarcation of a new type of fault lines around 
the issue of ethnic minorities. Exploding in war and ethnic cleansing in parts of former 
Yugoslavia133, intra-state conflict based on ethnic nationality reminded the international 
community of the violent potential of nationalism.  
The viciousness of these new ethno-national conflicts within the state prompted vivid 
academic interest in theories of conflict,134 and produced abundant new scholarship on 
conflict and conflict reconciliation. This profoundly changed the way we understood 
conflict: Mary Kaldor conceptualized a new type of warfare displacing the old wars and 
called for a cosmopolitan political response to it.135 The current investigation does not aim 
to contribute directly to this body of literature. It is concerned with conflict based on 
ethnic nationality to the extent that it investigates the conflictual potential of national 
identity. But since these new wars were waged on the basis of antagonized national/ 
ethno-national identities, the conclusions reached here will be also, indirectly, relevant to 
the literature on conflict and conflict reconciliation.  
 
‘Europe’ and Political Change 
In as much as this study investigates the interactions of the discourses of nationalism and 
Europeanization in their different interpretations of national identity and the political 
consequences of each, it is concerned with political change. Particularly along the axis of 
conflict and reconciliation, where current analytical interest lies, the change this 
dissertaion attempts to identify is transcending conflictuality. As discussed above, the 
132 The distinction between state-subverting and state-consolidating nationalism as per John Breuilly’s 
overview in Baylis, Smith and Owens, The Globalization of World Politics, 408. 
133 And elsewhere in the world, e.g. Rwanda. 
134 One of the most discussed new conceptualizations by Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and 
the Remaking of the World Order (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1999). 
135 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars (Stanford University Press, 2007). 
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European integration project was designed as a means to transcending conflictuality 
caused by antagonistic interpretations of national identity. During the first decades of 
integration, Europeanization was largely successful in achieving this goal. This is how 
special emphasis was laid on its ability to induce change. In academic literature on 
Europeanization this ability has extensively been analyzed in terms of conceptualizing an 
emerging European identity. Writings on the subject can be divided in two broad groups.  
The first one includes those analysts who forebode the fading of allegiances to the nation 
as a result of the progress of integration, and the gradual shifting of collective allegiances 
from the nation-state towards the supranational construct of Europe, creating a common 
European identity. This common identity is conceptualized to provide the political 
legitimacy needed for the future development of integration in Europe.136 Analysts in this 
group base their claims on two predicates. On the one hand, they establish the limitations 
of the nation-state in living up to the challenges of globalization: increasing 
interdependence between states in dealing with global issues and in pooling resources, 
massive immigration flows transforming previously compact populations, compromised 
sovereignty at the expense of responsibility to protect137, etc. On the other hand, analyses 
in this vein point to the successful functioning of the integration project (shared 
institutions, legal framework and political culture) and the natural long-term effects from 
it. Impeccably logical and most authoritative representation of this approach can be found 
in Habermas’ argument on the future of the nation-state in the era of globalization.138 
Analyzing the potential of supranational regimes such as the EU to succeed where nation-
states have failed, it argues that the emergence of a supranational (here, European) 
identity is the natural consequence of the institutionalization of supranational democratic 
procedures through a slow historical process, not unlike the one that established the 
legitimacy of the nation-state itself. In his defence of cosmopolitanism, Habermas insists 
that such an identity should be based on a civic sense of belonging (persons as citizens), 
136 Even though ‘there’s hardly more confused and polysemic a topic in European affairs as identity’, for a 
useful reference point to it, see Furio Cerutti and Sonia Lucarelli, The Search for a European Identity: Values, 
Policies and Legitimacy of the European Union (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), 3. 
137 Rooted in Butros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace and formally recognized in 2001 in a report by the same name 
of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.  
138 Jürgen Habermas, The inclusion of the Other, Studies in Political Theory (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998). 
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perhaps underestimating the pervasive political relevance of national, ethno-national, and 
ethno-religious identities. His belief in the democratic nature of the supranational 
government, too, could be criticized as unreasonably optimistic. In any case, the link 
between establishing European citizenship and developing European identity has provoked 
significant academic interest in exploring the political aspects of collective belonging.139 
Slightly different research in this vein, sceptical of the potential of a political identity to 
provide plausible collective allegiance in the long term, has focused on the commonality of 
cultural identity, suggesting that the ambivalence between the institutionally established 
identity of Europe (as the EU) and the non-institutionalized cultural identity of the ‘real’ 
Europe is inevitable but actually productive because it ensures its constant reciprocal 
determination.140 In general, though, accounts of an emerging European identity, 
theorized as a sense of supranational collective belonging capable of replacing allegiances 
to the nation-state, have had one weakness in common. They have proven vulnerable to 
the questions raised by the salience of national identity, the increased number, and the 
new types of ethno-nationalist conflicts. They have also not been able to account for the 
effects of the very processes of globalization continually bringing to Europe its antithetical 
‘Other(s)’ and constantly subverting the fixation of the notion of an established collective 
‘Self’.  
A second group of academic research on Europeanization and change has formed around 
those analysts who have been more sceptical about the emergence of a common 
European identity. Various studies from a broad spectrum of epistemological approaches 
have attempted to detect the existence of such common identity, to define it and even to 
measure it. An interesting example of the quantitatively oriented analyses of this kind is 
the joint project of Sifft et al., who establish ‘segmented Europeanization’ in public 
139 Thomas Faist, The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social Spaces 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), Beatrice Hansen, Critique of Violence: Between Poststructuralism and 
Critical Theory (London: Routledge, 2000), Jo Shaw, “Citizenship of the union: towards post-national 
membership?”, Jean Monnet Working Paper 6(97), (1997) at  
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/01/011401.html, Antje Wiener, ‘Making sense of the new 
geography of citizenship: Fragmented citizenship in the European Union’, UNSPECIFIED, Seattle, Washington. 
(Unpublished) (1997) at http://aei.pitt.edu/2754/. 
140 Peter Burgess, ‘What’s so European about the European Union? Legitimacy between Institution and 
Identity’, European Journal of Social Theory 5(4), (2002): 467–481. 
 
49 
 
                                                            
N. Nancheva                                                                                                                                        Transforming Identities in Europe 
discourse, but conclude that the impact of Europeanization on changes in the public 
sphere is limited and should not be overstated. 141 Another impressive example in terms of 
the collated data is Pichler’s ‘bottom-up’ approach to establishing the particular meanings 
of ‘being European’ across a large-number study of countries in Europe.142 He concludes 
that ‘European identity’ is unstable and contested and perpetuates the danger of 
replicating the same national differences it was meant to overcome in the first place. 
Another representative, reaching very similar conclusions, is Deflem and Pampel’s study on 
popular support for European unification, again based on a comparison across a large 
number of European member states.143 Qualitative studies in the same vein attempt to 
establish the deficiencies of ‘Europe’ as compared to the nation-state in terms of shared 
political mythology, popular cultural allegiances and common historical past. Anthony 
Smith’s essay on national identity and the idea of European unity is one such example.144 
Bo Stråth’s questioning of the use of the term ‘identity’ altogether when referring to the 
existing notions of unity in Europe is another.145  
The one characteristic most analyses from this group have in common is the (intentional or 
not entirely) assumption that European identity is comparable to national identity in terms 
of fundament, features and form. When placed in the framework of this comparison, 
European identity is bound to fail. As Ole Wæver observes, national identity is still likely to 
‘win out’, making ‘Europe’ seem irrelevant, if the relative power of loyalty to the two is 
being tested against each other.146 The vulnerability of research in this vein remains the 
fact that this assumption seems to be taken for granted.  
141 Stefanie Sifft, Michael Brüggemann, Katharina Kleinen-V. Königlsöw, Bernhard Peters, Andreas Wimmel, 
‘Segmented Europeanization: Exploring the Legitimacy of the EU from a Public Discourse Perspective’,  
Journal of Common Market Studies 45 (1), (2007): 127-55. 
142 Florian Pichler, 'European Identities from Below: Meanings of Identification with Europe', Perspectives on 
European Politics and Society 9 (4), (2008): 411-430. 
143 Mathieu Deflem and Fred C. Pampel, ‘The Myth of Postnational Identity: Popular Support for European 
Unification’, Social Forces 75 (1), (1996): 119-143. 
144 Anthony Smith, ‘National Identity and the Idea of European Unity’, International Affairs 68 (1), (1992): 55-
76. 
145 Bo Stråth, ‘A European Identity: to the Historical Limits of a Concept’, European Journal of Social Theory 5 
(4), (2002): 387-401. 
146 Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver, European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic 
States (London: Routledge, 2002), 25. 
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Placing the debate on the changing role of national identity in Europe within the frame of 
discussing an emerging European identity, therefore, seems to take it off course. As 
evident from the arguments representing both positions, there are sufficient reasons to 
believe that a common European identity is in the forging and has the potential to unite 
the people in Europe through a sense of belonging to a shared cultural, historical and 
political community. It is also evident, though, that such a common identity is only now 
emerging.  Although it undoubtedly offers a common source of collective self-identification 
for the people(s) in Europe, it is simply not as salient as national identity. This is why a 
comparison between the two would help little in understanding their respective roles 
within the European construct. It is argued here that the ‘European-ness’ of identity should 
be analyzed in terms of what it does offer as a source of collective self-identification, not in 
terms of its deficiencies as compared to nationality. Debate on the changing role of 
national identity in the integration project should not be side-tracked by arguments in 
favour of an emerging European identity, which are beside the point. Instead, it should be 
focused on the particular effects integration has had on national identity narratives within 
the Europeanization discourse, and what happens next.  
Enlargement as a political imperative of integration in Europe opened up new avenues for 
investigating Europeanization’s potential to induce political change. The impressive body 
of academic writing dealing with the relations between the European Union and the 
aspiring candidate member states from the Central and South Eastern parts of Europe, 
which appeared in view of the prospect of enlargement, forms the natural background of 
this analysis.  
As a rule, the relations between the EU and the former communist states which declared 
their aspiration for EU membership have been analyzed in a similar logical sequence. In 
order to qualify for membership, the states need to change and meet certain criteria; 147 in 
order to help them meet these criteria, the EU uses mechanisms of pressure 
147 Most often summarized as specified by the Copenhagen Summit in 1993 at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/copenhagen/default_en.htm. 
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(conditionality148) and example (norm-socialization149) to induce change. This logic is based 
on the assumption of a notably one-sided relationship between a strong community and 
an aspiring applicant state, which is, at best, limited. To underestimate the role that the 
applicant states from the ‘New Europe’ have played in transforming the European Union 
itself and changing political realities within the member states would be an unjustifiable 
analytical oversight. Suffice it to point to the very decision to enlarge despite the required 
major institutional reform and the associated financial costs and political risks.150 Other 
ways in which the EU changed in the context of enlargement are outlined, for example, by 
the discussion on minority rights, initiated partly in view of the standards of minority 
protection imposed on the applicant states. The discussion culminated in significant 
legislative reforms at communitarian and national level, addressing the issue of minority 
rights and minority protection, which the EU had not been especially concerned with 
before enlargement. Analyzing the impact of Europeanization from the one-sided 
perspective of the EU versus an applicant state is also problematic for one other reason. 
The analysis is based on the rather asymmetric power discrepancy between a strong 
community and its aspiring candidates. Explanations of change would, therefore, always be 
vulnerable to arguments for interest-maximizing calculations and the logic of 
consequences.151 Europeanization, though, seems to be much more than that, as the 
extensive academic discussion on its normative dimension suggests. It is surprising then 
that this perspective has provided the major body of work on the effects of 
Europeanization in Central and South-Eastern Europe. 
148 For an interesting take to that see for instance Milada Vachudová, ‘The Leverage of International 
Institutions on Democratizing States: Eastern Europe and the European Union’, EUI Working Papers 33 (2001) 
at http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/WP-Texts/01_33.pdf. 
149 Insightful approach to the subject in Frank Schimmelfennig, 'International Socialization in the New Europe: 
Rational Action in an Institutional Environment', European Journal of International Relations 6 (1), (2000): 
109-139, also Frank Schimmelfennig, European Regional Organizations, Political Conditionality, and 
Democratic Transformation in Eastern Europe, EEPS 21(1), (2007): 126-141, Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich 
Sedelmeier (eds.) The Politics of EU Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches (Routledge, 2005). 
150 Even if it is treated as a ‘rhetorical entrapment’, following Schimmelfennig’s thought-provoking argument, 
it is still a decision which was taken in view of the future new members, see Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘The 
Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the EU’, International 
Organization 55 (1), (2001): 47-80. 
151 As formulated by March and Olsen in opposition to the logic of appropriateness. For an overview of the 
argument James March and Johan Olsen, ‘The Logic of Appropriateness’, ARENA Working Papers WP04 
(2009) at http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-
publications/workingpapers/working-papers2004/wp04_9.pdf. 
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This dissertation aims to contribute to the literature on Europeanization and change by 
investigating the impact of Europeanization from an angle that has largely been 
understudied so far: along relations between two candidate states. Placing the analysis on 
such a nexus offers the advantage of studying a relationship of equality. Under 
international law two sovereign states are equal, despite differences in size, stability and 
capability. Their international behaviour is equally legitimate as long as it remains within 
the law. So a change from enmity to amity in their bilateral relations should not be 
ascribed solely to external pressure, especially not if there has been no violation of 
international law. The reasons for a change in behaviour towards the ‘Other’ should also 
be sought domestically in changed political priorities within the state. This dissertation 
aims to demonstrate that change is related to a modified perception of the ‘Other’ in view 
of a transformed vision of ‘Self’.  
This perspective has not been widely explored so far. Of the few studies on 
Europeanization and change in this vein that have appeared, Lene Hansen and Ole 
Wæver’s edited volume on European integration and national identity in the Norden152 is 
one to stand out as taking a similar approach. The book’s engaging analyses of the way the 
four Nordic states re-interpreted their national identity narratives to be able to relate to 
the EU have been particularly enlightening in demonstrating how narratives of the nation 
can successfully be accommodated into the Europeanization discourse. This is one way in 
which the volume is relevant to the current investigation. Another is its use of discourse as 
an analytical perspective. Focused on a traditionally peaceful region of Europe’s, however, 
Hansen and Wæver’s insightful book does not concern itself with the issue of reconciling 
conflictual national identities. The Balkans, unlike the Norden, showcase not only 
particular interpretations of national identity that are not necessarily ‘European’. The 
region displays national identity narratives of increased conflictuality, which is reflected in 
bilateral relations between Balkan states. An investigation of their Europeanization needs 
to address these peculiarities. Although referring to the methodology and theoretical 
framework of Hansen and Wæver’s volume, the theme and purpose of this dissertation 
lead along different analytical avenues. 
152 Hansen and Wæver, European Integration and National Identity. 
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It is useful to distinguish yet another line of research on the effects of Europeanization 
outside the EU that is somehow related to this dissertation. An informative example of this 
is Bruno Coppieters’ edited volume on Europe’s role in solving secessionist cases from 
Europe’s periphery (two of the cases are focused on states from the South Eastern parts of 
Europe).153 Following the technicalities of conflict resolution, the contributors examine the 
necessary conditions for its success and Europeanization’s potential to influence it. Again, 
the theme and purpose of the current study differ. It is interested in examining the way 
Europeanization influences narratives of national identity before they evolve into actual 
conflict. Understanding this influence has wider application to understanding conflictuality 
based in national identity. As pointed above, nationalism possesses an underlying 
conflictual potential, of which nationalist conflict is only the extreme case. Studying 
conflictual national identity narratives before conflict and investigating the mechanisms 
Europeanization discourse contains for their reconciliation therefore seems more relevant 
to the future of European integration.  
 
Exploring Identity Change in ‘Europe’  
Embedded in an anti-essentialist ontological understanding of social reality and taking a 
reflectivist approach in investigating it, the current study sets out to identify change in an 
object that cannot be quantitatively measured: national identity. Conceptualizing national 
identity as a collection of stories (narratives) about the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ suggests the 
analytical starting point for investigating change. It should search into the way these 
stories are told in order to identify differences. The poststructuralist meta-theoretical 
framework of the investigation, in turn, demonstrates that meaning cannot be detached 
from the discursive reality within which it has been articulated. This is what leads the 
analysis of identity narratives to the dominant discourses which uphold them. Seeing 
national identity as the link between the individual and sovereign power points to the 
nation-state as the norm in modern statehood and to nationalism as the dominant 
153 Bruno Coppieters (eds.) Europeanization and Conflict Resolution: Case Studies from the European 
Periphery (Gent: Academia Press, 2004). 
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discourse which upholds this norm. Nationalism is conceptualized here as a totalizing 
system of meaning which has provided some of the most salient interpretations of national 
identity narratives. Its hegemony, however, as in any discursive formation, is vulnerable to 
the social forces and political alternatives which it sought to exclude. Mobilizing these 
forces and upholding these alternatives as a promising political project, Europeanization 
came to challenge the hegemony of nationalism. Re-formulating the link between the 
community and sovereign-power, Europeanization upheld a different story of ‘Self’. Within 
its totalizing system of meaning, national identity narratives appeared less antagonistic 
because of the different interpretation of the meaning of their signifiers. This investigation 
sets out to explore how articulations of these meanings changed in the course of 
Europeanization. Taking up key signifiers of the national story told by the state both 
domestically and externally, the analysis traces modifications in their discursive positions.  
The transformations established suggest that Europeanization can offer a credible reading 
of national identity narratives which reduces their conflictual potential. It also ultimately 
stabilizes the discursive hegemony of Europeanization. Where the credibility of 
Europeanization’s interpretation fails, the hegemony of nationalism is re-instated and 
antagonistic national identity narratives increase in salience. The conflict-reconciliation 
dialectic along national identity lines in Europe can therefore be significantly affected by 
the political relevance of Europeanization. This dissertation claims that the long-term 
future of integration in Europe depends on the credible reading of national identity 
narratives within the discourse of Europeanization. Reducing the antagonistic potential of 
national identity through an inclusive interpretation of its signifiers, the credibility of 
Europeanization’s reading of stories of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ also stabilizes the discursive 
hegemony of the Europeanization itself. This is what ensures the political relevance of the 
project of integration. The purpose of the following chapter is to lay out the conceptual 
frame within which this claim is argued.   
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CHAPTER III 
CONCEPTUAL FRAME:  
DISCOURSE THEORY AND EXPLORING NATIONAL IDENTITY 
 
The unifying frame of this dissertation is poststructuralist discourse theory. Able to 
account for the contingent character, conflictual potential and re-current political 
relevance of national identity, discourse theory also provides a powerful conceptualization 
of identity change. Approaching the study of social reality from a reflectivist 
epistemological perspective within the broader school of postmodernity, discourse theory 
denounces the restrictive function of clearcut definitions. Instead, it offers an exceptionally 
flexible theoretical framework able to account for the specificities of the other key 
concepts of this study, nationalism and Europeanization. A discursive conceptualization 
allows for fuller understanding of the interaction between nationalism and 
Europeanization, addressing the perpetual struggle between their competing 
interpretations of social reality. It also reveals the centrality of the issue of national 
identity accommodation for the future of Europeanization. Representing the key link 
between the individual and sovereign power, national identity is not only central within 
the discursive hegemony of nationalism. It also remains a key signifier of Europeanization, 
as the process of European integration continues to be constrained by nation-state 
sovereignty. So failure to provide a credible reading of national identity could restore the 
hegemony of nationalism, marginalize the discourse of Europeanization, reverse the 
integration dynamics in certain points, and in the long term perhaps dislocate it. A 
discursive approach further demonstrates that even though challenged by integration in 
Europe, the discourse of nationalism cannot be dislocated just yet because politics is 
organized upon the fundament of nationalism’s upholding unit – the nation-state. 
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Therefore, a study of Europeanization’s reading of national identity should take account of 
the discursive relevance of nationalism and operate within its constraints. Discourse 
theory’s conceptualization of the perpetual over-determination of discursive reality in the 
dynamics of competing interpretations of it can address these constraints analytically and 
reveal their implications for politics. Together with the fact that discourse theory facilitates 
cross-disciplinary research and enables a multi-perspectival approach, these conceptual 
advantages confirm its suitability as a unifying frame for the purposes of this dissertation. 
This chapter aims to outline these advantages. First it briefly references several key 
discourse theory ideas which the dissertation operationalizes in its argumentation and 
investigation. Then it highlights the points where discourse theory’s treatment of national 
identity promises better understanding of its peculiarities. The chapter concludes with 
presenting the applicability of discourse theory to developing the central argument of the 
dissertation. 
 
Discourse Theory and the Conceptualization of Discourse 
Discourse theory emerged as a ‘cross-disciplinary attempt to integrate central insights 
from linguistics and hermeneutics with key ideas from social and political science [...], 
prompted by the growing recognition of the intertwining of language and politics in the 
process of societal transformation’154. The first generation of discourse theorists take as 
‘discourse’ the textual unit.155 It is interested in the semantic aspects of spoken and 
written text which are inevitably embedded within the historical context and its power 
hierarchies.156 A second generation of discourse theorists expands the idea of ‘discourse’ 
beyond text in the strictly linguistic sense, to include a wider set of social practices ‘as far 
as they contain a semiotic element’157. Theory in this vein demonstrates the influence of 
154 Jacob Torfing, ‘Discourse Theory: Achievements, Arguments and Challenges’ in David Howarth and Jacob 
Torfing, Discourse Theory in European Politics: Identity, Policy and Governance (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005), 5. 
155 The three generations of discourse theory here follow the classification of Torfing, ‘Discourse Theory. 
156 William Downes, Language and Society (London: Fontana Paperbacks, 1984). 
157 As quoted by Torfing, ‘Discourse Theory’, 7. For a detailed presentation of this conceptualization see 
Norman Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), Norman Fairclough, Critical 
Discourse Analysis (Boston: Addison Wesley, 1995). 
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non-discursive relations on the ‘rules of formation’158 of discursive practices but is unclear 
about the exact distinction between the discursive and the non-discursive.159 In his 
‘genealogical writings’ Foucault distances himself from this ‘quasi-structuralist’160 account 
of discourse by investigating the hegemonic struggles which shape and re-shape discursive 
formations.161 He demonstrates that understanding discourse is impossible without 
investigating the power relations which shaped it. A third generation of students of 
discourse completely abandon the unsustainable distinction between the discursive and 
the non-discursive162 to theorize all social phenomena as ‘discourse’. Within the 
philosophical frame developed by Derrida, everything becomes discourse. 163 The social 
world exists only in the infinite interplay of meaning, endlessly subverted and re-written in 
the clash of historical transformations and political interventions. In the work of Roland 
Barth, Julia Kristeva, Jacques Lacan, discourse is conceptualized as a relational system of 
signifying practices164 which provides ‘the contingent horizon’165 for the construction of 
any meaningful object and subject.166  
In contrast to Kant’s classical transcendentalism, poststructuralist discourse theory argues 
that perception and experience of the empirical world are made possible not by some pre-
given categories of the human mind but by conditions of possibility which are a structural 
feature of discourses.167 It does not deny the reality of the empirical world, as criticism 
sometimes has it. It argues that our understanding of the world, the way we interpret what 
it signifies, is not a feature of existing reality but a feature of language. This is how 
158 Seen as a remnant of his Marxist legacy, the term introduced by Foucault in Michel Foucault, Archaeology 
of Knowledge (London: Routledge, 2002). 
159 Particularly Norman Fairclough, Language and Power (London: Longman, 1989), also earlier Foucault (his 
‘archaeological’ writings in Foucault, Arachaelogy, also Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: an 
Archaeology of Medical Perception (London: Psychology Press, 1976), etc.). 
160 Torfing, ‘Discourse Theory’, 7. 
161 Michel Foucault, The Care of the Self: The History of Sexuality, Vol. III (New York: Pantheon, 1986). 
162 Notably Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics (London: Verso, 1985). 
163 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference (London: Routledge, 2001). 
164 Torfing, ibid., 8. 
165 Ibid. 
166 Torfing points out that a similar analytical outcome is reached by Wittgenstein in 1953, though following a 
different analytical path: Torfing, ibid., 8. 
167 Torfing, ibid., 9. 
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poststructuralist discourse theory conceptualizes ‘discursive truth regimes’.168 
Furthermore, as suggested by the claim for plurality of truth regimes, the meanings of 
social objects cannot be fixed around one pre-given self-determining centre. They are non-
referential and emerge as a result of relating the different social objects to each other. The 
identities of the social subjects are constructed on the basis of these established discursive 
relations. Their formation is therefore relational, contextual and historically contingent.  
Influenced by British post-Marxism169, French poststructuralism170, and Anglo-American 
debates about postmodernity171, Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau develop a synthetic 
political theory of discourse which offers a compelling framework for analyzing the 
political.172 Among other things, its contribution for understanding the dialectic of social 
antagonisms in constituting political reality173 has remained unchallenged. Operationalized 
into a full-fledged methodology by researchers such as Margareth Wetherell, Ruth Wodak, 
Ole Wæver, discourse theory has proven its analytical potential for the study of politics.174 
This dissertation operationalizes several key ideas of poststructuralist discourse by 
incorporating them into the main argument. Their conceptualization, together with their 
relevance to the investigation, will be clarified in the following paragraphs. 
Signifiers 
Discourses as systems of signification are formed around certain ‘privileged’ nodal 
points175 which enable partial fixation of meaning. They are called signifiers. The meaning 
168 Torfing, ibid., 13, see also Jacob Torfing, New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe, and Žižek (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1999). 
169 The intellectual wave produced in the 1970s translating Gramsci’s political writings into English, see Mike 
Prior and Dave Purdy, Out of the Ghetto: a Path to Socialist Rewards (Spokesman, 1979) at 
http://www.hegemonics.co.uk/docs/OutoftheGhetto.pdf. 
170 Notably, the work of Derrida. 
171 Useful overview of the main ideas and problems in Agger, ‘Critical Theory, Poststructuralism, 
Postmodernism’. 
172 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason (New York: 
Verso, 2005), Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (London: Routledge, 2007), etc. 
173 E.g. Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2000). 
174 Margaret Wetherell and Jonathan Potter, Mapping the Language of Racism (Hemel Hempstead: 
Harvester/ Wheatsheaf, 1992); Ruth Wodak, Rudolf de Cillia, Martin Reisigl and Karin Liebhart, The Discursive 
Construction of National Identity (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999); Ole Wæver, ‘The language of 
Foreign Policy’, Review Essay of Walter Carlsnaes’s ‘Ideology and Foreign Policy: Problems of Comparative 
Conceptualization’, Journal of Peace Research 27 (3), (1990): 335-343. 
175 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 112. 
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of all objects within discourse is organized in relation to these central knots of meaning in 
such a way that the signifiers represent the discourse and carry its totalizing power. But 
since there is no meaning outside discourse, the knots of meaning are tied around nothing 
– the signifiers are empty. Their meaning emerges as a result of its absence.  Laclau 
exemplifies this notion with the Hobbesian state of nature:  
“[I]n a situation of radical disorder, order is present as that which is absent; it 
becomes an empty signifier as the signifier of its absence.” 176 
Emptiness is a necessary condition of the signifier. It can become the centre of an 
emerging discourse precisely because it signifies what is missing, and thus, what is needed. 
Only when this condition is met, can political forces compete to present their political 
objectives as those which carry the contents of the empty signifier. This conceptualization 
of the emergence of discourses demonstrates their embeddedness in the historical 
contexts which called them into existence and their dependence on the dominant political 
forces which shaped them. Seeing the discourse of nationalism from this perspective helps 
reveal in its centre the narrative of nationhood, which is what all types of nationalist 
discourses have in common, irrespective of their characteristic features. It also helps 
address the principal primordialist/ modernist fault line in Nationalism Studies. Since 
discourses emerge around one privileged nodal point, then it was the signifier of the 
nation which called into existence the discourse of nationalism. But the nation signified 
nothing. Its absence is what enabled competing political projects to fill the signifier with 
contents, thus constituting it as ‘a nation’. The same dynamics can be seen in the 
formation of the discourse of Europeanization. It is organized around the signifier of 
‘Europe’. It was precisely ‘Europe’ as a community of like-minded states sharing common 
goals and values that was absent in the aftermath of two destructive global wars which 
tore the Old Continent apart. The project of European integration provided the much 
needed contents of this signifier, which upheld the discourse of Europeanization and 
constructed the states in Europe as the selected national participants in a unique 
supranational structure. A discursive perspective also reveals the basis of antagonism 
176 Ernesto Laclau, ‘Why do empty signifiers matter to politics?’ in Ernesto Laclau, Emancipation(s) (London: 
Verso, 1996): 36-46, 44. 
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between the two discourses. They struggle for hegemony over the interpretation of one 
and the same discursive element: national identity. The centrality of national identity is 
determined by its function of translating the meaning of the central signifiers of both 
discourses at the personal level.   
Totalization 
The precise meaning or ‘filling’ of the signifiers is ultimately determined through acts of 
political intervention based on the social antagonisms and the struggles for power within 
the particular historical constellation. 177 They are performed through discursive practices 
establishing relations between various discursive elements178. But since there is no other 
reference point, no ‘determining centre’179, meaning is fixed arbitrarily by excluding all 
other possible meanings. This act of ‘radical institution’180 of the signifiers upholding the 
discursive formation reveals the direct mutually constitutive relation between discourses 
and power, conceptualized initially by Foucault.181 The powerful revolutionary potential of 
popular discontent which brought down absolutist monarchy with the French Revolution 
asserted the belief that sovereign power should lie with the people. Ruling in the name of 
the people required that that the people be able to speak in one voice and agree, i.e. they 
had to be a community. The specific historical context of the time suggested their 
constitution as a national community. The empowered discourse of ‘the nation’ re-
enforced the belief in popular sovereignty and turned self-determination and civic (liberal) 
nationalism into a norm. The link between power and discourse can be uncovered also 
within the discourse of Europeanization. European integration was a project of the winners 
in the war. True, it depended on the participation of the two defeated but the subtext of 
their participation was ‘domestication’. It continued to represent victory with the breakup 
177 These interventions poststructuralist discourse theory calls ‘articulations’ (Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy) building on Foucault’s idea of discourses as ‘practices that systematically form the 
objects of which they speak’ (Foucault, Archaelogy, 49). 
178 Laclau and Mouffe make the distinction between elements and ‘moments’ – they position ‘elements’ 
outside the discursive formation in question, while the signs within it they call ‘moments’ (Laclau and Moffe, 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy). 
179 Derrida, ibid. 
180 As noted in David Howarth, Aletta Norval, Yannis Stavrakakis, Discourse Theory and Political Analisys: 
Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change (Manchester University Press, 2000), 4. 
181 In the ‘archaeologies’.  
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of communism and the powerful hegemony it established in Europe: the excluded had to 
apply for admission into the group of victors, comply with their requirements and change 
accordingly. The pulling power of Europeanization had left them no other viable political 
alternatives.  
Power within discourse, however, depends on the stability of the discursive formation. The 
discursive stabilization of meaning is possible only through the exclusion of alternative 
options. In this sense discourse is a reduction of possibilities. To be able to prevent the 
perpetual ‘sliding’182 of the signifiers against the signifieds and to exclude the infinite 
number of meanings they can carry, discourses always strive to achieve what Laclau calls 
ideological totalization,183 or complete closure. This is an attempt to deny the contingent 
character of social reality by creating political myths essentializing its boundaries. The 
narratives of nationhood linking the existence of the nation to primordial times and 
organic kinship illustrate one such attempt. The more recent narratives of European 
integration, designed to exclude the possibility of war, illustrate another.  
Field of Discursivity 
Laclau and Mouffe conceptualize the possibilities excluded from discourse as forming a 
field of discursivity184. The field of discursivity contains all the meanings signifiers within 
discourse could have or have had but are now excluded as available options. In this sense, 
it functions as a ‘reservoir’ of the possible. Laclau and Mouffe do not focus on the 
particular structure or organizing order of the field of discursivity while others185 
problematize it and suggest a distinction between all possible meanings and the possible 
meanings struggling for the same discursive terrain. A finite range of discourses, for 
example, offer divergent interpretations of the signifier of sovereignty. Absolutism, offers 
one contents for the signifier, which in Europe is ascribed to the past. Alternatives could be 
found in the discourses of nationalism, Europeanization, furthermore in ethnicity, 
182 Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 1989), 87. 
183 Ernesto Laclau, Emancipation(s) (London: Verso, 1996), 56. 
184 Laclau and Mouffe, ibid., 111. 
185 Marianne Jørgensen and Louise J. Phillips, Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method (London: Sage, 2002). 
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religion.186 In its entirety, the field of discursivity contains the full potential for political 
change. 
What enables meanings articulated by alternative discourses, which Laclau and Mouffe call 
‘floating signifiers’, to enter the discursive space is the occurrence of an event or 
phenomenon which discourse cannot accommodate within its system of signification. The 
hegemonic discourse cannot represent it, explain it or otherwise ‘domesticate’ it. The 
presence of floating signifiers subverts discourse’s carrying signifiers by revealing their 
arbitrary nature. It opens up the realm of the political for competing political projects 
articulating alternative interpretations of social reality and establishing alternative 
relations between its elements. The inhumanity of Nazi excesses presented the discourse 
of European nationalism with such an uncomfortable phenomenon. Its incomprehensibility 
threatened the symbolic order established in Europe. To prevent complete breakdown, the 
discourse of nationalism transformed dramatically. It excluded ethno-nationalist 
interpretations of state sovereignty as illegitimate and marginalized civic-nationalist 
interpretations to re-articulate them in terms of liberal democratic values. The 
marginalization of nationalist political rhetoric encouraged alternative visions of state 
sovereignty in Europe, notably based on functionalist and federalist ideas, to enter the 
discursive space of nationalism and challenge its reading of social reality. This historical 
condition of possibility enabled the emergence of the grand discourse of Europeanization. 
It did not dislocate nationalism, but it managed to challenge nationalism’s hegemony.  
Dislocation of the entire system of meaning is possible because discourse emerges on the 
basis of excluding alternative meanings. There is no other pre-given essence to it. Its 
totality is illusionary: discourse can never achieve full closure because it exists through 
what it attempts to deny. The meaning of objects in discourse is therefore only partially 
fixed. It always depends on the ‘otherness’ it excludes and needs to be constantly over-
determined in relation to it. This perpetuates the eternal struggle for hegemony over 
meaning, which forms the basis of political power.  
186 This limited range of discourses can be subsumed under the notion of ‘order of discourse’ theorized by 
Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992). 
 
63 
 
                                                            
N. Nancheva                                                                                                                                        Transforming Identities in Europe 
Identities in Discourse 
The identities of the social subjects in discourse emerge in the same dynamics. They can 
never achieve ‘fullness’187 because their existence depends on the excluded ‘Other’. Thus, 
the subject in discourse is always split.188 It strives to achieve totality by acts of 
identification, re-producing the boundaries of the discourse within which it can find 
relative stability. The national subject, for instance, is usually constituted on the basis of 
the signifiers of territory, language, custom, culture, past and purpose, whose function is 
to differentiate him/ her from all ‘other’ national subjects. The ‘Other(s)’ are positioned in 
a chain of equivalence, identified and identifiable only by their national ‘otherness’, which 
enables defining the national ‘Self(ves)’. Their differential subjectivity as national subjects 
is articulated in a chain of difference from the ‘Self(ves)’. The articulation and over-
determination of the logics of equivalence and difference aims to essentialize the subject 
positions. Such articulation is ultimately a discursive strategy. Any attempt to uncover its 
‘real’ essence subverts the very act of identification by revealing the emptiness upon which 
it is based. Then an opposing dynamics is initiated which re-positions the ‘Self’ in a chain of 
equivalence with the ‘Other(s)’. These opposing logics constantly over-determine the 
subject positions against a background of undecideability189 and prevent their ultimate 
fixation within discourse. They reveal that there exists no pre-given centre of subjectivity 
preceding the subject’s identification: no ‘concealed identity to be rescued beyond the 
latter’190. The identity of the subject is uncovered only through its discursive over-
determination. So the history of its transformations should be analyzed in the ‘Self’-‘Other’ 
dialectic and within the discourses determining it.191 
 
 
 
187 Ernesto Laclau, New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time (London: Verso, 1990). 
188 Bruce Fink, The Lacanian Subject: between Language and Jouissance (Princeton University Press, 1997). 
189 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 32f. 
190 Chantal Mouffe, ‘Citizenship and Political Identity’, 28. 
191 Mouffe, ibid. 28. 
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Analytical Advantages of Studying National Identity Change through Discourse 
Theory 
As noted in Chapter II, social identity has traditionally been conceptualized on the basis of 
sociological and psychological theories of self-identification and categorization. They have 
been very influential in theorizing membership into social groups and the social 
implications of membership for the individual and the social.192 Their insights have been 
extremely useful in understanding the dynamics of group behaviour and inter-group 
relations, as well as in understanding the socio-cognitive aspects of group maintenance. 
These contributions have been valuable for the study of national identity and nationalism. 
But seeing the processes of identification and categorization as a natural cognitive reaction 
of the human mind, they focus their explanations at the micro-level of individual 
psychology. They cannot go beyond the structural constraints of the human mind, thus 
overlooking the constitutive power of the social on the way human mind processes reality. 
Their explanations therefore essentialize the categories they attempt to address. Discourse 
theory offers a broader conceptualization of identity formation which can account for its 
specificities at the micro level but adds to it the important social dimension at the macro 
level, revealing the central link between identity constitution and political power.193  
Discourse theory’s conceptualization of identity is both disturbing and profoundly 
optimistic. On the one hand, it argues that subjectivity is contingent upon meanings fixated 
in an ultimately arbitrary fashion, which invalidates the very claim of subjectivity. On the 
other hand, it upholds the belief in perpetual change, which represents a promise against 
dissipitation. Thinking of national identity as impossible outside the discourses which (re-
)construct it offers an understanding of its malleable nature, its ever-present occurrence, 
its over-arching significance, and its attraction as a political project. It also proves useful in 
192 Hogg, ‘A Tale of Two Theories’, 259. 
193 Social Identity Theory also touches upon the responsivity of group identity to the social contexts 
(intergroup competition and mobility) but its explanations attempt to establish linear causality and in effect 
essentialize the categories they operationalize, as pointed by Clare Sutherland in the context of analyzing 
nationalism, see Clare Sutherland, ‘Nation-building through Discourse Theory’, Nations and Nationalism 11 
(2), (2005): 185-202, 186. 
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addressing the political interventions attempting to articulate its meaning in a hegemonic 
manner, uncovering the mechanisms for its discursive transformations.  
Function vs Definition 
In the first place, discourse theory marginalizes the academic discussion on defining nation 
and nationhood as irrelevant to grasping the significance of national identity. There is 
nothing to be defined since national identity can be everything. Its meaning is determined 
by the discourse which upholds it. Within the discourse of nationalism nation is the 
community of people which legitimizes the sovereign power of the state. It is determined 
as an integral element in the organization of the political world into nation-states. It is not 
coincidental that the terms ‘nation’ and ‘state’ are often used interchangeably. 
Theoretically speaking this is, of course, imprecise. Even though both terms are closely 
related through the claims each makes on geographical space, history, collective agency 
and political culture (including forms of government, institutions, legal traditions), ‘nation’ 
refers to the community of people, while ‘state’ refers to the institutional body that claims 
monopoly of legitimate force over a particular territory.194 But the link between the 
community of people on a particular territory and the claims for legitimacy of the 
institutional body monopolizing force there, is the notion of collective will, action and 
purpose. This link has become the rationale behind the state system existing from 
Westphalia to today. Within the discourse of nationalism, which determined its stability, it 
has acquired such a fundamental, deeply-seated quality that it is reflected in the very 
language of both politics and science. The discipline and practice of what we call today 
‘international relations’, for instance, should be better described by the phrase ‘inter-state 
relations’. The misnomers of the ‘League of Nations’ and its modern equivalent the ‘United 
Nations’ also refer to inter-state organizations per se.195 It is not surprising then that 
ordinary speech often uses the two terms interchangeably. This use should be taken into 
account when analyzing national identity, despite its theoretical imprecision, because it is 
194 Following Weber’s classical definition, see Weber, ‘Politics as Vocation’ in Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills 
(eds.) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (London: Routledge, 1970), 78. 
195 This observation is not original but is particularly precise. For other references to it, see Billig, Banal 
Nationalism, also Özkırımlı, Contemporary Debates, David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 
1995), etc. 
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an inevitable feature of the hegemonic discourse of nationalism. But if the link between 
‘nation’ and ‘state’ were broken and the notions of collective will, action and purpose were 
re-interpreted elsewhere, then national identity would come to signify something else. The 
discourse of Europeanization offers such an alternative vision of nationhood and 
statehood, so it inevitably affects the way national identity is interpreted. 
Always Antagonistic vs ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ Identities 
Second, discourse theory succeeds where mainstream accounts of nationalism have been 
ambivalent. It reveals in an affirmative manner the inevitable antagonistic potential of 
national identity and its pervasive conflictuality in Europe. Despite its significant 
peculiarities, the discursive construction of national identity follows the same dual logic as 
the construction of any other social identity in discourse. It requires the establishment of 
chains of difference between the national subject and its ‘Other(s)’ through discursive 
strategies of articulation that aim to essentialize the boundaries between them. 
Articulation involves practices of exclusion and over-determination, which perpetuate the 
tension between the infinity of possible meanings and the particular discursive 
interpretation. It re-affirms the boundaries between national subjects in an attempt to 
stabilize their identities despite the lack of essence to the logic of difference, because a 
revelation of the equivalence between the ‘Self’ and its ‘Other(s)’ will threaten the 
subjectivity of both. The practice of identity constitution, therefore, in itself generates 
conflictuality. In the context of national identity constitution in particular, this has already 
been noted by students of discourse theory and international relations. Michael Shapiro 
conceptualizes foreign policy with its focus on border maintenance as making an 
‘Other’.196 Taking up this idea, David Campbell applies it to his study of Bosnia to 
demonstrate the ‘othering’ potential of foreign policy in identity formation.197 Overall, 
analyses in this vein reveal the intrinsic antagonistic quality of ‘inter-national’ relations 
within the discourse of nationalism. This is what justified the attention of this study to 
national identity narratives reflected in conflictual bilateral relations.   
196 Michael Shapiro (1988) quoted by Iver Neumann, ‘Self and Other in IR’, European Journal of International 
Relations 2 (2), (1996): 139-74, 156. 
197 David Campbell, Writing Security. 
 
67 
 
                                                            
N. Nancheva                                                                                                                                        Transforming Identities in Europe 
The antagonism of inter-national relations within the discourse of nationalism is re-
enforced in a context of physical proximity. This is determined by the immediate 
availability of neighbouring regions and states as a source of narratives of ‘otherness’. Out 
of all possible meanings, it is the ones that struggle for the same discursive space that form 
what Fairclough theorized as the order of discourse.198 In view of national identity 
interpretations, neighbouring states and states in the same region struggle for the same 
discursive space in the mutually constitutive dynamics of identity formation.199 This 
conditions increased conflictuality of national identity in neighbour-state relations within 
the discourse of nationalism. The post-communist period in the Balkans illustrates this. 
This is how analytical interest in conflictual national identity guided this study to bilateral 
relations of two Balkan states.   
In addition to physical proximity (and often in relation to it), national identity articulation 
and determination may generate greater conflictuality, if it is upheld by one or several 
similar signifiers. Similarity in identity re-enforces the antagonism inherent to identity 
construction as it subverts the credibility of the chains of difference. Bulgaria and 
Macedonia, for instance, centred their national identity constructs around belonging to 
parts of the same geographical region, overlapping historical narratives and very similar 
languages. Articulation practices in both states then needed to find and re-instate a border 
separating the two identities in a categorical manner despite similarities. This imperative 
increases the conflictuality of ‘othering’200 and is reflected in bilateral relations.  
States in Europe, as Anthony Smith observed201, are more similar than different. Despite 
the numerous specificities in their national trajectories, all of them, albeit to varying 
degrees and over different periods of time, have shared into the fundamental traditions of 
Europe: Roman law, political democracy, parliamentary institutions, Judeo-Christian ethics, 
198 Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992). 
199 In a completely different context, Freud called this dynamics ‘the narcissism of minor differences’ (see 
Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents (New York: W. W. Norton, 1961), pp. 58-63. The apt phrase, 
utilised in the philosophical elaborations of Lacan and later Žižek and applied to international relations and 
politics by writers such as Michael Ignatieff, designates the threat that closeness in identity can pose on the 
self-identification of the state.  
200 I.e., the strategy of ‘making an other’ as per Campbell, Writing Security. 
201 Smith, ‘National Identity and the Idea of European Unity’, 68. 
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Renaissance humanism, rationalism and empiricism, and romanticism and classicism.202 
Together with their physical proximity, this contributes to increased conflictual potential of 
the ‘Self’-‘Other’ dialectic narrated within the discourse of nationalism. Indeed, the 
numerous conflicts which marked the era of its hegemony in Europe culminating in the 
two world wars, are evidence of that.  
Negotiable vs Fixed 
In the third place, discourse theory demonstrates that discursive spaces can change. Their 
boundaries are subject to perpetual re-negotiation against competing interpretations of 
reality. The identities they perpetuate can also change, depending on the re-definition of 
‘otherness’ against which they have been constituted. As emphasized, this is decided in the 
struggles for power which ultimately re-organize the political. Re-defining national identity 
in a reconciliatory manner therefore lies within the realm of the political and is subject to 
discursively re-positioning its ‘Other(s)’. The discursive strategies that bring about such re-
positioning affect the subjects and objects of national identity narratives, the contents of 
their signifiers, the signifying practices and rules which articulate meaning, the discursive 
boundaries within which narratives of identity operate. Understanding these is the key to 
analyzing national identity change.  
Discourse theory’s conceptualization of change is therefore able to address the 
reconciliatory effects of European integration on national identity narratives interpreted in 
a conflictual manner. Empowering a grand discourse of commonality of interest, purpose 
and practice, integration challenged the hegemony of nationalism in Europe as it 
profoundly re-formulated the meanings of its key signifiers. Within the discursive space of 
commonality opened up by Europeanization, the discursive positions of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ 
perpetuate a completely new dialectic. The national ‘Self(ves)’ do not seek their 
constitutive ‘Other(s)’ beyond national borders because Europeanization transforms the 
meaning of national borders and their function. Within ‘Europe’ borders no longer divide 
but connect nation-states. In this sense they cease to demarcate the limit between 
national ‘Self’ and ‘Other’, which gradually decrease conflictuality along these lines. 
202 Ibid., 70. 
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Instead, Europeanization shifts the limit between ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ to the borders 
demarcating the supra-national space of ‘Europe’, i.e. to the borders of the European 
Community. These new borders come to represent the new fault lines of conflictuality 
generated in the ‘Self’-‘Other’ dialectic. They enable the constitution of the European 
‘Self(ves)’ and inevitably call into existence (a) new necessary ‘Other(s)’. In the space of 
commonality upheld by the discourse of Europeanization the national subjects are re-
positioned as members of the same community by discursively re-enforcing similarities 
and marginalizing differences between them. Re-narrating national identity in these terms 
reduces its antagonistic potential in Europe and in turn stabilizes the discursive space 
upholding the modified narratives. 
Recurring vs Anachronistic 
Finally, discourse theory can help understand the ever-recurring salience of national 
identity in a political world organized into nation-states. Upholding the discursive 
hegemony of nationalism, national identity is indispensible within it. Indeed, opening any 
newspaper, we come across references to ‘the’ government, ‘our’ taxes, ‘their’ measures 
in dealing with disaster. These ‘homeland deixis’ as Billig calls them203 habitually refer to 
‘us’ as a unique self-evident community separated from the rest of the world by borders. 
Perpetually constituted through the rhetoric of national identity and essentialized in the 
discourse of nationalism, this community provides a fundamental source of self-
identification with the social which is always already there. The link to sovereign power 
and the level of sedimentation of the symbolic order it constitutes differentiate national 
identity from other sources of collective identity, making it binding and impossible to 
renounce. This testifies for the un-diminishing attraction of national identity rhetoric as a 
strategy of political mobilization: it is directed at a largest possible audience and it reaches 
its addressees in a manner that is both personal and obligatory.  
 
 
203 As strategies of rhetorical ‘pointing’, Billig, Banal Nationalism, 105. 
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Applicability of Discourse Theory to Understanding the Role of  
National Identity in Europe 
The discourse of nationalism was challenged by the unintelligible violence it endorsed. This 
opened up its discursive space to imagining a political alternative for realizing statehood: 
integration in Europe. Emerging as an ethically superior discourse – because it signified 
peace – Europeanization provided alternative meanings to the signifier of sovereignty, thus 
modifying the link between statehood and nationhood. Its model for pooling sovereignty 
in selected areas and transferring it to the supranational level constituted a new model of 
governance transcending the boundaries of national statehood. But it also required the 
constitution of ‘the people’ it governed as a community in order to be legitimate. In 
attempting to do so it reached beyond national borders to call upon a community of 
‘European states’. So it set out to modify the meaning of both statehood and nationhood 
within the discourse of nationalism. Destabilizing nationalism’s upholding signifiers, 
integration attempted to organize meanings around its own centre – ‘Europe’ – and 
achieve totality. Europeanization’s reading of nationalism’s central signifier – national 
identity – then became crucial to its empowerment, since it could potentially dislocate the 
hegemonic discourse. Radically re-determining ‘otherness’, Europeanization re-arranged 
the elements of the established discursive hegemony, enabling the initial success of the 
European project.  
One structural feature of the discourse of nationalism, however, remained unchallenged 
by Europeanization, conditioning its pervasive relevance. The process of integration began 
and developed within the constraints of the nation-state(s). The European project 
modified the notion of nation-state sovereignty by creating the vision of the common 
European ‘home’ but did not provide an immediate political alternative to it. Integration 
continued to operate within the limits of nation-state sovereignty. The complete 
dislocation of the discourse of nationalism, whose centre nation-state sovereignty formed, 
was therefore not possible. This suggests that as long as European integration is 
constrained by the nation-state(s), it will need to be able to provide a credible reading of 
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national identity (a floating signifier), in order to challenge the hegemonic interpretations 
of national identity within the discourse of nationalism. Failure to do so might eventually 
problematize integration all together. Bound by the organizing unit of the nation-state, if 
only partially, states in Europe could still revert to conflictuality, should ‘Europe’s reading 
of their national stories become irrelevant. 
Narrating National Identity 
Reading national identity in a credible manner within the discourse of Europeanization 
follows exactly the same mechanisms as within the discourse of nationalism. There is no 
other way to achieve totality in identity but to constantly over-determine subject positions 
against ‘Other(s)’.204 In order to conceal their ‘precarious’ nature205 and to essentialize the 
contingent limits of their world, social subjects perpetuate the narration of myths which 
(attempt to) ideologically ‘totalize’ and close the discursive space, thus also partially fixing 
identities within its contours. The attraction of the narrated myths depends on their 
credibility in reading past, present and future. They are the basis of political action because 
they enable interpellation (the ‘hailing’ of social subjects206) and political mobilization. The 
challenge before Europeanization consists in the taken-for-granted credibility of the story 
of nationhood. One of the most powerful myths of our time, this story offers a source of 
self-identification which significantly differs from other sources of collective identity.   
In a different theoretical frame, David Miller provided a checklist of nations’ distinguishing 
characteristics, which highlights some of the reasons for the credibility of the nationhood 
narratives.207 The first among them is the fact that nations are communities constituted by 
a shared belief that they exist. It is not sufficient that I see myself as belonging to a distinct, 
as the example goes, Cornish nation. Other people must think of their Cornish identity in 
the same way. This dependency of national identity upon the social collectivity it is 
204 It seems appropriate to clarify here that this over-determination is not seen as a consciously guided 
process, even though it is ultimately carried out by human individuals through language. It is, rather, 
embedded within the social and shaped by the power struggles of the historical time, which eventually 
decide its course. 
205 Mouffe, ‘Citizenship and Political Identity’, 28. 
206 Lacan’s notion developing Althusser’s conceptualization of the ideological subject, see Jean-Michel 
Rabaté, The Cambridge Companion to Lacan (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 170. 
207 Miller, On Nationality, 22-27. 
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ascribed to is what distinguishes it from the other powerful source of collective self-
identification – religion. It is a form of self-identification that cannot be made individually: 
the choices are to a large extent pre-given and, once made, binding. This dependency 
works the other way around too: nationhood cannot be renounced by considerations of 
the current generation because it is a community that is not defined by the present 
situation. Rather, it stretches back and forward across time and overrides other allegiances 
that may appear more ‘real’ because they are based on face-to-face contact between 
members (such as professional associations or teams). This is the second distinguishing 
characteristic of nations. The third is that the story of the nation constitutes an active 
identity: nations are communities that act together, take decisions together, are a source 
of agency. This is unlike other very powerful but ‘passive’ sources of self-identification, 
such as religion208 or race, and is what has established the nation as the principal source of 
political legitimacy in the modern state system. The fourth important characteristic of 
nations that distinguishes them from other myths is the connection they establish 
between the collectivity and a particular geographical place: the homeland. It is precisely 
this characteristic that has forged the link between nations and states and is in the basis of 
the claim that the world we live in is a world of nations.209 The fifth distinguishing 
characteristic Miller lists is common public culture. That includes a wide range of shared 
elements from national character to political principles, which provide an identifiable 
source of commonality but at the same time leave room for private culture to flourish. This 
characteristic provides such a broad and malleable fundament that a large number of 
people can easily identify with it, despite the numerous differences they consciously 
observe among each other. Therefore, the story of the nation is distinguished by at least 
five key characteristics that bind the individual who identifies with it in ways s/he cannot 
independently renounce or subscribe to and link him/her in important ways to the 
political, legal and cultural order of the modern world. This is what explains the credibility 
of the nationhood narrative as a source of collective identity and the hegemony of the 
discourse of nationalism which it perpetuates. 
208 Even though religious communities can be mobilized for action, they follow an external source of will (the 
deity) whereas nations act in their own name, as Miller notes (Miller, ibid., 24). 
209 As observed by Billig, cited above: the practice of politics and ordinary speech confirm his claim.  
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Re-Narrating National Identity within Europeanization 
To be able to offer a credible alternative reading, the discourse of Europeanization needs 
to address these key characteristics of national identity in a convincing manner. Otherwise 
it would not be able to establish a legitimate basis for its hegemony. Unsurprisingly, this is 
what the most sceptical critics of Europeanization point to: the ‘democratic deficit’ of the 
Community. To a large extent European integration upholds a collective identity that is 
already a source of agency. European citizenship, enabling participation in European 
elections, has made that possible. However, the symbolic link between voting and 
governance is broken by the non-electability of the European institutions which actually 
govern in the way national governments do.210 Within the narrow context of electability, 
Europeanization cannot compete with nationalism’s relevance on this point. What it can 
do is foster ‘European’ norms and rules of governance which are translatable at the 
national level. Liberal democracy and its political practices have been articulated as such 
signifiers of ‘European-ness’. Asserting their significance affects the type of agency 
national identity offers and increases its credibility as a positive source of identity.   
European integration has already established in a categorical manner a connection 
between the community of people and the geographical space they inhabit. The common 
market, the common borders, border management and control policies instituted this 
connection politically. The common geographical space of ‘Europe’, however, has not been 
constituted at a personal level as a symbolic ‘homeland’ in the way it has within the 
national space. In view of nationalism’s salient interpretations of territory as ‘national’, 
Europeanization can attempt to modify the salience of certain elements in the 
interpretation of territory that have lesser symbolic value than others. Borders, for 
example, represent such elements. Working on the practical significance of borders’ 
permeability to the functioning of everyday life at the micro level, Europeanization has 
been able to significantly increase the symbolic value of open borders and shared national 
territories. This has become one important element of ‘European’ national identity 
narratives and has increased their credibility.  
210 A re-formulation of that link might remedy this fault, despite the enormous political investment risk it 
involves, as the fate of the European Constitutional Treaty demonstrated. 
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Where European discourse offers probably most convincing interpretation of national 
identity is Miller’s fifth point. Common public culture is the area where public narratives 
are officially converging to over-determine the ‘European-ness’ of culture as a signifier of 
civilizational achievement.211 This is illustrated in the active promotion of Europe’s political 
values, of its achievements in the realm of the common market, as well as of its cultural 
contribution per se. Reverting to the national cultural denominator occurs occasionally and 
only in specific domestic contexts.212 In general, European public cultural space provides a 
source of commonality which can be easily adopted at the personal level, thus establishing 
the indispensable link between the micro- and macro-level which national culture does, 
but replacing it with the ethically superior narrative of the wider common ground. 
Europeanization’s emphasis on preserving cultural difference as a European asset itself has 
greatly facilitated the ‘European’ reading of the signifier of culture. 
Outside the cultural, though, European integration as a source of collective self-
identification has, so far, been optional. Despite its readily availability, subjects may 
choose to subscribe to it or not. Renouncing ‘European’ identity is made possible by the 
uncertainty in which it positions its subjects. Faith in its existence has not been articulated 
in a hegemonic manner, and both politics and academia have had a role in that. 
Articulating the integration project as representative of the entire continent and not just 
selected states could help reduce the optional quality of Europeanization. Emphasizing its 
normative superiority as an inclusive community, Europeanization could increase its 
political relevance both within its current boundaries and outside. Particularly in the 
context of regions troubled by identity-based antagonisms (such as the Western Balkans) 
Europeanization could provide sufficient incentives to demonstrate its inclusive character 
and highlight its relevance to domestic politics, which is the primary locus of articulating 
national identity. Academic effort, in turn, could abandon the futile duality between 
‘national’ and ‘European’ identity and focus on ‘European national identity(ies)’ instead to 
reveal the effects of European integration on re-narrating nationhood in Europe.  
211 The empirical data and conclusions in Sifft et al., ‘Segmented Europeanization’ suggests the logic of this 
dynamics. 
212 Pertti Alasuutari offers an interesting perspective on the reasons behind this trend in his study of Finnish 
‘culturespeak’, embedding his explanation in the trends for globalization, see Pertti Alasuutari, ‘Art, 
Entertainment, Culture, and Nation’, Critical Methodologies, 1, (2001):157-184. 
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One characteristic of the Europeanization discourse, however, can potentially compromise 
its ability to significantly challenge nationalist interpretations of national identity, even 
though it is precisely this characteristic that has accounted for much of the success of the 
European project. Europeanization was meant to enable transcending past antagonisms. In 
this sense its focus is inevitably on the possibilities of the present at the expense of the 
past. The community it constitutes is future-oriented (realizing the possible), unlike the 
national community which is past-oriented (perpetuating the given). This is why 
membership in it can be individually renounced by considerations of the current 
generation – it is still subject to negotiation. To be able to reach out to the past, 
Europeanization discourse needs to deliberately focus on re-interpreting nationhood 
narratives in such a way as to highlight commonality and marginalize conflictuality. Though 
painful because of the traumas it might unearth, the enterprise is essential for the 
‘imagining’ of the community of Europe as ‘real’. Inevitably, such efforts have already 
attempted to re-narrate European identities in a compatible manner but the deep 
sedimentation of national narratives within the discursive contours of nationalism has 
prevented significant progress in view of the chronological disadvantage of 
Europeanization.   
Overall, Europeanization’s ability to produce floating signifiers capable of ‘capturing’ the 
signifiers of nationalism around these key points and filling them with different meanings 
is what determines its credibility in reading national identity. Ultimately, this also 
determines the future of the project of Europe. Failure could over-determine and stabilize 
nationalist discourse, and re-position the national subjects as the sole referents of 
sovereign power. If, however, Europeanization succeeds in reading national identity as the 
link between the individual and sovereign power at the supranational level, then it has the 
credible chance to marginalize nationalist interpretations and achieve hegemony. The 
greatest gain of this outcome would be reducing identity-based conflictuality in Europe.  
The Hegemonic Struggle around National Identity 
This takes us back to the central claim of this study. National identity is inherently 
antagonistic, particularly in the context of commonality. It will always resist its constitutive 
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‘Other(s)’ in order to preserve its totality. The only way to transcend this antagonism is by 
challenging the hegemony of the discourse of nationalism which upholds it as its central 
signifier. Instituting supranational governance as another locus of sovereign power, the 
project of European integration attempted to do precisely that. By broadening the 
perimeter of the collective ‘Self’, Europeanization discourse dramatically re-positioned the 
national subjects and re-defined the category of ‘otherness’, so as to make national 
identities in Europe more inclusive and ultimately less ‘national’. This is what suggests 
Europeanization’s potential to shift the axis of antagonisms beyond the ‘European’ space, 
to reconcile previously conflictual national identities, and to stabilize its own discursive 
space by perpetuating their national narratives in a credible manner. Caught within the 
borders of the nation-state, however, national identity perpetuates the discourse of 
nationalism through the link it establishes between the collectivity of the people and 
sovereign power. As long as Europeanization operates within these constraints, it will 
perpetually compete for hegemony with nationalism. Providing a credible reading of 
national identity, as the source of collective self-identification linking modified sovereign 
power back to the collectivity of the governed people, will therefore become the 
touchstone of its success.  
Discourse theory enables us to explore this hegemonic struggle by revealing the 
mechanisms of empowering and dislocating discourses. Pointing to the political forces and 
antagonisms which compete for hegemonic interpretation of the meaning of social 
phenomena, discourse theory uncovers the centrality of national identity for legitimizing 
and exercising sovereign power. Through the link to sovereignty, the process of articulating 
national identity becomes fundamental to realizing any political project. This is what 
suggests the significance of accommodating the national narratives within the project of 
European integration. Investigating the discursive mechanisms of this accommodation 
shows that Europeanization marginalizes conflictual narrative interpretations and fosters 
commonality. Thus it increases the credibility of the national narratives as a positive source 
of collective self-identification and enhances their political relevance. Stabilized through 
them, the discursive space of Europeanization becomes hegemonic, perpetuating the 
political relevance of the project of European integration. Through its focus on constituting 
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and articulating meaning, discourse theory helps investigate this dynamics. This is what 
proves its applicability to the research goals of this study. 
 
Original Research Contribution to the Study of National Identity in Europe 
In order to better understand the role of national identity in Europe from this perspective, 
the current investigation sought a context for studying the interaction between divergent 
interpretations of national identity narratives. The project of EU enlargement to the 
former communist states provided such context. Expanding the European project to the so 
called ‘New’ Europe required imagining sovereign power as supranational, thus creating 
the imperative of re-telling the national stories to allow for this new political reality. 
Compromised through their communist past and uncertain about their political future, 
national identities in the former communist states did not provide convincing sources of 
collective subjectivity at the state level. This created a condition of possibility for 
empowering the discourse of Europeanization and initiated its rivalry with the hegemony 
of nationalism.  
It is on the basis of these assumptions that the current study selected as its object of 
analysis conflictual national identity narratives in the relations between two candidate 
member states: Bulgaria and Macedonia. Of all applicant countries, it chose to study two 
states from the Balkans because of the increased political relevance of nationalism and the 
increased conflictuality of national identity narratives in the region. Following the way 
national identity narratives transform in the context of empowering Europeanization, the 
analysis set out to establish modifications in the ‘Self’-‘Other’ dialectic conditioning 
conflictuality and the effects these modifications had on stabilizing discursive hegemony. 
Tracing the evolution of Bulgarian-Macedonian relations confirms that where 
Europeanization succeeded in providing credible alternative readings of national identity 
signifiers, it transformed identity narratives in an inclusive, non-conflictual manner. The 
new, ‘European’ interpretations of identity were upheld by the discourse of 
Europeanization, so stabilizing them also re-enforced the hegemony of Europeanization 
and the political relevance of its project of integration. Where Europeanization did not 
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succeed in articulating credible alternative meanings of national identity signifiers, 
conflictuality was perpetuated. The discourse of nationalism, which continued to provide 
the dominant interpretations of national identity signifiers around these points, often 
succeeded in capturing the signifiers of ‘Europe’, instrumentalizing them for the purposes 
of asserting its own hegemony over discursive reality. This significantly threatened the 
credibility of the Europeanization discourse itself and problematized its political relevance. 
These conclusions are therefore relevant to understanding not only the place of national 
identity in Europe, but also the future of the European project. In this sense, the originality 
of the investigation is threefold. 
In the first place, it is contained in the cross-disciplinary approach and analytical frame. 
Studying national identity change at the inter-section of the discipline of International 
Relations and the sub-disciplines of European Studies and the Study of Nationalism is in 
itself novel. The dissertation explores transformations of national identity narratives in the 
‘Self’-‘Other’ dialectic they perpetuate. Following the evolution of conflictuality in bilateral 
relations between two states (a traditional International Relations object of study) within 
the context of Europeanization (a classical European Studies field), the analysis reveals 
mechanisms of reconciling conflictual national identities (a central theme in the Study of 
Nationalism). The advantage of this approach lies in the combination of various theoretical 
backgrounds which enables fuller understanding of the role of national identity in Europe. 
The application of poststructuralist discourse theory, which easily accommodates such 
cross-disciplinarity, to the analysis of national identity change completes the unique 
theoretical configuration that represents this study’s disciplinary and analytical 
background. 
A second aspect in which the dissertation represents a novel research contribution is 
contained in its claim about the role of national identity within the European project. 
Analyzing the struggle for hegemony between the discourses of nationalism and of 
Europeanization, the analysis points to an inherent tension within the European 
integration project which it constantly attempts to deny. As long as it operates within the 
constraints of the political project of nation-state sovereignty, integration in Europe will 
perpetually be challenged by re-surfacing nationalist interpretations of identity. On one 
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end of the line (not inconceivably far down) stands the possibility of dislocating the 
Europeanization discourse and cancelling out its institutional construct. On the other (very 
far) end stands the possibility of transcending these constraints and re-enforcing a new 
symbolic order of Europeanization detached from the political project of nation-state 
sovereignty. This possibility might create the conditions for eventually dislocating the 
discourse of nationalism. The conclusions of this study stand somewhere in between. The 
political relevance of national identity in Europe is a fact, not only in its periphery but also 
in its very heart, even though the antagonisms it perpetuates is the last thing that Europe 
needs well into the 21st century. Europeanization, therefore, needs to find a way to co-
exist in the discursive presence of nationalism, ensured by the relevance of national 
identity, and still maintain its discursive power. It can do so by offering a credible 
alternative reading of national identity, upholding a positive, optimistic, self-enhancing 
vision of national subjectivity. The discourse of Europeanization has the potential to do 
this. By re-positioning threatening ‘otherness’ and deferring it from the ‘Self’, it can 
significantly reduce conflictuality in identity articulation, at least within the limits of 
‘Europe’. It can therefore offer a much broader range of possibilities for cooperation than 
identity articulated within nationalism. It can also claim moral superiority over nationalism 
in view of its reconciliatory potential and inclusive quality. Read within the discourse of 
Europeanization in such a manner, national identity narratives perpetuate the discursive 
hegemony which renders them credible. Inability to accommodate the signifiers of 
national identity, on the other hand, could pose a hegemonic threat to the discourse of 
‘Europe’ and assert the hegemony of nationalism. In this sense, the reading of national 
identity becomes the touchstone of the integration project. This suggestion is in itself a 
novel approach to seeing national identity in Europe.  
A third aspect of originality of this dissertation is its area focus. Taking up cases from the 
Balkans, the analysis contributes to the literature on a much understudied problem: the 
complex bilateral relations between the Republic of Bulgaria and the Republic of 
Macedonia213. Embedded into a common past for much of their newer histories, the two 
213 The official constitutional name of the Republic of Macedonia will be used in this dissertation at the 
expense of the internationally recognized ‘Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’.  
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states have evolved from joint emancipatory struggles for independent statehood during 
the 19th century into concealed sovereign antagonists in the heart of the Balkans of the 
20th century. Because of the particular historical context within which this evolution 
occurred and the East-West divide which had dominated both politics and academia in the 
region, the study of the relationship between the two states has mostly been framed 
within their domestic histories.214 Thus it has been unable to avoid the structuring 
influences of domestic contexts of nationalist interpretations of history. This dissertation 
explores conflictuality in Bulgarian-Macedonian relations from a non-historical 
perspective. Its discursive approach reveals the contingent nature of historical narratives 
and studies them as a means to uncover the power relations which upheld them in the 
first place. It attempts to understand the logic of discursive strategies of ‘othering’ which 
generate identity-based conflictuality, and to investigate the mechanisms for reconciliation 
which the grand discourse of Europeanization can provide. Presuming the impossibility of 
scientific objectivity, this dissertation therefore attempts to transcend the analytical 
constraints of discursive hegemony by focusing on the strategies of empowerment of 
hegemonic discourse and telling ‘small stories’ about the ways national identity changes 
and affects discursive reality. Understanding the logic of those promises to reveal much 
more about Bulgarian-Macedonian relations than existing research struggling within 
dominant interpretations of history. In this sense, the analysis offers an original 
contribution to an underexplored cleavage of Balkan politics – in the context of 
Europeanization. 
- - - 
Having outlined poststructuralist discourse theory as the theoretical and meta-theoretical 
frame of analysis underpinning this dissertation, and having explored its applicability to the 
research theme, research object and research goal of the dissertation, this chapter pointed 
214 See on the Bulgarian side, Dimitar Gotsev, National Liberation Struggles in Macedonia 1912-1915 (Sofia: 
Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, 1981) in Bulgarian, Kostadin Paleshtuski, The Macedonian Question in 
Bourgeois Yugoslavia 1918-1941 (Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, 1983) in Bulgarian, Kuzman 
Shapkarev, Reviving Bulgarian Spirit in Macedonia, Unpublished Notes and Letters (Sofia: Bulgarian Author, 
1984). On the Macedonian (Yugoslav) side, Aleksandar Hristov, Creating the Macedonian State (1893-1945) 
(Belgrade: Contemporary Administration, 1971) in Serbian, Lazar Kolishevski, Aspects of the Macedonian 
Question (Belgrade: People’s Book, 1981) in Serbian, Momchilo Stefanovich and Mihailo Apostolski, Greater 
Bulgarian Claims from San Stefano to the Present (Belgrade: Vuk Karadžić, 1978) in Serbian.  
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to the aspects of originality which distinguish the current piece of research. The purpose of 
the following chapter is to lay out the methodological frame of the investigation and to 
present the particular methods which enabled its realization.    
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY, RESEARCH DESIGN, METHOD: 
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AND THE STORIES OF IDENTITY 
 
Unsurprisingly, certain ontological considerations are related to certain epistemological 
choices, which together structure the way research is designed. 215 Meta-theoretical 
assumptions pre-determine what is there to be studied and how it can be approached. As 
discussed in detail in the previous chapter, poststructuralist discourse theory forms the 
theoretical background of this analysis. Its anti-essentialist ontology and anti-
foundationalist epistemology inevitably affect the research design of this investigation. The 
following chapter aims to demonstrate how poststructuralist discourse theory’s key 
analytical tool – discourse analysis – is applied to achieve the research purpose of this 
study: explore the mechanisms of narrative transformation of national identity within the 
context of Europeanization in order to better understand the significance of national 
identity within the European integration project. The findings of the investigation 
permitted the formulation of the central claim of this study. The credible reading of 
national identity narratives within the Europeanization discourse asserts the political 
relevance of the latter and has the potential to re-enforce a new discursive hegemony, 
marginalizing the discourse of nationalism. Before it proceeds to the specific 
methodological steps which enabled these findings, this chapter offers a brief justification 
of the topical research focus of the dissertation and its selection of cases.  
 
215 For a useful overview of scholarly debates on this point Colin Hay, ‘Does Ontology Trump Epistemology? 
Notes on the Directional Dependence of Ontology and Epistemology in Political Analysis’, Politics 27(2), 
(2007): 115–118. 
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Methodology 
Why Focus on the Eastern Enlargement 
The analysis sought to identify suitable discursive contexts which showcased the dynamics 
of ‘reading’ national identity within the discourse of Europeanization against that of 
nationalism, and to explore their credibility. Dominant interpretations of national identity 
narratives are examined within this changing discursive environment, conditioned by the 
hegemonic struggles between the grand discourses of nationalism and of Europeanization. 
The context of EU enlargement to the former communist space is seen here as showcasing 
these hegemonic struggles. In a very visible way, the breakup of communism in Europe and 
the appeal of European integration upheld Europeanization as a grand discourse, at the 
same time acknowledging the legitimate attraction of nationalism as an organizing 
discourse for the story of the state. This openness about the legitimacy of nationalism 
cannot be observed in much the same way outside the former communist space in Europe 
because of the specific historical background to the idea of integration and the different 
political course which the rest of Europe took after the Second World War. At the same 
time the normative attraction of the integration idea in the particular context of the 
breakup of communism decidedly empowered the discourse of Europeanization to 
compete with the dominant meanings established by nationalism. In this sense the 
Enlargement of the European integration project to the former communist space 
replicates a discursive environment similar to the one characterizing the early years of 
integration: challenged discursive hegemony of nationalism, enabling the empowerment 
of an alternative grand discourse. This environment would not have been as visible within 
traditional EU member states where Europeanization is represented as hegemonic. Though 
struggling with the discursive challenges posed by nationalism, traditional EU member 
states do not officially debate Europe without the integration project216. Excluding this 
option, which remains available to non-EU member states, attempts to conceal the 
discursive struggle between the two grand discourses over hegemonic interpretations of 
216 At least not as an official position of the state. 
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identity. The context of EU enlargement, in contrast, is open to it and therefore promises 
to reveal more about the narrative mechanisms of reading national identity in a credible 
manner and the discursive power of certain readings over others. Focusing on it has the 
analytical advantage of tracing the conditions of possibility which enabled the 
empowerment of the Europeanization discourse, emphasizing the discursive power of its 
interpretations of social reality – and identities. Unlike nationalism, whose power rests on 
antagonized national identities, the power of Europeanization discourse lies in its 
reconciliatory potential. Significantly increasing the credibility of the national narratives as 
a story of the state, Europeanization incorporated them into a new discursive hegemony. 
This dynamics, which the current study sets out to investigate, is captured in the process of 
enlargement of the European Union to the former communist states in Central and South-
Eastern Europe. This is what makes it a suitable analytical context for the investigation.  
The progress of decommunization generally increased the political relevance of national 
identity both as a strategy of dissent against totalitarian ideology and as a nation- and 
state-building strategy. In the changing discursive context of empowering Europeanization 
in the former communist space, ‘reading’ national identity became an indispensible 
element of the political struggles for hegemony in view of national identity’s link to 
sovereign power. Its political relevance, however, was not always as obvious. It is where 
identity narratives were antagonized to tangible identity-based conflictuality that their 
significance in formulating official state positions became evident and political mechanisms 
for reconciliation were called for. The Balkan region signified one such discursive point.  
Why Turn to the Balkans 
Among the states which emerged out of communism and (re-)turned to Europe, almost all 
can offer contexts of identity-based conflictuality, whether implicit or explicit. True, issues 
of national identity re-definition have been as prominent in Central Europe as they have 
been in the Baltic states. More often than not they have occurred along the fault line of 
ethno-national antagonisms217 and have remained low key as a problem of domestic 
217 Examples include a wide range of (ethno-)nations and (ethno-)nationalities in Europe: the problems of 
accommodating Russian minorities in the Baltics (reference points on that and other minority issues in 
Europe in Stephen Deets, ‘Reimagining the Boundaries of the Nation: Politics and the Development of Ideas 
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politics.218 But in the Balkans they escalated to inter-ethnic violence, ethnic cleansing and 
nationalist war. It was from the Balkans that Europe’s claims for having tamed conflictual 
nationalisms were inecquivokably challenged. The uncertainties caused by the complex 
transitions which the Balkan states219 embarked upon, significantly complicated by the 
imperatives of consolidating statehood and nationhood, triggered more intensive 
discursive strategies of identification. In the immediate absence of plausible alternative 
interpretations of collective state identity, they turned to nationhood as a relatively stable 
vision of ‘Self’. The salience of nationalism in the Balkans became so pervasive that 
explanations of it have often been linked to ‘cultural’ peculiarities of the region itself.220 
Choosing to study the dynamics of Europeanization’s reading of national identity in the 
Balkans, out of many possible cases from the former communist space, therefore aims to 
reflect the increased salience of identity-based conflictuality in the region. Within the 
conceptual frame of this dissertation, it is seen as offering ‘most difficult’221 cases of 
identity accommodation in ‘Europe’. In view of the discursive tension between the 
discourse of Europeanization and the discourse of nationalism, ‘difficult’ cases of 
accommodation would be national identity narratives articulated hegemonically within the 
discourse of nationalism. Indeed, the opposite could have made Europeanization the most 
likely outcome of this discursive configuration.222 It would therefore not have been able to 
reveal as much about the logic of accommodation as a ‘difficult’ case can.  
Why Select Bulgaria and Macedonia 
The investigation selected Bulgaria and Macedonia as its case studies. The two states 
showcase the discursive struggle discussed above. The break-up of communism 
submerged both of them in complex processes of transition to democracy and market 
on Minority Rights’, East European Politics and Societies 20 (3): 419-466); Hungarian minorities in Romania 
and Slovakia (Aurelian Craiutu, ‘A Dilemma of Dual Identity: the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in 
Romania’, European Constitutional Review 43 (1995)), Roma issues, etc.  
218 Despite various degrees of escalation of tensions – Estonia, Latvia.  
219 With the exception of Greece and Turkey. 
220 Maria Todorova challenges some of the arguments in this vein, see for instance Maria Todorova, ‘The Trap 
of Backwardness: Modernity, Temporality and the Study of Eastern European Nationalism’, Slavic Review 
64(1), (2005): 140-164, and Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
221 Jason Seawright and John Gerring, ‘Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of  
Qualitative and Quantitative Options’, Political Research Quarterly 61(2), (2008): 294-308. 
222 As the unproblematic 1995 EU-accession of Finland, Austria and Sweden suggests. 
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economy, as well as to consolidating nationhood and statehood. These major internal 
reforms created a context of insecurity which re-activated national identity rhetoric as a 
strategy of organizing and stabilizing the discursive space.  National identity’s most salient 
interpretations came from the discourse of nationalism, as the analysis in the empirical 
chapters will demonstrate. Decommunization processes thus re-enforced the political 
relevance of nationalism and politicized the inherent conflictuality which it contained. 
Empirically, this was linked to increased intra-state and inter-state antagonism. Despite 
their popular appeal, however, nationalist interpretations of identity had also been 
somewhat compromised, either because they had been utilized by the repressive regime 
(as in Bulgaria) or because they had been associated with violence and war (as in 
Macedonia). The project of integration in Europe offered an alternative interpretation of 
national role and purpose. The idea of (re-)turn to Europe as an optimistic vision for the 
future formulated participation in the project of European integration as a logical strategic 
goal from the very beginning of transition in both Bulgaria and Macedonia.223 This 
gradually empowered the discourse of Europeanization and linked it to the processes of 
national identity (re-)construction. Therefore, the discursive contexts within the two states 
illustrate the dynamics of national identity re-narration from the discursive hegemony of 
nationalism to the empowerment of Europeanization.  
Their selection as offering cases of narrative transformation of national identity, out of 
many possible cases from states in the Balkans, has been motivated by two considerations. 
One is purely pragmatic. This author has extensive previous knowledge of the two states, 
an insider’s view, access to institutional sources, linguistic competences. This not only 
greatly facilitates research. It also becomes a necessary precondition if the research is 
framed within a discursive approach which focuses on identifying specific contexts and 
linking them to particular meanings articulated through language.  
A second consideration which prompted this research choice is linked to its analytical 
relevance. As pointed above, the analysis seeks ‘difficult’ cases of national identity 
accommodation within the discourse of Europeanization, which is why it looked for them 
223 Usually linked to aspirations to join the Western military alliance, the NATO, and articulated in the 
formula ‘Euro-Atlantic integration’. 
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in the Balkans. Bulgaria and Macedonia offer such cases in view of the increased salience 
of nationalist interpretations of identity in their transitions. In comparison to other Balkan 
states, however, Bulgaria and Macedonia offer cases of identity narratives whose 
conflictuality can be considered moderate. They never participated in the type of ethno-
nationalist violence which occurred in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo. Even though 
manifested on every key political occasion, their conflictuality remained implicit. It is read 
in antagonistic interpretations of the signifiers of ‘Self’ upheld within the state and 
projected externally. It is displayed in conflictual state behaviour towards the domestic and 
foreign national ‘Other(s)’. While identity-based antagonisms exploding in violence are 
characteristic of the extreme cases of nationalism, the conflictuality in Bulgarian and 
Macedonian national identity narratives characterizes its most common cases. Indeed, this 
type of conflictuality can be detected not only in the former communist space but in the 
majority of states in Europe. As already noted, nationalism delimits the boundaries 
between national ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ along the borders of the national state as, customarily, 
borders identify separate national communities. Even when such communities co-exist 
within national borders, they still refer to past, prospective, or imaginary borders in their 
affirmation of collective identity.224 The divisive function of borders is necessary for 
national identity construction because its absence would subvert the uniqueness of the 
national ‘Self’. Thus, commonality conditions increased conflictuality, and states in Europe 
have a lot in common. In this sense the moderate conflictuality of Bulgaria’s and 
Macedonia’s national identity narratives illustrates ‘most similar’225 cases of European 
nationalism. Understanding its mechanisms of reconciliation within the discourse of 
Europeanization, therefore, has much greater applicability than studying an extreme case. 
Situated at the ideal methodological inter-section of similarity and difference in view of the 
salience of nationalism as a dominant discursive space for the narration of national 
identity, Bulgaria and Macedonia became the topical focus of this investigation.  
 
224 E.g. Flemish nationalism in Belgium, Basque nationalism in France, Catalan nationalism in Spain. 
225 Seawright and Gerring, ‘Case Selection Techniques’, 304-306. 
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The Advantages of Comparative Analysis 
A study of national identity narratives, however, would not be complete if it focused only 
on the articulations of national ‘Self’. National identity is necessarily constituted and re-
asserted against its constitutive ‘Other(s)’. It has no other determining centre, as discussed 
in greater length above. In this sense, its discursive articulations are inextricable from the 
discursive articulations of ‘otherness’. Obviously, the infinite number of excluded options 
upon which the constitution of national identity is made possible disables studying the 
‘Self’-‘Other’ dialectic in all of its interpretations as a viable research option. This is what 
suggested selecting one of its central dimensions and exploring its transformations. 
Certainly, this cannot be isolated from the entirety of the discursive field in which identity 
is being positioned. Conflictuality along one dimension of the ‘Self-‘Other’ dialectic is 
necessarily affected by its other dimensions. A valid analysis should acknowledge this. But 
isolating just one dimension enables the construction of a feasible research design that is 
capable of revealing the peculiarities of identity transformation under two hegemonic 
interpretations against a background of infinite possibility.  
As noted in the discussion on the field of discursivity, not all excluded alternative 
interpretations of identity are equally relevant to identity construction. Several more 
salient interpretations compete for the contents of the same identity signifiers, upholding 
different narratives. Their salience is determined by the outcome of political struggles 
which eventually brought about the stabilization of one interpretation of identity over 
another. In Bulgarian and Macedonian identity politics, Bulgarian-Macedonian relations 
delineate one particularly salient dimension of ‘othering’ in the construction of national 
identity because of the key position which the particular ‘Other’ took in articulating the 
‘Self’. This is the methodological reasoning behind selecting conflictuality in Bulgarian-
Macedonian relations, out of all possible alternatives, as central dimension of identity 
construction in the two states.  
Tracing the transformations of national identity narratives in the process of empowering 
the Europeanization discourse in two states and the evolution of their conflictual relations 
has been prompted by the conceptual framework of this study. But it also offers the 
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methodological advantages of comparative research. Either one of the case studies of 
conflictual national identity narratives on its own would have probably provided a more 
detailed picture of the peculiarities of identity articulation domestically. Nevertheless, this 
would have been an incomplete picture because it would have lacked the dynamics of 
interaction along the ‘Self-‘Other’ axis. Having two case studies instead of one allows 
highlighting the function of ‘otherness’ in the identity construction, be it only along one 
dimension of the ‘Self’-‘Other’ dialectic. It also prompts the inclusion of bilateral relations 
as an analytical field, thus offering insights not only to the domestic, but also to the 
external articulations of identity. Furthermore, having two case studies and not just one 
offers the possibility of tracing the transformations of identity narratives synchronically in 
the process of empowering the Europeanization discourse. Focusing on the same elements 
of identity articulation domestically and externally and identifying their modified 
interpretations promises to provide a fuller understanding of the mechanism of 
accommodating conflictual national identity narratives within the discourse of 
Europeanization. Comparing the outcomes uncovers commonalities and differences of 
accommodation which transcend the peculiarities of the single case study and offer a basis 
of inference. Turning one case study into a sui generis testing ground for the conclusions 
reached through the other becomes an indicator of the specific and the general outcomes 
in the two. In this sense the applicability of comparative analysis has been invaluable.  
Case Studies and Their Comparability 
As argued above, similarity of discursive contexts in Bulgaria and Macedonia suggests a 
basis of comparability between identity narratives and their transformation with the 
empowerment of Europeanization. This similarity has been conditioned by common 
elements in the fundament of identity (re-)narration. Bulgaria and Macedonia share into 
the geopolitical specificity of the Balkan region, so their interpretations of territory and 
territorial space have referred to similar reference points. The two states also share into 
the leading narratives of Balkan history centred around struggles for emancipation from 
the Ottoman Empire, movements for national independence and ambitions for integral 
national sovereignty. Within the discourse of nationalism these historical narratives are 
similarly salient, even though interpreted in a mutually exclusive manner. A third aspect of 
 
90 
 
N. Nancheva                                                                                                                                        Transforming Identities in Europe 
similarity is determined by national culture. Its most sedimented aspects have been 
articulated in the traditions of Eastern Orthodoxy and similar dialects from the Slavic 
linguistic family. Cultural similarities were seen as particularly threatening to the 
uniqueness of national ‘Self’ precisely because of their sedimented quality. Furthermore, 
the two states display notable similarities in their post-communist transitions. With the 
breakup of communism in Europe they both embarked upon complex processes of 
establishing democracy, re-structuring the market, re-defining the principles of statehood 
and consolidating nationhood. These reforms initially generated greater insecurity, which 
similarly re-activated the political salience of national identity as a strategy of making 
sense of destabilized discursive realities. Yet another aspect of similarity is revealed in the 
post-communist strategic orientation of the two states. As a strategic foreign policy goal 
both Bulgaria and Macedonia subscribed to the aspiration for Euro-Atlantic integration. 
This strategic orientation created the condition of possibility in both states for the 
empowerment of the discourse of Europeanization. Thus, commonality between Bulgaria 
and Macedonia includes similar elements in the traditional narration of national identity 
(territory, history, culture, direction) occupying similar discursive positions. It also displays 
similar discursive dynamics: the interaction between politically salient nationalism and 
empowering Europeanization. This points to the basis of comparability between the two 
and promises valid conclusions about the mechanisms of identity transformation within 
the discourse of Europeanization.  
But at the same time, the two states display specificities which need to be accounted for. 
They come from different traditions of statehood (unitary state versus a federative entity) 
which affects the way sovereignty and sovereign territory are being interpreted. It also has 
consequences for the perceptions of integrity of the state community. Differences in the 
domestic accommodation of national minorities (a monolithic-nation constitutional model 
versus a multi-nationality constitutional model) affect the narratives of nationhood and 
the interpretations of the nation in the two states. Differences in the interpretation of 
identity signifiers in the two states’ narratives of identity promise to add empirical value to 
the investigation. Irrespective of the precise contents of the signifiers of identity, they 
function in a similar way in the discursive practices of articulation and over-determination 
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of subject positions. Specificities in the two states also promise to add analytical value to 
the study. Unequal positions in the international system of states (recognized statehood 
versus the outstanding issue of acquiring international recognition) and dissimilar positions 
in regional politics (open disputes with other neighbours in the Macedonian case) lead to 
divergent paths towards European integration and consequently different strategies of 
empowering the Europeanization discourse. Nevertheless, European integration continued 
to represent a strategic point of national direction in the period under study and the 
European community continued to provide sufficient incentives in order to maintain the 
credibility of the strategic goal. In this sense, Europeanization remained dominant as an 
alternative discourse of community. Therefore, the different strategies of empowering it 
suggest different mechanisms of capturing identity signifiers within the discourse of 
‘Europe’. The purpose of this dissertation is understanding these mechanisms. So 
comparison between the two states promises to establish a plausible basis for 
inference.226 
Level of Analysis 
National identity narratives and their transformation can be studied both at the micro- and 
the macro-level since the community they imagine links the individual to the sovereign 
power which governs individual lives. Both methodological starting points, as well as a 
combination of the two, are valid research options promising interesting insights. The 
analysis offered in this dissertation operates at the level of the state. This methodological 
choice has been prompted by the disciplinary background of the study, by its subject and 
research goals, as well as by its conceptual framework. Originating from the empirical 
puzzle of nationalist conflict and conflictuality in Europe, this dissertation sets out to 
explore the mechanisms for antagonization and reconciliation of national identity within 
the discursive limits of Europeanization. International relations theory, which theorizes 
nationalist conflict at the level of the state, forms the natural background of the analysis. It 
intersects with the sub-disciplines of European Studies and the Study of Nationalism 
precisely in their common interest in national identity as nation-state identity. Analyzing 
226 Given its anti-essentialist ontology and reflectivist epistemology, the inference aimed at is descriptive and 
at best predictive, rather than causal. 
 
92 
 
                                                            
N. Nancheva                                                                                                                                        Transforming Identities in Europe 
the transformations of national identity at the state level is also justified by the research 
goals of this study. It follows transformations in national identity narratives in order to 
establish changes in the narration of the national story legitimizing the state and state 
sovereignty in the European integration project. The investigation traces the evolution of 
conflictuality in order to establish how changed stories of community stabilize one 
discursive power formation or another. Since the fault lines of discursive tension concern 
the legitimacy of the state and supra-state communities, then studying national identity 
narratives at the micro level is beyond the analytical interest of this dissertation. The 
conceptualization of national identity from a discourse theory perspective also suggests 
the irrelevance of the micro-level here. National identity differs from other social identities 
precisely in its link to sovereign power – this is what determines its political relevance. 
Focusing on the micro-level would marginalize this link at the expense of the psychological 
and sociological dimensions of identity articulation. And since this dissertation is interested 
in national identity narratives in their relevance to legitimizing different discursive 
hegemonies, it formulates its conclusions to be valid for the level of the state.   
Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis indicates what exactly is being studied. 227 As pointed out above, the 
subject of this investigation is the transformation of national identity narratives and the 
mechanisms of their accommodation in the grand discourse of Europeanization. Therefore, 
what is being studied is national identity narratives. This is the unit of analysis. National 
identity narratives are made up of stories articulating the subject positions of national 
‘Self’ and ‘Other’. Therefore, they represent a discursive dialectic which determines the 
interaction of the national ‘Self’ with ‘Other(s)’ and is in turn re-produced in these 
interactions. Studying national identity in the context of inter-state (read inter-national) 
relations therefore promises to reveal more about the interpretations of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ 
than analyzing identity narratives in isolation from actual state behaviour. This is what 
suggested the applicability of a small-N comparative study: here, studying several (six) 
227 According to students of methodology, this step precisely is what distinguishes a case study (single unit) 
from a cross-case analysis (many units): John Gerring, ‘What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good for?’, The 
American Political Science Review 98 (2), (2004): 341-354, 343. 
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identity narratives over two states.228 Following the transformations of interpretations of 
‘Self’ and ‘Other’ in the bilateral relations of these two states highlights changes along one 
(central) dimension of the ‘Self’-‘Other’ dialectic, which is necessarily a simplified model of 
identity change. At the expense of empirical detail, however, this methodological approach 
promises to uncover the logic of discursive transformation of national identity, which is the 
aim of this investigation. 
National identity has been defined here as a collection of narratives. So the selected 
dimension of the ‘Self’-‘Other’ dialectic is identifiable through narratives telling the story of 
the ‘Self’ in relation to that particular ‘Other’. These narratives indicate the discursive 
subject positions of ‘us’ and ‘them’. Thus they are directed both towards the domestic 
national space (inhabited predominantly by the ‘Self(ves)’) and towards the external 
national space (inhabited by the ‘Other(s)’). They focus on key elements characterizing the 
subject positions and narrating their story. The discursive position of national ‘Self’ is 
traditionally fixed through particular interpretations of history, territory, borders, 
nationhood, minorities, national role, political culture, language, religion, customs, 
traditions. This analysis chooses three of these signifiers which have greater salience and 
are present in the discursive constructions of identity in both Bulgaria and Macedonia. 
They are territory, nationhood, and national purpose. Their interpretations uphold three 
key narrative groups indicating the discursive position of ‘Self’. The discursive position of 
‘Other’ is fixed through elements establishing the limits of ‘Self’. In inter-state relations 
they are often contentious issues which highlight difference. Several elements in 
Bulgarian-Macedonian relations can be seen to serve this purpose: divergent 
interpretations of shared past, nationhood, statehood, church autocephality, language, 
minorities. Three have been selected as more salient in structuring bilateral relations: 
recognition of statehood, the language dispute, and acknowledging the status of national 
minorities. The interpretations of these three elements uphold narratives of identity which 
indicate the discursive position of ‘Other’ in the national identity construction.  
228 Ibid., 346. 
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Thus the analysis studies six national identity narratives (units): three of them are 
predominantly concerned with positioning the ‘Self’ and three of them – with positioning 
the ‘Other’ (Table 1). Tracing modifications in these six units in the course of empowering 
Europeanization in the two states should uncover the mechanisms of ‘reading’ identity 
signifiers within the new discursive formation and should indicate the logic of identity 
change. Focusing on one dimension of the ‘Self’-‘Other’ dialectic which (re-)produces 
identity – Bulgarian-Macedonian relations – helps highlight the investigated discursive 
dynamics.  
Identity Narratives of ‘Self’ Identity Narratives of ‘Other’ 
Territory 
Nationhood 
National purpose 
Recognition of statehood 
The language dispute 
National Minority Rights 
Table 1. Units of Analysis. 
Analytical Timeframe 
A logical approach to setting the timeframe within which identity change will be analysed 
here is to look at national identity narratives before the empowerment of the 
Europeanization discourse and after. Defining ‘before’ and ‘after’, however, implies 
selecting more or less discretionary moments in time, since the exact time of establishing a 
hegemonic discourse cannot be set in stone. Instead of looking for clues for formalizing the 
discursive empowerment of Europeanization, this analysis sets a timeframe using formal 
criteria and traces the transformation of the selected identity narratives within this 
timeframe. Europeanization began in the context of post-communist transition, so its 
chronological limits should contain (part of) the process of empowering the ‘Europe’ 
discourse.  
Transition was launched with the dismantling of the communist regimes. Formally this is 
linked to the first multi-party elections of 1990 for both Bulgaria and Macedonia, even 
though the symbolic marker of the end of communism is customarily placed elsewhere in 
the two states. In Bulgaria it is seen in the date 10th November 1989, when Bulgaria’s 
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totalitarian head of state was ousted from power in a party coup.229 In Macedonia, special 
symbolic meaning is carried by the declaration of independence of 8th September 1991, 
marking the break up from the Yugoslav federation and the beginning of Macedonia’s 
independent statehood. Despite the significant symbolism of these dates, a formal 
criterion has been preferred for selecting the beginning of the analysed period. First, 
formality enables chronological parity. Second, and more importantly, it prevents the 
analysis from missing out on key moments in the articulation of Macedonia’s national 
identity narratives (which already revolved around independence) should the later date be 
preferred. Also, dismantling the communist regime in Bulgaria was largely negotiated by 
the leadership of the communist party230, so the opposition needed time to organize and 
mobilize before decommunization could begin. In this sense, not much is lost in terms of 
official public debate on national identity if the last quarter of 1989 is not included in the 
analyzed timeframe.  
The chronological point marking its end is set by Bulgaria’s joining the EU as a symbolic 
mark of the end of transition – the first day of 2007. Obviously, the Europeanization 
discourse continues to undergo significant (and quite interesting) changes in both of the 
studied states after one of them achieved membership. But since the other state has not, 
this implies a completely different basis of comparability from the one adopted here. 
Participating in the discourse of Europeanization as a candidate and as a member state 
produces very dissimilar strategies of identity articulation in view of different subject 
positions of the state towards the supranational community. In this sense a comparison of 
identity narratives requires a different conceptual and methodological basis. It should 
make for the subject of exciting new research on national identity and Europeanization in 
the relations between the two states.231  
Within this timeframe, identity narratives articulating the discursive position of ‘Self’ are 
studied towards the beginning and towards the end of transition. These narratives are 
229 Timothy Garton Ash, We The People (Penguin, 1999). 
230 Jon Elster (ed.), The Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown of Communism (University of Chicago Press, 
1996), ch. 5. 
231 That should also reveal the stability of accommodation of the national narratives and test the 
reconciliatory power of the new discursive hegemony. 
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more static because of their function – to stabilize the position of ‘Self’, and are generally 
not linked to specific points in time. Unless their salience notably increases in view of 
particular discursive occurrences (e.g. the inter-ethnic tension in Macedonia of 2001), it is 
safe to assume that the dynamic of change there requires more time to unfold. Identity 
narratives articulating the discursive position of ‘Other’ are much more vulnerable to 
changing political contexts because they are more dependent on inter-state relations. 
Therefore, their investigation here concentrates around the moments of increased 
salience marked by significant events of bilateral concern. Narratives of recognition of 
statehood are thus most salient around the time of Bulgaria’s recognition of Macedonian 
independence (1991). Narratives of language are linked to the period of the so called 
language dispute and its resolution (1994-1999). Narratives of minorities are visible at 
various points during the studied period but their salience increases significantly with the 
involvement of the European Court of Human Rights after 1999. Therefore, the discursive 
space which is the object of this investigation is chronologically oriented towards these 
points (Table 2). 
Narratives of 
Identity 
1990- 1991-1993 1994-1999 2000-2006 -2006 
Self Territory    Territory 
Nationhood Nationhood 
Purpose Purpose 
Other  Recognition Language Minorities  
Table  2. Analytical timeframe and salience of identity narratives.  
 
Research Design  
Understanding the mechanisms of accommodating narratives of national identity within 
the discourse of Europeanization involves studying identity change. The investigation 
traces the transformations in national identity interpretations in the course of empowering 
‘Europe’ in Bulgaria and in Macedonia. Conceptualizing national identity as a discursive 
construction made possible through the exclusion of ‘otherness’, the analysis selects one 
central dimension of the ‘Self’-‘Other’ dialectic that accounts for identity constitution – 
Bulgarian-Macedonian relations – and follows its evolution under the hegemony of the 
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Europeanization discourse. It attempts to identify transformations both in the discursive 
position of ‘Self’ and in the discursive position of ‘Other’. It therefore follows identity 
narratives articulated towards the domestic and towards the external discursive space. 
Empirically, this implies studying co-variations diachronically within the units and 
synchronically across the units.232  
Domestic articulations of identity narratives are being traced around three traditional 
identity signifiers, which have been identified in both cases. They are upheld through the 
interpretations of national territory, national community, national purpose. The contents 
of these identity signifiers notably changes over time in the course of Europeanization. 
Some of its interpretations increase or decrease in salience, others disappear completely, 
yet other new interpretations gain discursive prominence. The transformation is being 
established in a within-unit comparison of the discursive pattern of national identity at the 
beginning of the process of transition, when national identity is being articulated within 
the discourse of nationalism, and towards its end, when national identity signifiers are 
increasingly being captured by the discourse of Europeanization (Table 3).  
Identity Signifier 
of Self 
1990 2006 
Bulgaria Macedonia Bulgaria Macedonia 
Territory integrity belonging openness integrity 
Nationhood unity ambiguity tolerance tolerance 
Purpose centrality statehood contribution predictability 
Table 3. Research Design for the study of identity narratives of ‘Self’.  
 
As visible from the table, different interpretations occupy similar discursive positions at the 
beginning of transition and towards its end. They make up for different discursive patterns 
of national identity. The analysis establishes that narratives of ‘Self’ generally tend to 
display a greater divisive potential within the discourse of nationalism and be more 
inclusive within the discourse of Europeanization, irrespective of the precise contents of 
their signifiers. 
232 Gerring, ‘What Is a Case Study?’, 343. 
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External articulations of identity narratives are being traced around three signifiers whose 
interpretations in both states raise significant conflictuality. They are detectable around 
the issue of recognition of statehood, in the language dispute and on the status of 
minorities. The transformations of these narratives are followed in an across-unit 
comparison of the evolution of interpretations in the course of empowering 
Europeanization (Table 4).  
Table 4 suggests that there has been visible shift in the interpretations of conflictual issues 
towards reconciliation. A detailed analysis of the narrative transformations demonstrates 
that what enabled transcending antagonisms was expanding the field of commonality 
between the two states through mutual participation in the discourse of Europeanization 
and the new responsibilities it determined.  
Identity 
Signifier of 
Other 
Bulgaria Macedonia 
Recognition 1991 1993 1991 1993 
Macedonia is 
part of Bulgaria 
 
First state to 
officially recognize 
the independent 
republic 
Bulgaria as a 
threat to 
Macedonian 
statehood 
Bulgaria as a 
partner 
Language 1994 1999 1994 1999 
Macedonian is 
Bulgarian 
Macedonia has a 
right to its own 
constitutionally 
defined language 
Bulgarian and 
Macedonian 
have nothing in 
common 
Despite 
commonality, 
Bulgarian and 
Macedonian are 
now different 
languages 
Minorities 1999 2006 1999 2006 
Macedonian 
nation and 
national 
minorities are 
non-existent 
Macedonians in 
Bulgaria have their 
rights guaranteed 
on par with the rest 
of the individual 
citizens 
Bulgaria’s only 
role in 
Macedonian 
nationhood has 
been as an 
occupant force 
Occasional 
recognition of a 
Bulgarian element 
in the construction 
of the state 
Table 4. Research Design for the Study of Identity Narratives of ‘Other’. 
 
Comparing the findings from the investigation of the transformations and modifications in 
the narratives of national identity articulated by the two states domestically and externally 
 
99 
 
N. Nancheva                                                                                                                                        Transforming Identities in Europe 
suggests two principal conclusions. First, participation in the discourse of Europeanization 
visibly reduces conflictuality in national identity narratives interpretations. It makes 
national identity constructions more open, more inclusive, and more focused on the 
possibilities of the present and future. Second, participation in the processes of integration 
upholds a reading of national identity which ensures the hegemony of the Europeanization 
discourse and the marginalization of the discourse of nationalism. The empirical analysis 
uncovers the discursive mechanisms of modifying the antagonistic interpretations of 
national identity signifiers and replacing them with meanings upheld by the discourse of 
community in ‘Europe’. The methodological toolbox of poststructuralist discourse theory 
and its principal methodological tool – discourse analysis – enable the practical 
implementation of this analytical task.  
 
Discourse Analysis as a Method 
Because of the vast amount of academic work on identity and discourse accumulated in 
the last couple of decades, the analytical link between the two has acquired a somewhat 
taken-for-granted quality. Therefore, it would be useful to re-iterate exactly what makes 
discourse analysis relevant to the study of identity, and a preferred choice of method233 for 
this piece of research examining its transformations.  
Originating in branches of philosophy, literary theory and linguistics, discourse analysis has 
developed to be applicable to a wide range of disciplines such as psychology, 
anthropology, communication, and, remarkably, the study of politics and international 
relations. Informed by the insights of discourse theory, the method has helped to 
problematize, in practice, the objectivistic, rationalistic bias of mainstream social science 
theory by challenging existing knowledge paradigms. Its most relevant contribution to the 
study of politics and international relations has been demonstrating the discursive 
construction of sedimented norms, values, symbols, and understanding the dynamics of 
identity formation.234 But because of its inseparable links to the basic assumptions of 
233 Here, stricto sensu as a method. 
234 Howarth and Torfing, Discourse Theory, 1-32. 
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discourse theory, discourse analysis is perhaps more accurately referred to as a 
‘methodology,’ rather than as a ‘method’. This means that it inevitably combines 
theoretical and meta-theoretical elements (‘ways of thinking about discourse’235) with 
strictly methodological elements (‘treating discourse as data’). In this sense, as Wood and 
Kroger observe, it is not simply ‘an alternative to conventional methodologies; it is an 
alternative to the perspectives in which those methodologies are embedded.’236 Bearing 
that in mind, henceforward the term will be used in the strictly methodological sense, and 
allowance for its meta-theoretical elements will be made by references to ‘discourse 
theory’.  
The great advantage of discourse analysis as a method is that it ‘allows [for] the integration 
of different dimensions of interdisciplinarity’237. This perfectly suits the model of this 
investigation which works in the intersection of the discipline of International Relations 
and the sub-disciplines of European and Nationalism Studies. Indeed, neither of these 
(sub-)disciplines alone can fully account for the complex mechanisms of how identity 
comes into being and how it changes. Putting their theoretical frames together, however, 
they have the potential to do so and discourse analysis offers them the methodological 
instrument to this end. Discourse analysis is particularly suited for an analysis of the 
discursive construction and articulation of identity precisely because its purpose is to 
uncover the mechanisms for the construction and articulation of all social meaning. By 
doing this, it also demonstrates what alternative identities are possible, how those can be 
taken up and what the implications of such a change can be. Thus it promises to fulfil the 
principal task of this study: to highlight the mechanisms which enable the accommodation 
of national identity in the project of European integration.  
Another great advantage of discourse analysis is its methodological heterogeneity.238 Since 
it has been informed by different disciplines, it can also draw from their methodological 
toolboxes. Thus the application of discourse analysis permits extensive research design 
235 Linda Wood and Rolf Kroger, Doing Discourse Analysis (London: Sage, 2000), 3. 
236 Ibid., 3. 
237 Ruth Wodak and Michal Krzyzanowski (eds.), Qualitative Discourse Analysis for the Social Sciences 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2008), 2. 
238 Teun Van Dijk (ed.), Discourse as Social Interaction (London: Sage, 2004). 
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combinations. This investigation is structured within a small-N comparative study with a 
qualitative methodology carried out on the basis of discourse analysis.  
Yet another methodological advantage is that discourse analysis facilitates approaching 
the ‘object investigated from multiple perspectives’239. In the case of national identity 
investigation this is particularly helpful because the discursive construction of national 
identity involves repetitive articulation at different levels: government (foreign policy, 
defence and security policy, minority policies, education policies, etc.), parliament 
(adopting relevant legislation – and rejecting it), state research institutes (historical 
evidence and publications), national media (opinion making on day-to-day issues), etc. 
Discourse analysis as a method allows for the incorporation of these levels into the 
investigation, thus gaining advantage over alternative methods such as foreign policy 
analysis, content analysis, as well as a variety of other qualitative (observation, 
interviewing, etc.) and quantitative (statistics, large-N cross-casing, etc.) methods. 
Defining ‘Discourse’ in Discourse Analysis 
The discourse analysis method is based on the assumption that all social meaning is 
constructed through discourses which are made legible in particular uses of language. 
Therefore studying the contexts in which language operates, the purposes for which 
language is being used, and the functions language is meant to perform, is the key to 
understanding all social phenomena. In practice, this is made possible by studying text, or, 
to be more precise, ‘text in context’, as per Van Dijk’s straightforward definition.240 It is 
through studying ‘texts in context’ that the meanings upheld by the discursive systems of 
signification are made methodologically legible.  
In terms of this definition an important clarification needs to be made. The vast range of 
possibilities for application of discourse analysis to various research contexts and 
theoretical approaches241 has led to the development of many varieties of discourse 
analysis242 and, consequently, many definitions of the precise meaning of the term 
239 Wodak and Krzyzanowski, Qualitative Discourse Analysis, 2. 
240 Which is the definition of the term ‘discourse’ suggested by Teun Van Dijk, Discourse, 164. 
241 Point made by Wodak and Krzyzanowski, Qualitative Discourse Analysis, 6. 
242 Wood and Kroger, Doing Discourse Analysis, Appendix B. 
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‘discourse’.  It is outside the scope of this study to discuss those in detail, but it should be 
mentioned in passing that differences concern the level of abstraction of the term (a 
signifying system of signs or the particular use of those signs), its relationship with the idea 
of text (interchangeable or hierarchical), as well as its relationship with non-written forms 
of language and non-verbal semantic structures (visual images, body movements, etc.).243 
Thus, we could use Van Dijk’s definition but we need to modify it for the purposes of this 
analysis.  
First, what is being studied is a phenomenon at the level of the state, so the texts used to 
delineate it discursively are officially produced and meant for the widest possible national 
audiences. These are by necessity reproduced in the written form (transcriptions) even 
when they have originally been produced in the spoken form (e.g. official speeches) 
because it is in their written form that they have reached their widest audience (through 
reproduction). Those will be analysed as written language. By way of exception, 
(transcriptions of) a couple of televised presidential addresses will be looked at, which 
were produced on nation-wide occasions such as national celebrations, and which 
presumably reached their widest audiences in their spoken form. So, both spoken and 
written language is meant by ‘text’ but only text in its written form will be analysed 
discursively here.  
Second, a clarification is needed as to what is meant by ‘context’. We are interested in the 
particular uses that language is being put to: what texts do. This includes strategies of 
representation, categorization, exclusion; their role in consolidating or dislocating power; 
their performance in terms of delimiting the legitimate, i.e. what can and cannot be said. 
Thus ‘context’ is closer in meaning to the working definition suggested by Wood and 
Kroger which refers to ‘the use of language [...] as social practice’.244 
Techniques of Textual Data Collection and Selection 
On the basis of these definitional notes, which aimed to clarify the meaning of the term 
‘discourse’ and its usage, the more practical steps in performing discourse analysis can be 
243 For a good overview, see Wood and Kroger, Discourse Analysis, Appendix B and Chapter 2. 
244 Ibid., 18. 
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addressed. Discourse analysis is performed by analysing texts contextually in order to 
establish what they ‘do’. The process of deciding which texts to study is known in the 
literature as ‘corpus building’.245 There are different methods of corpus building. Wodak 
and Krzyzanowski offer examples of cyclical corpus building (analyzing preliminary corpus, 
then adding to it and analyzing again until the data no longer yields new representations) 
or corpus building by progressive specification and reduction (specifying the loci for texts, 
then selecting data according to the preliminary hypotheses until reaching an operatively 
small sample).246 The particular choice of method for the building of a corpus of viable 
data depends on the research question, goal, and hypothesis. As Mautner points out in her 
review of print media analysis quoting Bauer and Aarts,247 attempts at random sampling 
are generally not appropriate because of the unknown size of the population. At the same 
time, though, researchers should resist the temptation of ‘cherry-picking’248 texts that 
support their hypotheses and ignore the ones that do not. Of course, choosing data always 
involves an element of subjective judgement, which is inevitable. Subjectivity can be 
somewhat counterbalanced by rigorous justification of choices and additional checks and 
balances, but it should be nevertheless acknowledged in analyzing the findings. The 
current analysis uses a kind of ‘made-to-order’ selection method that has been designed to 
best suit its purpose. The following paragraphs summarize the techniques used to build a 
viable corpus of data relevant to the study of narratives of national identity and their 
transformations under Europeanization discourse.   
In a study of identity narratives in two states over a period of time, the first selection 
criterion that stands out is temporal. This means that only texts produced in the period 
between 1990 and 2006 are collected. A further criterion comes from specifying the level 
at which the analysis operates: it is explicitly interested in identity narratives upheld at the 
level of the state. This means that the selected texts are produced by subjects officially 
acting on behalf of the state or in their capacity as representing the state. This 
specification is important because the investigation sets out to establish what can 
245 Wodak and Krzyzanowski, Qualitative Discourse Analysis, 35. 
246 Ibid., 35-37. 
247 In Wodak and Krzyzanowski, Qualitative Discourse Analysis, 35. 
248 Mautner’s metaphor, ibid., 37. 
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legitimately be said about national identity at the level of the state and how this changes 
over time.249 The analysis looks into texts produced by official state representatives such 
as the president, the prime minister, the speaker and members of parliament, relevant 
ministers, heads of national research institutes, but also speakers from the leading 
national media, concerned local authorities, as well as national party leaders. A third 
criterion comes from specifying the form of the produced texts. They should be officially 
produced texts meant to reach a widest possible national audience. Only in this form they 
could represent identity-constituting and identity-articulating acts at the level of the state.  
Combining the temporal, the level-of-analysis, and the form criteria is more or less 
straightforward, but it produces a vast population of potential texts. It covers, among 
others, official statements of heads of states and prime ministers at key domestic 
occasions and crucial points in the bilateral relations and foreign policy developments, 
statements of the speakers of parliament, press-conferences; press releases of the 
resource ministers and ambassadors on matters of disagreement, bulletins of the foreign 
ministries; speeches and statements during exchanged formal and informal visits between 
the two states; official interviews in the leading media: the major party mouthpieces, the 
national radio and television, etc. Indeed, this population must be reduced to make a 
viable research corpus. A fourth criterion, topical, is meant to serve this purpose. Identity 
narratives are being followed around the six discursive elements discussed above. At this 
stage the data collection and selection process is divided between two topical areas. A 
little less straightforward, the application of the fourth criterion to the data collected on 
the basis of the first three, involves elements of subjective judgment and computerized 
precision.  
The first topical area aims to identify texts containing interpretations predominantly 
concerned with the contents of the signifiers of ‘Self’. These are texts containing 
articulations of the meaning of territory, nationhood, purpose in view of the selected 
‘Self’-‘Other’ dimension. The purpose of the study is to explore change in these meanings 
with the empowerment of Europeanization, so a picture of the discursive pattern of 
249 As Wæver points out, ‘discourses organize knowledge systemically, and thus delimit what can be said and 
what not’ in Hansen and Wæver, European Integration and National Identity, 29. 
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identity ‘before’ and ‘after’ Europeanization is needed. These temporal marks, as already 
emphasized, are arbitrary and can be oriented towards the beginning of transition and 
towards its end, respectively. The first picture should be compiled from texts produced in 
the early/mid-1990s, and the second from texts produced in the early/mid-2000s.  
Interpretations of the meanings in the three narrative groups can be detected by searching 
contextual occurrences of particular words. Technically, such sampling can be performed 
with the help of a software programme such as WordSmith Tools in its Concord 
component. It is based on electronic searches of word occurrences in context from 
databases of ‘text only’ documents. Words identifying the narrative under study are 
semantically related to the use of the word designating its key signifier. Their contextual 
use is linked to the denominator ‘national’. Sampling of texts related to the signifier of 
‘territory’, for example, can be performed by searching for occurrences of the words 
‘national’ and ‘territory’ in the texts collected on the basis of the first three criteria (Table 
5). A relevant sample is produced when the key words are substituted with semantically 
related words such as ‘borders’, ‘sovereignty’, ‘integrity’, ‘geopolitical’, etc. The check-
word ‘Macedonia’ and its derivates can be entered in order to reduce the sample to texts 
directly concerned with the interpretations of the signifier of territory in relation to the 
constitutive ‘Other’. Furthermore, additional relevant samples can be produced by the 
introduction of another check-word such as ‘threat’, ‘autonomy’, ‘protection’, etc.  
Selection Criteria Territory Nationhood Purpose 
Early/mid-1990s  
 
national+ 
territory 
borders 
sovereignty 
integrity 
geopolitical threat  
 
+Macedonia 
national+ 
nation 
community 
citizens, people 
minority 
ethnic, identity 
Bulgarians 
+Macedonia 
national+ 
purpose 
interest 
role 
responsibility 
duty 
future 
+Macedonia 
Official texts 
 
 
Public texts 
 
Table 5. Selection Criteria for Identity Narratives of Self in Bulgaria. 
 
The sampling is repeated on Macedonian texts on narratives of identity in the same 
format. The search for occurrences of key words semantically related to the three signifiers 
should, however, be modified to take into account some of the peculiarities of the second 
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state’s context. Obviously, linguistic competence and previous knowledge of the political 
history of the state is indispensible in adapting the sampling technique to the two cases. 
For example, many relevant interpretations of the signifier of territory have been 
produced in the context of debating the Macedonian project of independence. To be able 
to identify these texts, a semantic indicator for ‘independence’ in relation to ‘federation’ 
should be introduced. Another example of modifying the sampling technique is related to 
the joint introduction of the search words ‘nation’ and ‘nationality’ in the Macedonian 
context in order to produce a textual sample on Macedonian majority-minority relations. 
In the Bulgarian case, compiling a sample based on these two search words would not 
have been possible, since the word ‘nationality’ in Bulgarian is used as a synonym of 
‘nation’ while in Macedonian it more often than not signifies a national minority.  
Selection Criteria Territory Nationhood Purpose 
Early/mid-1990s  
 
national+ 
territory 
independent 
federation sovereignty 
integrity 
geopolitical threat  
 
+Bulgaria 
national+ 
nation 
subjectivity 
citizens, people 
nationality 
ethnic, identity 
Macedonia 
 
+Bulgaria 
national+ 
purpose 
interest 
role 
responsibility 
duty 
future 
 
+Bulgaria 
Official texts 
 
 
Public texts 
 
Table 6. Selection Criteria for Identity Narratives of Self in Macedonia. 
 
The technique is repeated for both states for the period of late transition (early/ mid-
2000s), when the empowerment of Europeanization has already gained momentum. The 
two pictures are then compared, contrasted and analyzed.  
The second topical area from which texts are selected aims to collect data containing 
interpretations predominantly concerned with the contents of the signifiers of ‘Other’. 
Along the studied ‘Self’-‘Other’ dimension, these are texts interpreting conflictual issues in 
the bilateral relations of the two states. The analysis looks for texts dealing with the 
problems of recognition of statehood, the language dispute, and the status of minorities. 
The main difference from the sampling technique used for identifying texts on domestic 
articulations of identity is the temporal criterion. With external articulations of identity 
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narratives the analytical purpose is the same – detecting change. However, the three 
conflictual issues appear most salient in different moments of the transition. An overview 
of the main events in the official inter-state relations between Bulgaria and Macedonia, 
which can be produced by both foreign ministries250, points to the chronological positions 
of these moments. The issue of recognizing statehood is most salient in the first years of 
the transition and particularly around the Macedonian declaration of independence. After 
that it gradually decreases in salience until it almost completely disappears from political 
discourse. The language dispute is most salient in the late 1990s (1994-1999 and around 
this period). Again, after the formula for its resolution it has notably been marginalized. 
The issue of mutual recognition of minorities becomes most salient around the attempts 
for official political minority representation. Because of the turbulent reforms of the 1990s 
and the graver imperatives of domestic politics, this happened mainly in the new 
millennium. Even though there had been attempts for registering minority parties in the 
1990s, the issue did not acquire such salience in view of the more urgent political agendas 
in the two states. So the search for texts on the three issues of conflictuality focuses 
around these points in time.251 They also mark chronologically consecutive stages in the 
transition processes.   
Textual sampling is performed in a similar way. The occurrence of the words ‘Macedonia’ 
and ‘Bulgaria’ in Bulgarian and Macedonian texts respectively in the specified periods is 
the immediate lead. Related semantic fields will be signified by the words 
‘neighbourhood’, ‘region’ and ‘Balkans’ and their derived words in foreign policy and 
security documents. A further reduction is achieved by adding a control word semantically 
related to the respective conflictual narrative under study: statehood, language, 
minorities, nationhood. For example, ‘Macedonian’ and ‘language’ returns a relatively 
accurate sample of Bulgarian texts related to the linguistic disagreement on the 
recognition of Macedonian as a language in its own right, separate from the South-
Western Bulgarian dialects. ‘Bulgaria’ and ‘recognition’ returns a sample of Macedonian 
250 Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ overview at http://www.mfa.bg/bg/pages/view/5314, Macedonian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ overview at http://www.mfa.gov.mk/?q=nadvoresna-politika/bilateralni-odnosi. 
251 Obviously, this methodological choice is based on an acceptably reasonable guess:  if a key text on the 
topic is produced in a moment which stands outside of our pre-determined focus of attention, then we 
should come across at least a reference to it within the corpus of texts we are working with. 
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texts related to Bulgaria’s formal recognition of Macedonian statehood. ‘Minority’ and 
‘UMO’252 returns a sample of texts in both states on the political conflict flared by a series 
of attempts to register a political party representing a Macedonian national minority in 
Bulgaria. 
Selection Criteria Bulgaria Macedonia 
Statehood Macedonia+ 
 
independence 
recognition 
international 
 
Bulgaria+ 
 
recognition 
independence 
sovereignty 
1991-1993 
Official texts 
Public texts 
Language Macedonia+ 
 
language 
history 
identity 
nation 
Bulgaria+ 
 
language 
history  
identity 
nation 
1994-1999 
Official texts 
Public texts 
Minorities Macedonia+ 
 
minority 
descendent 
party 
UMO-Ilinden ‘PIRIN’ 
 
Bulgaria+ 
 
minority 
ethnic 
party 
registration 
‘Radko’ 
1999-2006 
Official texts 
Public texts 
Table 7. Selection Criteria for Identity Narratives of Other in Bulgaria and Macedonia. 
 
To ensure the text selection by search word is not mechanical, the selected texts are then 
checked manually for relevance to the studied narrative. They are also analyzed against 
formal outcomes in bilateral relations such as declarations, bilateral agreements, exchange 
of visits, etc., or the lack of these. The purpose is to trace variations in the interpretations 
which, similarly to the first topical area, are studied ‘before’ and ‘after’ Europeanization. 
Unlike it, however, the two pictures are not presented in separate sections for 
considerations of not breaking the chronological logic of the evolution of events.   
252 United Macedonian Organization: the abbreviation of the name of the political party which, in its various 
formations, claimed to represent the Macedonian national minority in Bulgaria. 
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Dividing the process of data collection into these two streams presupposes not only a 
variation in the temporal criterion and a modification of the topical criterion. It also 
suggests that an adaptation of the textual source criterion could make the data search 
more effective. Finding relevant articulations of identity directed towards the domestic 
discursive space, for example, is more probable in texts produced by actors with 
responsibility for domestic policies. Thus, the signifier of territory is frequently subject of 
discussions on defense and security policies. Sampling texts produced by the minister of 
interior and the minister of defense could therefore be particularly helpful. Finding 
articulations of identity directed towards the outside, on the other hand, is more probable 
in texts produced by actors with responsibility for foreign policy. Foreign ministers and 
ambassadors could therefore be a useful starting point of the textual search.  
Data Comparability 
Such adaptation of the data collection technique according to textual source could lead to 
samples of relevant data on particular issues. It cannot, however, always produce equally 
relevant data on all issues in the two studied cases. This is why it is used here as a 
supplementary technique. To ensure comparability of data, the textual search attempts 
consistency in consulting sources of equal standing on the different identity narratives 
under study. Texts produced by heads of states and governments are always the first 
consulted source because of the implied higher authority to formulate, articulate and 
interpret national positions. Parliamentary debates which form part of the parliamentary 
control and are publicized253 are a second important source of textual data because of the 
representative authority of the members of parliament as speaking on behalf of their 
constituencies, i.e. the people. Resource ministers, heads of research institutes and other 
state institutions are a third regular source of textual data because of their narrow 
responsibilities on particular aspects of state policies (Table 8).  
Data is collected from the texts accompanying the official public behaviour of these actors. 
The sampling focuses on various texts from the archives of these state institutions. Public 
speeches on specific occasions relevant to narratives of identity (such are celebrations of 
253 Televised and reported on in the media. 
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national holidays, commemorations of historical events, key political events), official 
declarations, statements, positions on particular issues (border disputes, minority 
legislation, foreign policy stands, etc.). Public interviews for the national media or televized 
debates can also provide relevant data. The aim is to select data representative of what 
can legitimately be said about particular identity signifiers at the level of the state. What is 
legitimate more often than not operates on the basis of what is legal. So, a logical point for 
orientation is also interpretation of state legislation. Empirical data is not taken from 
pieces of legislation per se254 but from official state interpretations of it. Possible data 
would cover interpretations of constitutional provisions and their amendments 
(particularly in their texts on sovereignty, borders, territory, citizenship, minorities, 
nationhood, state symbols), domestic and international laws regulating the respective 
regimes (laws on national minorities, ratifications of the European Convention of Human 
Rights and the jurisdiction of the Court, Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities, etc.), as well as official positions on European Court of Human Rights 
rulings, and cases of non-ratification of international legislation.  
State actors Textual sources 
 
Head of state 
Head of government 
Speaker of parliament 
Members of parliament 
Ministers (MFA) 
+ 
National media opinion-makers 
National research institutes representatives 
Speeches on Occasions 
Official interviews 
Press Conferences 
Declarations 
Positions 
Legislation & Commentary 
+ 
Media analyses 
Public research output 
Table 8. Source and Form Criteria for Text Collection. 
 
Again, achieving complete parity in the collected data has not been possible because of the 
mutually independent public behaviour of state actors in the two states. For example, the 
Bulgarian prime minister’s statement on the political will to make progress in the language 
dispute because of the necessity to improve cross-border transport infrastructure has not 
been matched by a statement on the issue by the Macedonian prime minister. But more 
254 Even though the legal framework can be seen to represent codified consensual positions on certain issues. 
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often than not comparable data on certain issues of interest can be collected around key 
points in the bilateral relations. The ban on registering a political party representing the 
Macedonian minority in Bulgaria, for example, prompts articulations on the issue at 
various levels from both sides. The same is valid for the Macedonian ban on registering a 
Bulgarian party. At the same time, silence on certain issues can also be indicative of the 
contents of narratives of identity. Bulgarian recognition of Macedonian statehood, for 
example, became a central discursive element of Bulgarian politics at the time but in 
Macedonia it hardly received any but formal acknowledgement. The discrepancy is 
analyzed in view of the position and function of the ‘Other’ in the two national identity 
narratives.  
Disparities in the collectable data on issues such as this are addressed by attempting to 
establish what else is being said on the topic and when. In the case of Bulgarian 
recognition of Macedonian independent statehood, for example, occurrences of 
articulations appear only on several formal occasions around the time of the event. Only 
later discourse on the issue begins to normalize and both positive and critical 
interpretations can be found. Certain issues are consistently not tackled at state level. In 
Bulgaria, for example, references to the ban on registration of the pro-Macedonian party 
are generally not contained in the rhetoric of the president. If they do appear, it is as a 
confirmation of the authority of the judiciary to competently rule on the issue. In 
Macedonia, on the other hand, concern for the status of Macedonian communities in 
Bulgaria frequently appears as a central issue of identity politics at all levels. The 
discrepancy is analyzed in terms of the different interpretations of the integrity of the 
nation and the place of national minorities in its structure. In general, disparities in the 
collectable data are addressed through contextual analysis of the official positions on the 
concerned issues and through discourse analysis of what data is available in other points in 
time.  
Data Availability 
Other than these disparities in the articulation on specific issues, access to data has been 
unproblematic. Since the investigation uses only official texts directed at wide national 
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audiences, the data is publicly accessible through the institutional archives. Most of it has 
been transferred to electronic contents and/ or is available online. When it has not (mostly 
data from the early 1990s), it can be consulted upon request. In the majority of the 
archives digital photocopying was permitted, which enabled transferring texts to electronic 
format and facilitated the contents analysis by search words. Texts whose photocopying 
was not permitted were analyzed for relevance manually. Given the large volume of 
available data, manual search cannot be exhaustive but random sampling following the 
criteria outlined above returns relevant data for a qualitative analysis based in an anti-
foundationalist interpretative epistemology. The same is true for collecting data on 
representations from the leading media archives from the early years of the studied 
period, which have largely been accessible only physically. The search has been focused 
around key chronological moments determined by the salience of the studied narratives. 
This methodological decision is based on the assumption that strategies of identity 
articulation and identity construction in the two states should be more intensive when a 
significant identity-related event occurs or when a contested element of the identity 
construction cannot be realized. Again, this necessarily excludes texts possibly relevant to 
the fuller understanding of the respective identity constructions if they stand outside the 
pre-specified temporal limits. Such omission is justified through the assumption that if a 
key identity related event occurred outside the studied timeframe, then at least a 
reference to it should be found inside it. The guided technique of data collection contains a 
more visible element of subjective judgment than random sampling but overall it has been 
balanced by the inevitable element of subjectivity required in the sifting of data gathered 
through random word searches. Moreover, in interpretative research subjectivity is 
acknowledged a priori as a factor and is used as an advantage in the analysis. Moreover, 
attempting to deny its interference through presumed scientific objectivity is generally 
viewed with suspicion.255  
255 In view of Foucault’s conceptualization of discursive formations, the notion of objectivity becomes 
irrelevant – Foucault, Archaeology. 
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The collected data has been analyzed in the original languages in which it has been 
produced (Bulgarian and Macedonian) in both of which this author is fluent. Translation of 
the quoted texts is the author’s unless otherwise specified.  
 
Identity Change and Inference 
As pointed out above, one of the principal uses language is being put to in the discursive 
construction of national identity is to tell the story of the nation as an uninterrupted 
narrative. That narrative is constructed on the basis of several key elements which have 
been referred to as ‘identity signifiers’. The contents and salience of identity signifiers 
change over time. The particular discursive pattern of identity signifiers in one point in 
time is indicative of the state’s national identity in that point. So identifying changes in the 
pattern of signifiers should be indicative of transforming identity. The pattern may change 
in a variety of ways. Some interpretations may appear or disappear over time. Some may 
increase or decrease in salience but remain present. The correlation between certain 
signifiers may change. In any case, the changed interpretations of the signifiers will 
produce a different discursive pattern of identity, leading to the exclusion of certain stories 
and the inclusion of others. It is precisely this narrative re-construction that allows 
transcending antagonisms based in identity.  
The conclusions generated on the basis of the corpus of selected data suggest that where 
empowering the discourse of Europeanization and establishing its hegemony re-articulated 
the contents of identity signifiers and re-organized their patterns in the two states in a 
credible manner, it prompted the gradual exclusion of conflictual narratives. Ultimately, 
this led to the marginalization of interpretations of nationalism and stabilized the 
hegemony of the discourse of Europeanization. Where the discourse of Europeanization 
did not succeed in capturing identity signifiers and providing credible readings of their 
contents, interpretations of nationalism remained salient and threatened the hegemony of 
Europeanization.  
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Comparing and contrasting the studied identity narratives allows assessing this claim 
without aiming at universal validity. The purpose of the study is to explore the mechanisms 
of accommodating national identity narratives within the discourse of Europeanization in a 
specific Balkan context. It aims to establish the effects of Europeanization on national 
identity re-narration, to see how Europeanization’s reading of national identity, in turn, 
affects the stability of the hegemonic discourse, and to find out what happens to 
interpretations of nationalism. The conclusions reached in the investigation uncover the 
specificities of accommodation of Bulgaria’s and Macedonia’s national identity narratives 
in the discourse of ‘Europe’ over a particular period of time – the transition to democracy. 
In this sense they contribute to Area Studies academic knowledge. But they also offer the 
possibility of descriptive inference on the mechanisms of reading national identity in the 
context of EU enlargement to the former communist space and particularly to the Balkan 
region. After mapping out the discursive contexts structuring the beginning of transition in 
both states, the following chapters demonstrate how these conclusions have been 
reached. 
 
 
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The first part of the dissertation laid out the theoretical, meta-theoretical and 
methodological background of the investigation, introducing poststructuralist discourse 
theory as an insightful perspective for studying national identity change in Europe. 
Through its main analytical tool – discourse analysis – this perspective offers a promising 
method of exploring the transformations which the discourse of Europeanization induces 
in national identity narratives and which it undergoes in the hegemonic struggle with the 
discourse of nationalism. This proves its applicability in an analysis of the role of national 
identity in the project of European integration, particularly in the context of EU 
enlargement. The second part of the dissertation presents the empirical investigation 
itself. Analyzing the collected data, the analysis aims to draw valid conclusions about 
national identity change in the context of Europeanization. It starts by introducing the 
discursive contexts which shaped national identity narratives at the beginning of the 
studied period – Chapter V. Chapter VI, VII and VIII offer analyses of selected national 
identity narratives from the two case studies of Bulgaria and Macedonia. They aim to 
identify change in the narration of the national stories in the process of empowering the 
discourse of Europeanization by comparing and contrasting the different cases both 
synchronically and diachronically. The analytical outcomes of this investigation are then 
used to demonstrate the validity of the central claim of the dissertation in the concluding 
chapter, linking the empirical investigation back to the theoretical background of the study 
and its main argument. Chapter IX applies the conclusions arrived at in Part II to the 
analytical framework drawn in Part I. Its purpose is to demonstrate how the investigation 
has enhanced existing understanding of the role of national identity in Europe by studying 
its narrative transformations in the changing discursive environment of two Balkan states.  
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PART II 
CASES 
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CHAPTER V 
NATIONALISM AS DISCURSIVE CONTEXT: 
IN SEARCH OF CREDIBLE IDENTITY 
 
An analysis of national identity narratives cannot be valid without an elaborate 
understanding of the hegemonic discourses which upheld these narratives, shaping the 
meaning of social reality. This dissertation begins the study of national identity from the 
context of hegemonic nationalism.  With the fall of the Iron Curtain the discourse of 
nationalism quickly came back to the political fore in the former communist space. The 
reasons for this are diverse. To begin with, national identity had never been truly 
supplanted by non-national communist state identities. It had had to publicly give way to 
the hegemonic discourse of party ideology empowered, largely coercively, to uphold the 
project of ‘people’s’ or ‘socialist’ republics. But despite concerted attempts to substitute 
loyalties to the national state with loyalty to the communist party and thus, symbolically, 
to the international communist proletariat, party ideology inevitably operated within the 
framework of the nation-state256. Therefore, it could never fully dislocate the discourse of 
the nation. Second, when faced with the task of (re-)building democratic statehood from 
the rubble of totalitarian regimes, the former communist states could not take recourse to 
other narratives representing to such extent the entirety of the population as a human 
collectivity, and thus providing the legitimacy to undertake the necessary, often taxing, 
reforms. It was the story of the nation surviving the ordeal of communism which offered a 
source of self-identification with the new state for all of its citizens.257 Furthermore, and 
this is significant, despite the instrumentalization by the communist regimes of varieties of 
256 Even when it comprised a federation, like in the Soviet or Yugoslav cases. 
257 This is to explain as well the wave of secessions after the breakup of communism: when the nation 
represented only a small part of the population of the state, it demanded the right to establish a state of its 
own. 
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nationalisms at different points in time, national identity did provide a form of oppositional 
identity of dissent from the identity of ‘comradeship’ in the totalitarian state. In the 
immediate context of regime change this oppositional potential gave rise to the discourse 
of nationalism as a political ideology in the new states.  
 
The Context of Rising Nationalism in Bulgaria 
In the Bulgarian case, just as in all post-communist states, this phenomenon had its 
peculiarities. Bulgaria fostered one of the communist regimes which made extensive258 use 
of the arsenal of nationalism in tightening its grip to power.259 One of its undertakings with 
most profound consequences for the ethno-national peace in the country was the large-
scale governmental assimilation campaign initiated in the early 1980s against Bulgaria’s 
Turkish minority260. The societal uproar the campaign caused served as a catalyst for 
mobilizing civil and intellectual dissent against the regime and was a factor in eventually 
negotiating the regime change.261 A strong association was thus created between the 
communist past and aggressive nationalism. This was taken up by the democratic 
opposition, which highlighted the link in its attempt to mobilize greater public support for 
reform. The following excerpt illustrates some of the key points in this rhetorical strategy: 
‘’The ‘nationalists’ [...] sided with the Bulgarian Communist Party [here at the 
roundtable talks][...] which is understandable because most of these so called 
patriots are [...] members of the party [...]. But it is not understandable why the 
[...]Communists agree to this shameful compromise: to allow among their members 
people instigating nationally-based hatred, violating the constitution (namely 
258 Though not consistent: even though it launched large-scale nationalist campaigns, they were often 
abandoned half-way through with a change in the Soviet position (policies towards Macedonia by 1956) or 
were initiated randomly with changes in the domestic environment (campaigns towards the ethnic Turks 
from 1970s). 
259 Katerina Popova and Marko Hajdinjak (eds.), Forced ethnic migrations on the Balkans: consequences and 
rebuilding of societies (Sofia: International Centre for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations, 2006). 260 The largest ethno-national minority group in the country. 261 Albert Melone, ‘Bulgaria’s National Roundtable Talks and the Politics of Accommodation’, International 
Political Science Review 15(3), (1994): 257-273, also W. Höpken, ‘From Religious Identity to Ethnic 
Mobilisation: The Turks of Bulgaria before, under and since Communism’, H. Poulton and S. Taji-Farouki 
(eds.), Muslim Identity and the Balkan State (Hurst, 1997), 54-81. 
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Art.35, Para.4), who could therefore immediately be brought to justice under the 
acting Penal Code, people swinging a horse tail262, singing ‘Unrest at the 
Bosphorus’263, and demanding physical reprisal with the leaders of the Union of the 
Democratic Forces264. They baffled entire democratic Europe with the wave of 
outdated nationalism which they roused [...] in Sofia and the rest of the country. [...] 
This compromise is unwanted and dangerous. It demonstrates that the Communists 
are still unable to distance themselves from the policy of violence which they have 
led so far with the national question.’’265 
The chair person of the first independent anti-communist organization in Bulgaria, 
speaking at the Roundtable Talks which negotiated the peaceful regime change, performs 
an act of identity constitution. He starts by re-enforcing the chain of equivalence between 
the communist party and nationalism through the inverted causal confirmation of the logic 
that ‘the ‘nationalists’ sided with (the communists)’ because ‘most of these [...] are 
members of the party’. Then he immediately rhetorically questions the morality 
(‘shameful’) and reason (‘not understandable’) of this union to demonstrate its 
unacceptability. First he proclaims its illegality (Art. 35, Para. 4 of the then acting 
Constitution of 1971 prohibited ‘preaching of hatred [...] based on [...] national affiliation 
[...] and stipulated its penalization’266) and calls for its condemnation (‘immediately be 
brought to justice’). He then goes on to link the claim of these ‘so called patriots’ with the 
most preposterous symbols of aggressive nationalism in Bulgaria: the swinging of a horse-
tail as in the nomadic times of the founder of the first Bulgarian state on the Balkans267, 
and singing a song glorifying an alleged brief Bulgarian conquest of the Balkan peninsula268. 
References to these symbolic fields aim at positioning such behaviour in the long gone 
262 A symbol of the early medieval proto-Bulgarians who were nomads. 263 A poem by the Bulgarian author Ivan Vazov turned into a nationalist march. 264 The UDF movement came to represent the democratic opposition and became the first oppositional party 
in post-communist Bulgaria. 
265 Rumen Vodenicharov, chair person of the Independent Society for the Protection of Human Rights, the 
first independent anti-communist organization in Bulgaria, speaking at the First Plenary Session of the 
National Roundtable Talks on 29th Jan 1990 from 10am, verbatim report. 
266 Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria of 1971 available at  http://www.parliament.bg/bg/19. 
267 The Bulgarian principality of Khan Asparuh established in 681. 
268 In Bulgarian historiography this happened during the rule of the Bulgarian king Simeon I, called ‘The Great’ 
in the lyrics of the song. 
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past. Completing the list with ‘demands for physical reprisal with the leaders of UDF’ aims 
at equating it with the obvious absurdity of such demands in the civilized world of today, 
as well as with the animosity against the ‘democratic forces’ and their ‘leaders’, thus 
demonstrating its incompatibility with the idea of decommunization. This rhetorical move 
is re-enforced by the next reference to the ‘baffling’ of Europe (suggesting nationalism has 
no place there) and the repeated positioning of nationalism in the past (it is explicitly 
called ‘outdated’). On the basis of this incompatibility of nationalism with reform and the 
democratic European future, it is condemned by the speaker as ‘unwanted and 
dangerous’, pointing to the threat of not distancing from the violence of the past.  
A month earlier one of the co-founders of the non-governmental public organization 
Committee for National Reconciliation269 reads its Founding Statute in the air of Radio Free 
Europe. Its concluding paragraph is particularly engaging in the same sense: 
‘’Brothers and sisters, nationally-based hatred is a heinous prejudice with a 
destructive effect over the individual, it carries with it only tears, blood and 
suffering. Citizens of Bulgaria, [...] cooperate with [...] the Committee for National 
Reconciliation [...] [T]his is needed in the name of democracy, rule of law, in the 
name of the future. Sofia, 7th December 1989.”270  
Summoning support for her call for national reconciliation, the author addresses her 
audience by invoking a blood relation (‘brothers and sisters’) which is a rhetorical strategy 
typical for nationalist discourse. Taking recourse to the nationalists’ rhetorical arsenal, the 
speaker attempts to engage a widest possible audience, including the presumed 
supporters of the very ideology she needs to condemn, by addressing them as part of the 
same community. Elaborating on the blood relation, she goes on to describe the effects of 
nationalism as physical agony (‘tears, blood and suffering’) in order to renounce it. On the 
basis of this, she attempts to rhetorically re-position the community: in the following 
sentence she replaces the blood relation which united her audience initially with a new 
269 Antonina Zheliazkova, an established academic who publicly opposed the assimilation campaign against 
the Turks and participated in the first dissident organizations, the Rousse Committee and the Committee for 
Glasnost and Perestroika. 
270 Interview for Radio Free Europe by Rumyana Uzunova, Roll No. 174, accessible in transliteration at  
http://www.omda.bg/arhiv/rumyana_uzunova/rumyana_sled_jivkov_8.html. 
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relation, citizenship (‘citizens of Bulgaria’). This rhetorical move is supported by the appeal 
that only such repositioning could lead Bulgaria to the values it craves (‘democracy, rule of 
law’) and could take it from the condemned past to the desired future (‘in the name of the 
future’).  
In the rhetoric of the mobilizing democratic opposition, nationalism is being positioned as 
the exact opposite of democracy, thus re-affirming its place in the past. Furthermore, it is 
repeatedly being pointed to as the reason for the continuing inter-ethnic tensions. The 
Chief Mufti, representing the Muslim community in Bulgaria, points out that the Muslims 
participate in the Roundtable Talks only as guests because members of the ultra-
nationalist organization Nationwide Committee for the Protection of National Interests 
form part of the quota from the government.271 By radically distinguishing democracy (the 
possible future) from nationalism (the condemned past) and insisting on their 
incompatibility, the members of the democratic opposition intend to dissociate 
themselves from the government, assert their legitimacy as carriers of the ‘future’ and 
thus mobilize as great popular support as possible, including by engaging the votes of the 
formerly repressed Bulgarian ethnic Turks. At the same time, however, the centrality of 
the ‘nationalist’ motif as a borderline of identification perpetuated the salience of 
nationalist discourse and further politicized the issue of national identity.  
This division was also exacerbated because of the communist successor party’s prolonged 
grip to power272: at the first free parliamentary elections in 1990 the socialists got 210 out 
of 400 seats in Parliament and at the second in 1991, 106 out of 240.273 To re-gain 
legitimacy for their presence in the state structures, they tried to gradually dissociate from 
the negative image of the ‘national question’274 without losing credibility in political 
stance. By attempting to re-negotiate a particular understanding of ‘nationalism’ as 
legitimate, in the meanwhile publicly rendering support to the efforts for redress of the 
271 Verbatim report from the Roundtable Talks on 29th Jan 1990 from 10am. 
272 After 3rd April 1990 Bulgarian Socialist Party. 
273 At the Roundtable Talks, which effectively negotiated the peaceful change of regime, the deal stricken 
ensured sufficient resources for the former communists to largely remain in the leading echelons of state 
power for almost the entire decade to come.  
274 The term used for designating the inter-ethnic problems inherited from the totalitarian era. 
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repressed, they ensured that nationalist discourse remained present into the discursive 
space of Bulgarian state politics of the early transition.  
Already during the preliminary Roundtable Talks the prime minister-to-be275 and other 
members of the socialist leadership276 rhetorically perform such attempts of dissociation 
from immediate responsibility for the assimilatory campaigns by pointing to the alleged 
roots of the inter-ethnic problem in the Balkan wars of 1912-13, i.e. much before the 
establishment of the regime: 
“[I]f we attempt [..] to analyze the problem and its genesis, we should go back much 
beyond 1984. [...] All of us should be extremely cautious in our interpretations of 
actions whose motivations we should first be able to understand. They go back to 
the Balkan wars.”277 “I would suggest not to discuss history now [...] because time 
does not wait for us. If we are unable to agree [on a joint declaration on the 
‘national question’] by tomorrow night at the latest [...] then there is no point in 
doing it.”278 
Other than shifting the roots of the inter-ethnic conflict to a period outside the communist 
regime and suggesting exculpating circumstances for the perpetrators, the speaker 
indicates that the background to the conflict is so complex that not everybody can really 
comprehend it, thus hinting at the great danger (‘should be extremely cautious’) of 
tackling the issue by the un-learned majority. By adding urgency to the extremely painful 
and still raw problem of national reconciliation, the ‘strategist’ of the Socialist Party279 
actually impedes the very task whose completion he is presumably calling for. The 
repeated reasoning behind such an ambivalent call is the idea that the problem pertains to 
the field of history and should rest there. Factually imprecise (for Bulgaria, the Balkan wars 
275 Andrey Lukanov, whose name is tightly linked to the execution of the repressions against the Bulgarian 
Turks in 1985 but who is to head a new Government in 1990. See verbatim reports from the 49th Plenary 
Session of the 36th National Assembly discussing the national minorities and the ethnic question, available at 
http://www.parliament.bg/bg/plenaryst. 
276 Aleksander Lilov, long-term member of the totalitarian State Council and future long-term member of 
parliaments from 1990, as well as head of the leadership of the Socialist Party from 1990. 
277 Preliminary Roundtable consultations of the government with the leaders of the democratic opposition on 
3rd January 1990 from 5.30pm, verbatim report. 
278 Ibid. 
279 As Lilov has often been referred to in the media.  
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were about minorities outside its borders, not inside), the governmental line is obviously 
consistent in re-positioning the roots of the national problem from the timeframe of the 
totalitarian rule to decades before that in an attempt to transfer the blame.  
At the same time, another discursive line taken up by the socialist government works for 
the re-formulation of the discredited notion of ‘nationalism’ into a political ideology 
compatible with post-communist politics. In the immediate aftermath of the regime 
change the contextual usage of the term ‘nationalism’ refers to the danger of ‘nationalist 
passions’280, to ‘chauvinist ideas’281, to dealing with ‘nationally-based hatred’282. In an 
attempt to distance the signifier of nationalism from the context of the irrational and 
destructive, nationalism is subtly being re-introduced to the public in a new light: as the 
ideology of national unity and the national interest. Evidence of this provides the 
establishment of the Nationwide Committee for the Protection of the National Interests, 
which legitimately takes part in the Roundtable Talks as a nationalist organization. One of 
its suggestions is re-formulating the controversial Art.1 of the 1971 Constitution to state 
that ‘[...] Bulgaria is a national state [...]’.283 The consultant from the Committee explains 
that this controversial constitutional provision in the context of inter-ethnic tension is 
referring to the European notion of the ‘nation-state’, going on to elaborate on the 
‘nation-state’ as a Western European ‘achievement’.284 Another rhetorical strategy of 
repositioning the signifiers of nationalist discourse is the constant reference on behalf of 
the socialists to ‘the nation’ (and not ‘the people’) as the addressee community of the 
reforms. Upon exiting the Roundtable talks to assume his role as the prime minister, 
Lukanov, for example, expresses his good wishes to the negotiators for ‘the benefit of the 
Bulgarian nation’.285 Despite the significant overlap of usage between the terms ‘nation’ 
and ‘people’, they are not interchangeablе. The move to constitute the community as a 
‘nation’ and not a ‘people’ subtly appeals to the national sentiment of the majority and 
suggests the relevance of a nationalist policy. Paradoxically, the established formula of 
280 Verbatim report from the Roundtable Talks, 349. 
281 Verbatim report from the Roundtable Talks, 75. 
282 Verbatim report from the Roundtable Talks, 311. 
283 Kiril Haramiev, consultant of the Committee, speaking at the Roundtable Talks Verbatim report, 360. 
284 Verbatim report from the Roundtable Talks, 362. 
285 Verbatim report from the Roundtable Talks, 376. 
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‘national unity’ (referring to the desired solution of the inter-ethnic conflict), turned into 
one of the consensual catch-phrases of the time, also serves such a purpose. Its endless 
repetition during the Roundtable Talks and the numerous documents they produced, as 
well as during the plenary sessions of the Grand National Assembly, eventually dimmed 
the paradoxical edges of the idea to successfully accommodate ethnic minorities through 
achieving a monolithic nation. This gave the use of the formula ‘national unity’ an aura of 
highest common good, again subtly legitimizing nationalist discourse. In the context of 
ethnically divided society on the verge of conflict the political use of the adjective 
‘national’ should be cautious because it might not be immediately clear who/ what it 
signifies. Insisting on acting in the interest of ‘the nation’ (and not the people, society, or 
the state) clearly constitutes a political community identified along the lines of 
nationhood, questioning any minority element’s membership in it, and thus increasing its 
antagonistic potential.  
The strong association of the totalitarian regime with aggressive nationalism, on the one 
hand, and the fact that a vast number of its representatives remained in power after its 
negotiated change, on the other, ensured the relevance of nationalist discourse to 
everyday politics in the immediate years after the fall of totalitarianism. Despite the 
democratic opposition’s attempts to dissociate politics of reform from the burden of 
nationalism, too much controversy revolved around the ‘national question’ in the early 
months and years of the regime change for such a move to succeed – at least not in the 
short term. By refusing to unambiguously accept responsibility for the assimilation 
campaigns, the socialists, too, exacerbated the controversy because many of them 
remained in public office and continued to head numerous state institutions despite direct 
participation in the ideological and practical preparation of the ‘Revival Process’286. By 
attempting to re-define the concept of nationalism in line with the notions of national 
uniqueness, national interest, and national policy in order to legitimize their stay in power, 
the socialists impeded the dissociation of politics from the discursive field of nationalism. 
The increased salience of nationalist rhetoric left its imprint upon the reading of national 
identity in Bulgaria in the years following the regime change. 
286 The propaganda name of the communist regime’s assimilatory campaigns against the Turks. 
 
125 
 
                                                            
N. Nancheva                                                                                                                                        Transforming Identities in Europe 
 
Rising Nationalism in Macedonia 
In line with the rest of the post-communist space, Macedonia also witnessed a rise of 
nationalist rhetoric in the years immediately following the fall of the Iron Curtain but the 
sub-contexts which facilitated it were distinctly different from the Bulgarian case. They 
were determined by the secession from the federation, the domestic majority-minority 
relations, and the regional inter-state relations.  
The Context of Secession 
First recognized as a state within the Yugoslav federation in 1946287, the Socialist Republic 
of Macedonia288 established the fundament of statehood in the spirit of ‘brotherhood and 
unity’289 with the rest of the Yugoslav republics. Even though the republics were instituted 
along national lines, the national element was excluded from the ideology upholding the 
power of the socialist state. With the disintegration of the federation, nationalism came to 
the fore both as a consequence of the re-stated claims for independent statehood along 
national lines and as a response to the political uncertainty which these claims created 
within the federation. Thus, one of the structural factors for the rise of Macedonian 
nationalism in the beginning of the 1990s was the context of prospective secession from 
federation. 
Unlike Bulgaria, however, nationalist discourse in Macedonia became associated with 
change, emancipation and the future, whereas the past remained predominantly linked to 
the integrationist ideas of commonality within the socialist federation. It was in the 
context of renouncing the past and embarking upon the idea of an independent 
Macedonian state as the grand political project of the present that nationalist discourse 
was initially upheld. Logically, this occurred within the discussion on the precise form of 
statehood that best suited the people of Macedonia, which gradually detached the 
287 Violeta Petroska-Beska and Mirjana Najcavska, Macedonia: understanding history, preventing future 
conflict (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2004). 
288 After 1963 when the name replaced the ‘People’s Republic of Macedonia’ with the re-naming of the 
Federation. 
289 The popular Yugoslav slogan characterizing the union in the federation. 
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narrative from the discourse of federation and linked it to the national state interpreted as 
an ethically superior form of statehood. Ascribing the blame for the tense inter-ethnic and 
inter-republican relations in Yugoslavia to the totalitarian system which kept the 
federation together, the Macedonian member of the Yugoslav Presidium declares in the 
first Macedonian multi-party parliament: 
“A radical transformation is needed. We have no right to defend a system of 
relations which antagonizes the peoples and the people, this is anti-
civilizational.”290 
Prohibiting the defense of the disintegrating federation as illegitimate (‘we have no right’) 
and backward (‘anti-civilizational’) because of its destructive effects at an individual (‘the 
people’) and national level (‘the peoples’) is a clear indication of the political direction 
which the Macedonian representative to the federation appeals for. In the following 
sentence he calls for following ‘our own interests [...] independent from anybody’291 
stating that the federation currently represents ‘a mystification around abstract, artificial, 
and supra-national interests’292. Referring to a clearly identifiable category (self interest) 
and juxtaposing it to the ‘mystification [of] supra-national interests’ implicitly introduces 
the notion of ‘national interests’ as superior. This rhetorical move is re-enforced by the 
chain of equivalence established between the categories of ‘abstract’, ‘artificial’, and 
‘supra-national’ and their relation to the field of the mystique. Having thus established the 
discursive hierarchy, Tupurkovski explicitly introduces the category of the national interest 
as ‘non-negotiable’, ‘vital’, and integral to the ‘Macedonian national question.’293 The 
subsequent parliamentary discussion294, already openly, denounces the previous 
totalitarian regime as:  
290 Vasil Tupurkovski, Macedonian Member of the Yugoslav Presidium speaking at the First Plenary Session of 
the Parliament of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia on 8th Jan 1991, 86 at 
http://www.sobranie.mk/ext/sessions.aspx?Id=8440FB6B-A414-4749-9270-5CB070CE4997. 
291 Ibid., 86. 
292 Ibid., 86. 
293 Ibid.. 87. 
294 On the future place of Macedonia in the federation. 
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“[maintaining] an appearance of inter-national peace and harmony through terror 
and depression [...] at the same time creating faceless collectivities and invented 
fictive well-being.”295 
Again, the regime is accused of faking, inventing, pretending, repeatedly confirming the 
link between the supra-national and the non-real, thus implying the reality and relevance 
of the national. This is also evident in the accusation of depersonalizing the national 
community (by creating ‘faceless’ collectivities) as an act of transgression. The rhetorical 
renunciation of the supra-national state community as oppressive and the rhetorical 
vindication of the national community as ethically superior established the context which 
initially empowered Macedonian nationalist discourse in the beginning of democratic 
parliamentary life in the republic. At the same time, fully conscious of its negative 
connotations, the new Macedonian political élite is systematically avoiding direct 
references to nationalism in pursuing the project of independent statehood. Instead, its 
legitimacy is constructed around the signifiers of the Macedonian people as the source of 
state sovereignty, the Macedonian national interest, and the Macedonian national 
question. In the context of disengagement from federation these signifiers legitimized the 
claim for independent statehood.  
Pleading for the particular responsibility of the parliamentarians for ‘the treatment of the 
Macedonian national question’296 and clarifying that ‘the Macedonian national ideal is 
unification’297, Tupurkovski draws parallels between this political project, on the one hand, 
and European integration, German unification, and globalization, on the other, thus 
concluding that ‘the Macedonian question [in this context] is an international and even 
universal question’298. Positioning the problem of Macedonian statehood and nationhood 
into such a radically widened context serves the purposes of legitimization.  
“We respect the right of self-determination of every people, the right to sovereignly 
decide its destiny, and we reject any interpretation of this right which places limits 
295 Todor Petrov speaking at the First Plenary Session of the Parliament of the Socialist Republic of 
Macedonia on 8th Jan 1991, 95. 
296 Tupurkovski, ibid., 87. 
297 Ibid., 87. 
298 Ibid., 87. 
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on its realization. The Macedonian people has continually been in possession of this 
natural sovereign right and will use it in line with its historical and national 
interests.”299  
Taking recourse to the underlying principle of modern nationalism – the right of self-
determination – the president of the republic declares absolute support for it (‘we reject 
any [...] limits’). Repeatedly pointing to the Macedonian people as the carrier of 
sovereignty (‘[the] people ...sovereignly decides’ and ‘[the] people has [...] been in 
possession of this [...] sovereign right’), he confirms the ‘natural’ character of this right and 
its importance for the realization of interests. He goes on to declare: 
“Macedonia speaks with others as the national state of the Macedonian people300 
[...] and defends its vital national and state interests [...] as its own and inviolable 
right [thus offering] guarantee for the rights of all Macedonian citizens in human 
and national sense.”301 
Constituting the state as a subject (‘speaks with others’, ‘defends its [..] interests’, ‘[has] 
right[s]’) on the basis of nationality also reveals the relevance of basic assumptions of 
nationalism. This is further confirmed by the duality of rights that are attributed to 
Macedonian citizens (‘human’ and ‘national’). But while human rights are universally 
recognized for all citizens of all states, the suggestion that national rights also need 
guarantee alludes to a national collectivity under threat, and implies the legitimacy of the 
discourse of nationalism. 
Despite the obvious relevance of nationalism, however, explicit references to it are only 
made with regard to external and internal ‘Others’, never with regard to the legitimate 
Macedonian national ‘Self’:  
299 Vladimir Mitkov, President of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia speaking at the First 
Plenary Session of the Parliament of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia on 8th Jan 1991, 85. 
300 The full quote includes ‘and all its citizens’ as the subjects of the state. 
301 Vladimir Mitkov, ibid., 85. 
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“[...] we cannot speak of Macedonian nationalism. [Because neither of us wants a 
foot of land belonging to others].”302 
Furthermore, when made reference to, nationalism is always positioned next to some of 
its extreme or illegitimate forms, indicating an attempt for dissociation from it. With 
regard to Yugoslavia as the immediate external ‘Other’ symbolizing the federative past, 
‘nationalism’ and ‘chauvinism’ go hand in hand from the very beginning of the federation 
in 1945303: 
“the declarative character of the Constitution brought Yugoslavia to the current 
height of the rampages of chauvinism and nationalism”304. 
“[..] the rampages of chauvinism, separatism and bloody inter-national collisions 
[..]indicate that in multinational states, where in the name of the peoples [...] ruled 
totalitarian regimes and élites, the national question was repressed and inter-
national relations brought to a boiling point.”305  
The slightly paradoxical suggestion that the damages caused by nationalism are 
characteristic of multi-national states are another rhetorical blow against the political 
option of ‘otherness’ (the federation) and re-affirming the political validity of the project of 
‘Self’-emancipation (independent statehood).  
With regard to the sizeable Albanian minority within the Macedonian republic, constituted 
as the internal ‘Other’, nationalism is still relevant: 
“[in the Western parts of Macedonia] we are witnessing a long-term division from 
the positions of Albanian nationalism and separatism.”306 
Pointing to nationalism and separatism as a threat to the integrity of the state (‘long term 
division’) when it comes to the Albanian minority, positions the Albanian community in a 
chain of difference from the Macedonian community. In the Macedonian context both 
302 Dimitar Galev, Agrarian Party of Macedonia 8th Jan 1991, 102. 
303 Todor Petrov, 8th Jan 1991, 92. 
304 Ibid., 95. 
305 Ibid., 95. 
306 Dushko Georgievski, 4th plenary session on 25th Jan 1991, 137. 
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nationalism (implicitly) and separatism (explicitly) are interpreted as natural, sovereign and 
inviolable rights of the Macedonian people and are defended as such. Denouncing 
‘Albanian nationalism and separatism’ as a threat re-affirms Albanian ‘otherness’ within 
the boundaries of the Macedonian republic and highlights the second important context 
which shaped the rise of Macedonian nationalism in the post-socialist years. 
The Context of Minority Accommodation 
The underlying feature of the rhetoric preparing the ground for an independent 
Macedonian state revolved around the idea of a national state for the Macedonian nation. 
As demonstrated above, the political project of independent statehood was legitimized 
through the notions of realizing the Macedonian national and historical interest, referring 
to the historical standing of the Macedonian question and confirming the inviolable 
sovereignty of the Macedonian people. This legitimization, however, did not take account 
of the sizeable non-Macedonian component of the Macedonian republic – the Albanian 
minority. Attempting to exclude the Albanians from the community constituted at state 
level conditioned a long-term inter-ethnic confrontation and to a large extent determined 
the type of statehood the newly independent republic achieved in the decade following 
independence. At the same time this confrontation perpetuated the discourse of 
Macedonian nationalism, empowered initially with the political project of independence: 
“We should all be clear that no peoples live in Macedonia. Macedonia is the state of 
the Macedonian people.”307 
Articulating the unambiguous co-relation between nation (‘the Macedonian people’) and 
state, on the one hand, and denying the same status to any other community (‘no peoples 
live [here]’) establishes a clear hierarchy in which the Macedonian national community 
dominates the project of statehood. This dominant position is further justified through 
appeals for historical justice: 
307 Mihail Panovski, VMRO-DPMNE, 1st plenary session, 8th Jan 1991, 100. 
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“[the Macedonian] population has fought for its freedom for centuries and now 
when the time has come for it to live in freedom in its own land, [it cannot accept] a 
governor from [Albanian] nationality”308  
Despite the newly democratic character of the Macedonian republic proclaimed on 
countless occasions in the immediate context of the first democratic elections309 and the 
fact that it was precisely the principles of democracy that backed the Macedonian claim 
for independence (such is the will of the Macedonian people310), in the Albanian context 
considerations of democratic representation are immediately discarded as unsubstantial. 
The discrepancy in the official line re-affirms the position of inequality. In the discussions 
on appointing a governor for the predominantly Albanian populated Western area of the 
republic311, it is declared: 
“If we want to cherish love [between the Albanians and the Macedonians] it needs 
to be known that this is Macedonian land and you need to be clear, the governor 
has to be Macedonian.”312 
Categorically stating that the only way for a harmonious relationship between the two 
communities (the ‘love’ relationship which the Albanian representative had called for313) is 
by accepting the formula of Macedonian domination over the principle of democratic 
representation (valid for the rest of Macedonia), again prescribes a position of 
subordination for the ethnic Albanians, maintained by the instructive tone in the second 
person plural (‘you need to be clear’).  
This rhetorical line is somewhat moderated by the recognition of the right of the Albanian 
minority to be included in the project of statehood. The new president of the republic Kiro 
Gligorov, addressing the assembly which elected him, suggests the formula of 
compromise: 
308 Kiril Kovachevski, 4th session, 25th Jan 1991, 146. 
309 See 1st plenary session verbatim report  8th Jan 1991. 
310 This argument is detectable in key political rhetoric from the period. 
311 Around the town of Tetovo. 
312 Kiril Kovachevski 4th plenary session, 146. 
313 In the words of Abdurahman Haliti, 4th plenary session, 8th Jan 1991, 85. 
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“[...] to build a sovereign and modern legal state [..] for the Macedonian people, for 
the other nationalities which live [in Macedonia], for all citizens of Macedonia.”314 
The formula maintains the position of difference (‘the people’ against ‘the other 
nationalities’), which cannot be discarded without major re-formulation of the claim for 
Macedonian independent statehood, but it offers a realm of commonality: Macedonian 
citizenship. United along the lines of citizenship, the members of the Albanian ethnic 
majority can enjoy the same civil rights as the rest of the Macedonian citizens. Moreover, 
they can do so irrespective of their national identity – they are recognized as a nationality. 
This is in contrast to Bulgaria at the time, where ethnic minorities could participate in the 
state community only as long as they subscribed to Bulgarian national identity renouncing 
their background nationality. In Bulgaria they had been designated as ‘ethnic’ communities 
(not ‘national’), having Bulgarian national self-identification, despite their different ethnic 
origins. Macedonia did recognize divergent national identities. However, this recognition 
served the dual purpose of offering a formula of inclusion into the project of statehood 
and maintaining the status of ‘otherness’. Having a different nationality excluded the 
ethnic Albanians from the community of the Macedonian people. It was clear, though, that 
without a formula of inclusion, there could be no meaningful political consensus over 
statehood: 
“The fact that the representatives of all nationalities supported my election [...] I 
appreciate as providing [me with] legitimacy [..] to represent the Macedonian 
people, all nationalities, and all residents of Macedonia.”315  
As Gligorov notes, the election of a new head of state could not be legitimate if the 
Albanian minority did not participate in it. This recognition is telling of the political 
bargaining power of the Albanian majority and its role in shaping the identity of the newly 
independent state. Unlike Bulgaria, where the largest ethnic minority was not included in 
the roundtable talks for negotiating the new power deal, and was given access to state 
power only after the negotiations had established the new status quo, the Macedonian 
314 Kiro Gligorov, 5th plenary session, 27th Jan 1991, 17. 
315 Kiro Gligorov, 5th plenary session, 27th Jan 1991, 16. 
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Albanians participated in its negotiation right from the start. Fully aware that their 
inclusion depended on the re-formulation of the political project for a Macedonian 
national state for the Macedonian people, the Albanians attempted to marginalize the 
national narrative in the project316, emphasizing instead more universal narratives such as 
protecting human rights and fostering democracy. In the discussion on the choice for a 
prime minister, for example, the representative of the Albanian party317 in the assembly 
insists: 
“[the prime minister] above all needs to be a person who wants the best for this 
republic [as a] common home [for all of us] independent of nationality, because 
man is necessarily a man and only incidentally a Macedonian, an Albanian, a Turk, 
etc.”318 
On a different occasion, defending the teaching of Albanian language in schools in the 
Western parts of the republic, Murati denounces the Macedonian claim that ‘in 
Macedonian land Albanian language cannot be taught’319: 
“We all want democracy but as long as we think ‘democracy for me but not for you’, 
there will be animosity between us. I would not like to say [...] that it was being 
worked here for a quasi-democracy, I do not like to think we would get to that.”320 
Appealing to commonality between different ethnicities and discarding national 
differences as incidental, Murati clearly attempts to challenge the hegemony of nationalist 
discourse and give the project of statehood an alternative meaning, upheld by 
individualism and equality. Replacing nationality as the central signifier of statehood with 
democracy (‘we all want [it]’), and suggesting that it might be under threat (the urgency 
highlighted by his double refusal to believe this might be the case), he discursively re-
arranges political priorities, suggesting an alternative framework for statehood.  
316 The ‘national key’ as Faik Abdi (Roma), calls it at 4th plenary session 25th Jan 1991, 162. 
317 Dzheladin Murati, a key figure in the Party for Democratic Prosperity. 
318 Dzheladin Murati speaking at the 7th plenary session on 25th Feb 1991, 208. 
319 Dzheladin Murati speaking at the 4th plenary session on 25th Jan 1991, 171. 
320 Ibid., 175. 
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The Albanian context added an important tenet to Macedonian state identity at the time. 
Even though the political project of independent Macedonian statehood demanded a 
national state for the Macedonian people, it could not acquire the legitimacy it needed 
unless it articulated a broader criterion for self-identification than nationality. Hence, the 
consensual formula acknowledging the ‘equal and sustainable’321 participation of other 
‘nationalities’. This made narratives of Macedonian post-socialist national identity much 
more inclusive, as compared to Bulgaria. At the same time, however, it institutionalized 
‘otherness’, upholding a state identity destabilized by mutually nourished domestic 
nationalisms. The internal instability of this identity construct made it more vulnerable to 
external attacks. 
The Balkan Context 
Macedonia staked its claim for independent statehood in a geopolitical environment that 
was not entirely benevolent. Surrounded by Bulgaria and Greece, which both had certain 
ideas of ‘Macedonian-ness’, Macedonia had always had to defend its identity against 
external encroachment. To Bulgaria, Macedonia was an integral element of the Bulgarian 
narrative of national pride, sacrifice and loss. Laying claims on the entire region of 
geographical Macedonia (Pirin, Vardar and Aegean) as old Bulgarian lands, Bulgaria had 
not come to terms with Macedonian statehood. To Greece, Macedonia was a central locus 
of Greek narratives of political superiority dating back to Antiquity. Symbolically, it was an 
inseparable part of Greek national identity and as such, Macedonian independent 
statehood could not be treated as anything but an aberration. The fact that both states 
had considerable parts of geographical Macedonia under their sovereignty was interpreted 
by them as evidence supporting their claims and justification for their ‘special’ positions 
towards the Macedonian republic. Appealing to past commonality, Bulgaria fluctuated 
between the paternalistic tone of an older brother protective of an unexperienced youth 
and the absolute negation of Macedonia’s distinctive identity. Both ends of the spectre 
denied Macedonia a position of equality in the world of sovereign states and thus 
contradicted the very nature of the most crucial political project for Macedonia – 
321 From the Preamble of the 1991 Macedonian Constitution at 
http://www.dzr.gov.mk/Uploads/ustavrm.pdf. 
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independent statehood. Greece, in turn, insisted on an essential right over anything 
‘Macedonian’ and categorically refused to acknowledge unauthorized use of the name 
‘Macedonia’ and of key elements from the insignia of the Macedonian state. From a 
position of recognized international authority, this refusal denied Macedonia the freedom 
to access the most stable of all signifiers of ‘Macedonian-ness’, the name.  
These ‘special’ positions differed significantly from each other, but in their encroachment 
over the discursive space of Macedonian identity they both constituted serious threats to 
its stability. Indeed, the domestic perception of the two neighbours was that of hostility. 
The future prime minister of independent Macedonia confirms: 
“Bulgaria and Greece {...] simply do not acknowledge that there is a Macedonian 
people.”322  
Debating relations with the rest of the Balkan states, another MP insists: 
“I cannot begin to understand the logic of opening a conversation about our 
decision [on the future in Yugoslavia] with the states that do not recognize us, 
which are Bulgaria [and] Greece.”323 
Even the notoriously pro-Balkan Ljubco Georgievski, another future prime minister, 
resignedly concludes: 
“Unfortunately, we cannot choose our neighbours, and our neighbours are [...] 
Greece and Bulgaria. We are in the middle.”324 
 
The notions of surrounded-ness and non-acceptance structure the perception of hostility 
emanating from Macedonia’s neighbours and constitute these neighbours as a threat. This 
is evident in the widely vocalized concern in Macedonia for the Macedonian minorities on 
the territory of these neighbours. The newly elected president Gligorov lists this concern 
among the most pressing issues before the new state: 
322 Branko Crvenkovski, Macedonia’s second prime minister, speaking at 6th plenary session, 1st Feb 1991, 27. 
323 Albania is also listed here in the full quote. Vladimir Golubovski, 7th plenary session, 25th Feb 1991, 155. 
324 Albania and Serbia in the original quote. Lubcho Georgievski, 7th plenary session, 25th Feb 1991, 156. 
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“In the first place, [vital] questions [for us] are the sovereignty of the Macedonian 
state [and] the fate of the Macedonian people in neighbouring countries [as well 
relations with our diaspora].”325  
Almost an entire plenary session is dedicated to discussing the possible benefits of using 
the results of a US State Department report on minorities in the Balkans, particularly its 
conclusions on the Macedonians in Aegean Macedonia and in Pirin Macedonia and 
Bulgaria in general.326 The concern is not only getting their minority status and rights 
recognized. It goes beyond that, “to enable [..] the love of the fatherland of the 
Macedonians [...] in neighbouring lands”.327  
This excessive preoccupation with the well-being of Macedonian minorities in the 
surrounding states, however, further exacerbates neighbours’ reservations over a 
sovereign Macedonia, serving as a catalyst of their anti-Macedonian sentiments. Both in 
domestic and in international contexts, the Bulgarian and Greek governments did not 
hesitate to make these sentiments known328, provoking as a response the mobilization of 
Macedonian identity politics and the securitization of Macedonian national identity. 
Complemented by complex Macedonian relations with Serbia as the former sovereign and 
Albania, this regional context stimulated the rise of defensive Macedonian nationalism and 
to a large extent affected the type of national identity it upheld.  
Thus, not unlike in Bulgaria, the first years of post-communism in Macedonia were 
structured by the discursive context of hegemonic nationalism. Understanding this context 
and its specificities in the two studied cases is the starting point of analyzing the meanings 
upheld by national identity narratives and the language used to articulate them.  
 
 
 
325 Kiro Gligorov, 5th plenary session, 27th Jan 1991, 18. 
326 Verbatim report from 7th plenary session, 25th Feb 1991. 
327 Kiro Gligorov, 5th plenary session, 27th Jan 1991, 25. 
328 The prime ministers of the two states Popov and Mitsotakis had made frequent statements in this sense. 
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The Hegemony of Nationalism as Discursive Context 
As argued in the first part of the dissertation, the discourse of nationalism is the implicit 
discursive background of modern statehood, which makes it perpetually relevant to the 
political. Both major developments in post-war Europe – the institutionalization of 
communism in the East and the project of European integration in the West – attempted 
to transcend its discursive boundaries, although in very different ways. This temporarily 
marginalized some of nationalism’s interpretations of state identity. The breakup of 
communism in Eastern Europe restored their political relevance, particularly in view of the 
East’s initial isolation from the integration processes in the West. The renewed search for 
credible collective identity in post-communist Bulgaria and Macedonia was thus structured 
by the discursive hegemony of nationalism. National identity narratives of the early 
transition in the two states are highly conflictual, upholding a closed community strongly 
dependent upon past antagonisms. The following chapter traces some of their most salient 
interpretations.  
As explained in the research design section in Chapter IV, the analysis identifies six central 
narratives (or groups of narratives) of identity, identifiable in both states, and traces their 
transformations in the two studied states. Three of them focus predominantly on 
discursively positioning the national subject. They are analysed at the beginning and 
towards the end of transition and variations in them are compared and contrasted in 
Chapter VI and in Chapter VIII. The other three central identity narratives, concerned 
mostly with discursively positioning the constitutive national ‘Other(s)’, are analysed in 
Chapter VII. They outline axes of conflictuality between the two studied states and are 
traced within the chronological periods of their greatest salience. Identifying variations of 
these narratives with the empowerment of the Europeanization discourse within and 
across the studied units is the main task of the following three chapters. 
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CHAPTER VI 
IDENTITY NARRATIVES IN BULGARIA AND MACEDONIA BEFORE EUROPEANIZATION 
 
Having laid out the discursive context of hegemonic nationalism as structuring the 
narration of identity in both Bulgaria and Macedonia towards the beginning of their 
democratic transitions, the dissertation proceeds to explore three central national identity 
narratives determining the discursive position of ‘Self’ in the two states. It selects salient 
narratives upheld by traditional identity signifiers identifiable in both states: territory, 
nationhood, purpose. Tracing their dominant interpretations before Europeanization, the 
analysis aims to establish the political consequences of identity narration for imagining the 
community of the state. It also aims to reveal the political consequences of identity 
narration for perpetuating particular state behaviour. Upholding a closed, exclusive 
community highly dependent on historical narratives and thus oriented towards the past, 
the hegemonic discourse of nationalism perpetuates inter-ethnic and inter-national 
confictuality.329 This significantly compromises the credibility of national identity narratives 
as legitimate source of sovereign power in Europe. But with the gradual empowerment of 
Europeanization, the political relevance of ‘European’ signifiers for narrating the national 
story increases. Having outlined the discursive pattern of national identity before 
Europeanization in this chapter, the analysis will then follow the discursive modifications 
introduced in it by the discourse of ‘Europe’ in chapters VII and VIII.  
 
 
 
329 The discussion on nationalism in Part I of the dissertation presents this argument in detail. 
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Bulgarian National Identity Narratives of ‘Self’ before Europeanization 
The political relevance of national identity narrated within the discourse of nationalism is 
revealed in the political antagonisms which it perpetuates. Despite its sedimented quality 
and increased popular appeal, national identity upheld in an antagonistic manner did not 
enjoy high credibility as a legitimate state identity in the context of post-communism. 
Against the imperatives of coming to terms with the past and starting anew, the 
community of the state had to be imagined in a different way. The search for this new 
identity in Bulgaria began with the beginning of transition, as demonstrated in the 
preceding chapter. The democratization process and the project of integration in Europe 
provided a general direction to this search, but the salience of nationalism prevented 
immediate progress towards it. This section aims to map out the discursive pattern of 
Bulgarian national identity in this context of increased instability still dominated by the 
discourse of nationalism. By tracing the dominant interpretations of three central identity 
signifiers and the narratives articulating their meanings, it attempts to identify the 
discursive logic of the conflictuality they perpetuated. Focusing on one dimension of the 
identity articulation dynamics – Bulgarian-Macedonian relations – the analysis explores the 
political consequences of conflictual interpretations. Assuming that their credibility fails in 
the non-constructive state behaviour they condition, this section ultimately aims to 
highlight the discursive omissions of nationalist discourse. It is against these omissions that 
Europeanization could provide a more credible reading of national identity.    
Identity Narratives of Nationhood 
A central signifier of national identity is attached to the discursive element of ‘nationhood’. 
In post-communist Bulgaria its most salient interpretations initially came from the 
discourse of nationalism, upholding the story of ‘national unity’ as the highest priority in 
safeguarding nationhood. Rooted in an historical myth from early medieval times and 
affirmed by the historical narrative of the liberation movement which led to the 
establishment of the independent modern Bulgarian state, at a most basic level the story 
of ‘national unity’ is understood as the natural bond of ‘brotherhood’. Similar to the five 
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proto-Bulgarian brothers-princes from a popular national myth330, unity is based on a 
blood relation, i.e. it suggests a sort of pre-given commonality that not everybody can 
share into. Although newcomers have traditionally been welcome in accordance with the 
proverbial hospitality, they will always remain guests because they do not share the same 
origin.331 In the context of threat against the community, the idea of ‘national unity’ 
becomes a source of strength against numerous adversaries from within and from without. 
This is why it acquires a quality of ‘highest value’. The period around the negotiated regime 
change in Bulgaria was a time of utmost uncertainty in ideological, social, political, 
economic sense. Moreover, it was a time of serious inter-ethnic tension as a legacy of the 
totalitarian nationalist violence against different ethnicity. In this context of instability the 
appeal for ‘national unity’ became increasingly salient.  
‘Unity of the nation’ is the central message of the parliamentary declaration on the 
national question332 which officially recognized the responsibility of the totalitarian regime 
for the nationalist violence of the past in an attempt to appease the protesting crowds 
throughout the country. Its Article 7 is specifically dedicated to the ‘unity of the nation’. 
Following the declaration, ‘unity of the nation’ is appealed to endlessly as a formula of 
consensus and highest good at the Roundtable Talks for brokering the post-communist 
power agreement. Listing it as one of the basic principles underlying the political system 
that post-totalitarian Bulgaria needs to establish with the reforms, the then vice-chairman 
of the ‘state council’ explains: 
“we are introducing new principles [..] such as democratism, humanism, unity of the 
nation, separation between executive, legislative and judicial powers.”333 
330 The fable for Khan Kubrat and his sons, see Milcho Lalkov, Rulers of Bulgaria (Sofia: Kibea Publishing, 
1995) at http://www.historyfiles.co.uk/FeaturesEurope/EasternBulgaria_Kubrat.htm. 
331 The peaceful accommodation of the Turkish minority population which remained within the borders of 
the new Bulgarian state after 1878 illustrates this model, see Valeri Stoyanov, The Turkish Population in 
Bulgaria between the Poles of Ethnopolitics (Sofia: LIK, 1998) in Bulgarian.  
332 Televized on 15th Jan 1990, available at http://anamnesis.info/clio-bg/index.php/vek/3243. 
333 Vice-chairman of the State Council and chair of the Legislative Committee Vasil Mrichkov, Roundtable 
Talks 19th March 1990 from 3.10pm, verbatim reports, 641. 
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From the side of the opposition, a representative of the Club of the Repressed334 also lists 
national unity among the priority goals of the reforms, when appealing for a particular 
type of electoral system: 
“this is particularly important [...] in the name of the consensus, in the name of the 
national unity, in the name of the peaceful transition, etcetera [...]”335 
The lack of theoretical precision in the use and the rhetorical inertia of such statements 
illustrates the formulaic quality which the phrase had acquired by this time.  
The acceptance of the idea of ‘national unity’ as a highest value upholds a particular 
national identity that is not necessarily reconciliatory. By emphasizing unity of the national 
community at all cost, the political actors in effect deny the members of the community 
the right to differences which transcend the boundary of the nation. This means that 
Bulgarian citizens are not expected to have any different national affiliation if they are to 
be members of the community of the Bulgarian nation. In the case of national minorities 
the implication is slightly paradoxical. Their right of belonging is recognized in so far as 
their ‘national consciousness’336 remains Bulgarian, despite ethnic or religious differences. 
This is the only reasoning which can preserve a cohesive, unified, monolithic nation, at the 
same time accepting otherness. But because minorities cannot share the bond of blood 
from the glorious and tragic past, as the Bulgarian narrative of nationhood has it, they 
inevitably remain something of an aberration. The emphasis on the need of ‘tolerance’, i.e. 
acceptance of something one does not necessarily agree with, illustrates this 
incongruence. The concept of a monolithic nation simply cannot accommodate fully and 
comfortably the idea of national minorities. It always maintains a fine distinction between 
‘ethnic minorities and our people’337.  
This is evident in the discussions on many of the political reforms undertaken with the 
breakup of communism, which the Roundtable Talks showcase, as well as in the legislative 
334 One of the first organizations of activists formed swiftly in the course of the regime change. 
335 Ivan Nevrokopski, ibid., 776. 
336 ‘Национално съзнание’, the use of the term has been well established in Bulgarian academia and 
politics. 
337 Milan Drenchev, Bulgarian Agricultural Popular Union at the Roundtable Talks, 12th Mar 1990 at 15.50h, 
verbatim report, 536 at. 
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decisions taken by the Grand National Assembly following the Roundtable. Political parties, 
for example, are considered to be ‘first and foremost, national organization[s...]’338, i.e. a 
clear hierarchy is being established between national and political affiliations in favour of 
the former. The constitutional provision on political parties, in turn, prohibits ‘the 
incorporation of political parties along ethnic lines’339. This precludes the collective right of 
political representation of (ethno-)national minorities340, which later became particularly 
controversial in terms of registering parties representing the Macedonian minority in 
Bulgaria. The registration of the organization representing the Turkish ethnic minority341, 
on the other hand, was only allowed after a statutes modification inviting membership 
from the Bulgarian majority (i.e. formally, it is not representing exclusively the ethnic 
Turks).342 The explicit prohibition of political representation of ethno-national minorities at 
the level of primary law continues the established hierarchy between national and 
political, placing ethnicity lower down the hierarchy line. This characterizes Bulgarian 
national identity of the time as highly exclusive, constituting a closed community in which 
belonging is defined by jus sanguinis343. Such an exclusive identity increases the degree of 
conflictuality, because it dramatically narrows the discursive space of the national subjects 
and constitutes everybody else in terms of threatening ‘otherness’. In view of Bulgarian-
Macedonian relations, such an identity can be disorienting because it conditions a 
challenge from within. Historically sedimented narratives of belonging constitute the 
people of Macedonia as ‘brothers’344: they are included in the same narratives which 
uphold the community of blood. Macedonia’s refusal to participate in these narratives 
threatens their credibility. This is furthermore challenged by the narrative re-writing of 
national identity in Macedonia, constituting Bulgaria as the threatening ‘Other’. Thus, the 
338 This argument is used to seek prohibition for financing political parties with funds from abroad, Vasil 
Mrichkov speaking at the Roundtable Talks, 26th Mar 1990 at 9.36, verbatim report, 732. 
339 Art.11, Para.4 of the 1991 Constitution. 
340 On the ambivalence between collective and individual representation rights in Europe, see Miodrag A. 
Jovanović, ‘Recognizing minority identities through collective rights’, Human Rights Quarterly 27 (3), (2005): 
625-51. 
341 The Movement for Rights and Freedoms. 
342 Venelin Ganev, ‘History, Politics, and the Constitution: Ethnic Conflict and Constitutional Adjudication in 
Postcommunist Bulgaria’, Slavic Review 63 (1), (2004): 66-89. 
343 Similar conclusion by Victor Roudometof, Collective Memory, National Identity, and Ethnic Conflict: 
Greece, Bulgaria, and the Macedonian Question (Westport: Praeger, 2002),19. 
344 Ibid., Chapter 2. 
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interpretation of one of the central signifiers of Bulgarian national identity – unity of the 
nation – pre-determines conflictuality in bilateral relations with Macedonia. 
Identity Narratives of Territory 
Another key signifier of Bulgarian national identity is articulated on the basis of the 
discursive element of territory. The most salient interpretations of national territory in 
post-communist Bulgaria uphold the story of ‘territorial integrity’. While preserving the 
territorial integrity of the state logically heads the security and defense policy goals of any 
state, constituting territorial integrity as a signifier of identity serves a different purpose. 
Originating in the idea of ‘unity’ of the Bulgarian nation, in many ways it defined the type 
of state modern Bulgaria became from its independence to the final decade of the 20th 
century. Many states contain territorial entities with various degrees of autonomy within 
their borders or are part of a federation, while retaining their territorial integrity. For 
Bulgaria the idea of the inherently integral nature of state territory characterized by an 
equal degree of sovereignty over all of its territorial regions has been upheld as sacrosanct. 
Even the remote probability345 that the Turkish minority might demand autonomy for the 
southern region which it predominantly populated, was sufficient to generate tensions in 
the inter-ethnic relations within the state.346 In their attempts to address the problem in a 
reconciliatory manner, the government and the democratic opposition discuss an official 
declaration in which the primary focus is on denying that ‘autonomy’ had ever come up as 
a political option. Thus, the leader of the National Union of Students347 insists that:  
“Their other demand, for autonomy, which has been flared by the chauvinists, 
needs to be addressed and denied [in the text of the declaration]”348 
The speaker of the democratic opposition continues: 
345 Which held very little relevance to fact at the time, given the lack of organizational power of the minority 
community. 
346 Valeri Stoyanov, The Turkish Population in Bulgaria. 
347 Having actively participated in the civil protests in the capital, the National Union of Students were invited 
to take part in the Roundtable negotiations as part of the opposition. 
348 Emil Koshlukov, leader of the Student Unions at the Roundtable Talks, plenary session on 3rd Jan 1990 
from 5.30pm, verbatim report, 562. 
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“[...] the declaration [...] needs to confirm that we have discussed the situation and 
that the issue of autonomy has not been brought up [...] because they say, rumour 
has it, that their main demand has been for autonomy.”349 
The attempts to publicly deny even the mention of the idea for autonomy are illustrative 
of the explosive potential which this idea might have on the internal stability of the state. 
In a telling allegory (‘to invite the wolf [into the sheep pen]’350) the prime minister-to-be 
insists that only the word ‘separatism’ (and not ‘autonomy’) be referred to when denying 
any ‘anti-state’ demands on behalf of the minority351. The allegory suggests that even 
though it might have been among the claims of the repressed, the demand for autonomy 
is categorically dismissed as a possible political solution to the inter-ethnic problem. 
Territorial integrity as a signifier of the national identity of the Bulgarian state is non-
negotiable.  
This is also evident in the new constitution agreed by the Grand National Assembly the 
following year. Its preamble refers to the ‘irrevocable duty [of the legislators] to guard the 
national and state integrity of Bulgaria’.352 Article 2 explicitly prohibits any ‘autonomous 
territorial formations’353 and designates the territorial integrity of the state as 
‘inviolable’354. Relevant in this context is also an interesting constitutional provision 
regulating property rights over land. Foreigners are denied the right to acquire ownership 
over Bulgarian land and if they inherit it, they need to transfer it immediately355. Rare in its 
juridical formulation, this provision is indicative of the degree of salience of the territorial 
integrity signifier in the construction of the national identity of the state. In the discursive 
dynamics determining the positions of national ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ such salience clearly 
designates the ‘foreign’ as a threat.  
349 Georgi Spasov, speaker for the Union of Democratic Forces, at the Roundtable Talks, verbatim reports 
from the plenary session on 3rd Jan 1990 from 5.30pm. 
350 Andrey Lukanov speaks at the Roundtable Talks, verbatim reports from the plenary session on 3rd Jan 
1990 from 5.30pm. 
351 Ibid. 37. 
352 Constitution of Bulgaria 1991, Preamble available at http://www.parliament.bg/en/const. 
353 Para.1. 
354 Ibid., Para.2. 
355 Before the amendment of 2005. (Art.22, Para.1). 
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Along similar lines, the discursive emphasis on the protection of state borders during the 
negotiation of the reforms re-enforces the perception of threat, and is another illustration 
of the closed character of identity upheld through the narratives of ‘national unity’ and 
‘territorial integrity’. In the discussion on dismantling the barbed-wire fences along the 
state borders the minister of the interior alerts to the dangers which such a move induces 
and the increased number of guards that it implicates.356 Contrasting the idea with the 
phenomenon of open borders in Europe, the minister underlines Bulgaria’s 
unpreparedness for open borders (‘[lacking prerequisites of] political, economic and social 
character’357), thus increasing the sense of threat. Emphasizing the role of state borders 
has the effect of discursively solidifying them as a source of protection against foreign 
threat. Such rhetoric increases the degree of conflictuality of national identity by re-
enforcing its closed nature. In view of Bulgarian-Macedonian relations, the salience of the 
territorial integrity narrative produced a field of political tension focused on the border 
region of Pirin Macedonia (within the territory of Bulgaria). The independence of the 
Macedonian state and its claims for protecting the Macedonian minority inhabiting this 
region increased the perception of threat against Bulgarian territorial integrity and 
considerably strained the bilateral relations. This is illustrated by the recurrence of the 
issue of minorities in relation to territorial integrity in the inter-state dialogue between the 
two states. 
Identity Narratives of National Purpose 
Another key signifier of Bulgarian national identity is identified in articulations of national 
purpose. Interpreted through the narratives of ‘centrality on the Balkans’, the meaning of 
this discursive element is determined by Bulgaria’s specific geopolitical position. Encrypted 
in an almost sacrosanct manner in the national anthem358, it is defined by the centrality of 
the ‘proud’ Stara Planina359 and delimited by the ‘blue’ Danube river to the north, the 
valley of Thrace ‘shining in the sun’ to the south, and the ‘fiery’ Pirin mountain to the 
356 Atanas Semerdzhiev, verbatim reports from the Roundtable Talks on 26th Mar 1990 from 9.36am, 732. 
357 Ibid., 732. 
358 Which demands dutiful respect, as the custom of standing up while the anthem is played suggests. 
359 The transliteration of the Bulgarian name of the Balkan mountain range, ‘The Old Mountain’ (Bulg.). 
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west.360 The mythologization of national geography as one of the instruments of nation-
building constructs a primordial attachment to the land which becomes the basis of the 
claim of sovereignty. Therefore it serves the dual purpose of constituting the community 
as national and legitimizing its territorial claims. By revolving its geographical space around 
the physical backbone of the Balkans – the Balkan mountain range – Bulgaria lays a 
particular claim to the geopolitics of the entire peninsula: its centrality.  
“We are the very centre of the Balkans,”361 declares among other things the Bulgarian 
president in an interview for the democratic opposition’s leading newspaper. “History has 
dealt us a key position on the Balkans,”362 says the vice-president a little earlier. The 
matter-of-fact quality of these statements and the consensual agreement with which they 
are met across the political landscape are an indication of the degree of discursive 
sedimentation of the notion of ‘centrality’. This is important because it has been 
narratively used as justification for failures in foreign and domestic policy on key political 
issues. The story of the nation as the victim of conflicting interests of the ‘Great Powers’ on 
the Balkans, whose intersection Bulgaria ‘tragically’ occupies, has been repeated over and 
over again, with each unsuccessful political move and each loss of positions.363 The ‘unjust’ 
Berlin Treaty of 1878, replacing the ‘just’ San Stefano Treaty which incidentally met all 
territorial claims of the new Bulgarians state, pushed Bulgaria into decades of dramatic 
effort to complete its national aspirations: ‘our righteous aspirations have met nothing but 
misunderstanding and animosity’, one of the leading historiographers of the communist-
time Academy of Sciences asserts.364 This historically documented conclusion365 is also 
reproduced in the political space at a highest level: 
360 Bulgarian national anthem available online at http://www.parliament.bg/bg/22. 
361 Demokratsia newspaper, 4th January 1992, interview with President Zhelyu Zhelev by Maria Vasileva. 
362 Atanas Semerdzhiev speaking at the Roundtable Talks, verbatim reports from 6th Feb 1990 from 14.35h, 
426. 
363 After a series of wars, participation in which had been motivated by the aspirations for national and 
territorial unification. 
364 Ilcho Dimitrov in an interview in Duma newspaper, 1st Feb 1992, Issue 27. 
365 See the monumental History of Bulgaria in 14 Volumes published by the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences in 
1979 (re-printed by GALICO in 1999). 
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“[our central geopolitical position] has been a curse for Bulgaria. [...] Bulgaria at the 
crossroads has always been a victim.”366 
The discursive victimization of Bulgaria because of its geographical and geopolitical 
position, projected as something that lies outside the scope of control of the subject 
(implying innocence), serves the political purpose of transferring the blame for the 
‘national catastrophes’367, which unwise or unfortunate (but otherwise ‘righteous’) policies 
have led the state into. Re-opening the ‘Macedonian question’ with Macedonia’s claim for 
independence and the ambiguities in Bulgaria’s position towards it establishes direct 
discursive links with this historical discussion on dealing with national loss. The fact that 
the context which determined Bulgaria’s reaction to Macedonia’s independence was 
discursively rooted in the traumas of the past to a large extent troubled bilateral relations 
and impeded a solution to the bilateral issues in line with the political present.   
The political relevance of the discourse on victimization in the early 1990s can also be 
linked to the uncertainty caused by the reforms. Rejecting totalitarianism, Bulgaria 
struggled to re-define its state identity in an entirely novel international environment. 
Established stereotypes of hostility – of ‘otherness’ – naturally resurfaced as points of 
orientation. However, the context of change, uncertain as it was, brought with it hopes for 
a new beginning. The fall of totalitarianism promised ‘freedom’ and opened up the 
discursive space for new interpretations of the signifier of national purpose. This is what 
enabled the transformation of the victimization narrative into a story of opportunity. 
“Today, in the world of modern communications, [our geopolitical] position is a 
great advantage; we should be the biggest of fools if we do not use our natural 
advantages.”368  
This interpretation links the idea of centrality to an antithetical discourse implying 
uniqueness, significance, responsibility. To begin with, centrality begins to be seen as 
366 Demokratsia newspaper, 4th Jan 1992, interview with President Zhelyu Zhelev by Maria Vasileva. 
367 The term ‘national catastrophe’ is used in Bulgarian historiography to describe the period after the Balkan 
wars and the period after the First World War, History of Bulgaria, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Volume 8 
(Sofia: GALICO, 1999). 
368 Demokratsia newspaper, 4th Jan 1992, interview with President Zhelyu Zhelev by Maria Vasileva. 
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conditioning Bulgaria’s special mission as a factor of stability on the Balkans. This idea is 
being repeated on numerous occasions as the reason and purpose of Bulgarian policy, and 
is being reinforced by external authoritative recognition which is widely publicised. The 
American then Secretary of the Air Force is being quoted as assuring the Bulgarian prime 
minister that ‘[your] country is the centre of stability on the Balkans’369. Positive pieces on 
Bulgaria from the European press are another way of suggesting Bulgaria’s exceptionalism: 
‘The Little Miracle on the Balkans’370. Reversing the political sign of centrality to signify 
stability is an expression of Bulgaria’s search for a new state direction and purpose at the 
beginning of the period of transition. Positive self-identification at state level is a good 
basis for political mobilization domestically and for successful negotiation internationally. 
For Bulgaria’s smaller neighbour Macedonia, however, the paternalistic tone of Bulgarian 
foreign policy did not promise good neighbourly relations, particularly not in view of 
Bulgarian ambiguities towards Macedonia as a sovereign nation.  
Another aspect of the new interpretation of centrality is directly relevant to Bulgaria’s (re-) 
turn to Europe. Being located at the geopolitical crossroads between Europe and Asia, 
Bulgaria presents itself as the gatekeeper of the borderline. In an international context the 
chair of the parliamentary committee on foreign policy declares: 
“The Black Sea has two coastal lines, one European, one Asian. Bulgarians are on 
the European line and do not intend to leave it.”371 
Such self-positioning is flattering because of the claimed mediatory role between two 
worlds, which are placed in a decidedly hierarchical order372, as suggested by the 
determination with which the claimed position is being defended (‘we do not intend to 
leave’ the European line). This formulation is not new to Bulgarian historiography. It 
implies ‘a special duty and a special responsibility before Europe to help solve the 
369 Donald Rice, US Secretary of the Airforce, Demokratsia newspaper, 28th Jan 1992, the quote is a headline 
(!). 
370 Züddeutsche Zeitung, quoted in Demokratsia newspaper, 22nd Apr 1992. 
371 Demokratsia newspaper, 29th Apr 1992 quoting Aleksander Yordanov, Chair of the Parliamentary 
Committee on Foreign Policy. 
372 As opposed to the dynamics of discursive undecideability in discourse theory, Ernesto 
Laclau, Emancipation(s). 
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problems in the Balkan region,’373 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explains. Thus not only is 
Bulgarian claim for Europe being staked, but at the same time this claim is being 
argumentatively backed. Insisting on a special ‘duty and responsibility before Europe’ 
arising for Bulgaria from its alleged gatekeeping position also suggests a special 
relationship between Bulgaria and Europe. Such self-identification aims to discursively 
enhance the self-image of the state. In the longer term it is indicative of the future 
directions of foreign policy strategy. In view of Bulgaria’s international position on the 
Balkans, however, this self-identification imposed certain paternalism which Macedonia 
found particularly irritating, as the second section of this chapter demonstrates. Within the 
discursive hegemony of nationalism, the credibility of ‘European’ stories of ‘Self’ is still 
questionable. 
 
Credibility of Bulgarian National Identity Narratives of ‘Self’ before 
Europeanization 
Contextually identifying the dominant interpretations of three of its most salient signifiers 
– national unity, territorial integrity, geopolitical centrality – helps imagine the discursive 
pattern of Bulgarian national identity from the early post-communist period. It reveals a 
closed community predominantly oriented towards the past. Self-identification with the 
community is possible only along the strict lines of nationhood excluding those who cannot 
partake in the nationhood narrative. Most significantly this category refers to minority 
communities sharing different national, ethnic, linguistic, or religious backgrounds. 
Formally accepted in the wider community of the state, they are discursively marginalized 
and subtly constituted as the internal ‘Other(s)’. Their ‘otherness’ is often transferred by 
association to the national communities of origin (i.e. Turkey), constituting various external 
‘Others’ in the face of immediate neighbours as a threat. The closed character of Bulgarian 
national identity determines its high degree of conflictuality. 
The orientation towards the past, in its turn, links past antagonisms to the present, making 
them part of the agenda of everyday politics. This orientation impedes processing and 
373 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Declaration 18th Jan 1992. 
 
150 
 
                                                            
N. Nancheva                                                                                                                                        Transforming Identities in Europe 
coming to terms with the past374 because it includes the past in the discursive field in 
which the identity of the national ‘Self’ is being articulated. In the context of post-
communist transition, such interpretation of identity became increasingly problematic. In 
view of Bulgarian-Macedonian relations, in particular, it immediately brought to the fore 
the narrative of Bulgarian loss over Macedonia as soon as the issue of establishing bilateral 
relations at state level was re-opened. The inability to dissociate from this narrative 
determined the conflictual character of bilateral relations and threatened to compromise 
Bulgaria’s regional standing. 
An exclusive national identity oriented towards the past is also particularly vulnerable to 
the destabilizing effect of closeness in identity. A national identity oriented towards the 
past is much more difficult to re-formulate because its signifiers are part of historical 
narratives with higher degree of sedimentation, i.e. they are more difficult to re-tell. This is 
what conditioned Bulgaria’s increased perception of threat as a result of Macedonia’s 
claims over some of the discursive elements upholding Bulgarian national identity. The 
uncertainty caused by the change of regime in Bulgaria and the struggle to re-define a 
post-communist national identity for the Bulgarian state had already challenged the 
stability of these elements. Nationalism’s inability to fix their meanings in a credible 
manner opened up the discursive space to alternative interpretations of identity which 
promised to reduce insecurity. Europeanization stood out as the major discursive 
contestant.  
 
Macedonian National Identity Narratives of ‘Self’ before Europeanization 
In the context of disintegrating from the Yugoslav federation, accommodating the vocal 
Albanian minority, and struggling for recognition among encroaching neighbours, the 
Macedonian state sought to project an identity capable of making sense of these changes 
and reducing the discursive insecurity for its subjects. In the hegemonic presence of 
nationalism, however, its most salient articulations upheld a highly contentious national 
identity destabilized from within by unresolved tensions and threatened from without as a 
374 Die Vergangenheitsbewältigung from the German reconciliation tradition. 
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consequence of its antagonistic projections. This compromised the ability of nationalist 
discourse to provide a credible reading of Macedonian national identity and asserted the 
need for alternative, more credible, interpretations.  
Identity Narratives of Nationhood 
The most salient interpretations of Macedonian nationhood within the hegemony of 
nationalism struggle with the idea of ‘national tolerance’. Their inability to produce a 
credible narrative of nationhood within the identity construct of the state determined 
internal instability. On the one hand, the central justification of the project of 
independence revolved around the vindication of national suffering and the recognition of 
Macedonians’ right of national emancipation. In this sense it upheld statehood as an 
entirely national project. On the other hand, the historical opportunity for a national state 
along these lines seemed to have passed because the active political participation of non-
Macedonian ethnic minority communities, leading among which the Albanian, prevented 
the absolute closure of the nationhood narrative in the implementation of the statehood 
project. Rhetorically entrapped between the dominant story of nationhood and the need 
for legitimacy, Macedonian statehood had to reach a compromise. This is embodied in its 
claim to have achieved a just balance between national unity and tolerant inter-ethnic 
relations. As a signifier of identity this claim upheld a more inclusive national community 
which, at least declaratively, was not constrained by the limits of monolithic nationhood. 
This is in contrast to the Bulgarian insistence on an ethnic accommodation model which 
could be successful only as long as it excluded divergent narratives of nationhood. 
Macedonia, unlike Bulgaria, allowed the notion of ‘nationalities’ in its national identity 
construct, which justified its claim for national tolerance as a signifier of the identity of the 
Macedonian state.  
That this compromise was reached as a matter of urgency is suggested in the conflict 
between narratives of nationhood and the imperatives for legitimacy throughout 1991. In 
the period leading up to the referendum375 a powerful rhetorical line upheld the statehood 
375 The referendum for the future of Macedonia as an independent state held on 8th Sep 1991. 
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project as a national state per se. As a national state, the new entity would naturally 
represent the collective identity of the majority community, the Macedonian nation:  
“This is why in the national state we can only speak of equality among the citizens 
in the protection of their rights and freedoms, and we cannot speak of equality 
between the nation and the national minorities as collectivities.”376 
Even though absent from the rhetoric of most leading state actors, this line did appear as a 
narrative at official state level. It is detectable in the parliamentary debates from the entire 
period.377 It is the active political participation of the Albanian minority that first began to 
question this rhetoric:  
“[...] I will stand for strengthening the national unity but also stabilizing the inter-
ethnic relations, promoting these relations and creating a climate of togetherness 
on the basis of mutual respect, equality, political rights and freedoms and mutual 
trust.”378 
The repeated formula of ‘stabilizing’, ‘promoting’, ‘improving’ the inter-ethnic relations 
suggests that they are under threat and aims to increase their priority in the first months 
of the democratic transition, thus leading to their gradual securitization. Categorically 
placing the inter-ethnic relations on the urgent political agenda of the new Macedonian 
state, the Albanian political representation calls for a fair and equal treatment of the 
national minority communities on par with the national majority community. This call 
attempts to radically re-formulate the entire project of Macedonian statehood, and is, 
logically, met with fervent opposition on behalf of the majority, insisting on preserving the 
national character of the signifiers of the state:  
“Nationality [in the constitution] should be specified, Macedonian-ness should be 
specified, because for the first time in its history the Macedonian people has this 
chance [to adopt a national constitution].”379 
376 1st Plenary session of the Macedonian parliament, 8th Jan 1991, 93. 
377 http://www.sobranie.mk/ext/sessions.aspx?Id=8440FB6B-A414-4749-9270-5CB070CE4997. 
378 Dzheladin Murati speaking at the 4th Plenary session, 25th Jan 1991, 75. 
379 Branko Crvenkovski, 25th Plenary Session, 11th Nov 1991, 25. 
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This argument is taken even further in its most radical interpretation, suggesting that 
treating the Albanian minority on par with the Macedonian national majority might lead to 
the paradox of inversing the hierarchical positions: 
“[...] it seems, if we continue working like this [..], one day we [the Macedonians] 
will become minority and will have to defend our minority rights.”380 
These rhetorical formulations catalyzed Albanian discontent with the suggested course of 
statehood and created an opposing rhetorical current of resentment: 
“The Macedonian nation refers to itself as the sole successor of Macedonia. [..] The 
Albanians seem to be an unwanted constitutive element in this historical context, 
only because they insist on being an equal subject in the [project of] statehood.”381 
Intensifying the minority protest against alleged unjust treatment clashed with the 
extreme calls for nationalizing the project of statehood, thus threatening to escalate the 
political atmosphere to unmanageable degrees. This is what predicated the need for an 
inter-ethnic compromise.  
Pointing to the inter-ethnic conflicts that tore Yugoslavia apart, the prime minister-to-be 
reminded of Macedonia’s ‘vital interests’382 which could not be realized unless ‘we tried to 
establish tolerant relations between all of us.’383 This is the context within which the 
notion of constituting the state identity as a community of citizenship, not nationhood, 
gained prominence:  
“[...] in this moment in Europe there is no single state that is constitutionally defined 
as a national state.”384 
380 Todor Petrov, 25th Plenary Session, 11th Nov 1991, 54. 
381 Ismet Ramadani speaking at the 25th Plenary session on 9th Nov 1991, 45. 
382 Macedonia’s second prime minister from the former communist elite, Branko Crvenkovski, lists these as 
‘completing statehood and acquiring independence and sovereignty’, ‘protecting territorial integrity’, 
‘entering the European processes of integration’, see Branko Crvenkovski, 25th Plenary session on 11th Nov 
1991, 25-26. 
383 Branko Crvenkovski, 25th Plenary session on 11th Nov 1991, 25. 
384 Crvenkovski, ibid., 28-29. 
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The speaker of parliament re-enforces the argument in favour of civic, not national, 
statehood: 
“[..] our Macedonian state [...] contains its national aspect [...] but now we need to 
move forward to a civic state, because the Macedonian is not simply a member of 
the nation, but is a member of the nation as a citizen, as an enlightened individual 
[...]”385 
The act of rhetorically positioning the national and civic statehood in a hierarchy in which 
citizenship is placed higher, as a more ‘enlightened’ stage of statehood attempts to justify 
the necessary modification of the Macedonian project of independence. Emphasizing the 
fact that the national character of the state will not be removed, the speaker 
demonstrates how a state community organized along civic lines is a community better 
fitting the political present (‘we need to move forward’). What prevails on the side of a 
civic community is the European perspective (‘no other state in Europe’), as will be 
demonstrated in greater detail below.  
The obvious hesitations in taking the project of independence from national to civic 
statehood are telling of an internal undecideability in Macedonian identity. Even though 
the particular issue that caused such heated debates (removing the ‘national’ denominator 
from Article 1 of the constitution) was resolved in favour of civic identity, the national 
marker continued to designate the community of the state386. In the ambiguous story of 
national tolerance, this internal tension destabilized Macedonian identity when it needed 
affirmation and recognition both from within and from without. In this sense it actually 
increased its conflictuality. Unlike Bulgaria, which fixed its post-communist identity by 
openly refusing to accommodate divergent narratives of nationhood, Macedonia formally 
acknowledged domestic otherness. Unable to completely detach from the narrative of 
nationhood, however, it created a context of domestic antagonism which affected its 
national and international standing for the following decade.  
385 Stojan Andov speaking at the 25th Plenary session on 9th Nov 1991, 192. 
386 Evident from the Preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia of 1991 available at 
http://www.dzr.gov.mk/Uploads/ustavrm.pdf. 
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Identity Narratives of Territory 
In contrast to Bulgaria, national territory was interpreted in Macedonia not as integral and 
undivisive, but as perpetuating the national story of belonging. The uncertainties 
surrounding the status of the territory of Macedonia throughout most of the 19th and 20th 
centuries and the territorial aspirations of neighbouring sovereign states towards it left its 
population no other stable source of collective self-identification but the name of the land 
they inhabited. ‘Macedonia’ as the locus of their struggles for political emancipation from 
empire began to define the identity of the people contested on all other grounds. Caught 
between conflicting narratives of nationhood (Bulgarian, Serbian, Greek) but unable to 
subscribe to either one of them, the people of Macedonia could effectively declare their 
own identity only through the name of their land. Because of this specific historical role, to 
a degree replicated later in the federation, the story of territorial belonging is 
characterized by a great degree of sedimentation as an identity signifier in the narration of 
Macedonian identity.  
“Macedonia is all we have!”387 
“Our negotiating position starts from the inviolability and entirety of the [political 
and national subjectivity and] the territorial, the total integrity of Macedonia. We 
have no right to even discuss these categories with anybody. We will reject a priori 
any whatsoever pressure or usurpation of the integrity of Macedonia.”388 
The fact that the land of geographical Macedonia is a primary source of self-identification 
has an important implication for imagining the community at state level. The borders of 
the Macedonian state include about one-third of the entire geographical region historically 
referred to as ‘Macedonia’; the rest of it is part of neighbouring states. The implication, 
therefore, is that of incompleteness, of a severed whole. This is indicated in the numerous 
references in Macedonian political rhetoric of the time to ‘unification’389 and to the 
387 5th Plenary session, 27th Jan 1991, 25. 
388 Vladimir Mitkov, Chairman of the State Council of the Republic, 1st Plenary session 8th Jan 1991, 85. 
389 E.g. Vasil Tupurkovski, 1st Plenary session 8th Jan 1991, 92. 
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‘Macedonian national question’, as well as in the extraordinary concern for the ‘parts of 
the Macedonian people’ in neighbouring states.  
“Macedonia never has had and never will have territorial aspirations towards its 
neighbours because territorial aspirations one can have towards something that is 
not one’s own.”390 
Even though such explicit formulations are, indeed, rare, they are indicative of the implicit 
understanding that ‘Macedonia’ as a self-identification category refers to a larger 
community. This understanding is one of the key reasons for the high degree of 
antagonism in the relationships of the Macedonian state with its neighbours. In the 
Bulgarian-Macedonian relations in particular, it contains an implicit claim over Pirin 
Macedonia and its people. These relations are further strained by the conflicting claim on 
Bulgarian side over the exclusively Bulgarian character not only of the Pirin region, but also 
of the rest of Macedonia.  
Another implication of the story of territorial belonging for the pattern of Macedonian 
national identity is the increased symbolic significance of the name. Being a primary 
signifier of identity, the name ‘Macedonia’ is non-negotiable. In the context of the name 
dispute with Greece and the grave consequences which Greek disaffections have had on 
Macedonia’s economic and political stability in the Balkans391, as well as on its progress in 
the Euro-Atlantic integration, this has become evident. Even beyond the logical line of 
argumentation on Macedonian side that choosing a name for their state is an exclusive 
prerogative of state sovereignty, the firm Macedonian position in the dispute displays, 
beside everything else, Macedonian inability to discuss nothing less than the constitutional 
name (‘Republic of Macedonia’). Conforming with the formulations acceptable to Greece, 
such as for example ‘Vardar Macedonia’, would have involved a dramatic reduction of the 
discursive space delimiting the community, even though it precisely corresponded to the 
territorial space of the state.  
390 1st plenary session 8th Jan 1991, 97. 
391 Caused by the Greek embargo. An interesting reference to the topic offers the Greek perspective, Ritsa 
Panagiotou, ‘FYROM’s Transition: on the Road to Europe?’, Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans 10(1), 
(2008): 47-64. 
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Thus the salience of nationalist interpretations of territory in Macedonia perpetuated a 
collective identity incongruent with political realities. On the one hand, this re-enforced a 
domestic perception of being besieged among malevolent neighbours. On the other hand, 
it projected an external impression of threat towards the political status quo in the region. 
Both dynamics work against the discursive stability and security of collective identity in the 
various contexts within which it operates. This is evident in the insistence in repeating the 
adjective ‘Macedonian’ as a nominal modifier of everything: 
“We, the Macedonians [...] have this constant urge to prove ourselves. We would 
have been happy if we could mention in every article [of the new Constitution] that 
it was ‘Macedonian’. Macedonian legal system, Macedonian television, 
Macedonian this, Macedonian that. We are constantly proving ourselves with the 
subconscious feeling that maybe all this is threatened, it is not recognized, and we 
need to repeat it and convince our selves that it is so.”392 
Referring to the reliance on the name ‘Macedonian’ as re-assurance of one’s own identity, 
the Macedonian president exposes this insecurity and denounces it as unnecessary. In the 
Balkan context, and particularly in view of Greek non-recognition of the name, he calls for 
greater self-esteem because ‘[the name] is [...] beyond any real and comprehensible 
enquiry, meaning: [our state] is called Macedonia’.393 This is a discursive attempt to 
confirm the stability of Macedonian identity and neutralize the perceptions of external 
threat against it.  
In the domestic context, and particularly in view of accommodating the Albanian minority, 
the excessive preoccupation with the ‘Macedonian’ denomination of the signifiers of the 
state strains inter-ethnic relations. It adds unnecessary emphasis on the discussion on 
Macedonian priority and right over non-Macedonian ethno-national communities by virtue 
of the ‘Macedonian’ character of the state.394 This became evident in the spirited debates 
in parliament over the exact text of the constitutional preamble referring to the character 
of the state. The various formulations revolved around the necessity to insist on the 
392 Kiro Gligorov, 25th plenary session, 15th Nov 1991, 46. 
393 Gligorov, ibid., 45. 
394 For instance in the debates over the official languages in the state, 25th plenary session, 78-83. 
 
158 
 
                                                            
N. Nancheva                                                                                                                                        Transforming Identities in Europe 
‘fatherland’ implication of the national denominator. A powerful discursive line advises 
against such a formulation:  
“It is normal that [we] crave recognition, and above all, collective recognition. And 
our insistence to make this constitution a national landmark and give it a national 
character is understandable. But does this really fulfil our intention? [...] Who do we 
need to prove to that this is the state in which the Macedonian people accomplishes 
its statehood, to us or to the others? [...] There’s no state in Europe [...] defined in its 
constitution as national.”395 
It is noted that such insistence on nationality would reveal the instability of Macedonian 
identity (‘who do we need to prove to’) and, furthermore, would distance Macedonia from 
its prospective European aspirations. However, the eventual confirmation of the 
formulation of ‘national state of the Macedonian people’ remained, indicating that the 
imperative of collective recognition along the lines of ‘Macedonian-ness’ could not be 
ignored just yet.  
Thus, the story of belonging to ‘Macedonia’ as geographical land implies a discrepancy 
between the politically established limits of the Macedonian discursive space and its 
imagined ends. Externally, it projected the image of a national community significantly 
larger than the one demarcated by the territorial borders of the state. This suggested a 
possible future course of aligning the two contours, left the perception of threat among 
Macedonia’s neighbours, and re-enforced their already suspicious policies towards the 
new state. National identity upheld through these narratives pre-positions its own ‘Others’ 
in a conflictual manner, intensifying the conflictual potential of external relations. 
Internally, this interpretation increased the significance of the name ‘Macedonia’ as 
denominator of the nation, marginalizing the members of the communities which could 
not share in the Macedonian nationhood narrative. In this sense it deteriorated inter-
ethnic relations by establishing a contested hierarchy between the majority and the 
minorities and by intensifying antagonistic discourses of domestic nationalisms. Overall, 
395 25th Plenary session, 11th Nov 1991, 27-28. 
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nationalist interpretations of territory had a destabilizing effect on Macedonian identity by 
increasing its external and internal insecurity.  
Identity Narratives of National Purpose 
The perception of insecurity in Macedonian identity has its roots in the interpretation of 
Macedonian history. The narratives of victimization, suffering and injustice are integral 
elements of it. Their taken-for-granted quality is evident in the multiple purposes these 
narratives serve in the discursive space of Macedonian politics. When referring to the 
insecurity in Macedonian identity, the president mentions in passing the probable 
explanation: 
 “[...] perhaps because of our very difficult history, that has been our fate [...]”396 
The suggestion does not question the adjectives (‘very difficult’), it only modifies their 
explanatory value in this precise case (‘perhaps’). The resignation with which the 
difficulties are being accepted (‘[it] has been our fate’) is indicative of a deeply sedimented 
narrative of victimization which stands out as an important signifier of Macedonian 
national identity in the early years of the transition to democracy.  
“[Ours] has been, after all, the most contested people today and throughout 
history.”397 
The narrative of victimization can be identified in numerous and varied articulations. They 
refer to the Macedonian land, to the Macedonian people, to its dignity, to the wrong-
doings the Macedonian people has suffered, to its isolation and helplessness. Many major 
political undertakings in the course of preparing and declaring independence are justified 
through the narrative of victimization. Electing a president is important for ‘finding a place 
under the sun for this long-suffering patch of land [that is Macedonia], to call our own’398. 
The president, in his turn, sees his elected post as a mission to ‘bring Macedonia back its 
dignity’399. Exactly the same appeal is taken up by the newly elected vice-president a week 
396 Kiro Gligorov, 25th plenary session, 15th Nov 1991, 46. 
397 25th Plenary session, 11th Nov 1991, 27-28. 
398 5th Plenary session, 27th Jan 1991, 6. 
399 5th Plenary session, 27th Jan 1991, 24. 
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later: ‘Let’s bring Macedonia back its dignity!’400 This is not accidental. The suggestion that 
Macedonia has been dishonoured apparently has very wide political resonance. It is used 
for mobilization purposes because it is discursively linked to the notion of vindication and 
the need for recognition. These ideas underlie the central lines of justification of the grand 
political project of the time: independent statehood.  
The notion of vindication is visible in the appeal to the Macedonian people to renounce 
the role of a victim and finally take hold of their own destiny. The only way to do this is 
through independent sovereign statehood because, it has been argued, Macedonia has 
never actively participated in the organization of matters within the Yugoslav federation. 
Pointing to the very beginning of Macedonian statehood – the sittings of the popular 
front401 which negotiated the foundations of socialist Yugoslavia – a couple of speakers at 
the first session of the democratic parliament express their fears of ‘being caught in the 
snow’:402 a historical reference to the inability of the Macedonian representatives to get to 
the sitting because of the deep snow. An even stronger satire is evident in the allegory of 
Macedonian hesitation in breaking from the past and choosing a new president:  
“[as before], Santa Claus will come and will open our little gift box and will hand us 
down our president of the republic [...] whom the entire political life of this republic 
will depend on.”403 
The political call for active participation of Macedonia in the crafting of its own fate is 
therefore based on dissociation from the passivity of the federal past and finding an own 
place ‘under the sun’404. The formula ‘own people on own land’405 has been repeated as an 
invocation throughout the year preparing the independence.406 Independent statehood 
comes to discursively represent staking out rights over one’s own land. Thus denouncing 
400 Ljubco Georgievski, 6th Plenary session, 1st Feb 1991, 44. 
401 AVNOJ, abbreviation for the Anti-Fascist Popular Council for the Liberation of Yugoslavia (1942, 1943, 
1945). 
402 1st plenary session, 8th Jan 1991, Bogdan Nedelkoski, 65, Todor Petrov, 91. 
403 1st plenary session, 8th Jan 1991, Todor Petrov, 91. 
404 5th Plenary session, 27th Jan 1991, 6. 
405 The saying ‘свои на своето’, which cannot be translated literally, implies the feeling of being among close 
people in one’s own home.  
406 See for instance, 5th plenary session, 6, 25th plenary session, 33, etc. 
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the discourse of victimization becomes rhetorically linked to embracing the project of 
independent statehood. This reveals its constitutive role in the new Macedonian identity. 
An identical link exists between the victimization narrative and the call for recognition. The 
political project of independence is being interpreted as a substantially new stage in 
Macedonian statehood. This is illustrated in the formulaic references to creating ‘a 
completely autonomous, independent and sovereign state called the Republic of 
Macedonia’407, ‘longing for an autonomous and sovereign state’408, defending the integral 
‘legal, political, cultural, national subjectivity’ of Macedonia,409 the need to acquire 
‘international legal subjectivity’410, etc. These widely used formulas suggest that despite 
the claims of continuity in Macedonian statehood, Macedonia’s statesmen are conscious 
of the categorically new political opportunity for the Macedonian state. Hence, their 
depiction of the political time as a historical turning point enabling the desired 
emancipation of the Macedonian nation from the assumed compromise of federative 
statehood to ‘autonomy’, ‘sovereignty’ and ‘subjectivity’. It is viewed as the logical 
culmination of the long struggle of the Macedonian people for ‘national liberation’411, thus 
juxtaposing the project of independence to the narrative of victimization as its just end 
point.  
Irrespective of its justness, however, entering this new stage of emancipated statehood 
cannot be finalized through a unilateral decision. Hence the awareness of the need for and 
the call for external recognition: 
“[...] the legally schooled should know best that Macedonia [...] does not have 
internationally recognized continuous legal subjectivity, regrettably. [..] The Basque 
country also has its own history [...] but it is not a state. And so do the Kurds.”412 
The rhetorical parallel with the Basques and the Kurds is not legally (or factually) accurate 
but it emphasizes the argument for the difference between the historical continuity of the 
407 25th Plenary Session of the Parliament, 9th Nov 1991, 18. 
408 Ismet Ramadani speaking at the 25th Plenary session, 9th Nov 1991, 45. 
409 The first plenary session. 
410 Stoile Stoikov speaking at the 25th Plenary session, 9th Nov 1991, 86. 
411 See, for instance, 25th Plenary session, 9th Nov 1991, 45. 
412 Stoile Stojkov speaking at the 25th Plenary session, 9th Nov 1991, 186. 
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Macedonian state, which is not questioned, and the legal continuity, which is. The parallel 
with the state-less people is also meant to add urgency to the call for recognition, 
articulated at every significant political juncture. The need to re-write the constitution for 
instance, the first crucial task after the referendum in favour of independence, is framed in 
this call for recognition of the republic’s international legitimacy.413 Its link to the 
renounced victimization narrative, however, perpetuates the discourse of Macedonian 
nationalism and increases the conflictuality of the collective identity of the new state.  
In the domestic context an expression of this increased conflictuality is the re-articulation 
of the call for recognition of the Macedonian state as a state of the Macedonian nation, 
already pointed to above. In the regional context too, this narrow interpretation generates 
more conflictuality because of its unrealistic call for aligning the notions of nation and 
state.  
“In view of international recognition [...] the Serbs recognize the Macedonian 
nation, but do not recognize a state. The Bulgarians say they recognize the territory 
but do not recognize the nation, the Greeks practically deny both, whereas the 
Albanians [...] remain lukewarm [...] [But] how do we seek international recognition 
when we ourselves say that we are nobody’s state? [...] we ourselves say we do not 
have a state but ask the neighbours to say ‘it’s yours’.”414 
Equating the omission of a direct constitutional reference to the Macedonian nation with 
relinquishing ownership of the state aims to demonstrate the unacceptability of such a 
political option and to justify imagining the state as a national state. A state collectivity 
organized along national lines, however, inevitably excludes major parts of the political 
body of the state and is thus considered illegitimate. It is not a viable political option and 
its perpetuation creates a deep divide in the political project of independence, threatening 
to destabilize the identity of the Macedonian state. In the context of regional hostility such 
identity is even more vulnerable to encroaching ‘otherness’, which pre-supposes its higher 
conflictual potential. Thus the salience of the victimization narrative incorporates the 
413 See the five sittings of the 25th Plenary session from 9th to 17th Nov 1991. 
414 25th Plenary session from 9th Nov 1991, 162. 
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notion of nationhood into the project of independent statehood in such a manner that it 
challenges its internal credibility and increases its external stability. At the same time, 
dissociating from the victimization narrative implies a major reformulation of the notion of 
vindication which is central in the justification of independent statehood. It therefore 
conditions a discursive contradiction within the political project of statehood which 
needed to be solved before the new state could uphold a stable and politically legitimate 
national identity.   
 
Credibility of Macedonian National Identity Narratives of ‘Self’ before 
Europeanization 
Macedonian national identity in the early years of democratic transition is revealed as 
highly divided and controversial. Identifying the dominant interpretations of its most 
salient signifiers highlighted the declarative national tolerance towards ‘otherness’ 
unsupported by political practice, the notion of territorial belonging, dissociation from the 
victimization narrative through the call for vindication and recognition. Within the 
discursive context of hegemonic nationalism and its interpretations, Macedonian national 
identity was torn between projected ambitions and political constraints. It constitutes a 
state community shaken by instability and insecurity, generated by the undecideability 
between the narrative of nationhood and the narrative of citizenship as the story of the 
state. The decades-long ambition of the Macedonian people for a sovereign national state 
finally arrived at a political opportunity with the disintegration of the Yugoslav federation. 
However, its political environment prevented the realization of the statehood project 
within the national frame. The struggle to accommodate the civic imperatives of a non-
monolithic nation into the national narrative of statehood propelling the project of 
independence, produced a series of political compromises whose internalization required 
time. The collective identity which they attempted to construct and uphold at state level 
was torn between the traditional orientation towards the past of the nationhood narrative 
and the typical detachment from the past of the citizenship narrative. The internal tension 
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generated by narratives of ‘Macedonian-ness’ destabilized Macedonia’s national identity 
construct in a time when its legitimacy was being put to doubt.  
Instability is also generated in the external projections of Macedonian identity. The 
articulations of more inclusive and open identity narratives were instrumentalized by 
Macedonia in its bilateral relations in the region. Faced with suspicion on behalf of 
neighbouring Bulgaria and Greece, Macedonia attempted to affirm its position by 
demanding from its neighbours similar formally inclusive and open treatment for 
Macedonian minorities on their territories. These demands were met with distrust and lack 
of understanding, firstly because Bulgarian and Greek national identity constructs were 
much more closed and exclusive and their treatment of minorities was organized on 
completely different terms. But second, and most significant here, Macedonian calls for 
recognition of minorities were met with lack of understanding because neighbours also 
refused to acknowledge Macedonia’s legitimacy as a sovereign legal subject. In this way 
the projected image of Macedonian national identity provoked external animosity and had 
a negative impact on Macedonia’s regional standing. This seriously compromised 
nationalist interpretations of identity. In the discursive vacuum of halted international 
recognition and the inability to access the discursive resources of Europeanization 
discourse, immediately available to Bulgaria, it dramatically increased the instability of 
Macedonian national identity and largely determined the progress of its transition.  
 
Comparability between Bulgarian and Macedonian National Identity Narratives of 
‘Self’ 
Identifying the upholding narratives of Bulgarian and Macedonian national identity and the 
discursive patterns in which they appear helps understand conflictuality in Bulgarian-
Macedonian relations, which will be further analyzed in the next chapter. Table 9 helps 
visualize the way interpretations of national identity relate to each other in the two states. 
It is notable that while identity signifiers occupy similar discursive positions, the meanings 
they articulate are very dissimilar. The discursive position of the nation, for instance, is 
interpreted in two diametrically different ways in the different contexts which the signifier 
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operates in. The attempt to discursively imagine the nation against the backdrop of ethnic 
differences is driven by identical ethno-national configurations: dominant national 
majority, one dominant national minority.415 The political context in the two states varies, 
which prompts divergent models of accommodation. In Bulgaria the dominant national 
minority was not given access to active participation in the political power deal of 
transition. This prevented its inclusion in the official narrative of the nation and permitted 
the narrative constitution of the nation in monolithic terms. Hence, the salience of the 
story of national unity. In Macedonia, in contrast, the dominant national minority was 
already actively participating in re-negotiating the political contract and this did not allow 
the majority to codify a monolithic national construct. Instead, the notion of intra-national 
balance (re-)told a more inclusive national story permissive of national difference. Hence, 
the signifier of national tolerance.  
The different interpretations of the discursive position of the nation have important 
implications for the conflictual interaction between the two states. Bulgaria, whose notion 
of a unitary nation included ‘Macedonia’ as a key historical narrative, had difficulties in 
coming to terms with the distinctiveness of a separate, non-Bulgarian Macedonian nation 
precisely because of the salience of the national unity signifier in its national identity 
construct. Macedonia, whose formulations of a diverse national community included the 
people born in the non-Macedonian parts of the Macedonian region, insisted on 
recognition of national minority status and granting national minority rights for these 
people on the basis of its claim for tolerance. The demands raised towards the immediate 
external ‘Other’ from the particular discursive interpretations of the nation turned out to 
be mutually exclusive. Meeting them required a major reformulation of the meanings 
attached to the nation and its discursive position. This compromised the political relevance 
of nationalism and pre-conditioned the need for alternative interpretations. 
A very similar dynamics is notable around the discursive position of territory. The salience 
of the territorial signifier in Bulgaria emphasized integrity, determining the high security 
context which (even the suggestion of) a special status of any of its territorial regions was 
415 And a range of smaller minority groups. 
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being framed in. This included the taboo of recognizing any degree of political or territorial 
autonomy for minority-populated regions (Pirin Macedonia is discussed in these terms). 
The historical sedimentation of this signifier is also accountable for the continued political 
relevance of territories previously included in the Bulgarian national narrative (Vardar 
Macedonia is one of them). The discursive position of territory is interpreted in a different 
way in Macedonia. Its centrality increased the salience of the story of belonging since the 
name of the geographical territory provided an unambiguous source of collective self-
identification for a state and nation struggling for recognition. The discrepancy between 
geographical and legal ‘Macedonia’ is what is perceived as a threat both to the territorial 
and discursive spaces of neighbouring states. The most salient interpretations of territory 
in the two national identity constructs increased the significance of borders, border 
regions and border populations, emphasizing ‘otherness’. In this sense they intensified 
antagonisms.  
The interpretations of the discursive element of national purpose are also conflictual. 
National purpose in both states was related to the story of victimization. Narratively, 
however, this story was put to different purposes. In Bulgaria it was inextricably attached 
to the discursive position of ‘Macedonia’ in the Bulgarian national story and in this sense it 
referred to dealing with national loss. It attempted to construct justification for this loss in 
an optimistic manner, articulating meanings of centrality, uniqueness and special 
responsibility. These meanings were not necessarily conflictual. But within the discursive 
hegemony of nationalism, the paternalism in policies towards Macedonia which they 
implied naturally subverts the notion of equality and antagonized an already fragile 
relationship. In Macedonia the discourse of victimization referred to the historical 
impossibility of national statehood. It was linked to the call for vindication of ‘Macedonian-
ness’ and the call for recognition of Macedonian sovereignty justifying the legitimacy of 
the strategic political project of the time – independence. Again, this interpretation was 
not necessarily divisive, but in the specific context of rising nationalism it re-enforced the 
boundaries between national ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ and increased their political 
indispensability. Demanding a position of equality for the subject of the state, which its 
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external ‘Others’ refused to acknowledge, it pre-conditioned the antagonistic potential of 
nationalist interpretation of the signifier of purpose.  
State 
Community 
National Identity Narratives of Self 
Nationhood Territory Purpose 
Bulgaria Increased salience of 
the idea of ‘national 
unity’: 
 
-belonging by jus 
sanguinis; 
-monolithic nation, no 
‘national’ minorities 
acceptable; 
-exclusive membership. 
Territorial integrity: 
 
-equal sovereignty over 
the entirety of national 
territory; 
- non-negotiable in terms 
of minority demands; 
-prohibition of land 
ownership for foreigners; 
-state borders 
encapsulating the 
community. 
Centrality on the Balkans: 
 
-increased attachment to 
national geography as an 
indicator of belonging; 
-key element is the ‘Balkan’ 
mountains, suggesting 
territorial uniqueness on 
the peninsula; 
-victimization narrative 
based on the idea of 
centrality on the Balkans; 
-basis for the claim to 
‘Europe’. 
Macedonia National tolerance 
formally upheld as a 
compromise between 
the project of national 
statehood and the need 
for legitimacy: 
 
-increased inter-ethnic 
tension in stabilizing the 
compromise; 
-unsuccessful attempt 
to articulate national 
statehood in civic terms 
Territorial belonging: 
 
-the narrative of severed 
national integrity; 
-the centrality of the 
narrative of ‘unification’; 
-increases symbolic 
significance of the name 
‘Macedonia’. 
 
 
Victimization narrative: 
 
-sovereignty as 
‘vindication’; 
-active vs passive national 
role; 
-centrality of the 
imperative for recognition; 
-salience of the narrative of 
national statehood in its 
narrow interpretation. 
Table 9. Discursive Patterns of National Identity before Europeanization: Bulgaria and Macedonia. 
 
Positioned within the discourse of nationalism, the narrative signifiers of Bulgarian and 
Macedonian post-totalitarian national identities span a field of conflicting meanings and 
interpretations. Investigating their discursive features suggests that without major re-
working of the discursive patterns of both national identity constructions, the conflictuality 
they perpetuated could not be overcome. It also reveals the inability of the discourse of 
nationalism to read national identity in the two states in a manner compatible with the 
changing discursive contexts of decommunization and democratization. The inherent lack 
of credibility of national identity narrated within the discursive limits of nationalism 
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highlighted the need for imagining the community of the state from a different 
perspective. The opening up of discursive spaces in both states to the common European 
processes of cooperation and integration with the launch of the democratic transition 
quickly formulated this perspective as a (re-) turn to Europe. The following two chapters 
will explore how embracing the long-term goal of Europeanization in the two states 
affected imagining the state community and began to transform national identity 
narratives. By upholding new inclusive interpretations of national identity signifiers, it 
gradually facilitated reconciliation along the lines of bilateral conflictuality, encouraged 
detachment from the discourse of nationalism and emphasized the political relevance of 
Europeanization discourse. Ultimately, it also improved the credibility of national identity 
narratives read through the discursive lenses of ‘Europe’.  
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CHAPTER VII 
BILATERAL RELATIONS AND CONFLICTUAL IDENTITY  
 
Exploring and contrasting national identity narratives in Bulgaria and Macedonia prior to 
Europeanization revealed their incompatibility with the changing discursive contexts of 
democratization and participation in the common European processes. Interpreted within 
the discourse of nationalism they determined a high degree of identity-based conflictuality 
in state behaviour. This is confirmed both in domestic inter-ethnic relations and in the 
external inter-state relations of the two states. While the previous chapter traced 
interpretations of three key elements determining the discursive position of ‘Self’ and 
conditioning conflictuality domestically, this chapter will follow narratives of identity 
determining the discursive position of ‘Other’ and governing external relations. It is divided 
in three sections, each focusing on one aspect of conflictuality maintained by antagonistic 
interpretations of national identity. These have been selected on the basis of their political 
salience in both states: recognizing statehood, solving the language dispute, and granting 
minority status. The analysis follows the dominant interpretations of the discursive 
elements upholding these issues. Tracing the evolution of bilateral relations, the analysis 
uncovers the transformations in the narratives of identity enabling (or disabling) 
reconciliation. The findings from the investigation suggest that with the progress of 
Europeanization and the empowerment of its discourse, reconciliation was made possible 
at most of the conflictual points. This in turn facilitated the integration efforts and re-
enforced the new discursive hegemony, marginalizing nationalism’s most salient 
interpretations.  
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SECTION I:  
NARRATIVES OF RECOGNIZING STATEHOOD 
 
In order to highlight the elements of this transformation, this section starts by mapping out 
the specific discursive context which structured bilateral relations prior to Europeanization. 
It then goes on to trace the identity narratives which governed bilateral behaviour around 
the issue of recognition of the international subjectivity of the Macedonian state. Linking 
variations in these narratives to the gradual empowerment of Europeanization discourse 
and the specificities of this process in the two states, the analysis finally follows post-
recognition narratives of identity to see how the discursive position of ‘Other’ has changed 
in the hegemonic clash between nationalism and Europeanization.  
 
The Context of Inequality and Distance 
Around the beginning of the post-communist transition the relationship between Bulgaria 
and Macedonia was not that of equality. Beside domestic narrative interpretations of 
national identity which attempted to establish hierarchical positions, inequality was also 
determined by the specific international legal and political context of the time. Even 
though Bulgaria emerged from one of the most rigid totalitarian systems as one of the 
most loyal Soviet satellites, its international legal subjectivity had not been questioned 
since it formally declared independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1908. So when it 
began to dismantle its totalitarian structures in 1989 in line with the processes in the rest 
of Eastern and Central Europe, it launched its transition to democracy as an independent 
sovereign state. Macedonia, by contrast, started its democratic transition on completely 
different terms. The Macedonian state had only enjoyed international legal subjectivity as 
a constituent republic of the Yugoslav socialist federation. Macedonian statehood had not 
been possible before 1944. Therefore, when the socialist federation began to disintegrate 
and the Macedonian republic decided to seek independence as a sovereign state in 1991, 
it had yet to deal with the issue of international recognition. As it turned out, its 
 
171 
 
N. Nancheva                                                                                                                                        Transforming Identities in Europe 
international legal subjectivity was challenged on several grounds (leading among which 
were Greek objections against the state’s name), which seriously impeded international 
recognition. In this context, the post-totalitarian relationship between Bulgaria and 
Macedonia began as that of an international sovereign and one bidding to be recognized 
as such. This naturally distorted the discursive power balance of the interaction. In Bulgaria 
it initiated the paternalistic rhetoric on Macedonia which discursively re-affirmed 
inequality and visibly obstructed bilateral relations. In Macedonia this gave rise to the 
rhetoric of defiance which further deteriorated relations and antagonized narratives of 
‘otherness’ in the two states.  
The distance between ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ was increased by the divergent chains of 
difference articulating the meaning of identity. Bulgaria had always held a special position 
on Macedonia because ‘Macedonia’ had been a central element in the narration of 
Bulgarian nationhood. In the post-communist period the renewed relevance of the 
Macedonian question was deliberated on the basis of this special position. ‘Macedonia’ as 
a significant point of reference in the ‘Self-Other’ dialectic had no equivalent in Bulgarian 
national identity narratives. Macedonia, on the other hand, attempted to rhetorically 
belittle Bulgaria’s significance in Macedonian narratives of nationhood by discursively 
positioning it in a chain of equivalence with the rest of Macedonia’s neighbours. The 
consistency in this discursive strategy did not allow Bulgaria any special status in Bulgarian-
Macedonian relations. This act of distancing along the ‘Self-Other’ nexus was an effort on 
behalf of Macedonia to play down the inequality of the relationship. Thus, the discursive 
constitution of ‘Other’ in the two states established chains of difference within which no 
reconciliation with ‘otherness’ was possible. This in turn re-enforced the perceptions of 
threat which initiated the dynamics of distancing in the first place. 
It is clear from this that the context which framed Bulgarian-Macedonian relations in the 
early post-totalitarian period was not conductive of amity. Quite to the contrary, it 
positioned the major outstanding issues between the two states along the lines of 
conflictuality. As a matter of foreign policy order, the first issue that needed to be 
addressed in the bilateral relations was international recognition of Macedonia. In view of 
the regional ambiguities about the name of the newly independent republic, the need to 
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officially recognize Macedonia’s constitutional name appeared simultaneously with the 
recognition of statehood on the political agenda. Narratives of recognition structured the 
first post-communist interaction between the two states but, affected by the context of 
inequality and distance, their interpretation differed significantly.  
Bulgaria’s and Macedonia’s strategic orientation towards participation in the processes of 
European integration, however, gradually began to empower the discourse of 
Europeanization. Introducing the national ‘Self’ to a markedly different ‘Self-Other’ 
dialectic by radically broadening the range of commonality between the ‘Self’ and its 
constitutive ‘Other(s)’, Europeanization in effect modified the meanings attached to 
national identity signifiers. This changed the discursive patterns of the two national 
identity constructions in significant ways, modified identity narratives and eventually 
facilitated partial or complete reconciliation along the ‘Self’-‘Other’ nexus in the narratives 
of recognition. Their ‘European’ re-narration added credibility to the post-totalitarian 
reading of national identity by disabling conflictuality. This stabilized the discourse of 
Europeanization in both states. The following section sets out to explore how this 
happened.  
 
International Recognition of Macedonia’s Name and Statehood 
The Macedonian referendum on the future of the state of September 1991 confirmed 
popular support for the project of independent statehood and initiated the Macedonian 
quest for international recognition. Formally marking a new stage in Macedonian 
statehood, this was obviously a significant moment in the Macedonian national story. 
However, it also represented a turning point in Bulgarian nationhood narratives. 
‘Macedonia’ as an integral element of the story of national ‘Self’ in Bulgaria had managed 
to accommodate Macedonian statehood within the Yugoslav federation with the help of 
the ‘Greater Serbia’ plot.416 Macedonia’s dissociation from the Serbian-dominated 
federation without demonstrating any signs of wanting to return to its ‘Bulgarian origins’ 
416 Stefan Troebst, Die bulgarisch-jugoslawische Kontroverse um Makedonien 1967-1982 (München:   R. 
Oldenbourg, 1983). 
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presented Bulgaria with the laborious task of having to re-tell the ‘Macedonian story’ in 
order to take account of Macedonia’s self-reliance. This required modifying the narrative 
of national catastrophe and loss, justification for which had comfortably been found in 
Bulgaria’s ‘righteous’417 struggles for Macedonia. The complexity of the undertaking 
determined Bulgaria’s initial unpreparedness to deal with the perspective of Macedonia’s 
independence. This is visible in the reluctance which accompanied the discussion about 
raising the ‘Macedonian question’ during the first year of Bulgaria’s transition.418  
With the declaration of Macedonian independence from the disintegrating Yugoslavian 
federation, the issue of re-defining Bulgaria’s position on Macedonia acquired renewed 
political urgency. It is important to highlight that from the very beginning non-recognition 
was not a viable political option.419 The controversies rather revolved around the 
modalities of recognition: exact timing and manner. The idea that recognition should be 
postponed was central in the socialists’ position, which was unsurprising given their 
greater attachment to the discourse of nationalism and the key position Macedonia played 
in its stories420. The actors mainly responsible for the decision, however (the prime 
minister, the president, and the foreign minister), represented the democratic forces and 
their ambition to demonstrate detachment from nationalist politics became central in the 
decision-making process. This was evident from their reliance on the report of the 
European arbitration commission for the status of the former Yugoslav republics,421 which 
the government awaited before deciding on the form and the timing of recognition. 
Linking Bulgaria’s reaction to the European stance might have been a sign of insecurity in 
the face of a potentially conflictual outcome, but it helped frame the entire rhetoric of 
Bulgaria’s position in the discourse of ‘European-ness’: 
417 Ilcho Dimitrov, interview in Duma newspaper, 1st Feb 1991, Issue 27. 
418 See verbatim reports from the roundtable talks and verbatim reports from the Grand National Assembly, 
in the context of the ethnic minority tensions and the status of the claimed Macedonian minority in Pirin 
Macedonia. 
419 No mention of that political option in official positions. 
420 Verbatim report of the reactions in parliament 15th Jan 1992, also Demokratsia newspaper, 16th Jan 1992 
‘The Socialists did not Welcome the Recognition’. 
421 The Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on the former Yugoslavia headed by Robert 
Badinter. 
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“Bulgaria appreciates the European Community member-states’ unity of action on 
the crisis in Yugoslavia [...], [Bulgaria] accepts and supports [..] Brussels’ approach 
of equality [...], we also entirely share the recognition criteria [listed in the EC’s 
declaration] [which is why] we will soon recognize Macedonia’s independence 
[..]”422. 
This was declared several days before recognition. On the day when the prime minister 
announced in parliament that the government had reached the decision to recognize 
Macedonia, he insisted that “this act expressed our willingness to preserve peace and 
security on the Balkans and in Europe”.423 The chair of the parliamentary committee on 
foreign policy also confirmed that the government’s decision is congruent with the 
European arbitration committee’s report on the legal basis for independence and “secures 
[Eastern European states’ place] in the common European processes.”424 In his televised 
address to the nation on the evening of the decision, the president declared:  
“the decision [to recognize Macedonia] is another confirmation of Bulgaria’s 
unswerving pursuit [...] of facilitating the actual unification of Europe [in line with] 
the aims of the common European policies of today.”425  
A couple of days later the Ministry of Foreign Affairs publicized a declaration, again 
referring to Bulgaria’s ‘special duty and responsibility before Europe’426:  
“Democratic Bulgaria seeks to sustainably implement European policies on the 
Balkans and will coordinate its decisions with the common positive processes on the 
continent, headed by the European Community.”427 
The decision to recognize Macedonia’s independence is Bulgaria’s first significant foreign 
policy act in the post-communist period. Following a year of relative international self-
isolation as a result of the intense domestic negotiations on the regime-change and the 
422 Message from the President Zhelyu Zhelev to the President Kiro Gligorov from 11th Jan 1992, BTA Courier 
Service.  
423 Filip Dimitrov, 28th plenary session, 15th Jan 1992, 45. 
424 Alexander Yordanov, 28th plenary session, 15th Jan 1992, 76. 
425 Nation’s address by the president from 15th Jan 1992, BTA, Courier Service. 
426 Declaration of the MFA, 18th Jan 1992, BTA Courier Service. 
427 Reprinted in Demokratsia newspaper of 18th Jan 1992. 
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new constitutional order, Bulgaria sought to re-claim its international presence and, more 
significantly, position itself in the realm of ‘Europe’. Thus the rhetoric of ‘European-ness’ 
surrounding the recognition of Macedonia is in effect a call for European recognition of 
Bulgaria and the first Bulgarian identity claim for ‘European-ness’ voiced in the 
international space after the breakup of communism. In this sense non-recognition would 
have represented international silence and it would have deprived the new democracy of a 
‘European’ voice. In terms of identity politics, this is what explains the fact that it had not 
been considered as a political option.   
Another key reason for Bulgaria’s affirmative position on Macedonian independence has to 
do with the central place of the ‘Macedonian’ element in the Bulgarian nationhood 
narrative. In it ‘Macedonian’ to a large extent represents part of what is thought of as 
‘Bulgarian’. Discursive illustration of this is the systematic reference to the Macedonian 
people as ‘brothers’428 or ‘Macedonian brothers’429. This suggests that the relationship is 
seen as one of ‘blood’, i.e. Macedonians are made part of the Bulgarian national 
community constituted along these lines. Moments of rhetorical emotion take this 
suggestion even further: 
“We are witnessing a moment which takes us back down the lane of history and 
simultaneously opens for us a door to the future. [...] Today Bulgaria is making a 
fateful step. It is making a step [..] towards our brothers Bulgarians in the Republic 
of Macedonia. [applause on behalf of the majority, acclamations ‘Bravo!’ – 
stenographer’s note]”430 
The emotional approbation with which referral to the Macedonian people as ‘Bulgarian 
brothers’ is met in parliament (at that coming from a position of responsibility in foreign 
policy) is indicative of the implied meaning of the ‘brotherhood’ narrative. It is not 
surprising then that in its relationship with Macedonia Bulgaria seeks a special position. 
428 While the rest of the former Yugoslav republics are referred to, in contrast, as ‘our friends in Slovenia, 
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina’, see Alexander Yordanov at the 15th Jan 1992 plenary session of 
Bulgarian parliament, 77. 
429 Ibid., 79. 
430 Alexander Yordanov at the 15th Jan 1992 plenary session of Bulgarian parliament, 80 (underlining – the 
author). 
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Postponing recognition until the international reaction had crystallized would not have 
given it such. The only chance of obtaining a special position was deemed to be recognizing 
first. Indeed, the Bulgarian government took the decision for recognition on the day 
following the EC declaration on the juridical validity of Macedonia’s claim for 
independence,431 before any other state had reacted. This swift action should be 
interpreted not only in light of good neighbourly relations (‘important step towards even 
closer cooperation with all of our neighbours’432), even though this might have been true 
in the case of recognizing Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It, more than 
anything, is meant to articulate Bulgaria’s position as that of Macedonia’s special protector 
and defender.  
“It is well known that Bulgaria is in favour of a free and independent Macedonia, 
which will finally be fended against the territorial aspirations of its neighbours. [...] 
Bulgaria does not have and has not had any other wishes for Macedonia but to see 
its population free and capable of deciding its own fate.”433 
Obviously, the Bulgarian president does not include Bulgaria in the number of the 
neighbours threatening Macedonian territory. Quite to the contrary, he presents Bulgaria 
as the benevolent patron (‘wishes to see’) of the needing protection Macedonia (‘be 
fended against’). The implicit notion of ‘patronage’ is confirmed by the suggestion that 
Macedonia is not ‘free and capable of deciding its own fate’ yet because this is Bulgaria’s 
wish for Macedonia’s past and present (the present perfect and simple tense respectively 
of the verb ‘have’). This notion in effect re-enforces the idea of an asymmetric relationship. 
Another significant discursive element in the president’s message for the Macedonian 
president is the avoidance of the term ‘Macedonian people’: the formulation ‘Macedonia’s 
population’ is used instead. The omission of the national denominator ‘Macedonian’ 
against the background of the president’s declarations from the summer of the previous 
year434 is indicative of the reasons for Bulgaria’s claimed patronage over Macedonia: it is 
431 15th and 14th Jan 1992, respectively. 
432 Nation’s address of the president from 15th Jan 1992, BTA Courier Service. 
433 Message from the President Zhelyu Zhelev to the President Kiro Gligorov from 11th Jan 1992. 
434 That even though Bulgaria will recognize the Macedonian state, it will never recognize the Macedonian 
nation. 
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thought of as ‘Bulgarian’435. This position is an adaptation of the Bulgarian narrative of 
‘Macedonia’ to the new political situation. It offers the opportunity of re-affirming the 
hierarchy of the relationship in a legitimate manner, while seeking to preserve Bulgaria’s 
special status in it. It is also in concordance with Bulgaria’s ambition to represent itself as a 
key stability factor on the Balkans436. This is another way in which the swift recognition of 
Macedonia upholds a particular vision of Bulgarian national identity which is not 
necessarily ‘Europeanized’.  
This vision of Bulgarian identity is also not particularly compatible with Macedonia’s vision 
of Bulgarian identity, nor is it with Macedonia’s vision of Macedonian identity. Its 
articulation allows taken-for-granted references in the Bulgarian public space to the ‘so 
called Macedonian nation’ and the ‘Bulgarian roots’ of Macedonia437. It permits Bulgaria’s 
foreign minister to publicly announce that he will postpone establishing diplomatic 
relations with Macedonia ‘until Macedonia’s attitudes towards the issues of giving up 
territorial aspirations and the non-existence of minorities in neighbouring countries 
crystallize.’438 This rhetoric helps Macedonia constitute Bulgaria in terms of malevolent 
‘otherness’. This is reflected in the regular use in Macedonia of the pejorative denominator 
‘bugarashi’439 as the ultimate label of national betrayal in Macedonian political discourse. 
Systemically used against the oppositional party VMRO-DPMNE440 because of its pro-
Bulgarian leadership441 for example, the label ‘bugarashi’ is meant to discredit the party’s 
political standing, calling it on numerous occasions to re-declare its Macedonian loyalty.442 
Another way in which Macedonian visions of Bulgaria are incompatible with Bulgaria’s 
claimed patronage has to do with the portrayal of Bulgaria as Macedonian occupier. 
435 Ilcho Dimitrov calls the people of Macedonia ‘Macedonian Bulgarians’ in an interview for Duma 
newspaper, 1st Feb 1992. 
436 ‘Expresses Bulgaria’s aspiration to be a stabilizing factor on the Balkans’: from Zhelev’s address to the 
nation 15th Jan 1992, ‘The Bulgarian Government believes that its position will contribute to the stability of 
the Balkans as part of the new Europe’: declaration of the MFA from 18th Jan 1992, etc. 
437 See, for instance, Velizar Enchev from the newspaper Otechestven vestnik reporting on Skopje’s reactions 
to Bulgarian recognition 16th Jan 1992. 
438 Stoyan Ganev in an interview for Demokratsia newspaper of 8th Feb 1992. 
439 A pejorative form of the national denominator ‘Bulgarians’ in the Macedonian language. 
440 The abbreviation from the transliteration in Macedonian and Bulgarian of the name of the party Internal 
Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity, representing the 
democratic right. 
441 Ljubco Georgievski at the time. 
442 Ljubco Georgievski, Facing Truth: Essays, Interviews, Articles (Sofia: Balkani, 2007). 
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Rooted in the notion of belonging to the land of Macedonia, a key signifier of Macedonian 
identity as noted earlier, it assumes that important parts of Macedonia are ‘occupied’ by 
Bulgaria and the fate of the Macedonian people living in those parts is put to danger. 
Suggesting inherent malevolence and ‘otherness’, this interpretation of Bulgaria is not 
permissive of any approximation between the two national identity images.  
In the context of this general negative attitude towards Bulgaria, which had already been 
built up during the period of preparation of independence, Macedonia’s reaction to 
Bulgarian recognition is unsurprisingly reserved. Cautious of the hierarchy which Bulgaria’s 
patronage attempts to re-enforce, Macedonian public discourse even airs the idea that 
Bulgarian recognition is undesirable since it would improve Bulgaria’s public standing in 
Macedonia.443 This accompanies the realisation that international recognition is the 
inevitable result of Macedonian independent and autonomous policies pursued so far,444 
and not subject to the fortuitous positions of the neighbours. In this context, the emphasis 
is put not on Bulgaria’s public declarations of support but on the inherent flaws in 
Bulgaria’s official position. The Macedonian President confirms: 
“[...] we are particularly painfully experiencing the attitudes of those of our 
neighbours who, instead of helping us because we are the last nation on the 
Balkans to achieve its independence and international recognition, are contesting 
either the name of our state or the name of our nation.”445  
Drawing from the popular repertoire of the victimization rhetoric to construct justification 
for support (‘instead of helping us’), the president unambiguously identifies the enemies 
without naming them: the name is contested by Greece and the nationhood by Bulgaria. 
Their malevolence is implied (‘we are painfully experiencing [their] attitudes’) but at the 
same time belittled: 
443 Nova Makedonija newspaper, 16th Jan 1992. 
444 Kiro Gligorov, 31st plenary session, 10th Jan 1992, 7-8 (‘sooner or later we shall be independent’). 
445 Kiro Gligorov, 31st plenary session, 10th Jan 1992, 9. 
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“We have understanding for these of our neighbours and for their problems, or if 
you wish, delusions, we think of them [...] without rancour [..], [we wanted to show 
them] our good will [...]”446 
The dignified acquiescence which the neighbour’s ‘delusional’ animosity is met with 
attempts to reverse the hierarchy of the relationship by changing its organizing criterion 
from power to morality: on the moral scales Macedonia should be the suggested stronger 
side. This discursive move is repeated not only domestically. Immediately after Bulgaria’s 
official recognition of Macedonian independence, the Macedonian president gives a press 
conference in Skopje, in which he declares, among other things that: 
“Macedonia welcomes Bulgaria’s recognition but is disinterested in its historical 
prejudices which are its domestic problem and not a topic of inter-state 
dialogue.”447 
The same acquiescence for Bulgaria’s domestic ‘problems’ aims to confirm Macedonia’s 
moral superiority and reverse the hierarchy of power. The formulation of equality used to 
characterize the relationship (‘inter-state dialogue’) re-enforces this effect.  
Another discursive strategy which aims to diminish the possible significance of Bulgaria’s 
swift recognition of Macedonia attempts to establish a chain of equivalence between 
Macedonia’s allegedly malevolent neighbours. This is already visible in the texts cited 
above: they do not single out the responsible malevolent subjects but put them under a 
common denominator, ‘our neighbours’. Even more explicit illustration of this strategy can 
be found in the leading media: 
“As we can see, Bulgaria [...] intends to put conditions [on establishing diplomatic 
relations], following the example of Greece. Seeking to push Macedonia into 
relinquishing its national minorities in the neighbouring states, if it gets to that, will 
uncover the whole game around the supposedly principled, historical, non-strings-
attached recognition of Macedonia’s independence on behalf of Bulgaria. [...] This 
446 Ibid., 10. 
447 Press Conference in Skopje by Kiro Gligorov, 16th Jan 1992, reported by BTA. 
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all demonstrates that Bulgaria’s position approximates Greece’s position on 
Macedonia, which Bulgaria had initially denounced as absurd.”448 
Equating Bulgaria with Greece and suggesting that its foreign policy act contains conditions 
unacceptable to Macedonia (‘to relinquish its national minorities’) discursively minimizes 
the significance of the fact that Bulgaria was the first state to recognize Macedonian 
statehood. Furthermore, equating Bulgaria with Greece implies an equal degree of 
negativity, even though Greece’s refusal to recognize Macedonia under its constitutional 
name had far greater negative consequences than Bulgaria’s difficulties in assimilating the 
idea of a Macedonian nation ever could have had, because of Greece’s Euro-Atlantic 
standing at the time.  
Overall, it is obvious that the special status sought by Bulgaria is not accepted by 
Macedonia, despite the declarative support in the swift Bulgarian recognition. 
Furthermore, in the discursive space upholding Macedonian national identity, it is seen as 
a latent threat and is resisted – despite the awareness that it could protract Macedonia’s 
international isolation. Viewed in light of the identity construction dynamics producing 
conflictual narratives of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’, this outcome is not unusual. Bulgaria is 
struggling with accommodating the new Macedonian status in its own historical narrative 
of nationhood one of whose central plots revolves around Macedonia. Attempting to 
preserve the special status of the relationship, Bulgaria re-enforces a hierarchy of 
inequality in the relationship between the two states which is unacceptable to Macedonia. 
This hierarchy is the only discursive space within which the key signifiers of Bulgarian 
narratives of ‘Self’ continue to articulate un-modified meanings. From protecting the 
territorial integrity of the state against possible threat, through preserving the unity of the 
nation against division, to promoting Bulgaria’s role as a central factor of stability on the 
Balkans and in Europe, Bulgaria’s position towards Macedonia around the time of the 
declaration of independence is determined by a particular (nationalist) vision of Bulgarian 
national identity. Macedonia, too, behaves in accordance with the salient nationalist 
interpretations of identity, articulated domestically. Its call for recognition and for 
448 From the commentary of an interview by the Bulgarian foreign minister Stoyan Ganev in Nova Makedonija 
newspaper, 12th Feb 1992. 
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vindication of the long-suffering Macedonian people cannot accommodate patronizing 
attitudes because for Macedonia they represent the renounced past. The salience of the 
signifier of territorial belonging does not permit abandoning the aspiration for a close 
relationship with the Macedonian territories under foreign sovereignty. Its notion of 
national tolerance demands the same for Macedonia’s claimed minorities abroad. Within 
the discourse of nationalism, the community of the state is imagined through mutually 
exclusive or highly conflictual meanings. Against their hegemony, even the signifiers of 
‘Europe’ which had already begun to appear in national discursive spaces, were 
interpreted in an antagonistic manner. This disabled any rapprochement along the 
relationship between ‘Self’ and ‘Other’, as visible from the underlying animosities feeding 
back into the domestic discursive spaces.  
 
Re-enforcing Domestic Antagonisms in the Context of Nationalism 
The visible political presence of the former communists in Bulgaria is what mostly affected 
the way recognition was interpreted domestically. Recognition was constructed as a threat 
to Bulgaria’s national security and international standing. Picking up on the indecisiveness 
in the government’s foreign policy between declarative support and national interest 
considerations, the socialists point to the most intractable issues in the bilateral relations 
to interpret them as threatening central signifiers of national identity. Recognition of the 
Macedonian state is thus rhetorically linked to the imperative of recognizing the 
Macedonian nation and national minority, a prospect which Bulgarian national identity 
narratives were unable to accommodate at that stage because of the salience of the 
national unity signifier. The possibility of demanding autonomy for the Pirin Macedonia 
region, which the socialists associated with recognizing Macedonian nationhood, 
threatens, on the other hand, the interpretation of integrity and inviolability of the 
territory of the state.  
“[O]ur recognition of Macedonia could bring Bulgaria to the verge of territorial and 
national separatism. Embracing European standards on human rights and 
minorities [...] could be utilized to inspire (cultural, political and territorial) 
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autonomy in Pirin Macedonia [and its] consequent annexation [..] by the Republic of 
Macedonia. Under the principle of the domino effect such aspirations might rise 
among the Turkish minority and lead to reciprocal actions on behalf of Turkey.”449 
The reference to embracing European standards and their potential negative 
consequences is of key significance here. Bulgaria’s presumed ‘European’ behaviour is 
articulated as consequential because of its incorrect interpretation by the reciprocant, also 
implying inferiority. Such rhetoric is potentially dangerous because it suggests the 
irrelevance of European standards to the bilateral relations and offers absolution for this. 
By sounding the familiar ‘Turkish alarm’ the urgency of the situation is significantly 
increased because of the still too recent inter-ethnic tensions in Bulgarian society. 
Another discursive line adopted by the socialists emphasizes that recognition, even though 
necessary, has been too hasty and untimely, and promises international isolation as a 
consequence of unwise foreign policy. It places the issue in the realm of ‘high politics’ 
(foreign policy, security policy, defence) which politicizes recognition in an urgent manner. 
This is significant also because it suggests a threat to another key signifier of Bulgarian 
narratives of ‘Self’, the aspiration to be a stability factors on the Balkans: 
“The length of the period in which Bulgaria remains the first and the only state to 
have recognized Macedonia (not counting the ‘recognition’ by the illegitimate North 
Cyprus Republic [...]) enormously increases the risk potential for our national 
security [...]. [Our] looming isolation on the Balkans threatens [...] to largely restrict 
our foreign policy manouverability. [...] A hostile constellation is being created 
which leaves Bulgaria [and Macedonia] with a single open door – towards the 
Bosphorus.”450   
Raising again the prospect of dependence upon Turkey, Bulgaria’s most significant 
historical antagonist, places Bulgaria’s support for Macedonia in the context of short-
449 Prof. Anton Parvanov, ‘Bulgaria, the Balkan Syndrome 1913, and the Macedonian Rubicon’ in Duma 
newspaper of 5th Feb 1992. 
450 Ibid. 
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sightedness and treats it as a foreign policy lapsus.451 The threat with international 
isolation, when the entire behaviour of Bulgaria begins to be focused on the search for 
assertion and visibility on the international scene and a ‘return to Europe’, implies a 
negative evaluation of the act of recognition and warns against further support. In this 
sense Greek disaffection is particularly concerning because of Greece’s position as an 
immediate neighbour situated within the European political space. The socialists do not 
miss the opportunity to emphasize this, quoting the Greek foreign minister as saying: 
“Even for the future to come [the hasty recognition of Macedonia] will be an 
obstacle for Sofia’s European orientation. [...] [This] misguided [foreign policy move] 
annihilated the trust [between Greece and Bulgaria].”452 
Even though it is voiced by the political representatives of Bulgaria’s past, this 
interpretative line becomes increasingly salient because it links popular rhetorical 
imperatives of the past to Bulgaria’s ambition for the future. It demonstrates that the 
attempt to preserve the special status in the relationship with Macedonia has jeopardized 
the state’s Balkan position and European future. The socialists instrumentalize this tension 
between past and present in the act of recognition for the purposes of gaining political 
leverage. This suggests that while operating within the hegemonic discourse of 
nationalism, even the ‘Europe’ signifiers are being harnessed to serve its purposes.  
Similar entanglement in politics dictated by attachments to the past can be observed in 
Macedonia. Upheld by nationalist interpretations, Macedonian identity narratives of ‘Self’ 
were unable to accommodate rapprochement with Bulgaria, despite the presumably 
amicable act of recognition. If taken up, Bulgaria’s declarative support could mean 
breaking Macedonia’s international isolation by establishing the first diplomatic relations. 
But, at the same time, too close political proximity with Bulgaria threatened the credibility 
of the narratives upholding Macedonia’s national identity discourse. Having just shed the 
patronage of Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia, Macedonia could not oblige its other big 
451 This line of analysis is maintained in other key pieces as well. The established historian and academic Prof. 
Ilcho Dimitrov also judges the recognition as a blunder of haste, see Prof. Ilcho Dimitrov, ‘From Recognition – 
Onwards’ in Duma newspaper of 1st Feb 1992. 
452 Tsocho Shatrov reporting for Duma newspaper, 17th Jan 1992. 
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patron because much of the identity narration of post-federation Macedonia was upheld 
by the claim for emancipation and vindicated independence. Operating within the 
hegemonic discourse of nationalism, Macedonian politics could not make use of Bulgaria’s 
support, even though it could have facilitated their declared goal of asserting Macedonia’s 
place on the Balkans and in Europe. The salience of the interpretations of severed territory 
and divided nation also prevented re-positioning Bulgaria from the function of malevolent 
‘Other’. These interpretations used Bulgaria’s recognition to perpetuate domestic 
confictuality of identity.  
Bulgaria is repeatedly portrayed as an aggressor through references to the ‘Bulgarian 
aspirations’ towards Macedonia453. On the political front accusations for favouring an 
alleged Bulgarian-Macedonian confederation454 begin to appear much more frequently as 
an instrument for summoning political support. The parts of geographical Macedonia in 
Bulgaria are referred to as the ‘oppressed parts of Macedonia’455. Macedonia’s official 
active interest in the fate of the people living there is debated as an official position of the 
state: 
 “We do not want anything else from Bulgaria. The only thing we ask of them is to 
recognize the rights of our minorities, in line with the demands of Europe [and the 
UN].”456 
The assumption of violated rights highlights the distance between ‘us’ and ‘them’, while 
the reference to Europe adds value to the justness of the demand (‘to recognize the rights 
of our minorities’). Bulgaria’s refusal to even discuss this issue is interpreted in the most 
extreme terms:  
“[..] the genocide over the members of the Macedonian nation [..] in Bulgaria 
[..]”457, “[...the] open fascism, which labeled all of Bulgaria’s citizens as ‘bulgarians’, 
453 Vladimir Goluboski, 52nd plenary session, 10th Dec 1992, 134. 
454 Ibid. 
455 41st Plenary session on 27th Oct 1992, 80. 
456 43rd plenary session, 1st Jul 1992, 101. 
457 43rd plenary session, 2nd Jul 1992, 35. 
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among them the Macedonians, the Turks, and everybody else, and which even tried 
to change their names [...]”458 
The references to ‘genocide’ and ‘fascism’ articulate Bulgaria’s position as universally 
unacceptable in moral and political terms. They try to justify Macedonia’s concern with the 
fate of the people of Pirin Macedonia under the sovereignty of Bulgaria, even in matters of 
the exclusive authority of the state, such as the organization and result of the population 
census: 
“[..] when we speak of the vital interests of the Macedonian national unity abroad, 
as in the particular case of the Bulgarian national census which performs legal 
denationalization of the Macedonians [we should not be silent].”459 
Such rhetoric fed into Bulgarian nationalist interpretations of threat and re-enforced them. 
Thus, realizing the project of independent Macedonian statehood, articulated within the 
context of nationalism, prevented dissociation from conflictual narratives. It disabled the 
narration of recognition as anything but a threat to the new state, which perpetuated 
already conflictual interpretations of identity.  
By interpreting Bulgaria’s support for Macedonia as destructive of Bulgaria’s and 
unacceptable for Macedonia’s international goals, nationalist rhetoric framed it as 
eventually incongruent with the identities representing the two states and in effect 
proscribed further rapprochement along the Bulgarian-Macedonian relationship. By 
bringing back the dominant political discourse to the notions of ‘national interest’, 
‘national self-consciousness’, ‘national responsibility’460, it attempted to re-enforce the 
hegemony of the discourse of nationalism, which had been challenged by the signifiers of 
the ‘European’ (‘European norms’, ‘European standards’, ‘European common processes’) 
structuring the early narratives of the recognition of independence. The intense domestic 
struggles for political hegemony, characterising the transfer of power between the old and 
the new ruling élites, took much political energy away out of the bid for Europeanization 
458 41st pleary session, 27th Oct 1992, 120. 
459 52nd plenary session, 10th Dec 1992, 143. 
460 Ibid. 
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and redirected it into the search for solutions to domestic problems caused by uncertain 
political rules and identities.461 Ultimately, the overall political, economic, social, and 
cultural reforms undertaken in the complex processes of transition challenged established 
norms and institutions and eventually created a general context of uncertainty which 
destabilized traditional discursive hegemonies. It visibly compromised the credibility of 
national identity narratives upheld within this uncertain context.  
In Bulgaria this was reflected in the instability of the governments, the persistent grip to 
power of representatives of the former totalitarian regime, the political and economic 
insecurity caused by the unsteady transition to democracy and market economy, the 
questionable legitimacy of the privatization processes, the widespread perceptions of 
corruption and lawlessness462. At the state level this context of uncertainty opened the 
political space for alternative interpretations better suited to articulate meanings of 
purpose and role in the new context. They were able to threaten and dislocate key 
signifiers of nationalist hegemony, particularly in view of its failure to provide in any 
convincing way a positive source of collective self-identification against the background of 
looming poverty. In this sense the reforms enabled the dislocation of nationalist discourse 
and the empowerment of the Europeanization discourse, but they also impeded 
immediate achievements in the process of Europeanization. This is illustrated by the 
perpetuated conflictuality of the behaviour towards Macedonia, still governed by key 
signifiers of nationalism. 
461 This discursive dynamics prevents subsequent attempts to bring the two states closer on various issues of 
mutual concern. In the Macedonian parliamentarian elections, for example, the affair of the so called 
‘Bulgarian leaflets’ acquired unimaginable dimensions. Sparked by the pre-election distribution of old leaflets 
in Bulgarian language from the time before the formal codification of Macedonian language, the scandal 
eventually aimed at discrediting the oppositional party VMRO-DPMNE by exposing its ‘pro-Bulgarian’ 
character. Insignificant in anything else but dimensions, the affair is illustrative of the enormous negative 
potential of political association with ‘Bulgarian-ness’. A similar affair in Bulgaria, popularized by the media as 
‘Mishev gate’ (after the name of a notorious informer of the communist security services in Bulgaria whose 
name first appeared in the arms scandal which brought Dimitrov government down, see 
http://www.trud.bg/Article.asp?ArticleId=808098 accessed 10th Feb 2012), which accused Dimitrov’s 
government of an arms deal with Macedonia had even stronger discrediting impact. It eventually led to a 
vote of non-confidence for the government. Even with the president’s repeated mandate, Filip Dimitrov 
could not gain the necessary support in parliament to form a new government. This is illustrative of the 
political unacceptability of any relationship with Macedonia other than the one prescribed by the discourse 
of Bulgarian nationalism. 
462 Ivan Krastev, Shifting Obsession: Three Essays on the Politics of Anticorruption (Cambridge University 
Press, 2004). 
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In Macedonia the process of discrediting nationalist hegemony in favour of an alternative 
grand discourse was even slower because of the complexities of transition there. Besides 
the complex processes of democratization and liberalization of the market, post-
communist Macedonia also had to address a series of issues arising from the imperative of 
consolidating statehood and the complex inter-ethnic division, as well as to overcome the 
impediments before international recognition. The Albanian blockade of the Macedonian 
referendum for independence463 alerted to the need of re-defining the basis of Albanian 
participation in the project of statehood. The perception on behalf of the Albanian 
minority of exclusion and injustice deepened the domestic divides and created a discourse 
of domestic Albanian nationalism challenging the notions of ‘Macedonian-ness’ and 
antagonizing politics in the new republic. This enormously troubled Macedonia’s transition 
and in important ways threatened the internal stability of Macedonian national identity. 
Interestingly enough, Albanian nationalism soon took recourse to the signifiers of 
European discourse in its bid for just political accommodation, thus challenging 
Macedonian nationalism from within. This determined the initial discursive tension 
between Macedonian nationalism and Europeanization. Europe’s reserved reactions to 
Macedonian independence, the postponed recognition by the European Community, and 
the conditions set on the international use of the republic’s name as a consequence of 
Greek objections, did not help the empowerment of the discourse of Europeanization in 
the newly independent republic. The few tentative steps in the direction of Macedonia’s 
European orientation did not provide sufficient basis for substantial re-thinking of the 
dominant narratives of ‘Macedonian-ness’ until well into the 1990s. This is evident in the 
intransigence in the relationship with Bulgaria, still predominantly governed by the 
meanings of Macedonian nationalism. Even though tentative, however, the first steps 
towards ‘Europe’ were taken in both states as a consequence of the search for a credible 
vision of national ‘Self’.  
 
 
463 At the 23rd Plenary session, 17th Sep 1991. 
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Empowering ‘Europe’ in Bulgaria 
In Bulgaria the Europeanization discourse was taken up by the democratic opposition 
primarily as an anti-communist alternative to the power establishment associated with the 
communist past. It interpreted communism as an aberration from Bulgaria’s European 
belonging. This interpretation, perpetuated by the first democratic coalition government, 
attempted, largely successfully, to construct ‘Europe’ as a counter discourse to the 
communist past in terms of ‘European legal standards and the ethical and material values 
of Europe’464. In this sense the attraction of the European discourse was initially provided 
by the notion of ‘return’. It made sense of the communist experiment as a passing 
moment, a lapsus, in Bulgaria’s European trajectory: 
“The Road to Europe is not new for Bulgaria. [It] will be only a suffered return after 
45 years of forcible exile in the misanthropic communist camp. BULGARIA HAS BEEN 
AND WILL BE AN INSEPARABLE PART OF EUROPE!”465  
This is repeated on numerous occasions. On an official visit to Turkey, a leading Bulgarian 
parliamentarian asserted, among other things, that ‘there is no democracy where the 
former communists are in power, under any form whatsoever [..]’466. This radical break 
from the communist past also implies dissociation from communist nationalism in 
domestic and foreign policy. In the European context, Bulgaria’s Balkan policies are framed 
by entirely different principles: 
“Bulgaria sees as its mission to implement European policies in the Balkans, free of 
historical prejudice [...], good neighbourly relations with all neighbouring states, [...] 
independent foreign policy which can turn Bulgaria into a factor of stability on the 
Balkans and in Europe.”467 
464 National Conference of the UDF, 14th Apr 1992, BTA Courier Service. 
465 Report on the National Conference of the UDF in the Demokratsia newspaper of 15th Apr 1992, capitals in 
the original. 
466 Aleksander Yordanov quoted in Demokratsia newspaper, 29th Apr 1992. 
467 Report on the National Conference of the UDF in Demokratsia newspaper, 15th Apr 1992. 
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Focusing on the familiar interpretation of the signifier of national purpose (‘factor of 
stability’), the democrats link the discourse of Europe to a new, non-nationalist foreign 
policy (‘free of historical prejudice’), detached from the imperatives of the past (‘good [..] 
relations with all neighbours’). This is a major modification of the established narrative of a 
‘special status’ in the attitudes towards Macedonia. It signifies detachment from the 
dependence upon stories of national loss over Macedonia and national tragedy. The 
rhetorical effect of this interpretation comes from establishing a causal relation between 
‘returning’ to Europe and overcoming bilateral conflictuality: 
“Before the Balkans can become an inseparable part of a truely united Europe, the 
states from the Balkan region need to walk the avenue of understanding and 
sincere cooperation. Bulgaria is aware of this responsibility.”468 
And since the democratic party tapped into the rhetorical resources of the ‘Europe’ 
discourse in order to gain leverage in the political game, references to it began to appear 
increasingly often in the discourse of everyday politics.  
“This is Bulgaria’s chance: it managed to push the representatives of the [former 
communists469] off all electable posts. Precisely because of that in a few days we 
will be able to re-gain our self-esteem as Europeans [by being admitted to the 
Council of Europe].”470 
The first tangible success in Bulgaria’s general strategy of ‘return to Europe’ – the 
successful bid for membership in the Council of Europe – even though significant in many 
ways, was rhetorically magnified by the democratic media in order to emphasize the vision 
of the democratic government and assert the political and symbolic meaning of the 
accomplishment. Headlines such as ‘Democratic Bulgaria Appears on the Big European 
Stage’471, ‘Bulgaria Returned to the Bossom of the European Family’472, ‘It Is the European 
468 National Conference of the UDF, 14th Apr 1992, BTA Courier Service. 
469 The official name of the party at this point is Bulgarian Socialist Party (Communists). 
470 Demokratsia newspaper, 4th May 1992. 
471 Demokratsia newspaper, 5th May 1992. 
472 Demokratsia newspaper, 6th May 1992. 
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Hour of Stardom for New Democratic Bulgaria’473, and ‘Hello Europeans’474 illustrate this 
rhetoric. At the same time, the fact of membership is interpreted as recognition on behalf 
of Europe of the democratic character of the new Bulgarian state and as such it is an 
authoritative external confirmation of the aspired new identity. Highlighting the specific 
achievements of democratization, the Bulgarian president emphasizes the importance of 
this: 
“Membership in the Council of Europe is not a benefaction or a privilege [..]. It is 
recognition of the democratic changes which the people have made happen in their 
own state; it is recognition of the people’s maturity and wisdom; it is recognition of 
political culture and civilization. [..] For two and a half years the Bulgarian people 
created a multi-party political system, independent syndicates, free press, 
independent radio and television, autonomous universities, democratic multi-party 
elections, a parliament with an opposition, a president elected by the direct vote of 
the people.”475  
The president’s address represents an act of ‘European’ identity articulation. Equating the 
state with its people, Zhelev completely marginalizes the nationalist source of self-
identification, the nation. Even though he uses the national denominator (‘Bulgarian’), the 
president is consistent in his reference to ‘the people’. Against the taken-for-granted 
references to the state community as the ‘Bulgarian nation’ in political discourse of the 
time, this nuance is significant. The omission of the ‘nation’ signifier allows the constitution 
of the community along the lines of moral categories (‘people’s maturity and wisdom’) and 
universal values (democracy, ‘political culture’, ‘civilization’). Listing particular steps of the 
democratization process, as declarative as they might be476, aims at materializing the 
achievement, improving its credibility and highlighting its significance. In his address to the 
nation the President continues to point to the ‘deprivations and difficulties’477 which 
473 Demokratsia newspaper, 8th May 1992. 
474 Demokratsia newspaper, 8th May 1992. 
475 Nation’s address of the President of the Republic of Bulgaria Dr Zhelyu Zhelev, Sofia, 7th May 1992, BTA 
Courier Service. 
476 The independence of Bulgarian media has been questioned many years after 1992, for instance. 
477 Nation’s address, Dr Zhelyu Zhelev, Sofia, 7th May 1992, BTA Courier Service. 
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accompanied the reforms.478 The reference aims to address popular discontent with the 
economic crisis and the overall uncertainty created by the transition. By emphasizing that 
it was these deprivations and difficulties that eventually enabled such a grand success for 
Bulgaria, he addresses the omission of nationalist discourse which mostly destabilized its 
hegemony: its failure to address looming poverty in the country. Invoking the familiar 
signifier of purpose (‘[the Bulgarian people] turned [their country] into a stability factor on 
the Balkans’479), the President immediately links his rhetoric to the principal new strategic 
goal of Bulgaria’s politics: membership of the European Community: 
“This is why I will not be too surprised if by the end of the year Bulgaria becomes an 
associated member of the European Community. [..] Our people deserves this. It 
demonstrated it with its deeds.”480 
By presenting association status as a credible political prospect of the near future and as a 
prospect dependent upon the merit of ‘the people’, the President rhetorically increases its 
attractiveness and calls for popular support. At the same time he, again, summons the civic 
community of the state – and not the nation – as the referent of optimistic future.  
The prime minister performs an identical rhetorical move: linking the tangible international 
success of Council of Europe membership to the imperative of the key international 
strategic goal, associated membership of the European Community: 
“Our inclusion in the Council of Europe is enormously significant but it needs to be 
followed by other initiatives and decisions by the end of the year, which should lead 
to associated status with the European Community.”481 
The logical link established between the two goals and the already magnified significance 
of the first aim to construct association with the EC as an even greater success, summon 
political support and justify prospective policies. The prime minister, in line with the 
478 He talks of both political and economic reforms even though the criterion for Council of Europe 
membership refers only to democracy. 
479 Ibid. 
480 Ibid. 
481 Filip Dimitrov at a celebration event of the National Club of the Friends of the European Community, Sofia, 
National Palace of Culture, 9th May 1992, BTA Courier Service. 
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general line of his party, also falls back on the discursive opposition between 
Europeanization and the renounced political experiment of the communist past: 
“We repeat the word ‘Europe’ over and over again, so that it sounds almost like a 
spell that communism will never ever happen again.”482 
The idea for the ‘enchanting’ power of the repetition of the word ‘Europe’ suggests a high 
degree of attraction, increased rhetorically by the renouncement of the communist past 
associated with it. Against the background of this positive prospect, the strategic goal of 
membership of the European Community, declared from the very beginning, seems more 
desirable and more achievable. This is confirmed by the insistence that joining the Council 
of Europe is meant as ‘simply the first step to our integration into the community of 
democratic states and, in the future, the European Community’483, repeated on numerous 
occasions and from various points of authority. 
The credibility of these claims is re-enforced by declarative rhetoric on behalf of Europe, 
popularized by the Bulgarian media upon every contact with representatives of EC 
member-states. At the Bulgarian-Portuguese meeting of foreign ministers, for example, 
the Portuguese foreign minister is quoted as saying: 
“I can express my hope that in May [1992] Bulgaria will be given a green light for 
initiating [association] negotiations with the European Community.”484 
The report is published under the headline ‘Support on Our Way to Europe’ and, together 
with the repeated comments of the Portuguese foreign minister concerning the ‘green 
light’ for negotiations with the EC, it sends a clear message: all effort should be put in 
direction of achieving the desired status in Europe, which is already so close. The same 
function performs the publicized address of the vice-president of the European 
Commission on occasion of a celebratory event at the Bulgarian National Palace of Culture, 
expressing ‘the European Community’s wish to start negotiations for associated status’485. 
482 Ibid.  
483 Speaker of Parliament Stefan Savov in an interview for Demokratsia newspaper of 30th May 1992. 
484 Portugal’s foreign minister João di Deus Pinheiro, Lisbon, 29th Apr 1992, BTA Courier Service. 
485 Frans Andriessen, Vice-President of the European Commission, 9th May 1992, BTA Courier Service. 
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Even though the beginning of negotiations for associated status is the preliminary step to 
the loosest form of institutionalized contact with the EC and can hardly be interpreted as a 
particular achievement486, this extensive rhetorical preparation of the event, officially 
confirmed several days later487, renders it politically more significant and increases its 
popularity: 
“Let no one be fooled that [these achievements] are not connected with the two 
events of the most recent elections – coming to power of the Union of Democratic 
Forces [..]and moving into opposition the Bulgarian Socialist Party.”488 
The discursive line of associating ‘return to Europe’ with the policies of the democratic 
coalition government demonstrates the manner in which the discourse of ‘Europe’ is 
utilized in the political power game: it is meant to increase popular support despite the 
economic crisis. It also illustrates the process of gradual but persistent empowerment of 
the discourse of ‘Europe’ in Bulgarian politics.  
Even though associated membership status was not confirmed until 1993489 and enforced 
until 1995490, the beginning of negotiations marked Bulgaria’s step-by-step progress in its 
aspirations towards Europe. The utilization of the ‘European’ rhetoric in the democratic 
party’s power struggle ensured the invariable presence of ‘Europe’ on the political agenda 
of the state. The systematic approach of negotiations applied the ‘Europe’ problematique 
to all aspects of policy. The asymmetric format of the negotiations (a state applying for 
associated status in a community of states), on the other hand, enabled their portrayal as a 
learning process491, as a strategy of self-improvement492, thus highlighting the general 
486 Especially given the fact that several Central European states are already registering progress as 
associated members at the time (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary). 
487 12th May 1992. 
488 Ilko Eshkenazy, chief negotiator in the associated membership negotiations of 14-15 May 1992 in 
Demokratsia newspaper, 12th May 1992. 
489 March 1993, signing of the Association Agreement 
http://ec.europa.eu/bulgaria/abc/pre_accession/history_relations/eu-political-relations_bg.htm accessed 
15th Feb 2012. 
490 1st Feb 1995, the Association Agreement comes into force 
http://ec.europa.eu/bulgaria/abc/pre_accession/history_relations/eu-political-relations_bg.htm accessed 
15th Feb 2012. 
491 ‘Brussels Teaches Sofia a Lesson in Economics’ in Demokratsia newspaper, 15th May 1992. 
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need for change in every relevant aspect of statehood. In this sense it prompted the 
credibility of the interpretation of ‘return to Europe’ as a process of thorough collective 
identity transformation.  
The aspiration for full membership in the European Community, declared as early as 
negotiations for associated status began, indicates the desired direction of this 
transformation. By the end of the year when associated membership status was enacted, 
the government and parliament had agreed upon and sent to the European Council 
Bulgaria’s formal application for full membership of the European Union493. Even though 
the first decision on the application was negative (1997), which is unsurprising given the 
total breakdown of Bulgaria’s financial credibility by 1997 and the acute governmental 
crisis of the winter of 1996-1997, the political consensus about Bulgaria’s aspirations for 
full integration into the European union had not changed.  
Against the background of an unsteady transition and increasing popular discontent with 
its course, giving up the European aspiration would have meant depriving the state from 
any meaningful sense of direction. This is significant. By the late 1990s the discourse of 
Bulgarian nationalism, constituting a closed, self-reliant national community of people 
united by a common narrative of past tragedy and grandeur, had already become 
discredited because it no longer provided a positive image of collective ‘Self’. Mired in 
poverty and deprived of immediate prospects of prosperity, Bulgarians could no longer 
identify with the vision upheld by the discourse of nationalism, which had structured their 
ideas of purpose at the beginning of transition. The attraction of the ‘European’ discourse 
was conditioned by its radical dissociation from the past, by its promise of economic 
stability, and, to no lesser a degree, by its elusive attainability. So while Bulgaria’s identity 
signifiers of the immediate post-communist period had already been destabilized by the 
pessimistic political realities, Europeanization proposed an alternative model of self-
identification that seemed both positive and optimistic. This is what enabled the 
492 ‘The European Community Association Agreement: Bulgarian’s European Bible’ in Demokratsia 
newspaper, 14th May 1992. 
493 European Council in Madrid 15-16th Dec 1995 see 
http://ec.europa.eu/bulgaria/abc/pre_accession/history_relations/eu-political-relations_bg.htm 15th Feb 
2012. 
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hegemony of the ‘Europe’ discourse and determined its impact on the transformation of 
Bulgaria’s national identity. The reciprocal incentives provided by Europe throughout the 
process marked by the formal start of accession negotiations in 1999494 confirmed the 
credibility of this identity choice.  
 
Empowering ‘Europe’ in Macedonia 
Macedonia took a different path to empowering the discourse of ‘Europe’. The ‘Europe’ 
signifiers were present in Macedonian political discourse from the very beginning of the 
transition. They revolved around the notions of democracy, peaceful transition, economic 
prosperity, inter-ethnic tolerance, human rights protection, regional and international 
cooperation and integration495, which were typical ‘European’ points of reference in the 
majority of the Central and Eastern European transitioning states. But while in Bulgaria the 
discourse of ‘Europe’ was taken up as an oppositional discourse against the establishment 
representing the past and this is what ensured its political salience, in Macedonia the past 
was renounced with the rhetoric of national emancipation and independence, which 
ultimately operated within the discourse of nationalism. The ‘Europe’ signifiers were 
meant to uphold the national narrative in a positive optimistic manner but their role at the 
beginning of transition was supportive: they had to provide long-term direction and 
guidance. The immediate strategic goal of independent statehood was defined by the 
discourse of Macedonian nationalism.   
This discursive configuration might have been just as successful in empowering ‘Europe’ as 
in Bulgaria, if the particular domestic and international contexts framing Macedonia’s 
project of independent statehood had not significantly detached its politics from the 
European discourse. In the first place, the political leadership of the Albanian minority saw 
in the European rhetoric a legitimate discursive strategy for advancing the needs and 
demands of their electorate. It systematically resorted to ‘European’ signifiers in order to 
494 The decision is taken on 10th Dec 1999 at the Helsinki European Council. 
495 See 5th Plenary session 27th Jan 1991 because of the more solemn occasion which this session provides: 
the inauguration speech by the newly elected president Gligorov. 
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counteract the nationalist rhetoric of the majority and to ensure fair inclusion of the 
Albanian element into the project of statehood:  
“[..] the democratic forces in Macedonia will not allow the state to become captive 
of the calculations for national exclusivity because as such we will never be part of 
Europe or close to it [..]”496 
The overall perception among the minority representatives was that this goal was not 
accomplished, which is evidenced by the general Albanian voting abstention.497 Their 
rhetoric of discontent which called for justice on the basis of ‘European’ norms was 
logically opposed to the majority’s position, thus juxtaposing the ‘European’ discourse to 
the discourse of Macedonian nationalism: 
“The happening of Europeanization raises a series of issues of principle [..]. It 
exercises pressure over state sovereignty and state stability. Whether willingly or 
not, [Europe] interferes into the domestic affairs of the state, particularly a ‘newly-
composed’ state [such as ours].”498 
Calling upon the grounding principle of the modern state system – inviolability of state 
sovereignty – the analysis presents Europeanization as intervention and intrusion, rather 
than a learning process of socialization into the European normative space. The quoted 
European categorization of Macedonia as a ‘newly-composed state’ aims to highlight the 
unacceptability of Europe’s position: it contradicts the central Macedonian narrative of 
continuity of Macedonian national identity. The moral standing of Macedonia’s reluctance 
to allow interference is supported by Europe’s recognition of its civic liberalism. An expert 
representative of the Council of Europe is quoted as saying that she does ‘not know any 
country in Western Europe which gives national minorities such freedom.’499 
496 Seyfedin Haruni at the 25th Plenary session, 9th Nov 1991, 69. 
497 22nd Plenary session, 2nd Sep 1991 in the run-up to the referendum, for the post-voting discussions, see 
23rd and 24th sessions on 17th and 23rd Sep 1991. 
498 Europeanization ‘Happening’: Unfortunately, the European Models for Democratic Society Cannot Be 
Copied in Macedonia, Puls newspaper, 4th Mar 1994. 
499 Lenz-Cornette ibid. 
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It is important to note, however, that even though the discursive attempts of decoupling 
the European signifiers from the Macedonian narrative of nationhood were evident 
already in 1991, they did not immediately succeed. Quite to the contrary, there is evidence 
that Macedonian élites attempted to modify their nationalist rhetoric in order to 
accommodate some of the Albanian demands. This is visible in the majority’s strong line of 
argumentation in favour of a civic organization of the state, despite popular visions of a 
national state: 
“[..] we need to respect the opinion of those who said that at this moment no state 
in Europe has a national constitution and no state in Europe is defined as a national 
state in its constitution. [they are all] civic states. [..] It’s up to us to decide whether 
we will follow [..] the conditions prescribed by Europe or not.”500 
The power of the ‘Europe’ signifier is suggested by the speaker’s rhetorical strategy of 
leaving the options open (‘it’s up to us to decide’), even though it is implied which one is 
the correct option. This boldness of argumentation, however, gradually began to sound 
unconvincing. First, it was voiced from the political left which was associated with the non-
national model of statehood of the past. It therefore lacked sufficient credibility as a viable 
narrative of independent statehood. Second, lack of majoritarian support for it failed to 
satisfy Albanian discontent, which further discredited its salience. Third, Europe largely 
failed to provide any substantial incentives in order to re-enforce its credibility and 
increase the political relevance of Europeanization processes which could have upheld it. 
The consequences of this triple dynamics prevented stabilizing the ‘European’ reading of 
the organization principles of statehood. The discourse of fairness upheld by the Albanian 
political élite increasingly captured the signifiers of ‘Europe’ and decoupled them from the 
central narrative in the majority’s justification of independent statehood – a Macedonian 
state for the Macedonian people. 
The discursive current working against the empowerment of the European discourse in 
Macedonia was significantly re-enforced by Europe’s reservations in recognizing 
Macedonia’s international subjectivity in view of Greece’s objections to the name of the 
500 Branko Crvenkovski at the 25th Plenary session on 11th Nov 1991, 27-28. 
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republic. Without explicitly endorsing Greek intransience in the name dispute, Europe’s 
hesitation undermined Macedonia’s international standing and had an extremely negative 
effect on popular consensus about Europe. This was recognized publicly by Macedonia’s 
president in the months following Macedonian independence: 
“Our recognition by the European Community is already a matter of morality and if 
it does not happen soon, this will be a defeat of European policies [in 
Macedonia].”501  
The delayed recognition not only challenged the salience of the Europe discourse in 
Macedonia, it had a destabilizing effect on the entire construct of Macedonian national 
identity because it questioned the validity of its political form: the independent 
Macedonian state. Europe’s inability to address Greek demands against Macedonia in any 
meaningful way are interpreted as particularly damaging:  
“ [..]today Europe, again, is trading with the national feeling of this people and the 
dignity of all citizens of Macedonia, when without any legitimacy it took the [..] 
decision to recognize the state without the name; there is no citizen in this 
unrecognized Macedonia who does not feel violated, belittled, injured.”502 
Calling upon arguments from the spheres of morality and legality, such rhetoric 
exemplifies the damages which non-recognition and partial recognition inflicted upon 
Europe’s standing in the discursive space of Macedonian nationhood. This perception of 
unfairness began to decouple the Macedonian nationhood narrative from the European 
discourse in a more categorical manner than the Albanian claim for abidance by Europe. In 
order to re-create a credible narrative of national direction and purpose, Macedonian 
political élites resorted to more exclusively nationalist rhetoric at the expense of European 
discourse, particularly in their defense against Albanian demands for parity in the state. 
“[We are] concerned about whether we meet some European standards. If we do 
not meet them, the European Community will sanction us, so we must. But why 
don’t these standards apply to Bulgaria, why don’t they apply to Serbia, why don’t 
501 President Kiro Gligorov quoted on 14th Apr 1992 by BTA from Belgrade. 
502 Blagoy Handjiski at the 43rd Plenary session, 1st Jul 1992, 78-79. 
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they apply to Greece, why don’t they apply to England? Isn’t England a democracy 
but in the name of nationality [and nationalism] every day bombs explode in 
London because [Northern] Ireland wants independence and [England] won’t give 
it.”503 
The fact that the framework for minority rights in Europe was still rudimentary504 and that 
Europe itself was highly undecided about the type of protection it wanted to provide505, 
increased the perception of double standards valid for Macedonia but not for Macedonia’s 
protagonists, nor for Europe itself. The vague reference to these standards (‘some 
standards’) confirms the diminished credibility which Europe had come to enjoy in 
Macedonian political discourse on this issue. The suggestion that democracy did not 
preclude nationalism (‘isn’t England a democracy’506) re-enforced this notion. 
The period between Macedonia’s declaration of independence and the first major act of 
international recognition, membership in the United Nations organization in 1993, had a 
general destabilizing effect on Macedonian national identity and on its domestic and 
regional security. Evidence for this is the fall of the non-partisan government of Kljusev by 
mid-1992 and the return to power of the former communists under the leadership of 
Crvenkovski, which put the process of democratization in the country under serious doubt. 
It is also interpreted domestically as distancing from Europe: 
“[I]f in power [were] people who had had nothing to do with communism but with 
true democracy, [we] would have had taken a different road which would have 
taken us faster to Europe.”507 
The discreditation of the democracy narrative and the divisions maintained by Albanian 
discontent challenged the signifiers of Macedonian national identity from within, 
threatening its strategic political project of statehood.  
503 Trajan Mitsevski, MP representing the Macedonian majority, 41st Plenary session, 28th Oct 1992, 74. 
504 See for reference Gabriel Toggenburg, ‘A Rough Orientation through a Delicate Relationship: the European 
Union’s Endeavours for (Its) Minorities’, European Integration Online Papers 4(16), (2000) at 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-016a.htm. 
505 Based on collective or individual rights – see Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of 
Minority Rights (Oxford University Press, 1995). 
506 The example is meant to re-enforces the claim, despite its imprecision.  
507 49th Plenary session, 3rd Sep 1992, 117. 
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It was further destabilized from without. The fact that UN recognition had been 
conditional – membership was agreed under the name acceptable to Greece508 and not 
under Macedonia’s constitutional name – did not remedy Macedonia’s international and 
regional standing in any radical way. A compromise agreement with Greece brokered by 
the UN did not result in lifting the Greek economic blockade over Macedonia until 1995, 
which, together with the UN embargo over Yugoslavia, and the reluctance to establish any 
meaningful bilateral ties with Bulgaria, sealed Macedonia from its main trading partners 
and pushed the country into economic isolation just as pernicious as the international 
political vacuum which surrounded it. This had a destabilizing effect on Macedonia’s 
national identity signifiers as it caused a deep economic and societal crisis. Accompanied 
by the general loss of national direction as a result of the intractability of the dispute with 
Greece and the halt in Macedonia’s international positioning, by the mid-1990s the deep 
international isolation threatened to destabilize the very project of Macedonian 
statehood.  
To avoid this, the Macedonian leadership declared its readiness to discuss Greek demands 
and make progress in overcoming the dispute with Greece. Other than the name 
objection, Greece laid claims on key identity formulations in Macedonia’s constitution (the 
formulation of duty of care for the Macedonians in neighbouring countries509 interpreted 
as irredentist) and key Macedonian national symbols (the so called Virginia sun which 
appeared on Macedonia’s first national flag510). The fact that Macedonia was willing to 
give these up in order to break international isolation, testifies both for the destabilization 
which had shaken the construct of Macedonian national identity and for the search for 
new direction which was illustrated by the desire to re-launch the project of 
Europeanization.   
In view of Macedonia’s new placatory policy towards Greece and the progress made in the 
bilateral dispute, Europe was finally ready to establish diplomatic relations with Macedonia 
(1995) and begin granting assistance under PHARE (1996). This enabled, for the first time 
508 Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia (FYRoM). 
509 Art.49 of the 1991 Constitution, which Macedonia had to amend. 
510 Also coerced into changing in the name of appeasing Greece. 
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in years, improving the credibility of Macedonia’s European option and increasing the 
relevance of European discourse to Macedonian politics. It was the breakthrough in the 
economic and political isolation and the first European funds that upheld optimistic 
narratives about trade and development and gradually re-introduced the European 
signifiers as guidelines in Macedonian politics. Whether debating tax and tariffs, wheat 
production, education or elections, the norm was gradually beginning to be measured 
against the ‘European standards’.511 This conditioned the possibility of re-narrating 
Macedonian politics in terms of ‘Europe’ despite the operationalization of the European 
signifiers by the Albanian political leadership and its initially divisive effects. 
As in Bulgaria, membership in the Council of Europe was considered a stepping stone in 
the Europeanization process. Even though it, too, was postponed until 1995, when the 
problems with Greece began to be resolved, it marked the start of institutionalizing the 
Europeanization process in Macedonia. Even though the strategic goal of European 
integration was not an immediate political option, dialogue with the European institutions 
established by the mid-1990s initiated the steady process of empowering the European 
discourse. Not unlike Bulgaria, Macedonia embarked on the way to Europe because it 
lacked any other sensible political alternative. On the one hand, the imperatives of the 
processes of transition to democracy and market economy indicated this clearly. On the 
other hand, the process of consolidating statehood, halted by the country’s embroilment 
into a severe inter-ethnic crisis512 and strained regional relations, also suggested European 
integration as the adequate solution. In this sense, even though much later than in 
Bulgaria, the political will for Europeanization produced similar dynamics, thus 
conditioning a hegemony of the European discourse. But it was not until 2001 that an 
association agreement was signed between Macedonia and the EU. Immediately after its 
entering into force in 2004, Macedonia applied for EU membership and was granted the 
official candidate status in the following year. This (delayed but) steady progress towards 
Europe ensured the credibility of the ‘European’ narration of Macedonian identity and 
slowly dislocated many of the signifiers of Macedonian nationalism. 
511 Plenary sessions from 29th Nov 1995 to 2nd Apr 1996 provide examples of the debates on the above topics 
and the European indicator. 
512 Culminating in the civil conflict of 2001. 
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Europeanization Effects on Bulgarian-Macedonian Post-Recognition Narratives of 
‘Otherness’ 
Investigating the narratives of recognition and post-recognition in Bulgarian-Macedonian 
inter-state relations of the early transition reveals interesting, albeit still subtle, 
transformations in both states (Table 10). Initially, narratives of recognition were 
articulated predominantly within the discourse of nationalism. They upheld mutually 
exclusive identity constructions, which were inevitably conflictual. The presumably 
amicable act of recognition performed in reference to ‘Europe’ was interpreted within this 
discourse as consequential and hostile. With the gradual empowerment of the discourse of 
Europeanization, however, alternative interpretations of recognition and post-recognition 
began to structure bilateral relations. Where they managed to provide credible reading of 
central identity signifiers, these interpretations upheld less conflictual national identity 
constructions. In Bulgaria, the credibility of the ‘European’ reading of identity was 
improved by the immediate incentives received from ‘Europe’. The optimistic, positive 
identity of deserved progress, which it upheld, prompted less antagonistic interpretations 
of the Macedonian ‘Other’. It also increased the appeal of ‘Europe’ as a rhetorical self-
enhancement strategy and stabilized the process of Europeanization. In Macedonia 
Europeanization did not provide sufficient incentives for a credible reading of Macedonian 
national identity at the time. It increased the salience of interpretations which conflicted 
with sedimented meanings of national identity signifiers, without providing a credible 
alternative. Within the discourse of ‘Europe’, therefore, narratives of recognition and post-
recognition upheld a discouraging vision of Macedonian identity domestically seen as 
largely pessimistic, unfair and undeserved. This is what compromised the appeal of 
Europeanization and perpetuated nationalist antagonisms until a more tangible notion of 
‘Europe’ was able to provide a more credible reading of Macedonian national identity. 
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State Bulgaria Macedonia 
Signifiers 
upheld by 
Nationalism 
International voice Vindication 
Special status towards Macedonia Renouncing protectionism 
Protecting territory against threat Links with adjacent Macedonian 
territories 
Preserving the unity of the nation Close relationship with Macedonian 
minorities on the other side of the border 
Signifiers 
upheld by 
Europeanizati
on 
Overcoming nationalist conflict and 
upholding civic nationhood as 
indicative of break from the past  
Non-national statehood as remnant from 
the past  
Good relations with neighbours as 
a sign of progress  
Civic statehood as accommodating 
Albanian minority in par with the majority  
European incentives increasing 
political relevance 
Compromise not encouraged through 
international recognition  
Table 10. Identity Narratives of Recognition and Post-Recognition in Bulgaria and Macedonia. 
 
 
SECTION II:  
NARRATIVES STRUCTURING THE LANGUAGE DISPUTE 
 
Exploring transformations along another line of identity narratives articulating ‘otherness’ 
– the language dispute –  which increased in salience during a later phase of the transition, 
reveals further aspects of the discursive mechanisms through which Europeanization 
upheld stories of national identity and increased their credibility. Chronologically, the 
language dispute governed Bulgarian-Macedonian relations from the mid- to the late 
1990s. The period was characterized by very different political outcomes in the two states 
determined by changing discursive hegemonies. The empowerment of the discourse of 
Europeanization had already begun to transform discursive realities even though the 
hegemony of nationalism had proven difficult to shift. The different salience of 
Europeanization in the two studied states helps highlight the discursive logic of capturing 
the same identity signifiers – in different contexts – and discursively re-positioning them in 
a new vision of ‘Self. Inevitably, this also impacted bilateral conflictuality and facilitated 
reconciliation.  
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Changed Contexts 
By the mid-1990s the exhilaration of the first post-communist years had waned to give way 
to the pragmatic politics of transition and international re-positioning. Both Bulgaria and 
Macedonia had initiated the transition to functioning democracy, and both states had also 
seen representatives of the former communist élites return to power in the course of the 
democratic electoral competition. But while in Bulgaria the partial retreat of the 
democratic opposition meant temporary re-enforcement of nationalist discourse, in 
Macedonia it was associated with a further destabilization of the national identity upheld 
by the discourse of nationalism. This is displayed in the dynamics of domestic inter-ethnic 
accommodation. In Bulgaria it followed the model designed during the negotiated regime 
change under the patronage of the former communists and, in view of their return to 
power, it was neither challenged nor changed. In Macedonia, in contrast, the return to 
power of the former communists ensured increased political participation for the minority 
élites, which the Macedonian project of national statehood had not been prepared for, 
and perpetuated a serious inter-ethnic divide in the country.513  
The transition to a market economy had also been initiated in both states and as this 
naturally led to major re-structuring of the whole economies, it was also accompanied by 
serious economic hardship and increasing poverty among the populations. In Bulgaria the 
economic crisis stimulated significant re-thinking of the meaning of the signifiers of 
direction and purpose and facilitated Bulgaria’s orientation towards ‘Europe’ as a symbol 
of economic prosperity and stability. Together with the first successful steps in the process 
of European integration, this categorically empowered the discourse of ‘Europe’ and 
permitted its gradual stabilization in the national discursive space. In Macedonia, however, 
this process was hampered by Europe’s reservations about recognizing Macedonian 
statehood and in establishing an international dialogue with the independent republic. 
513 Valeri Stoyanov, The Turkish Population in Bulgaria between the Poles of Ethnopolitics (Sofia: LIK, 1998); 
Židas Daskalovski, The Macedonian Conflict of 2001: Problems of Democratic Consolidation (Libertas Paper 
56, 2004).  
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Against the background of the Greek economic blockade of Macedonia, the UN embargo 
on Serbia and the only limited trade ties with Bulgaria, Macedonia quickly lapsed into deep 
isolation which exacerbated the functioning of its economy and deepened the economic 
crisis. This challenged key signifiers of national identity. In the lack of immediate optimistic 
prospects and European incentives, meanings of identity were seriously destabilized, 
leading to widespread perception of national insecurity.  
So, while in Bulgaria the process of consolidating the post-totalitarian statehood and re-
thinking Bulgarian nationhood in the context of transition actually facilitated Bulgaria’s (re) 
turn to Europe, in Macedonia it deepened the international isolation and initiated a 
process of introspective re-formulation of Macedonian identity, challenged from within by 
the political struggle for ethnic accommodation. Eventually the process did produce an 
interpretation of national identity compatible with the discourse of ‘Europe’ but it took 
longer and was more cumbersome. Macedonia’s first successful steps towards European 
integration, even though delayed, greatly facilitated the empowerment of this re-narration 
of identity in view of the strategic goal of Europeanization and helped stabilize it.      
Bulgarian-Macedonian relations evolved in congruence with these domestic and 
international contexts. The high degree of instability initially perpetuated bilateral 
antagonisms and raised further issues of disagreement between the two states. With the 
gradual progress of Europeanization, however, and the re-interpretation of national 
signifiers of identity associated with it, a notable relaxation in the bilateral tension was 
made possible. This is testified by the significant progress in resolving the inter-state 
language dispute which had frozen Bulgarian-Macedonian relations for half a decade.  
 
The Language Dispute and Its Conflictual (Non-)Narratives 
The Bulgarian-Macedonian language dispute, like the other lines of conflictuality between 
the two states, was predicated on two mutually exclusive identity narratives of ‘otherness’. 
The first one was Bulgaria’s claim of patronage over everything Macedonian. The second 
was Macedonia’s denial of commonality with everything Bulgarian. As two extreme 
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interpretations of the historical past of the region, these identity narratives logically 
positioned Bulgaria and Macedonia in a relationship of unreconcileable antagonism. 
Elaborating on its historical narratives of commonality, popular Bulgarian discourse 
claimed that, because of the great degree of similarity of the language spoken in 
Macedonia with the South-Western dialects of the Bulgarian language, Macedonian was, 
in fact, Bulgarian. Pointing to the late codification of Macedonia’s official state language514, 
Bulgarian narratives aimed to demonstrate the ‘artificial’ character of Macedonian and 
reveal its ‘true’ nature as a dialect of Bulgarian.  
Macedonian narratives, on the other hand, attempted to deny any substantial 
commonality with the Bulgarian language, pointing to the scientifically proven 
autochthonous character of Macedonian, and referring to its historical standing through 
the centuries. Macedonian national language as a signifier of identity capable of 
articulating national uniqueness despite the internal and external contestations against the 
state’s identity, had a central discursive position in Macedonian identity narratives: 
 “Language is our only fatherland.”515 
This awareness of the significance of Macedonian language as the ultimate locus of 
Macedonian-ness impervious to foreign intrusion is not new. But in a time of re-defining 
Macedonian identity and the internal and external insecurity the process generated, 
national language began to fix identity in a categorical way like no other identity signifier. 
The formal codification of Macedonian language concurs chronologically with the first 
recognized Macedonian state.516 In this sense it establishes tangible links with Macedonian 
statehood. The project of re-negotiating the terms of statehood of the early 1990s brought 
it back to the political agenda of the state as evidence for the viability of the project. 
Narratives upholding the centrality of national language in the imagining of the national 
514 1944, compared to the first Bulgarian codification in 1878. 
515 Blazhe Koneski quoted in Puls newspaper from 13th May 1994. 
516 Within the Yugoslav socialist federation. 
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community dominated the discursive space of Macedonian politics around the time of the 
declaration of independence. 517  
At an official level these narratives first clashed with the Bulgarian national stories in an 
inter-state dispute in 1994, around the time of the first official visit of the Macedonian 
president Kiro Gligorov to Bulgaria upon Bulgarian invitation. There had been language-
related incidents earlier in the year, but they had not acquired such salience because of 
the lower (ministerial or ambassadorial) level at which they had occurred. One had 
involved the refusal of the Bulgarian minister of education518 to sign bilateral agreements 
discussed with his counterpart in Skopje in the Macedonian language. A similar issue had 
arisen around the Bulgarian ambassador to Skopje earlier in the year519. With the expected 
publicity surrounding the visit of President Gligorov to Bulgaria, however, these incidents 
culminated in a full-blown diplomatic conflict. The particular reason for it was 
disagreement on the wording describing the official languages of the two states. This issue 
quickly became central during the official part of the visit because of the series of bilateral 
documents which had been prepared for signing by the presidents. In line with the 
governmental guidelines, Bulgaria insisted that the the documents be signed in ‘the official 
language of the two states as per their constitutions’520, without further specifications in 
the text. The assumption was that the two states shared a language.521 Macedonia, on the 
other hand, insisted on mentioning the Macedonian national denominator when specifying 
which the official language of the state was. The two divergent demands eventually 
prevented the signing of any of the prepared documents during the visit. The political 
impossibility to supersede these formulations in any constructive way during the following 
years in effect completely froze Bulgarian-Macedonian relations and blocked all inter-state 
517 Kiro Gligorov speaking at the 5th Plenary session on 27th Jan 1991, 19 “[...] against all our discontent, we 
dare not forget that today our language is a European language, that for 45 years only it developed and 
made our literature, poetry and art flourish, which is what determines the cultural face of a nation.” 
518 Minister of Science and Education Prof. Marko Todorov during a visit to Skopje on 14th Apr 1994, BTA 
Courier Service. 
519 Anguel Dimitrov, commented in parliament on 20th Apr 1994, 43. 
520 Symeon Guiannakos, ‘Bulgaria’s Macedonian Dilemma’, Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans 3(2), 
(2001): 153-170. 
521 Together with the other two official forms of the Bulgarian language – the language spoken in the 
Republic of Bulgaria and the language spoken by the Bulgarians living in the region of Banat, currently 
divided between Romania, Serbia and Hungary. 
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dialogue at a time when both states could have benefited enormously from bilateral 
cooperation.  
To fully understand the meaning of this diplomatic and political deadlock and how 
language became such a crucial inter-state problem, it is necessary to understand the 
identity narratives which conditioned it. Language represented a central signifier of 
national identity constructs in both states. Different nationalist discourses, however, 
produced divergent interpretations of it.  
For Bulgaria, linguistic similarity with the dialects spoken in Macedonia had provided 
justification for Bulgaria’s historical claim for patronage over the people living there. 
Despite the different political path which Macedonia had taken over the course of the 20th 
century, Bulgaria had continued to commemorate and cultivate historical commonality 
with it. On the basis of shared historical past, ‘Macedonia’ had come to represent an 
important aspect of Bulgaria’s cultural heritage: many classical works of Bulgarian 
literature treat Macedonia and its tragic loss as a key element of the Bulgarian national 
story522. This story, supported by Bulgarian national historiography, had translated 
‘Macedonia’ into the Bulgarian political space as originally Bulgarian in ethnicity and 
culture. The similarity of the Macedonian language with Bulgarian was interpreted as 
further evidence of this. Against the background of the general salience of language as a 
signifier of Bulgarian nationhood, treating Macedonian as a language of a foreign state 
posed a serious threat over Bulgaria’s national identity construct. In a time of general 
insecurity caused by the deepening economic crisis, this was politically dangerous. Already 
destabilized by the reforms and without many tangible European incentives, Bulgarian 
narratives of national identity could not accommodate the threat. Instead, they resorted to 
the familiar interpretations of nationalism. This rhetorical (re-)turn was facilitated by the 
democratic government’s collapse523 and the looming electoral victory of the former 
communists524.  
522 One prominent example is Dimitar Talev’s four volume epic novel on Macedonia. 
523 In 1992, followed by two expert governments. 
524 Who formally returned to power in 1995. 
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 ‘Recognizing the state but not recognizing the nation’525, the ambiguous formula declared 
as early as 1991 at the prospect of Macedonian independence, came to structure 
Bulgaria’s position in the language dispute despite the inherent contradiction in it. 
Sovereign statehood carries with it the legitimacy to decide on domestic affairs of the 
state, one of which is choosing an official state language. The way nationhood is 
constructed usually pre-determines the choice of languages. Bulgaria’s ambiguity 
attempted to present recognition as an act of condescension, assuming a role in the 
process which it did not have. The assumption was highly contested in Macedonia itself 
because of the notion of patronage it imposed. Introducing historical narratives into the 
political discourse as valid political argumentation, Bulgaria’s position durably linked policy 
towards Macedonia to the narratives of the past. Their high degree of sedimentation 
prevented the establishment of constructive inter-state dialogue, taking account of 
differences in the interpretations of nationhood. Language, as a key element in the 
constitution of the Macedonian national community, was one of the national signifiers 
most bitterly contested by Bulgaria, not least because of its key role in the construction of 
Bulgarian national identity itself. Pointing to the ‘artificial’ and ‘invented’ character of the 
Macedonian language526, Bulgarian nationalist discourse began to treat its use as an 
official language of another state as encroachment upon Bulgaria’s cultural heritage. 
Macedonia’s official declarations of the autochthonous character of its national language 
were taken as an affront to the memory of the dead in the Bulgarian struggles over 
Macedonia.527 These interpretations made impossible official acknowledgement of 
Macedonian as another state’s language within the discursive space of Bulgarian 
nationalist discourse. Thus, the concrete steps the government of Filip Dimitrov made in 
order to activate bilateral relations with Macedonia were hamstrung by formulations 
unacceptable to Macedonia. Against the background of more pressing international 
imperatives for both states, this regional stand-off was not widely problematized but by 
525 Zhelyu Zhelev, In Spite of It All: My Political Biography (Sofia: Kolibri, 2005). 
526 ‘Demonstrated’ by Bulgarian linguistics and historiography, see for instance Valentin Stankov, Bulgarian 
Literary Language in the Revival: Scientific Facts and Pseudo-Scientific Arguments (Sofia: Macedonian 
Scientific Institute, 2003), Dimitar Tyulekov, Political Myth for the ‘Macedonian Minority’ in Bulgaria 
(Blagoevgrad: Macedonian Scientific Institute, 2007). 
527 Dimitar Dragnev, The Skopje Icon Blazhe Koneski: Macedonian Linguist or Serbian Political Worker? (Sofia, 
Macedonian Scientific Institute, 1998). 
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the mid-1990s it had already become an intractable inter-state dispute which discredited 
the two states’ claims for democratization and Europeanization.    
It is significant that Bulgarian public space was predominantly silent on the subject. 
Recognizing the priority of historical narratives of nationhood over economic interest 
considerations would have caused a serious erosion of legitimacy even within the 
hegemony of nationalism. History was called upon, instead, to serve a different, legitimate, 
purpose: 
“In their [Balkan and European] aspirations Bulgaria and Macedonia will walk 
together, because this is what history obliges us to do, because this is what our 
present and our future summon us for.”528 
If cooperation is dictated by history, then failure to achieve it defies the credibility of the 
historical narratives. The identity of the Bulgarian national collectivity, still oriented 
towards the past and embedded in stories of national ‘Self’ referring to past glory and 
grandeur, was not ready to accommodate such challenge. This is why Bulgaria’s insistence 
on the controversial formulation went widely unacknowledged in Bulgaria. When 
responsibility for the bilateral deadlock had to be taken, it was sought in Macedonia, not 
Bulgaria. Pointing to the straightforward way in which cooperation agreements were 
signed with the Albanian president at the time, Zhelev is quoted as saying: 
 “It is so easy, you see, when politicians do not meddle in the work of linguists.”529 
Implying that politics and linguistics should be kept separate (a task Bulgarian identity 
narratives failed to achieve, not least in the rhetoric of the president), Zhelev attempted to 
rhetorically transfer the responsibility for this failure because of its incompatibility with the 
state’s official position: 
528 Concluding speech by Aleksander Yordanov, Speaker of Bulgarian Parliament at the 364th plenary session 
on 26th Apr 1994. 
529 At the meeting with the Albanian President Berisha upon signing the bilateral agreements in both 
Bulgarian and Albanian language, Puls newspaper, 13th May 1994. 
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“Establishing friendly and ever closer relations of cooperation with the Republic of 
Macedonia [..] requires mutual trust and denouncing some prejudices from the near 
past.”530 
It is unsurprising then that Bulgaria’s inability to align its state’s behaviour with its political 
rhetoric was not happily commented on. It remained a missed opportunity for advancing 
relations with Macedonia, which for the next half a decade remained at a complete 
standstill. The lack of political will to find a solution acceptable to both sides was not 
problematized in the context of domestic instability.  
As pointed above, in Macedonia, too, language had been one of the central signifiers of 
national identity. Against the background of contested nationhood and conditional 
statehood, language had come to represent Macedonia’s categorical distinctness within 
the federation it had been part of and amidst encroaching neighbours. Precisely because 
of past commonality with Bulgaria, the Macedonian nation-building process had taken 
particular care to limit similarities with Bulgarian when codifying the national language. 
This had been accomplished by adopting cultural vocabulary of non-Slav origin, by 
introducing non-Cyrillic alphabet signs, by changing the orthography of common words in 
order to avoid signs used in Bulgarian.531 Beside the differences fostered with the 
codification of the Macedonian language, the half century of modern Macedonian 
statehood had cultivated a national linguistic community which had grown apart from 
Bulgaria. In this sense commonality with the Bulgarian language had notably diminished by 
the early 1990s. So when Macedonian publics and élites were faced with the renewed 
Bulgarian claims of patronage, their indignation stirred a wave of anti-Bulgarian rhetoric. 
This happened at a time when Macedonian statehood was struggling against external non-
recognition and almost complete international isolation. In the lack of any tangible 
European incentives, Macedonia turned to the discourse of nationalism to address the 
challenge against its identity. The return to power of the former communists532 and the 
demands of the Albanian political leadership, however, posed another, domestic challenge 
530 Introductory speech by Aleksander Yordanov, Speaker of Bulgarian Parliament at the 364th plenary session 
on 26th Apr 1994. 
531 Blazhe Koneski, Grammar of the Macedonian Literary Language (Skopje: Kultura, 1982). 
532 Their party, the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia, was re-elected in 1992 and governed until 1998. 
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to the Macedonian nationalist discourse and the identity construction it upheld. 
Destabilized from within and threatened from without, the discourse of Macedonian 
nationhood could preserve its credibility only if it did not react to Bulgarian claims. This 
conditioned Macedonia’s retreat from inter-state dialogue with Bulgaria and contributed 
to the prolonged freeze of bilateral relations. 
This is noted in Macedonian public space. The leading media report Macedonian reactions 
to the language dispute as ‘either silence, or no comment’.533 At the same time, these 
reactions are assessed as ‘paradoxical’ against the background of the excessive 
preoccupation of Macedonian politics with the issue of organizing and carrying out a 
national census in six languages: 
“The paradox here results from the greater [need] to protect the Macedonian 
language in our own state than against official Bulgaria’s refusal to acknowledge 
it.”534 
The commentary points to the domestic threat against national language as a signifier of 
identity which diverted political attention from addressing the bilateral problem. At the 
same time Macedonian discourses do not omit the significance of this problem and the 
implications it might have. They point to its discrepancy with the ‘time of democracy and 
attempts for Europeanization of the Balkans”535, as well as to the threat it posed to 
national freedom, national memory and national culture536. This reveals the central 
position of language in the construction of nationhood: 
“[...] without language, without identity, without nation, there is only naked 
territory and geographical spaces.”537 
The intricate link established between language, identity and nation points to their 
significance for the national subjectivity of the state and aims to justify the categorical 
position of the Macedonian leadership. It continues the long-standing tradition of defense 
533 Puls newspaper, 13th May 1994. 
534 Puls newspaper, 13th May 1994. 
535 Ibid. 
536 Ibid. 
537 Ibid. 
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against similar attacks, arguing that these issues are subject to domestic political 
consensus and cannot be an object of international debates and contestation:  
“The Macedonian language is part of Macedonia’s national identity and this is a 
topic which cannot be discussed [by anybody else but Macedonia].”538 
Discarding Bulgaria’s historical claims as irrelevant and inappropriate, Macedonian rhetoric 
refers to the ‘reality’ of Macedonia539 and its ‘happening’ and ‘occurring upon’540 Bulgarian 
politics. The verbs of action discursively re-enforce the notion of ‘reality’. From the 
viewpoint of ‘reality’, this rhetorical line goes, there could not have been any other 
Macedonian reaction despite Macedonia’s complicated international and domestic 
situation.  Furthermore, because of the complications, this reaction is interpreted in heroic 
terms: 
“In extremely heavy and difficult political, economic and military realities and 
various combinations against Macedonia by its neighbours and the wider world, 
Macedonia managed to promote, again, in front of the Bulgaria state, its position of 
autonomous subject of statehood and nationhood.”541 
The implicit heroisation of the stance taken by Macedonia in the bilateral relations 
performs the function of justification for the negative consequences ensuing from it. In the 
context of complete international isolation and deteriorating internal stability, closing the 
possibly only door open for Macedonia in the region requires serious discursive 
argumentation. Explicit analytical formulations appear to address this need: 
“It seems that not signing the agreements was, in fact, the best that could have 
happened: Bulgaria found itself, once again, facing straight into the reality called 
Macedonia. And this is the first step in the long march of renouncing the illusions of 
history.”542 
538 Puls newspaper, 29th Apr 1994. 
539 Described as “independent sovereign state, equal political subject in the international relations and stable 
partner in the dialogue with everybody, including Bulgaria” by Puls newspaper, 29th Apr 1994. 
540 Ibid. 
541 Puls newspaper, 29th Apr 1994. 
542 Puls newspaper, analysis from 29th Apr 1994. 
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Discursively presenting the two states’ failure to reach any form of agreement and sign any 
particular document of cooperation as ‘the best’ possible outcome is a strategy of reducing 
its political impact for Macedonia. Placing the event into a chain of supposedly systematic 
efforts on behalf of Macedonia (‘once again’, ‘the first step’) to stand its grounds before 
the historically ‘deluded’ opponent, also attempts to depict it as a desired political 
outcome and not a serendipitous course of events. The same purpose serves the detailed 
political analysis of the economic and political situation in Bulgaria as ‘full of 
contradictions’543: 
“People’s lives get worse every day, inflation grows and the value of the Bulgarian 
Lev against the dollar is declining.”544 
References to the high levels of corruption and criminalization of Bulgaria’s transition545 
attempt to play down the potential value of any inter-state dialogue with Bulgaria and to 
understate the potential losses of failing to sign the planned bilateral trade and business 
agreements. In a time of Macedonian isolation and crisis, the political responsibility for 
non-constructive foreign policy behaviour could be too risky. Presenting dialogue with 
Bulgaria as non-productive, other than offensive to Macedonian nationhood, serves the 
purpose of neutralizing these political implications.  
 
Narratives of Reconciliation – Resolving the Language Dispute 
With the gradual progress in Bulgaria’s efforts of Europeanization, however, the language 
dispute began to attract political attention, mainly because of the questions it raised about 
the nature of Bulgaria’s relations with its neighbours. In view of Bulgaria’s formal 
application for full EU membership from the end of 1995 and the prospects for its success, 
the official position towards Macedonia began to receive criticism. In an editorial piece 
entitled ‘United Europe, the Barbarians and Civilization’, the democratic party’s 
543 Ibid. 
544 Ibid. 
545 Ibid., detailed materials on the Bulgarian corporation Multigroup notorious with its links with organized 
crime cartels. 
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mouthpiece546 analysed modern Balkan nationalism as an idiosyncratic element of the 
worst inventions of the 20th century in parallel with Barbarianism in the Roman Empire. 
The language dispute with Macedonia is interpreted as a remnant of this ‘Barbarianism’ of 
modern nationalism: 
“[We risk] to stare in awe outside New Europe [like the ancient barbarians in front of 
the Empire], while it tries to understand exactly what language dispute there is to 
solve [..] and how it threatens our national identity.”547  
Similar rhetoric began to come even from the lines of the socialists. This is remarkable 
because it was precisely the policies of the socialist government that re-enforced the 
freeze in Bulgarian-Macedonian relations by politicizing controversial nationhood 
narratives in the first place. Speaking as a representative of the socialist leadership, the 
future Bulgarian president confirms: 
“We need to admit that our two states have better relations with their other 
neighbours than with each other, which is incongruent with the good historical, 
economic and cultural ties traditional between us in the past.”548 
The statement still operates within the familiar Bulgarian narrative of shared past but 
represents an important modification. It avoids the conflictual interpretation of 
‘brotherhood’ by emphasizing the amity in the relationship (‘good [..] ties between us’). 
This makes it acceptable to the Macedonian side, which is not comfortable with the 
insistence on ‘excessive closeness’549 with Bulgaria. It also enables problematizing the 
freeze in bilateral relations:  
“We have been unable to establish the optimal environment for development of our 
relations [..] and we have lost from this. The peoples on both sides of the border have 
lost, families have lost, businessmen have lost, those who needed the intellectual 
546 The Demokratsia newspaper. 
547 Ivo Berov, ‘United Europe, the Barbarians and Civillization’ in Demokratsia newspaper from 2nd Feb 1999. 
548 Georgi Parvanov, Vice-Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Bulgarian Socialist Party in an interview for 
Puls newspaper from 26th Apr 1996. 
549 As the Macedonian interviewer suggests, this is what damaged Bulgaria’s image of benevolent partner in 
Macedonia’s international relations, see Georgi Parvanov, interview for Puls newspaper from 26th Apr 1996. 
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contact with the other side have lost, [geopolitically] which is most important, we 
have lost from this. ”550 
Interpreting the lack of good bilateral relations as a ‘loss’ and emphasizing the many 
implications of this loss at the personal, economic, cultural, and national level is a 
significant change in the narratives on Macedonia. Coming from the lines of the socialists 
who are the ruling party at the time, it signifies a detachment from the traditional 
nationalist narrative of a closed community defined through its losses in the past, and 
signals an orientation towards the benefits of the present. Articulated by the leader of the 
renewed socialist party bidding for a turn in power, this interpretation indicates political 
legitimacy. Framing the discussion on Macedonia in these terms helps identify specific 
reasons for the freeze in bilateral relations, thus opening up the discursive space to the 
search of possible solutions: 
“We need to admit that both in Sofia and in Skopje there are reporters and public and 
political figures who, with their statements and actions, malevolently increase the 
reservations on both sides of the border.” 551 
Singling out those held responsible for the general deterioration of relations among a 
group of journalists and opinion-makers is a clear indication for an attempt to acquit the 
government in its official position. Immediately, this points to the most controversial issue 
– the language dispute – and the possible avenues for its closure: 
“The issue of the language which the documents between Bulgaria and Macedonia 
should be signed in is a matter of secondary importance, and its current escalation is 
fed by factors and powers disinterested in developing our relations in a positive 
direction. [..] Our party and parliamentary group is actively working to find a formula 
around the language issue which would be acceptable to both states.”552 
Interpreting the language dispute as a matter of secondary importance is already an 
attempt at depoliticizing it and taking it off the urgent political agenda. This discursive 
550 Ibid. 
551 Ibid. 
552 Ibid. 
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move is being performed repeatedly (in the same interview duplicating ‘this is not even the 
most important issue’553 and on further occasions554), thus emphasizing its validity.  
With the fall of the socialist government the following year and the electoral victory of the 
democrats, this rhetoric was taken up as an official governmental policy towards 
Macedonia. ‘Solving’ the language dispute with Macedonia became one of the first foreign 
policy goals of the Kostov government555, both as a publicity-generating strategy and as an 
attempt to take credit for the ‘Europeanization’ of Bulgaria’s relations with its neighbours. 
The governmental change in Macedonia as a result of the electoral victory of the 
Macedonian right556 stimulated a similar dynamics. The new Macedonian prime minister 
Georgievski, often attacked for his moderate position in Macedonia’s Balkan policies and 
accused of being ‘pro-Bulgarian’, was also a factor in reaching a compromise. His 
leadership encouraged an intensified bilateral dialogue with Bulgaria.  Starting at 
ambassadorial557 and ministerial558 level, the two governments began to gradually 
normalize political discourse surrounding bilateral relations by attaching it to the 
practicalities of mutually beneficial cooperation in particular areas. Discussed is the 
establishment of a free trade zone between the two states, agreements avoiding double 
taxation, agreements for protection and promotion of mutual investment, cooperation in 
the airway and railway transport, etc. The issues of possible bilateral cooperation are 
organized in a total of 23 agreements whose signing had been blocked since the beginning 
of the language dispute in 1994. Framing the relations between the two states in the 
discourse of mutual interest logically raised the question why this had not been done 
earlier559 and enabled declarative certainty of progress in the conflictual areas: 
553 Ibid. 
554 See Parvanov, speeches at http://www.president.bg/news.php?type=3. 
555 Ivan Kostov, 1997-2001 elected with the mandate of the democratic party. 
556 Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity forms 
the new government in Nov 1998 headed by Ljubco Georgievski. 
557 Briefing on the Bulgarian ambassador to Skopje’s approval for a preliminary text of a prospective bilateral 
agreement in Demokratsia newspaper 8th Feb 1999. 
558 Macedonia’s economic minister Nikola Gruevski visits Bulgaria for a meeting with his Bulgarian 
counterpart Valentin Vassilev to discuss the particulars of prospective economic cooperation on 9th Feb 1999, 
BTA Courier Service. 
559 ‘Relief in trade contacts with Macedonia from the beginning of 2000’ in Demokratsia newspaper 10th Feb 
1999. 
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“By the time [these agreements] are enforced, the ‘language dispute’ will have been 
solved by the diplomacies of our two states.”560 
Avoiding contentious abstract formulations in the everyday political talks between the two 
states helped achieve progress in these efforts because it allowed their depoliticization. By 
taking the focus off matters of principle, the political dialogue centred around improving 
the cooperation framework in specific areas. This emphasized the pragmatic benefits of a 
good relationship and the missed opportunities of the prolonged bilateral freeze.  
Against the background of Bulgaria’s active efforts for Europeanization and the intensified 
dialogue for cooperation in a series of areas, Bulgarian leadership was eventually able to 
produce a formal position on the controversial issues in Bulgarian-Macedonian relations, 
which could gain political legitimacy and be officially accepted. The special position which 
Macedonia occupied in the Bulgarian national narrative represented a particular challenge 
in this task. Empowering the discourse of ‘Europe’ proved capable of providing an 
interpretation of this position which simultaneously preserved its special status and 
removed the conflictuality surrounding it. At an official celebration of the anniversary of 
Bulgarian parliamentarism, the Bulgarian prime minister chose to declare: 
“Going back in history I would probably not err if I said that, after the word ‘Bulgaria’, 
the most frequently repeated word on the premises of the Bulgarian parliament had 
been the word ‘Macedonia’. Looking into the future, however, I am convinced, the 
most frequently repeated word [here] will be the word ‘Europe’.”561 
Highlighting the dynamics of the re-orientation of the Bulgarian nationhood discourse from 
the past to both present and future, the prime minister emphasized the role of the signifier 
of ‘Europe’ for overcoming Bulgaria’s obsession with the Macedonian narrative. Re-
positioning the narrative from the distant past (and the signifiers of national tragedy and 
loss associated with it) to the beginning of the inter-state dialogue between Bulgaria and 
Macedonia (Bulgaria’s recognition of Macedonian independent statehood), made possible 
560 Press conference by the economic ministers Valentin Vassilev and Nikola Gruevski, Sofia, 9th Feb 1999, 
BTA Courier Service. 
561 Ivan Kostov, Prime Minister at the celebratory plenary session of Bulgarian parliament on 10th Feb 1999. 
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as a result of this re-orientation, is what enabled the non-conflictual re-interpretation of 
Bulgarian-Macedonian relations: 
“The governments of the Republic of Bulgaria and the Republic of Macedonia reached 
an agreement [as] a natural consequence of the historical fact that Bulgaria first 
recognized the independence of the Republic of Macedonia.”562 
Framed within the discourse of ‘Europe’, this chronological re-positioning of the historical 
dependency of Bulgarian-Macedonian relations increased its legitimacy: 
“[..] the two states found a way to begin to speak in the language of United Europe, 
the language of friendship, of understanding, of tolerance and of mutual respect [..]. 
This is Bulgaria’s piece of European news.”563 
Establishing the equivalence between behaviour guided by the norms of Europe (‘to speak 
the language of [..] Europe’) and the moral categories characterizing a relationship of 
friendship attempts to discursively delegitimize the conflictuality in Bulgarian-Macedonian 
relations. Emphasizing the breakthrough which such amity marks (‘piece of [..] news’) and 
labelling it as ‘European’ rhetorically articulates the meaning of the event as a success.  
This notion is re-enforced by the overexposed declarations of approval coming from 
domestic and international sources of authority. The foreign minister defines the decision 
as a ‘sign of civility and European behaviour’564. The chairman of the foreign policy 
committee in parliament salutes the ‘remarkable consensus on un-blocking the relations 
with Macedonia’565. The president also lends his absolute support for the reached 
agreement by confirming he has been part of the efforts that led to it: 
562 Ibid. 
563 Ibid. 
564 Nadezhda Mihailova at the Committee for International and Integration Policy quoted by Demokratsia 
newspaper of 12th Feb 1999. 
565 Assen Agov at the Committee for International and Integration Policy quoted by Demokratsia newspaper 
of 12th Feb 1999. 
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“[..] this issue is about to be closed in an extremely satisfactory manner for both 
sides, keeping the dignity of both Bulgaria and Macedonia. This opens an avenue for 
pragmatically resolving all problems that stand between us.”566   
Linking the resolution of the dispute to the notion of pragmatic politics is a discursive 
strategy for emphasizing its compatibility with the national interests of Bulgaria. The 
explicit confirmation that Bulgaria’s dignity as a sovereign state has not been affected in 
the bilateral compromise re-enforces this idea and demonstrates that a new interpretation 
of what represents ‘Bulgarian-ness’ has occurred.  
Framed within the positive signifiers of European-ness, publicized external approval adds 
legitimacy to the policy of rapprochement with Macedonia and serves the purpose of 
neutralizing nationalist arguments against it.  
“Obviously, the two states managed to [..] overcome history. This is [..] a European 
approach to solving the problems. [..] The agreement between Bulgaria and 
Macedonia is truely a European solution.”567 
Associating the decreased salience of historical narratives with European-ness (‘European 
approach’, ‘European solution’) indicates the re-orientation required of Bulgaria in its 
interpretation of Bulgarian-ness. Detaching the national identity narratives from their 
focus on the past and re-orienting them instead to the present and future is what enabled 
the ‘overcoming of history’. At the same time, the modified interpretation of Bulgarian-
ness retains familiar signifiers of national identity which preserve the credibility of the 
nationhood narratives. This is illustrated by the emphasis on the significance of Bulgaria’s 
new policy on Macedonia for the stability of the Balkans: 
“Bulgaria did a lot to contribute for stabilizing the region. [..] What the Prime 
Minister just announced will additionally help improve the future stability of the 
Balkans.”568 
566 President Petar Stoyanov quoted in Demokratsia newspaper of 11th Feb 1999. 
567 Avis Bowlen, US Ambassador to Bulgaria, 11th Feb 1999, BTA Courier Service. 
568 Peter Metzger, Germany’s Ambassador to Bulgaria, 11th Feb 1999, BTA Courier Service. 
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Bulgaria’s traditional signifier of purpose – the role of the state as a factor of stability on 
the Balkans – is being highlighted to help accomplish the discursive move from narrating 
Bulgarian national identity within nationalist discourse to narrating it within ‘Europe’ 
without losing credibility. The fact that recognition for this Bulgarian role comes from 
‘Europe’569 increases its discursive significance.  
The same purpose serves the immediate rhetorical link established with the notion of 
national interest: 
“Having succeeded in finding a common language again with Macedonia, there will 
be no barriers in front of us to stop us from speaking it in the name of the national 
interests and the national ideals, which should be our only guide in our service.” 570 
Linking the ‘Europeanization’ of relations with Macedonia back to the notion of national 
interest is meant to confirm its compatibility with the identity construct of Bulgarian 
nationhood: it is being emphasized that both the ‘national interests’ and the ‘national 
ideals’ are upheld in an improved dialogue with Macedonia.  
The change in the official discourse on Macedonia is illustrative of the transformation in 
identity narratives which had occurred in the course of transition. In view of Bulgaria’s new 
political priorities and policy goals and its gradual progress towards Europeanization, the 
national collectivity needed no longer be constituted around historical narratives of past 
grandeur and glory. It had a clear perspective for the future which could provide an 
optimistic, positive source of self-identification: ‘returning’ to Europe. This is what 
suggested the decreased political significance of historical narratives about Macedonia and 
the increased significance of narratives of good neighbourly relations. With important 
implications for the contents of Bulgarian national identity, the depoliticization of historical 
narratives on Macedonia produced, eventually, a re-arrangement of the identity pattern 
and a modified constellation of signifiers. The change is evident in the new interpretation 
of the national interest: making specific steps in the direction of Europe, one of which is 
improving relations with neighbouring countries.  
569 In the face of the German ambassador. 
570 Prime Minister Ivan Kostov at the celebratory plenary session of Bulgarian parliament on 10th Feb 1999. 
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The particular formula which enabled the improvement of Bulgarian-Macedonian relations 
was nothing new: it had been discussed previously by the governments of Videnov and of 
Crvenkovski and had been discarded as unacceptable. Its wording stipulated that the joint 
declaration between Bulgaria and Macedonia be signed in duplicate copies ‘in the official 
languages of both states: Bulgarian under the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, and 
Macedonian under the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia’571. The fact that the 
same formula had been seen before as unacceptable is an indicator for the changed 
political environment which enabled the general consensus in Bulgaria around Macedonia.  
It is important to note, however, that the deep sedimentation of Bulgarian narratives on 
Macedonia did not permit their dislocation from the national discursive space. Even 
though the language dispute was gradually moved down the political agenda of the state, 
the interpretations of ‘Macedonia’ that caused and perpetuated it did not disappear. 
Because of their historical intertwinement with the narratives of Bulgarian nationhood, 
they could not be completely removed from the national discursive space. Bulgaria’s 
difficulties in acknowledging the distinctiveness of the Macedonian national language 
continued to plague narratives on Macedonia. This was particularly visible in the reactions 
in Bulgaria’s right-wing political space to the announced joint declaration: 
“In no case should this be interpreted as recognizing the Macedonian language. [..] I 
repeat, it does not follow that we recognize such a language on Bulgarian territory 
and this is clearly formulated.”572 
The duplicated confirmation that the official position on the nature of the Macedonian 
language and its use in Bulgaria has not changed attempts to appease the concerns of the 
nationalists. It also aims to restore the balance in the familiar national identity narrative, 
which is accomplished through two explanatory interpretations of the joint declaration’s 
language formula. One concerns the practicalities of the political process that led to it. It 
explains that this formula is a step forward from the proposal of the Macedonian 
571 Text of the Joint Declaration of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Bulgaria and the Prime Minister of 
the Republic of Macedonia of 1999 available in English at 
http://www.bcci.bg/bulgarian/events/decl_mac_en.htm. 
572 Krasimir Karakachanov, leader of the Bulgarian VMRO in an interview for Demokratsia newspaper, 11th 
Feb 1999. 
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government, presumably demanding the unconditional recognition of the Macedonian 
language. 
“The position of the previous governments in Skopje was very ultimative. It 
demanded that we recognize the existence of a Macedonian language and that the 
documents be signed in Bulgarian and Macedonian without any qualifications. [..] 
The formula now accepted guarantees both our historical interests and our national 
security in view of any future demands.”573 
The statement aims to demonstrate that the national position has been asserted and 
championed: the reference to ‘historical interests’ and the consideration of ‘national 
security’ issues confirm this. Transferring political responsibility for past intractability on 
the issue to Skopje re-enforces the idea that concerted effort has been made and progress 
has been achieved on behalf of the Bulgarian government, thus highlighting the outcome 
as a success.  
The second interpretation concerns general principles that underlie the new policy. It 
upholds the idea that pragmatic national policies should not be driven by considerations of 
history: 
“Historical claims are not the job of politicians. [..] Language and nation, let alone 
history, are not to be recognized. A nation or a language either exist or not. It would 
be silly to continue arguing about history.”574 
The discursive separation between the historical and the political is the key change in 
Bulgaria’s rhetoric. Denouncing the political relevance of historical arguments as ‘silly’, the 
leader of the nationalists attempts to close the dispute without compromising core 
nationalist assumptions.  
The timing of the move is repeatedly justified with the change of power in Macedonia, 
which aims to re-enforce the idea that Bulgaria’s position has always been amicable: 
573 Ibid. 
574 Ibid. 
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“Bulgaria has long been ready for this day. Our foreign policy towards Macedonia has 
always been consistent and tolerant, and the European values are the criterion which 
we use to solve the contentious issues. This is the language which Europe speaks 
today. When Skopje began to speak this language, our domestic language dispute 
became unnecessary.”575 
The rhetorical re-alignment of Bulgarian foreign policy with European values essentializes 
Bulgaria’s position and problematizes Macedonia’s: the responsibility for the previous 
freeze in the relationship should be transferred to Macedonia because Bulgaria ‘has always 
been [..] tolerant’ and ‘European’. In stark contrast with the intransience of Bulgaria’s 
previous official position on Macedonia, this claim represents an attempt for 
domestication of the discursive transformation which enabled the breakthrough in the 
relationship. The only voices that contradicted it came, predictably, from the lines of the 
socialists, now in opposition, who suggested that the solution of the language dispute with 
Macedonia implied a ‘grave compromise’576 with the Bulgarian national interests. This 
deviance from the consensual approval for solving the dispute, however, is marginalized as 
‘nationalism’ inadequate to the new ‘European’ character of Bulgarian politics: 
“[..] whether the socialists will have the courage and resources for a candidly 
nationalist campaign against the normalization of Bulgarian-Macedonian relations 
[or not],  the damage of such campaign for both Bulgaria and Macedonia would be 
guaranteed.”577 
Contrasting the ‘European-ness’ of improving bilateral relations against the damages of 
nationalist politics is the discursive dynamics which enabled overcoming the antagonisms 
of the past. Associating Bulgaria’s prosperous future with Europeanization and articulating 
amity with Macedonia as the only European option for the progress of bilateral relations 
facilitated taking the historical narratives on Macedonia off the political agenda and 
marginalizing them as remnants of the nationalist (communist/socialist) past. This helped 
575 Aneliya Dimitrova, ‘Language’, commentary in Demokratsia newspaper, 11th Feb 1999. 
576 Georgi Daskalov, a leader from Demokratsia newspaper of 16th Feb 1999. 
577 Demokratsia newspaper of 16th Feb 1999. 
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initiate a bilateral institutional dialogue which eventually led to negotiating a legitimate 
solution to the language dispute.  
The political narratives around the actual signing of the Joint Declaration between Bulgaria 
and Macedonia, which put an end to the language dispute, confirm the increased salience 
of the signifiers of ‘European-ness’. ‘Respect for European principles in the interaction with 
partners’578, a ‘European solution to Balkan problems’579, ‘saluted’ and ‘appreciated’ by 
the European Union580, are the common approaches to covering the event in the leading 
media. Even though sceptics criticized the event as a gesture to Europe rather than a 
gesture to Macedonia, it had important implications both for improving Bulgarian-
Macedonian relations and for empowering European discourse. The policies of the new 
democratic coalition government in Bulgaria were already framed within the context of 
‘Europe’ as a general strategic goal. This facilitated the overall institutional consensus on 
solving the dispute with Macedonia and enabled the signing of the Joint Declaration, as 
well as the whole spectrum of subsequent bilateral documents advancing the relations in 
various sectors. Ranging from economic cooperation (free trade, investment plans, 
transport links) to cooperation at the level of ‘high politics’ (defense and security581), the 
joint initiatives opened up the bilateral discursive space for normalized political dialogue. 
Guided by the signifiers of ‘European’ behaviour and ‘European’ values such as trust, 
tolerance, amity, pragmatism, the progress in the bilateral relations marginalized the 
discourse of nationalism as detrimental and irrelevant to the many aspects of possible 
cooperation. In this sense, Europeanization discourse dislocated nationalist discourse as 
hegemonic in the bilateral relations, in the meantime producing a less antagonistic – and 
more credible – interpretation of collective state identity.  
But while the process of Europeanization in Bulgaria had already achieved several tangible 
results, which enabled the sustainable empowerment of the ‘Europe’ discourse over the 
entire discursive space of Bulgarian politics and facilitated the general institutional 
578 Demokratsia newspaper 23rd Feb 1999. 
579 Ibid. 
580 Demokratsia newspaper, 24th Feb 1999. 
581 Plans for joint military training events, Bulgaria’s big donation of military arms and equipment for 
Macedonia of 1999. 
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consensus on overcoming the freeze in the bilateral relationship, Macedonia was at a 
different stage in its efforts for Europeanization. As a result of the delay in international 
recognition and the continuing domestic problems with minority accommodation, 
Macedonia had not been able to initiate an institutional dialogue with the EU as early as 
Bulgaria. By the time Bulgaria was already officially an applicant state (December 1999), 
Macedonia was about to begin its associated member status negotiations (April 2000). This 
determined the decreased political relevance of the ‘Europe’ discourse and its only partial 
appropriation in the discursive space of Macedonian politics. A domestic political factor 
also contributed to Macedonia’s ambivalence on ‘Europe’. While the Bulgarian democratic 
coalition had replaced the former socialist élite on all institutional positions of leadership, 
Macedonia was experiencing a deep institutional divide between the presidency (still 
headed by the solid functionary from Yugoslavian times Gligorov) and the government 
(already led by the democratic party’s leader Georgievski). The clash between the two 
institutions divided Macedonian politics around key political issues582 and was displayed in 
the debates over the advancement of Bulgarian-Macedonian relations. Thus, even though 
the prime minister and his government upheld the signifiers of ‘Europe’ to justify their 
policy towards improving relations with Bulgaria and gain legitimacy for it, the 
Europeanization discourse was not empowered consensually, as it was in Bulgaria. The 
salience of nationalist discourse, perpetuated by the socialists around the former 
Macedonian prime minister Crvenkvoski, whose central theme was anti-Bulgarian rhetoric, 
demonstrates this.  
The leadership of the Macedonian socialists claimed that the compromise reached by the 
two states had been a fatal error. Insisting that the formula of the compromise (signing the 
documents ‘in Macedonian language under the constitution’ of Macedonia) limits the 
Macedonian language to the boundaries of the constitution and does not imply 
recognition of its existence outside of it, the former Macedonian ambassador to Bulgaria 
denounced it as ‘unacceptable’583. He demanded that it be accompanied by an explicit 
declaration on behalf of Bulgaria recognizing the Macedonian language. Such a 
582 See the debate between the president and the prime minister at the parliamentary session on 23rd Feb 
1999, also enquiries at the parliamentary committee on security etc.  
583 Georgi Spasov for Dnevnik newspaper, 15th Feb 1999. 
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declaration, already demanded officially by the previous Macedonian government, had 
obviously not been deemed possible by Bulgaria. Inquiry into the aspects of the agreement 
that remained contentious between the two states had a destructive effect on the 
prospects for bilateral cooperation. By insisting on these aspects, the Macedonian 
socialists attempted to secure popular support by utilizing the salience of nationalist 
narratives constituting Bulgaria as the threatening Macedonian ‘Other’. But despite 
support from the president584, the oppositional voices of the socialists were steadily 
marginalized, not least because the Albanian minority’s political representation, in line 
with the government, had also subscribed to the discourse of Europeanization as a tool 
against Macedonian nationalism. The prime minister defended his policy of normalizing 
relations with Bulgaria by calling upon the realm of commonality which this discourse 
upheld: 
“Is there a person who could be bothered by normalizing relations between two 
Balkan states [..] particularly between Macedonia and Bulgaria? [..] Yesterday the 
European Union expressed support for normalization [..], in the morning Great Britain 
sent us congratulations for the courage and the manner in which we acted. [..] And 
instead of being proud [..] that once and forever we overcame this dispute [..], we are 
now starting all over again to search for problems and faults.”585 
Juxtaposing the notion of ‘normalization’ and its universality as a value with the 
‘abnormality’ of conflict, Georgievski emphasizes that ‘Europe’ is entirely in favour of 
normalization. Therefore, the ones seeking ‘problems and fault’ would be the ‘abnormal’, 
non-European elements in Macedonian politics. This is a discursive attempt for 
delegitimizing the dispute and the narratives associated with it, thus justifying the policy of 
the government as the only legitimate option. 
584 The new president Trajkovski, who took office in December 1999, came from the lines of the democratic 
party VMRO-DPMNE. 
585 Ljubco Georgievski at the 12th plenary session on 23rd Feb 1999, 13-14. 
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“We do not intend to be in a situation of frozen relations, martial relations, to be 
constantly threatened. We want security for the Republic of Macedonia. Is there a 
better example of security than good relations with this [the Bulgarian] state?”586 
Transferring improved relations with Bulgaria to the realm of ‘high politics’ (threat and 
security) highlights their significance and aims to justify the government’s policy of 
rapprochement. Reversing the familiar Macedonian narrative of Bulgaria as a threat, the 
prime minister insists that ‘good relations’ with Bulgaria signal the best way to ensure 
Macedonian security. Bulgaria’s post-declaration donation of military equipment is used as 
an illustration of this claim587: 
“We should once and for all forget about the schemes that somebody will attack us 
from Bulgaria. Apparently, they are the ones arming us [..]”588 
This is a powerful change in the official interpretation of Bulgaria in Macedonian political 
discourse. Traditionally positioned among the many Balkan enemies of the independent 
Macedonian state589 with mainly anti-thetical discursive role, Bulgaria now becomes a 
partner and amity with Bulgaria begins to signify ‘security’ and ‘normality’. These are key 
signifiers of the ‘Europe’ discourse in Macedonia and as such they re-align good bilateral 
relations with Europeanization. This is the dynamics which attempted to marginalize 
nationalist narratives on Bulgaria, while empowering the Europeanization discourse.  
Unlike Bulgaria, Macedonia still needed to see ‘Europe’ as a tangible political prospect of 
the near future in order to establish general institutional and political consensus on its 
European option. This had detrimental effect on the hegemony of the discourse of 
Europeanization in Macedonia. On the issue of resolving the language dispute, the partial 
empowerment of ‘Europe’ in Macedonian discursive space was complemented by 
Bulgaria’s determination to demonstrate reconciliatory regional policies in order to 
facilitate its own integration efforts. This greatly assisted the resolution of a dispute which 
586 Ibid., 14. 
587 Ibid., 14. 
588 Ibid., 14. 
589 The traditional reference is through the allegory of ‘wolves’.  
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had been initiated in the first place by Bulgaria’s intransigence on the issue of language, 
and determined the amicable outcome.  
 
Europeanization Effects on Identity Narratives of the Language Dispute 
Bulgarian and Macedonian post-communist identities were initially upheld by narratives of 
the past. This is what determined the stark dependence of Bulgarian-Macedonian relations 
upon historical antagonisms. Political discourse in both states, however, reflected the 
inadequacy of such identity constructions in the general silence on the language dispute 
(Table 11). The gradual marginalization of the former communists in the periphery of state 
power and the constitution of democratic governments as a definitive break from the past, 
well into the transition processes, enabled the adaptation of national identity narratives to 
the political imperatives of the present. Focusing on the opportunities they offered placed 
bilateral relations on the plane of pragmatic politics and facilitated the marginalization of 
conflictual interpretations impeding cooperation. Transcending conflictuality was 
discursively attached to the signifiers of ‘Europe’, speaking of security, stability and 
normality. Against the background of strategic re-orientation of national politics towards 
European integration, this increased the appeal of the new narration of national identity 
and significantly stabilized the discourse of Europeanization.  
State Bulgaria Macedonia 
Signifiers 
upheld by 
Nationalism 
Compromising nationhood Asserting statehood 
[Silence] [Silence] 
Signifiers 
upheld by 
Europeanizati
on 
Good relations with neighbours Normality 
Regional amity, trust and tolerance National and regional security 
Pragmatic politics, national interest Pragmatic politics 
Table 11. Narratives of the Language Dispute in Bulgaria and Macedonia. 
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SECTION III: 
NARRATIVES ON RECOGNIZING NATIONAL MINORITIES 
 
The investigation of national identity narratives determining the discursive position of 
‘Other’ in Bulgarian-Macedonian relations has focused so far on two narrative groups. In 
the first years of transition it followed transformations of narratives of recognition and 
post-recognition. From the mid-1990s to the end of the first transitional decade it explored 
changing narratives of language and the way they facilitated reconciliation of the language 
dispute. Conditioned by different factors in the two states (domestic political struggles, 
minority-majority relations, international status, etc.), both narrative groups tend to 
display similar discursive transformations. First, the general orientation of national identity 
constructions shifted from past to present and future. This re-orientation helped 
depoliticize conflictual historical narratives and take them off the urgent political agenda 
of the state. Second, the boundary between collective ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ began to 
transcend the limits of the national space to include the ‘European’. Even though it was 
delimited by state borders, this dynamics turned ‘Europe’ into a key signifier of the 
national and significantly increased the realm of commonality between the two states. 
Third, political priority began to be determined more by pragmatic rather than ideational 
interpretations of ‘interest’. This helped avoid conflictual formulations of principle and 
concentrated the bilateral relations on the possibilities for mutually beneficial cooperation. 
Overall, these discursive transformations increased the credibility of national identity 
narration by adapting it to the changing political imperatives, and marginalized nationalist 
interpretations. They also stabilized the discourse of Europeanization as providing a 
positive and optimistic reading of national identity narratives.  
The salience of the two narrative groups increased in two different points in time. 
Recognition became an issue at the very beginning of transition while language was 
problematized towards the middle of the first transitional decade. Narrative 
transformations reflect this chronological difference because it is related to different 
degrees of salience of the Europeanization discourse. While in 1991 ‘Europe’ was merely a 
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distant promise, an idea that had little immediate political relevance in the context of 
utmost insecurity created by the regime changes, in 1999 it was already a foreseeable 
political prospect. The discursive power of its signifiers was gradually increasing as a result 
of the more visible relevance of Europeanization. Therefore, articulating national identity 
through it seemed to have become easier over time. Tracing the transformations of 
another narrative group – narratives on national minorities – whose salience was greatest 
in the period of the late transition, helps fully grasp the logic of this discursive dynamics. 
Inextricable from the historical narratives of nationhood, the issue of national minorities at 
home and abroad defined one of the central lines of conflictuality in Bulgarian-
Macedonian relations. Shaped by antagonistic interpretations of ‘Other’, the stand on 
minorities in the two states differed in view of the different identity patterns and the 
different interpretation of the signifier of nationhood.  
Building on its central interpretation of national unity, Bulgaria rejected the notion of 
‘national minority’ all together. In the legal framework for protection of minorities, the 
state operationalized the term ‘ethnic minorities’ and treated their members as Bulgarians 
of different ethnic origin. This interpretation upheld the monolithic character of Bulgarian 
national identity, at the same time granting the necessary protection. Short of collective 
political rights, which were unconstitutional under Bulgarian legislation590, these minorities 
enjoyed the full spectrum of minority rights. The ethnic accommodation model negotiated 
at the beginning of Bulgaria’s transition to democracy provided the rules for sufficient 
political participation of the largest minority group, the Turks, so there had been no further 
political imperatives for re-thinking the framework. Externally, Bulgaria had no consistent 
policy toward its minority communities in neighbouring states but had a specific position 
on Macedonia. Because of the historical interpretation of ‘Macedonia’ as part of the 
Bulgarian nationhood narrative, the common story was that of Serbization and 
communization of the originally Bulgarian national identity of the people living in 
590 See Art. 11, Para 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria. 
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Macedonia.591 Where these processes had failed, Bulgarian narratives assumed, there 
were still people professing their ‘original’ Bulgarian consciousness, despite the threat of 
repressions. Bulgaria’s official position was that of encouraging this presumed target group 
and protesting against Macedonia’s repressive policies. But it did not demand special 
minority status, because recognition of a Bulgarian minority in Macedonia would imply the 
clear distinction between the Bulgarian nation and the Macedonian nation. Bulgaria was 
far from adopting this position.  
Macedonia took a much more clearly defined stand on national minorities. In view of the 
complex processes of inter-ethnic negotiations and the active participation of the sizeable 
Albanian minority in the political processes of transition, the notion of ‘national minorities’ 
became a permanent part of Macedonian national identity narratives. Accommodated 
through the formula of national tolerance, it secured a range of cultural and political rights 
for all minority groups on the territory of the republic. However, Macedonia never 
acknowledged either the existence of a Bulgarian minority group or the significance of a 
Bulgarian element in its national identity construction. Bulgarian presence in Macedonia 
was re-told as foreign occupation and professing Bulgarian national consciousness was 
interpreted as a form of treason592. In this sense minority protection in Macedonia was 
never extended to Bulgarian minority groups. But in view of the salience of the signifiers of 
national territory and the notion of territorial belonging, Macedonia sought to secure it for 
Macedonian minorities abroad. As already noted, concern for Macedonians living in parts 
of Macedonia under foreign sovereignty was a high priority foreign policy task and 
interpreted as one of the state’s main external responsibilities. The constitutional 
provision explicitly stipulating this role confirms this.593 In the context of Bulgaria’s 
narration of national identity as monolithic and Bulgarian ambiguity on Macedonian 
nationhood all together, this concern of the Macedonian state was perceived as a 
591 Link between fostering Macedonian national identity and communist totalitarianism in Yugoslavia, see for 
an overview of the arguments Veselin Angelov, Macedonian Question in Bulgarian-Yugoslavian Relations 
(Sofia: University St Kliment Ohridski, 2004). 
592 See Ljubco Georgievski, Facing the Truth, 9-23. 
593 Art.49 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia. 
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particular threat. In Bulgaria it was interpreted as a national security problem594. Placing 
the discussion of minorities on the agenda of security politics in Bulgaria further politicized 
the minority issue in Macedonia and re-enforced antagonistic narratives on Bulgaria. 
It is evident from this that Bulgarian and Macedonian national identity narratives clashed 
both internally and externally on the issue of national minorities and created one of the 
most intractable conflictual fields in the bilateral relations. It was maintained by three key 
narratives: perception of threat against the territorial integrity of the state, incompatibility 
with the historical narratives of nationhood, and unrecognized minority status and 
minority protection. These narratives placed the issue of national minorities on the agenda 
of national and state security policies, which significantly impeded their normalization and 
de-politicization. With the first positive steps towards Europeanization, the insecurity 
generated by the complex transition processes began to subside.  (Re-)turn to ‘Europe’ 
posed particular practical demands on the two states, among them good bilateral relations 
and a framework for minority protection. This streamlined bilateral relations into the 
rationality of Europeanization policies and helped take conflictual interpretations off the 
political agenda. Even though the two states did not agree on a mutually acceptable 
interpretation of the contentious formulations, they managed to avoid them in their inter-
state dialogue, thus reducing their political relevance. Tracing the changed articulations 
along the three key conflictual narrative lines on national minorities demonstrates the 
mechanism of this discursive dynamics.   
 
Narratives on National Minorities and the Threat to Territorial Integrity 
Narratives of territorial threat signalled one aspect in which the issue of national minorities 
affected Bulgarian-Macedonian relations. Their political relevance was linked to the 
historical references in identity narration and was determined by their conflictual 
interpretations in the two states. The relations of the Bulgarian communist party with 
594 As was Macedonia’s concern about its minorities under Art.49 seen by Greece: it was stated as one of the 
reasons for the Greek economic blockade. For an overview of what led to this extreme regional position, see 
for instance Loring Danforth, ‘Claims to Macedonian Identity: the Macedonian Question and the Breakup of 
Yugoslavia’, Anthropology Today 9(4), (1993): 3-10. 
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socialist Yugoslavia of the first decades of communism had brought about a series of rather 
controversial political campaigns directed at the population of the region of Pirin 
Macedonia in Bulgaria.595 Initially they had been aimed at fostering a distinct, Macedonian, 
identity in line with the warm relations with Josip Broz Tito. After the split between Tito 
and Stalin596, Bulgaria’s communist policies had changed course and had declared the 
Bulgarian character of the region and its population. Eventually the issue had been 
completely closed, particularly in view of communist historiography’s nationalist 
interpretation of Bulgaria’s new history597 and its tragic narratives on Macedonia. The 
heated debates at the very beginning of the democratic transition borne by the ‘national 
question’ and the need for redress of the repressed Turkish minority did not re-open the 
issue of the Macedonian minority in Pirin because such minority was not officially 
recognized598 and did not have any political voice.599 It was not until Bulgaria’s recognition 
of Macedonian independence that the issue was placed on the urgent political agenda of 
the state in view of Macedonia’s official concern for its national minorities abroad.  
From the very beginning of the formal inter-state relations between Bulgaria and 
Macedonia, the issue of national minorities was treated with utmost urgency because of 
its discursive association with the prospect of territorial separatism. The strong link 
between nation and territory, a classical characteristic of nationalist discourse, formed the 
justification of Bulgaria’s official policy of non-recognition of minority status and minority 
rights for the contested minority in Pirin Macedonia. The significance of this link is 
demonstrated in the context of establishing diplomatic relations between Bulgaria and the 
newly independent Macedonia. Despite Bulgaria’s declarative act of international 
recognition and the pledged support for the former Yugoslav republic, it was almost two 
years after recognition that it opened an embassy in Macedonia. Indeed, diplomatic 
relations had already been established, but with more than eight months’ delay and at 
consular level only. When asked by the press why he was delaying his first formal visit to 
595 Veselin Angelov, Macedonian Question. 
596 Ibid. 
597 History of Bulgaria, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Volume 8 (Sofia: GALICO, 1999). 
598 An insignificant number of people had declared that they were of ‘Macedonian’ ethnic origin in the official 
censuses, see official information available at http://www.nsi.bg/Census/Ethnos.htm. 
599 Roundtable discussions, verbatim reports, 80-81. 
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Macedonia even though he had received an official invitation, the Bulgarian foreign 
minister pointed precisely to the claim for recognizing Macedonian national minority and 
the related ‘territorial claims’600. Linking minority status to protecting the official territorial 
borders of the state inevitably placed the discussion of minorities on the agenda of ‘high 
politics’ (national security and defense) and prevented its ‘normalization’. Taken up by the 
socialists, this theme became central in narratives on Macedonia for a long time, 
discursively delegitimizing the possibility of recognizing minority status and excluding it 
from the political options of the state.  
Indeed, Bulgaria’s official position never acknowledged a different national identity of the 
people in Pirin Macedonia other than Bulgarian and refused to discuss their status in terms 
of minority rights and protection, despite the lack of any reasonable concern for Bulgaria’s 
territorial integrity in view of Macedonia’s position601. The period of the language dispute 
re-enforced nationalist interpretations of Macedonian calls for minority protection as a 
hidden agenda for territorial demands. This is illustrated by the high priority which the 
matter assumed when Bulgaria’s political will for overcoming the language dispute 
changed. It became the subject of one of the two key provisions which enabled the 
breakthrough. Together with the formulation on language, Bulgaria’s efforts in the 
negotiations which led to the signing of the 1999 Joint Declaration were focused on 
securing a guarantee for non-intervention in decisions on the status of Pirin Macedonia 
and its population. In view of Macedonia’s constitutional concern for the fate of 
Macedonian minority communities under foreign sovereignty, Bulgaria insisted on a 
provision clarifying its non-application to Bulgaria. Bulgarian demands for such a provision 
were based on the precedent with Greece but in effect demonstrated political concern at 
official state level that Macedonia’s constitution might be interpreted as the legal basis for 
intervention in Bulgaria’s domestic affairs. The semantic link between territory and nation, 
pointed to above, is displayed in the very text of the declaration. The provision 
guaranteeing the lack of territorial demands immediately precedes the provision declaring 
the non-application of Macedonia’s concern under Art.49 of its constitution. The latter is 
600 Stoyan Ganev quoted in Duma newspaper 12th Feb 1992. 
601 Macedonia’s virtually non-existant for the first half of the 1990s army. 
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being interpreted in Bulgaria as withdrawal of any claims for the existence of a 
Macedonian minority: 
 “Skopje will not seek a Macedonian minority with us.”602 
Securing Macedonia’s official confirmation that there are no territorial aspirations and no 
intentions of violating the unity and monolithic character of the Bulgarian national 
construction formed the basis of all future dialogue between the two states. The overall 
framework of the ‘Europe’ discourse which was pointed to throughout is evidence for its 
empowerment and the role it played in re-articulating Bulgaria’s own vision of collective 
‘Self’. 
In Macedonia the link between territorial threat and national minority narratives was 
based on historical representations of Bulgaria as an occupant force603. These narratives 
had been upheld by key signifiers of Macedonian identity (divided Macedonian land, 
dispersed Macedonian people) defined against Bulgaria as the immediate foreign ‘Other’. 
Bulgaria’s act of recognition extending declarative support for the newly independent 
Macedonian state had not succeeded in dislocating them because of Bulgaria’s ambiguous 
official position. Even though the new state had been recognized, the Bulgarian president 
had explicitly declared that recognition did not apply to the Macedonian nation.604 Within 
the discourse of Macedonian nationalism, therefore, recognition by Bulgaria had been 
interpreted as a tool for increasing Bulgarian influence and advancing Bulgarian aspirations 
towards Macedonia. This interpretation of Bulgaria had not remained completely 
unchallenged605 but it had been the most common.606 Bulgaria’s failure to establish any 
meaningful institutional dialogue with Macedonia and its subsequent intransience in the 
language dispute had re-enforced this discursive configuration. This is evidenced by the 
602 Editorial headline, Demokratsia newspaper from 2nd Feb 1999. 
603 Parliament plenary session on 12th Aug 1992, 27, on 27th Oct 1992, 80 etc. 
604 Zhelev, In Spite of It All. 
605 Plenary session of the Macedonian parliament on 15th Feb 1992, 89 for a reference questioning the fact 
that Bulgaria’s position is not reported as a positive outcome; Ibid., 90 for an attempt to appeal for leaving 
the past behind; Ibid., 104-111 for a reference to Bulgaria as ‘a friend’, etc. 
606 President Gligorov would not visit Bulgaria to avoid being called ‘bugarash’, Georgievski’s visit to Sofia was 
regarded as ‘highly suspicious’ – see plenary session on 15th Feb 1992, 86-88. 
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absent or consistently negative reporting on Bulgaria in the Macedonian media.607 In this 
sense the breakthrough in the language dispute was a positive outcome for transgressing 
the boundary of threatening ‘otherness’ in the simple fact that it permitted the initiation 
of inter-state dialogue with official Bulgaria. Placing the relationship between the two 
states on the plane of the pragmatic politics of cooperation allowed opening up 
Macedonia’s discursive space for alternative narratives on Bulgaria.  
As a result of the positive outcome of the language negotiations and in preparation of the 
official visit of the Macedonian prime minister to Bulgaria, Macedonia requested military 
support in military equipment and weapons608 which Bulgaria granted. Among the list of 
cooperation initiatives and bilateral agreements609, a Bulgarian donation of 150 tanks and 
142 artillery guns was formally announced610. Against the state of the Macedonian army at 
the time (4 actual tanks611), the donation was evaluated in Macedonia as ‘an exceptional 
gesture on behalf of the Bulgarian government’ and ‘the strongest proof of the existing 
trust between the two states’.612 The signifiers of amity (‘an exceptional gesture’, ‘existing 
trust’) are a novelty in Macedonian narratives on Bulgaria. Unsurprisingly, they were 
questioned in the Macedonian parliament613. In defense of the policies of his government, 
the prime minister challenges the sedimentation of narratives constituting Bulgaria as a 
threat. Pointing to the link between the politics of the past and the interpretation of 
Bulgaria as the ultimate enemy, both in the communist regime of the federation and in the 
socialist government of the early transition period614, Georgievski attempts to 
demonstrate the political irrelevance of such interpretation and discredit its logic. On this 
basis is his call for a change: 
607 See for instance Puls newspaper (NIP Nova Makedonija) 1992-1996 in their column dedicated on Bulgaria. 
608 A standard request of the democratic Macedonian government in its contacts with NATO member states 
and in other contacts abroad, given the fact that the retreat of the Yugoslav army left the republic in severe 
shortage of military equipment. 
609 23 by the official announcement of MFA Bulgaria at http://www.mfa.bg/en/news/. 
610 Ibid. 
611 According to Georgievski at the press conference in Sofia, 22 Feb 1999, BTA Courier Service. 
612 Ibid. 
613 In a hearing by the Macedonian president Gligorov who claims he had ‘no knowledge of the donation’, 
albeit he was Commander-In-Charge of the Macedonian army, see parliamentary session on 23rd Feb 1999. 
614 Georgievski, parliamentary session on 23rd Feb 1999, 14. 
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“We should once and for all discard this conspiracy theory that somebody should 
always attack us from Bulgaria. [..] Again and again we find ourselves in a situation 
when we are inventing problems with Bulgaria. It is a new problem every time. [..] 
Honestly, I do not understand this frustration of ours with regard to Bulgaria.”615 
Defining Macedonia’s obsession with the threat from Bulgaria as the irrational expression 
of a bothered identity (‘conspiracy theory’, ‘frustration’), the prime minister uncovers its 
‘invented’ nature and denounces it. Against its irrationality he places rational 
considerations of classical realist national interest: 
“If somebody gives you weapons in such quantities, [..] this, not lastly, proves that 
they are not planning a military aggression against you. [..] An arm, which we have 
all the time thought of as the enemy, gives us weapons. What is the problem with 
that? [..] Is there greater security for us [than this]?”616 
Rhetorically demonstrating the lack of rationality and logic behind constituting Bulgaria as 
a threat in the context of the Bulgarian military donation, Georgievski successfully 
challenges the sedimentation of the narratives of animosity and opens up discursive space 
for positive interpretations of Macedonia’s relations with Bulgaria. Even though 
Macedonia’s progress in the process of Europeanization was still in its very early stages, 
the signifiers of ‘Europe’ were called upon to justify the relevance of such policy: 
“I believe that we will be able to demonstrate what Europe wants from us [...] What 
we are doing now is the impossible, trying to re-open the document [Agenda 2000] 
and see whether we can be included somehow, by good will. [..] [T]he strategic 
interests of this state will remain the same [..] [guided] by the principles and rules of 
European democracy.”617 
This discursive strategy is confirmed by the vice minister of foreign affairs and future 
president of Macedonia Trajkovski: 
615 Ibid., 15. 
616 Ibid., 15. 
617 Ibid., 16. 
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“We demonstrated the political will to overcome the past. The place of the past is in 
history, and we should be looking into the future. [..] We spoke to each other under 
the standards of Europe, I would like us to move from being in the periphery of 
Europe to becoming part of it.”618 
In line with the prime minister’s rhetoric, Trajkovski repeats the association of antagonism 
with the past, thus confirming its irrelevance for the political present (‘the place of the past 
is in history’). The signifiers of dialogue, understanding, good will (‘spoke to each other’, 
‘demonstrated the will’) are, in contrast, associated with the future and its normative 
correctness (‘we should’). By outlining the clear direction of this future (from the periphery 
to the heart of Europe), the vice minister indicates the desired change in Macedonia’s 
identity: living up to ‘the standards of Europe’. It is the ambition and appeal of European-
ness that encouraged putting the past behind, together with the antagonisms which it had 
nourished.   
 
National Minorities and Narrating Nationhood 
While taking the concern for the state’s territorial integrity off the agenda of Bulgarian-
Macedonian relations, the resumed dialogue between Bulgaria and Macedonia brought 
back to the fore antagonisms caused by divergent interpretations of nationhood in the 
narratives on minority communities at home and abroad. The central clash was pre-
determined by Bulgaria’s insistence on a monolithic nation and Macedonia’s comfortable 
accommodation of the idea of national minorities. 
The incompatibility of the notion of ‘national’ minority with the Bulgarian narration of 
nationhood was asserted at many levels. Even when ratifying the Council of Europe’s 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities619, Bulgaria did so upon 
the reservation that it had no national minorities620. Ratification was meant more as a 
618 Boris Trajkovski, Sofia 12th Feb 1999, BTA Courier Service. 
619 1999, 7th May. 
620 See Bulgarian reservation at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?CL=ENG&NT=157&VL=1 plus 
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gesture of good will and participation in the common European processes rather than an 
active legal framework for minority protection. This interpretation of nationhood was 
complemented by Bulgarian narratives on Macedonia positioning it as an element of its 
own identity (ethnic, cultural, political, territorial, national). On the basis of it, Bulgaria 
expected a political relationship defined along the lines of ‘brotherhood’621 but also a clear 
order of superiority for its own position. This interpretation made the issue of Macedonian 
minorities politically irrelevant and even offensive.  Macedonia’s refusal to comply with it 
and acknowledge the element of commonality provoked Bulgaria’s alienation and 
frustration, since re-constructing Macedonia as a foreign ‘Other’ would also imply re-
constructing the image of ‘Self’. As a consequence Bulgaria resorted to narratives of a 
prodigal brother, lost but still loved from afar.622  
Macedonia, on the other hand, had positioned Bulgaria precisely as the constitutive 
‘Other’ in narrating its own story of difference. Together with the other antagonists of 
Macedonian ‘Self-hood’, Bulgaria was expected to either encroach upon or accept it, but 
was not permitted to participate in it. In the Macedonian interpretation of nationhood, the 
issue of minorities was not only politically relevant but indispensible to establishing any 
meaningful inter-state dialogue with Bulgaria. It could not be marginalized because its 
regulation indicated that the dialogue was being held from a position of equality: two 
distinct nations. Bulgaria’s refusal to communicate on this basis and even acknowledge its 
relevance alienated Macedonia even further and helped re-enforce the narrative 
construction of Bulgaria in terms of encroaching ‘otherness’. This is why Macedonia 
explicitly rejected the ‘brotherhood’ narratives and insisted that the relationship was one 
of enmity, reflecting this in its position on national minorities at home and abroad.  
Thus, the antagonization of nationhood narratives had serious impact on intra- and inter-
national relations in Bulgaria and Macedonia. The breakthrough in the language dispute 
did improve dialogue between the two states by placing their relations in a realm of 
parliamentarian and jurist Lyuben Kornezov’s special opinion of ‘legal absurdity’ of the document, interview 
Duma newspaper of 20th Feb 1999. 
621 As systematic references to Macedonia as ‘brothers’ suggest. 
622 ‘In the end, we are brothers’ – 27th May 1992 Demokratsia newspaper, ‘Seeing Macedonia is like meeting 
a loved relative whom you have expected for years’, ‘Macedonia, our beautiful nostalgia’ – 22nd May 1992 
Demokratsia newspaper, etc. 
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commonality – Europeanization.623 But it did not significantly alter narratives of 
nationhood determining the two states’ positions on the minority issue. Their modification 
required concerted political effort and took time because they formed part of the history 
of the national ‘Self’. What the initiation of bilateral dialogue within the discourse of 
Europeanization did was distance the formulation of policy from the interpretation of 
history.  
The key sign of this change is the official rhetorical dissociation from historical narratives 
by ascribing their validity to the realm of the sciences, not politics. As early as the mid-
1990s an improvement in the blocked relations was related to leaving the ‘historical 
definition of national identity [to] the scientists’624. Around the time of the negotiations on 
the joint declaration of 1999, the notion of Vergangenheitsbewälltigung designated the 
process as a success both domestically and internationally.625 The imperatives of bilateral 
cooperation as an indicator of normalization and, consequently, Europeanization 
sidetracked concerns about history and took them off the immediate political agenda of 
inter-state dialogue.  
Obviously, the deep sedimentation of narratives of nationhood did not permit their 
removal from political discourse all together. They continued to be present in everyday 
politics even though they were no longer reflected in the official position of the state. In 
Bulgaria this was demonstrated in the political rhetoric surrounding the activities of 
various pro-Macedonian cultural and political organizations domestically. In Macedonia it 
was voiced in the concerns about surrendering the interests of the Macedonian nation 
through improving relations with Bulgaria. The text of the joint declaration limiting the 
Macedonian constitutional provision about care for minority communities abroad was 
interpreted as a limitation to one of the key responsibilities of the state in terms of 
protecting national identity abroad: 
623 Ivan Krastev, ‘Bulgaria Cut Its ‘Macedonian’ Knod’, interview for Capital newspaper of 13th Feb 1999. 
624 Parvanov, interview for Puls newspaper, ibid. 
625 Boris Trajkovski, Sofia 12th Feb 1999, BTA, Krasimir Karakachanov, interview for Demokratsia newspaper 
of 11th Feb 1999, Kostov and Georgievski at the press conference in Sofia, 22 Feb 1999, BTA Courier Service. 
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“Macedonia is to enter a period of uncertainty [which is suggested by] the indications 
of renouncing the Macedonian language and the Macedonian minority in the 
Republic of Bulgaria, its statements of the factual non-existence of the Macedonian 
nation, etc.”626  
The attempt for re-securitization (‘a period of uncertainty’) of the issues of language, 
minorities, nationhood in view of renewed relations with Bulgaria is indicative of the non-
fixed character of the newly established frame for dialogue. Agreements with Bulgaria 
could still be interpreted as a threat to Macedonian national interests and identity (‘giving 
up our constitutional responsibilities’, ‘a step towards abandoning our compatriots in 
Bulgaria’, ‘a recognition that the Macedonian language is only a language under our 
constitution’627). These interpretations are related to the instability of the ‘Europe’ 
discourse in Macedonia: the first tentative steps in the process of Europeanization had not 
been sufficient to establish a stable institutional and political consensus on 
Europeanization as the leading strategic goal of Macedonian politics.  
“Should Macedonia have been so clever as to become Europe’s experimental dough, 
a test zeppelin for somebody’s questionable visions of re-organizing international 
order?”628 
Putting to doubt the rationality of Macedonian policies in view of complying with European 
rules about international behaviour illustrates Macedonia’s ambiguity about Europe. The 
suggested loss of identity (‘experiemental dough’) and lack of clear ethical trajectory (‘a 
test zeppelin’) indicate the most common avenues which this ambiguity took.  
But even though present in political discourse, these interpretations no longer appeared as 
the official position of the state. In its formal communication with Bulgaria, Macedonia 
adhered strictly to the Europeanization discourse, which opened and maintained a realm 
of commonality with Bulgaria. It is this discursive realm that enabled the initiation of inter-
state dialogue all together. With the progress of the process of Europeanization in both 
626 Plenary session on 12th Feb 1999. 
627 Ibid., Ilinka Mitreva, 30. 
628 Ibid. 
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states, commonality between the two states stabilized and expanded, which further 
marginalized conflictual interpretations as incompatible with it.  
Similar dynamics is noticeable in Bulgaria where the empowerment of the ‘Europe’ 
discourse was accelerated by Bulgaria’s earlier progress in the process of Europeanization. 
The opposition against the proposed Bill for Regional Development in Bulgarian 
parliament, in its section on trans-border cooperation between municipalities in Bulgaria 
and Macedonia, for example, is counter-attacked by a consistent argument in favour of 
European practices:  
“We need to demonstrate we are working for regional development so that Europe 
can look at us with fresh eyes”629, “The European Charter for Trans-border 
Cooperation, which we ratified: [..] this is how Europe has regulated this [field]. [..] In 
Europe and in the normal world in general, things are being done this way”630, “We 
need to be in line with the European criteria.”631 
The vice-prime minister re-enforces the power of this line of argumentation by attaching it 
to the notion of ‘national interest’ and ‘patriotism’: 
“I do not think that there exists a Bulgarian with national pride and patriotism who 
would be ashamed of what we are doing to open the borders with neighbouring 
states and turn them into an open door between us [..] and Macedonia.”632  
Emphasizing the compatibility of the European norm with the notions of ‘national pride 
and patriotism’ has been central in empowering the discourse of ‘Europe’, particularly with 
regard to improving relations with Macedonia. The above statements illustrate how the 
‘Europe’ discourse was utilized to transgress the constraints of national space and attach 
the notion of national interest to a realm of commonality which included Macedonia as an 
immediate ‘Other’.  
 
629 Petar Mutafchiev, Democratic Left, plenary session on 5th Mar 1999. 
630 Ibid., Iliyan Popov, Union of Democratic Forces. 
631 Ibid., Todor Kostadinov. 
632 Ibid., Vice-Prime Minister Evgeni Bakyrdzhiev in a response to enquiry by George Ganchev. 
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Narratives on National Minorities, Collective Minority Rights and  
Political Representation 
Marginalizing conflictual narratives of nationhood as pertaining to the realm of science and 
thus irrelevant to the political, however, proved more challenging when it came to the 
official state policy on minority status, minority protection and minority rights. Even 
though the official positions of the two states confirmed the political will to detach policies 
from mutually exclusive historical interpretations, they found it hard to reflect these 
positions into their domestic policies when faced with contentious minority demands. 
Against the background of progressing Europeanization and narratives of good bilateral 
relations and cooperation, the minority issue was taken off the agenda of foreign policy. A 
turning point in this sense was the 1999 Joint Declaration which confirmed political will in 
the two states to overcome all sources of tension, including the ones related to the area of 
minority issues. Several of the text’s provisions, among them renouncing the separatist 
appeals of public or private subjects, the attempts for intervention in the domestic affairs 
of the other, and negative propaganda, aimed to normalize this policy area.633 Indeed, 
conflictual minority issues gradually ceased to appear as an object of official bilateral 
dialogue between Bulgaria and Macedonia. But they continued to plague discursive spaces 
of domestic politics in both states even after the declaration.  
Ultimately, the conflict revolved around the issue of minorities’ collective rights and 
political representation. In general, the two states had legitimate minority policies towards 
other minority groups and as a rule had granted them extensive minority protection. But 
they were reluctant to treat each other’s minorities in the same way. In view of divergent 
historical interpretations of the national ‘Other’, these positions are unsurprising. But in 
the context of bilateral rapprochement they began to stand out as an aberration. 
Identifying various minority demands and the ways they were channelled in the two states 
633 See text of the Joint Declaration, Art.11 and following provisions at 
http://www.bcci.bg/bulgarian/events/decl_mac_en.htm. 
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reveals the mechanism of accommodation of minority narratives into the changing context 
of Europeanization.   
Shortly after the beginning of Bulgaria’s transition the public presence of representatives 
of the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria was made known through various registered 
organizations and formations. They ranged from cultural and educational associations634 to 
political parties. But while the organization and functioning of the various cultural 
associations (through public activities, publications, etc.) was understood as part of the 
process of democratization, the registration of political parties was seen as more 
problematic. This was partly related to Bulgaria’s legislative framework (the constitutional 
provision prohibiting the organization of political parties along ethnic lines, the protection 
of the territorial integrity of the state and considerations of national security). Legislative 
considerations, however, were not decisive: there were ways to abide by them and still 
provide minority political representation, which is illustrated by the active participation of 
the party of the ethnic Turks in Bulgarian political life. What played decisive role in the 
problematization of Macedonian minority party representation in Bulgaria were political 
considerations. It was associated with the political taboo on discussions of separatism and 
distinct national identification, in view of the salience of territorial integrity and national 
unity in the narration of Bulgaria’s national identity. This is demonstrated in the nuanced 
attitude towards the different Macedonian organizations. 
Generally, Macedonian organizations in Bulgaria, and specifically political parties, can be 
divided in two groups: pro-Bulgarian and pro-Macedonian.635 The former claimed to 
represent the Macedonian minority as ‘Bulgarians from the region of Macedonia and 
nothing else’636. In their view, ‘recognizing the Macedonian nation [..] is a juridical 
absurd’637. The latter group claimed to represent the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria as 
part of the Macedonian nation in the Republic of Macedonia and in the rest of the 
634 All Bulgarian Union ‘Macedonia’, Union of the Macedonian Cultural and Educational Associations, 
Macedonian Scientific Institute. 
635 Summary by Dolores Arsenova, ‘Ethno-centric Formations in Bulgaria and Macedonia: an Object of Inter-
State Consensus’, Archive Bulgaria-Macedonia, Challenges of Transition (Sofia: 2001) at  
http://www.balkans21.org/arhiv/dolores6.htm. 
636 Valentin Kitanov, Executive Committee of UMRO-SMD for Trud newspaper from 31st Aug 1993. 
637 Stoyan Boyadzhiev, Chariman of UMRO-SDM for Demokratsia newspaper, 2nd Aug 1994. 
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Macedonian region. They wanted ‘to unite all Macedonians from Aegean, Albanian, Vardar 
and Pirin Macedonia and their descendants living in Bulgaria’638. Unsurprisingly, the pro-
Bulgarian group found it easier to make a permanent place for itself in the official 
Bulgarian political space. It was organized around the UMRO formation639 and declared its 
political presence as early as 1990. The majority of the demands it formulated under its 
programme were met almost immediately in the early 1990s640, among them to re-open 
the Macedonian Scientific Institute, to re-new the activities of the Macedonian 
associations for culture and education, to restitute their property, etc.641 In 1997 they even 
came to power as a coalition partner in the Kostov government of the United Democratic 
Forces. In the course of Europeanization processes their active participation in formal 
politics forced them to adapt.642 On the one hand, they re-dressed their overt nationalist, 
and particularly anti-Macedonian, rhetoric in the guise of patriotism: ‘do not impinge on 
patriotism in the history textbooks’643. On the other hand, they shifted the focus of their 
political efforts from the realm of bilateral relations (anti-Macedonianism in Macedonia) to 
the realm of domestic politics (pro-Macedonianism in Bulgaria), and their negative charge 
to positive. This is illustrated, for example, by abandoning the attention to confirming the 
‘actual’ large numbers of the ethnic Bulgarians in the Republic of Macedonia644 in favour of 
concentrating on the Macedonian representation within the limits of Bulgaria645.  
Accommodating the pro-Macedonian group of political parties in Bulgaria’s legitimate 
political space proved more problematic, particularly in view of Bulgarian-Macedonian 
conflictual relations of the 1990s. The more moderate formations among them, such as the 
UMRO-Traditional Macedonian Organization ‘Ilinden’646, were better tolerated. Their 
formal registration as political parties was facilitated by the explicit declaration that the 
638 Art.1 of the Statute of UMRO-TMO Ilinden (independent) headed by George Solunski. 
639 One of the many who claimed ownership over the name. 
640 Programme Declaration of the Union of the Macedonian Cultural and Educational Associations published 
by BTA 10th Sep 1990, BTA Courier Service. 
641 The only one of their principal demands which could not be met was the return of the sarcophagus with 
the remains of the revolutionary Gotse Delchev, which is kept in Skopje, see Arsenova, ‘Ethno-centric 
Formations’. 
642 Dynamics confirmed in the study by Arsenova, ibid. 
643 Krasimir Karakachanov in 24 Hours newspaper, 1st Dec 1999. 
644 Karakachanov in Standard newspaper from 31st Aug 1993. 
645 Karakachanov in 24 hours newspaper, 23rd Sep 1999. 
646 Led by George Solunski. 
 
247 
 
                                                            
N. Nancheva                                                                                                                                        Transforming Identities in Europe 
organization ‘does not stake any territorial claims’647 and does not aim to harm ‘the 
territorial integrity of the state’648. The party never had any electoral significance due to 
the negligible number of its supporters649 and it did not attract any extraordinary political 
attention (due to its moderate programme), even though it existed for the best part of the 
1990s. This is unlike the extreme pro-Macedonian political party UMO ‘Ilinden’650. It staked 
its claims for political relevance as early as 1990, declaring that it represented the 
‘numerous’ Macedonian minority in Bulgaria. According to its articles of association and its 
programme, it aimed to ‘unite all Macedonians in Bulgaria on a regional and cultural basis’ 
and to achieve ‘the recognition of the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria’, as well as to work 
for the ‘political development of Macedonia’651. And while these aims did not represent 
any unambiguous threat, the political rhetoric of its leaders made clear the extremist 
platform of the party:  
“You [Bulgaria] cut off Pirin Macedonia and annexed it. The other two parts of 
Macedonia you sold to the Serbs and the Greeks. You are separatists and your 
separatism needs to be corrected now.”652  
Its registration was, predictably, refused in subsequent court judgements of 1990 and 
1991, where the courts found that the association’s aims were ‘directed against the unity 
of the nation’, that it ‘advocated national and ethnic hatred’, and that it was ‘dangerous 
for the territorial integrity of Bulgaria’.653 It is interesting to note that, much like the 
Albanian minority in Macedonia, the pro-Macedonian activists in Bulgaria sought to 
capture the signifiers of ‘Europe’ for the purposes of their own cause: 
647 Art.22 of the Statutes, Archive Ethno-sociology of the Central Party Archive, Vol.4. 
648 Platform-Declaration from 14th Nov 1989, Archive Ethno-sociology of the Central Party Archive, Vol.4. 
649 Arsenova, ibid. 
650 Led by Yordan Kostadinov. 
651 ‘Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria’, nos. 29221/95 and 29225/95, §§ 
10-14, ECHR 2001-IX. 
652 Yordan Kostadinov, interview for Continent newspaper from 25th Apr 1995. 
653 ‘Case of the United Macedonian Organization Ilinden – PIRIN and Others v. Bulgaria (Application no. 
59489/00).  
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 “Europe should unite Macedonia in the future so that there be peace on the 
Balkans.”654 
Linking unification of Macedonia with peace on the Balkans reveals a political agenda not 
necessarily compatible with the processes of Europeanization. It is significant, 
nevertheless, that it is the discourse of ‘Europe’ that is being utilized to counteract the 
majority’s nationalist discourse655. In the context of hegemonic nationalism in the early 
years of transition, however, and in view of the general extremist rhetoric of the political 
party, its existence was found inadmissible by the government, the law, and the general 
public. It did, however, acquire significant media presence, which notably politicized the 
issue of political representation of the Macedonian minority.  
Unable to achieve a legitimate political status, the organization split in 1994 when the 
more moderate activists656 founded their own party – UMO ‘Ilinden-PIRIN’. The activity of 
this organization marked a peak in the politicization of the issue of Macedonian minority 
representation in Bulgaria.657 After amending its founding statutes, which the Sofia City 
Court658 had found in conflict with Art.44 (2) of the constitution659, the UMO ‘Ilinden-
PIRIN’ was formally registered as a political party in the early 1999. Successful registration 
allowed it to run in the following local government elections and win two mayorships and 
three seats for municipal councillors in the Pirin Macedonia region.660 This was significant, 
because it created the context for normalization of the issue of Macedonian minority 
representation by attaching it to the processes of democratic representation. Against the 
general bilateral rapprochement between Bulgaria and Macedonia, initiated with the 
closure of the language dispute, this was an indication for the good political will to 
implement the declared principles of amity in Bulgarian domestic politics. It was also in line 
with Bulgaria’s progress in the processes of Europeanization.  
654 Yordan Kostadinov, interview for Continent newspaper from 25th Apr 1995.  
655 In a way similar to the Albanian demands in Macedonia. 
656 Around Ivan Singartiyski. 
657 References to key public arguments by Information Agency Focus News 25th Jul 2006, Archive Service. 
658 The legal institution with jurisdiction over the registration of political parties in Bulgaria. 
659 Prohibiting organizations whose activity is aimed against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and the unity 
of the nation, instigating ethnic or national hatred, etc. 
660 In Gotsedelchevsko, according to BTA, 25th Oct 1999. 
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Seized by 61 members of parliament of various political backgrounds, however, Bulgaria’s 
Constitutional Court issued a judgement in 2000, proclaiming the political party 
unconstitutional under Art.44(2) of the constitution. In its ruling, the Court treated the 
UMO ‘Ilinden-PIRIN’ party as a descendent of the extremist UMO ‘Ilinden’ and took into 
consideration not its official statutes but the activities of its leaders, including under the 
umbrella of the banned party. Even though there was evidence for such argumentation, 
the suggestion that the final decision of the Court was influenced by political rather than 
juridical reasons, could not be avoided. Invocation of Art.44(2) suggests a serious threat to 
national security. The actual political significance of the UMO ‘Ilinden-PIRIN’ party, 
however, was negligible, as demonstrated in its electoral performance: it won 0.03% of 
votes which equals approximately 2500 people.661 This, together with the fact that the 
party upheld a very moderate platform and maintained its activity within the limits of the 
law, indicated that there was little evidence of an actual threat to the national security of 
the state. The interpretation of conflict with Art.44(2) was based on discussion, not actions 
for subversion, of the territorial borders of the state:662 a subject taboo in Bulgarian 
political and public space in view of the salience of the territorial integrity signifier of 
national identity. In fact, public debate on the existing territorial borders of a state are a 
fully legitimate subject in any democratic society and Bulgarian primary legislation 
provides for the possibility of changing them through a parliamentary decision for 
ratification of an international treaty663. Therefore, it was not so much legal but political 
argumentation which motivated the constitutional court’s ban. Despite the partial 
dislocation of the Bulgarian discourse of nationalism, it was the salience of its signifiers 
which apparently influenced the constitutional judgement.  
661 Momchil Milev, ‘Theory of Macedonian Conspiracy’ in Capital newspaper of 3rd Mar 2000 at 
http://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/bulgaria/2000/03/03/254626_teoriia_na_makedonskata_konsp
iraciia/. 
662 Based on a letter by Kiril Ivanov to the Open Society Institute in Bucharest, which contains radical 
demands for separating Pirin Macedonia from Bulgaria. The letter reaches the Court before one of the key 
deliberations and changes the direction of the debates. – see ‘Case of the United Macedonian Organization 
Ilinden – PIRIN and Others v. Bulgaria (Application no. 59489/00), also Milev, ‘Theory of Macedonian 
Conspiracy’ in Capital newspaper, ibid.  
663 Art.5(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria.  
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A sudden blow to the years of consistent effort of the democratic government to 
normalize bilateral relations with Macedonia, as well as an obstacle to Bulgaria’s progress 
in the Europeanization process, such a judgement can be best understood contextually. 
Around the beginning of the millennium the empowerment of the Europeanization 
discourse had reached already visible dimensions. It was present in the justification and 
interpretation of almost all politically significant decisions at state level and in rhetoric 
from the entire political spectrum. On the issue of minority rights, however, 
Europeanization discourse was notably ambivalent. Lacking a definitive reference point in 
its own legislation664, the EU followed the lead of the Council of Europe which only 
produced a relevant international instrument in the mid-1990s. Controversial in its missing 
definition of the term ‘national’ minority, the instrument was not even ratified by all EU 
member states at the time or was ratified with reservations.665 Minority protection was 
not formally part of the EU membership criteria (formulated in the early 1990s) even 
though indirectly, through the requirement for functioning democracy and the human 
rights provisions of the acquis, it had acquired significance in the membership preparation 
and negotiation. So, predictably, the normative power of the signifier of ‘European-ness’ in 
the area of minority protection was unconvincing and this had been noted in public 
debates on the issue in both Bulgaria and Macedonia. Clashing with the meanings upheld 
by the powerful signifiers of nationalist discourse, it inevitably faced resistance. In the 
immediate aftermath of war in Kosovo and the escalating inter-ethnic tension in 
Macedonia, the question of recognizing minority status and granting minority rights 
outside the already established model became extremely problematic.  
This context helps understand the decision to ban the political party of the pro-
Macedonian activists in Bulgaria, despite the marginalization of nationalist narratives 
interpreting Macedonianism as a threat to Bulgaria’s national identity and despite the 
empowerment of European narratives positioning Macedonia in the frame of amity and 
cooperation. Predictably, this provoked negative reactions on behalf of the Macedonian 
664 The 1992 European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages, the 1994 signed Framework Convention 
for the Protection of National Minorities, the system for protection developed under the ECHR which set 
Europe’s minimum standards of equality and non-discrimination. 
665 E.g. Germany and Luxembourg, see 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?CL=ENG&NT=157&VL=1.  
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state. The Macedonian president expressed ‘regret for the decision of the Bulgarian 
magistrates and hope that the Bulgarian authorities will be more careful in the future with 
regard to the delicate bilateral issues’666. The prime minister confirmed that ‘the decision 
does not help the good bilateral relations’667. The foreign minister voiced doubt in 
Bulgaria’s European future ‘because it does not respect minority rights’668. The 
Macedonian parliament reacted by adopting a declaration of support for the members of 
UMO ‘Ilinden-PIRIN’669. It is important to note, however, that these official Macedonian 
reactions publicized immediately after the publication of the Bulgarian court’s decision, did 
not have further impact on bilateral relations. They were necessary in view of the media 
turmoil caused in Macedonian public space but at the official state level they had no 
further consequences. The official visit of the Bulgarian president in two months’ time was 
expected as planned and the heads of state and government extended a ‘cordial 
welcome’670 to Stoyanov throughout his stay. More importantly, the Bulgarian president 
was also welcomed by the Macedonian media. Even the notoriously suspicious Bulgarian 
media noted the ‘warm’ reception671. At the formal press conference given by the two 
heads of state in Skopje the Bulgarian was indeed asked about the constitutional ban on 
UMO ‘Ilinden-PIRIN’ but his response satisfied the audience. Stoyanov explained that the 
political party was banned because it called for changing the territorial borders of the 
state, which contradicted the constitution.672 Nevertheless, the two presidents declared 
their accordance on a series of issues, which was confirmed in the signed treaties and 
agreements, and re-iterated their good will to further develop bilateral cooperation, 
including in view of European integration. In this sense the issue of the constitutional ban 
did not affect the manner in which talks were held, nor did it affect their outcome. This 
666 Trajkovski, reported by Capital newspaper of 10th Mar 2000 at 
http://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/sedmicata/2000/03/10/254801_antibulgarski_protesti_v_make
doniia/. 
667 Georgievski, reported by Capital newspaper of 10th Mar 2000. 
668 Dimitrov, reported by Capital newspaper of 10th Mar 2000. 
669 Plenary session on 9th Mar 2000.  
670 Editorial Sasho Ordanoski, Forum journal, Skopje 10th May 2000. 
671 Aleksey Yurdanov, ‘Macedonia Less Suspicious towards Bulgaria’, editorial for Capital newspaper of 19th 
May 1999.  
672 Stoyanov and Trajkovski press conference in Skopje on 19th May, BTA Courier Service. 
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suggests that nationalist discourse had already been discredited at official state level, even 
though it was still present in the domestic political space around minority issues.  
In Macedonia the discursive dynamics around the issue of political representation of a pro-
Bulgarian minority evolved in exactly the same fashion, despite Macedonian protests 
against the banning of pro-Macedonian political parties in Bulgaria. The political parties 
and organizations claiming to represent the Bulgarian minority were banned from official 
activity and registration. Several of the organizations acquired greater public significance, 
either because of their media presence or because of the publicity they achieved through 
alternative means. Among the political parties two have been more visible. The pro-
Bulgarian UMRO-Tatkovinsko673, one of the many organizations laying claims to the 
historical name of the Macedonian liberation movements, interpreted the state of 
Macedonia as a second state of the Bulgarian people and demanded that ‘the borders of 
1913 be erased’674. By the statements of its members, the organization had set up 
committees in ‘almost all towns of the Republic of Macedonia’675. However, it was never 
officially registered. The Human Rights Party676 was the other pro-Bulgarian organization 
which acquired visible public presence. Its leader claimed that it represented ‘more than 
200 000 Bulgarians [as] members’677. The party denied the distinct character of the 
Macedonian nation, claiming it was Bulgarian678, and declared the Bulgarians in Macedonia 
were being ‘assimilated and terrorized’679 by the Skopje government, which is why it 
announced that it wanted ‘Bulgaria to become homeland for the Bulgarians in 
Macedonia’680. By the end of 1993 the party was officially prohibited as 
unconstitutional.681 The argumentation of the court refers to the activity of the party’s 
673 Led by Dimitar Tsarnomarov. 
674 Dimitar Tsernomarov, Makedoniya newspaper from 18-25 Apr 1995. 
675 Ibid. 
676 Of Iliya Ilievski. 
677 Iliya Ilievski, Novinar newspaper, 2nd Nov 1993. 
678 Trud newspaper, 27th Jan 1994. 
679 Zemya newspaper, 9th June 1993. 
680 Svoboden narod newspaper, 9th June 1993. 
681 Court decision from 9th Dec 1993. 
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leader who threatened the territorial integrity and the borders of the Macedonian state,682 
an identical judicial position as in Bulgaria.  
In the context of increased domestic instability of the early transition years and 
international uncertainty as a result of non-recognition, nationalist narratives of 
Macedonian identity prevented any interpretations of such public demands other than as 
threats to the national security of the Macedonian state. But even under the government 
of Georgievski in the late 1990s, which was notoriously ‘pro-Bulgarian’683, these 
organizations failed to establish any meaningful dialogue with the state. This suggests that 
they gradually lost political relevance. Indeed, a new descendant pro-Bulgarian 
organization, the ‘RADKO’ Association684 did register formally in 2000685. Its political 
platform, however, was much more moderate than that of its predecessors’. It called for 
‘cultural and spiritual unity’ with Bulgaria but clearly avoided any territorial references to 
the same686. Among its key goals was achieving equal status for the Bulgarian minority to 
the status of all the other nationalities mentioned in the Macedonian constitution which 
represented a ‘constitutive element’ of the Macedonian nation. Consequently, the 
organization also demanded that the Bulgarian language be one of the official languages in 
the Republic.687 As in Bulgaria, however, judicial arguments gave way to political 
considerations. The seized Constitutional court found that the organization’s platform and 
statutes were ‘aimed at forceful change of the official state order, impeded the 
Macedonian people from freely expressing their national identity, and instigated national 
hatred and intolerance’688. Clearly designating the programme of the pro-Bulgarian 
association as a threat to the Macedonian identity in the official position of the state was 
incompatible with the declared political will to advance bilateral trust and understanding. 
The situation bore significant similarities with the reaction to the registration of the pro-
Macedonian political party in Bulgaria. However, in the Macedonian context it is important 
to emphasize that the court decision was taken amidst the ongoing civil conflict between 
682 Art.3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia. 
683 As accused by the Macedonian media and opposition, see Capital newspaper editorial of 12th May 2000. 
684 Led by Vladimir Paunkovski. 
685 Statutes http://www.radkomk.com/OSNOVANE.pdf. 
686 Ibid. 
687 Ibid. 
688 http://www.radkomk.com/UstavniotSud.htm.  
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the Macedonian majority and the Albanian minority689, which added utmost urgency to 
the matter already framed in the discourse of national security. Obviously, in a situation of 
open conflict caused by extremist minority demands, the possibility of identical 
development along the lines of another majority-minority relationship was inadmissible. 
Again, as in Bulgaria, the judicial outcome was not transferred to the bilateral space of 
communication and did not affect Bulgarian-Macedonian relations in any harmful manner. 
As soon as the inter-ethnic conflict was over and the Macedonian state began to normalize 
its politics again, inter-state dialogue with Bulgaria was resumed with the early 2002 visit 
of the next Bulgarian president.690  
It is important to note that both in Bulgaria and Macedonia the issue of recognizing 
national minorities, when it comes to Macedonian and Bulgarian minority groups 
respectively, is framed in a discourse slightly different from the discourse surrounding the 
rest of the national minority groups. While the terms ‘Turkish minority’ or ‘Albanian 
minority’ or ‘Roma minority’ have been established unambiguously to designate the 
respective communities, in the case of the Macedonian and Bulgarian minorities the 
denominator used is not that of nationality but of affiliation. Thus in Bulgaria it is officially 
talked of ‘Macedonianists’ while in Macedonia – of ‘Bulgarophiles’. In view of the 
sedimentation of divergent historical narratives excluding the ‘Other’ as a constitutive 
element in national identity constructs, this is unsurprising. Even in the context of 
Europeanization and ‘European’ re-narration of the national story, these divergent 
narratives are still present because they are part of the historical past. Europeanization as 
a narrative is focused on the political present and future. It came into being precisely 
because it enabled closure of the (conflictual) past. In this sense the Europeanization 
discourse does not aim to change the stories of the past. Instead, it is meant to shift the 
focus from the past to the possibilities of the present and future and, with time, create 
new stories out of them. This helps understand why Bulgaria and Macedonia continued to 
speak with the categories of their nationalist pasts, where the ‘Other’ did not exist as an 
element of the ‘Self’, when it came to minorities. They simply had no different story to tell. 
689 US Institute of Peace report, ‘Macedonia: Understanding History, Preventing Future Conflict’ at 
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr115.html. 
690 Parvanov, Feb 2002. 
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What is significant, however, is that they no longer used these categories in their official 
communication with each other and no longer allowed them to affect their bilateral 
relations. Articulated as an official position of the state, this was one of the key predicates 
for the marginalization and eventual dislocation of conflictual narratives from political 
discourse. In the long term this could also create the need for re-thinking of history.  
In collecting the national census data from the years 2001 (Bulgaria) and 2002 (Macedonia) 
both states provided the technical possibility for their citizens to declare their ethnic and 
national identity as Macedonian or Bulgarian respectively. This is worth highlighting since 
the structure of the previous censuses, particularly the first censuses from the post-
communist period, had been questioned as prejudiced or manipulative in this regard. As a 
result, 5,071 people in Bulgaria identified themselves as ethnically Macedonian691 and 
1,417 people in Macedonia identified themselves as of Bulgarian origin692. These numbers 
may seem insignificant, especially compared to the claims of the minority activists in both 
states for thousands of members of the respective minorities693. But what is significant is 
that the state officially provided the option to declare citizenship and national and ethnic 
identity as separate categories. So if the small numbers of the members of the 
Macedonian and Bulgarian minority in the two states should be questioned at all, it is 
worth considering as well how relevant the claims of the minorities’ political 
representatives are. Despite the juridical bans on political party registration for minority 
organizations, the pro-Macedonian party in Bulgaria did have a chance to participate in 
local elections694 and the return from its participation largely confirmed the census data. In 
Macedonia pro-Bulgarian parties were not allowed into the electoral competition, but if 
the situation there is similar, then a disturbing conclusion presents itself. Pro-Macedonian 
and pro-Bulgarian activists might be utilizing minority discourse to advance their own 
political agendas without either comparable representation or necessity among the 
minority communities. This suggestion raises concern not least because it reveals attempts 
for politicization of narratives of national identity in a conflictual manner, which could have 
691 See http://www.nsi.bg/Census/Ethnos.htm.  
692 See http://makstat.stat.gov.mk/pxweb2007bazi/Database/.asp. 
693 But were largely confirmed in the 2011 census data from both states. 
694 Which happened in the period immediately following the establishment and preceding the ban on the 
party. 
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serious negative implications both for the normality of domestic politics and for the 
normality of bilateral relations. One way to neutralize these would be to capture minority 
representation into the mechanisms and logic of democratic politics and gradually 
normalize the discourse of urgency surrounding it. What problematizes this option in the 
context of Europeanization is the fact that Europe itself is often ambivalent on it. 
Undecided between individual and collective protection and rights695, integration in 
Europe has so far managed to avoid taking a firm stance on minority representation, 
despite the already established jurisdiction of the European Court on Human Rights on the 
matter696. Analyzing it from the perspective of clashing discourses of national identity – 
those upheld by nationalism and those upheld by Europeanization – helps understand 
why.  
 
Europeanization Effects on Identity Narratives on National Minorities  
National minority issues in Bulgarian-Macedonian relations offer particularly difficult cases 
of accommodating narratives of national identity within the discourse of Europeanization. 
The reasons for this are largely related to the discursive characteristics of Europeanization, 
even though the deep level of sedimentation of national minority narratives is also a 
factor. On the one hand, Europeanization was designed as a pragmatic strategy of 
transcending past antagonisms and the discourse that maintains it deliberately diverts 
political attention from history. Europeanization discourse is politically unconcerned with 
the past, which leaves historical narratives to alternative interpretations. Furthermore, 
European integration opened up a discursive space, in which the problem of national 
minorities ceased to exist because both nations and their minorities ceased to be 
interpreted in terms of ‘otherness’. National minority issues, embedded in history, 
remained therefore largely governed by interpretations of the discourse of nationalism. On 
the other hand, even when Europeanization attempts to specifically address national 
695 For an overview of the clash, see Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority 
Rights (Oxford University Press, 1995). 
696 See Geoff Gilbert, ‘The Burgeoning Minority Rights Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’, 
Human Rights Quarterly 24 (2002): 736-780. 
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minority issues, its discursive power is unconvincing because it is aimed at capturing one of 
the central signifiers of nationalism. In view of the relatively recent and quite loose 
normative accommodation of national minorities within the European integration project, 
this attempt cannot be successful in such short terms.  
Europeanization effects on conflictual narratives of identity focused on the issue of 
national minorities are thus restricted to two things. First, gradually detaching them from 
historical interpretations and attaching them to the practicalities of the democratic 
process. Second, removing national minority issues from the scope of ‘high politics’ – 
defense, security, foreign policy. The ambivalence between ‘European’ interpretations of 
national identity and nationalist-biased policy on minorities inevitably requires longer 
periods of time to disappear from the discursive spaces of domestic politics (Table 12). 
State Bulgaria Macedonia 
Signifiers 
upheld by 
Nationalism 
Territorial threat Territorial threat 
Incompatibility with narration of 
nationhood 
Incompatibility with narration of 
nationhood 
Impossibility for political 
participation  
Impossibility for political participation  
Signifiers 
upheld by 
Europeanizati
on 
Taking minority narratives off the 
agenda of foreign and security policy 
through dissociation from the 
signifier of territory 
Detaching narratives on Bulgaria from the 
positions of ‘occupier’ and ‘aggressor’ 
Distancing policy from history Maintaining a realm of commonality 
Ambivalence between rhetoric and 
policy 
Ambivalence between rhetoric and policy 
Table 12. Narratives on National Minorities in Bulgaria and Macedonia. 
 
Conclusion: Comparing Identity Narratives of ‘Otherness’ 
Comparing transformations in the narratives on minorities with those in the narratives on 
recognition and language reveals important aspects of the discursive logic of 
Europeanization in reading national identity. In the first place, it demonstrates that 
‘European’ interpretations begin to acquire taken-for-granted quality in time. The 
narratives telling the ‘European’ story of recognition, for instance, appeared dominant 
towards the end of transition, despite the controversies which they raised around the 
actual time of recognition. They were no longer challenged by alternative interpretations. 
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Nationalist interpretations of language also gradually ceased to appear in official state 
discourse, despite their deep sedimentation and increased popular appeal. By the time 
when the issue of minorities acquired more visible political dimensions, even the 
extremely salient nationalist interpretations of it were easily removable from formal inter-
state dialogue. This suggests that with the hegemonic empowerment of Europeanization, 
European readings of national identity are stabilized and have the potential to dislocate 
nationalist hegemony.  
Second, the comparison reveals that articulating ‘European’ meanings of central identity 
narratives becomes easier over time. With the progress of the integration efforts of the 
two states highly antagonistic interpretations become problematic for the simple fact that 
inter-state/ inter-ethnonational conflictuality is incompatible with the project of ‘Europe’. 
The gradual empowerment of the discourse of Europeanization as hegemonic highlighted 
the incapacity of nationalism to uphold national identity in a politically relevant manner 
and enabled the stabilization of ‘European’ interpretations. This suggests that the progress 
of integration emphasized the immediate political relevance of Europeanization and 
significantly improved the credibility of its interpretations of identity.  
Third, placing the three narrative groups against each other and comparing the 
transformations which occurred in them with the empowerment of Europeanization 
reveals that some discursive elements are more difficult to read than others. Despite the 
varied degree of sedimentation of nationalist interpretations, their marginalization and 
dislocation generally follows similar discursive logic. Nationalist narratives on minorities, 
for instance, do appear domestically at official state level even when other nationalist 
articulations in Bulgarian-Macedonian relations have already been compromised. But they 
disappear from official bilateral dialogue, which creates the condition of possibility for 
their de-politicization and eventual marginalization from domestic state articulations as 
well. The discursive element of minority representation, however, is continuously 
interpreted in a hegemonic manner within the organizing order of nationalism. As already 
noted above, this points to an omission within the discursive framework of 
Europeanization.  This suggests that the discourse power of Europeanization is linked not 
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only to the external political relevance of integration, but also to the specificities of its 
progress within the traditional limits of ‘Europe’.  
Overall, the progress of the (preparation for) integration processes asserted the 
hegemonic power of Europeanization to authoritatively articulate the meaning of national 
identity. In the reading of identity narratives of ‘Other’ it greatly facilitated reconciliation 
along most lines of conflictuality. This notably improved the credibility of ‘European’ 
identity articulations, marginalized nationalist interpretations and re-enforced the 
hegemony of the discourse of Europeanization as upholding the new positive story of the 
nation.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
EUROPEANIZATION OF IDENTITY NARRATIVES IN BULGARIA AND MACEDONIA  
 
Having established the dominant interpretations of identity narratives determining the 
position of ‘Self’ and their possible implications for Bulgarian-Macedonian relations 
(Chapter VI), the analysis then followed three narrative groups maintaining bilateral 
conflictuality (Chapter VII). Identifying changes in their discursive narration with the 
progress of Europeanization, the investigation established a visible trend towards 
reconciliation along most of the conflictual narratives. Revealing a change in the discursive 
position of ‘Other’, the transformed narratives increasingly imagined a ‘European’ identity 
of the state. The purpose of Chapter VIII is to establish how these transformations fed back 
into the domestic discursive space. Focusing on the same discursive elements which 
upheld national identity at the beginning of transition, this chapter aims to identify 
modifications in their interpretation towards the end of transition. It is meant to close the 
chronological frame of the studied period. An investigation of change in some of the most 
deeply-seated national identity narratives promises to generate a fuller picture of the 
identity transformation which occurred in the context of empowering ‘Europe’ and of the 
discursive mechanisms of its accommodation.  
 
Bulgarian National Identity Narratives towards the End of Transition 
Bulgaria was formally invited to begin its negotiations for EU membership at the very end 
of the old millennium697. Initiating the negotiations made visible the reality of integration 
preparations in a very practical way. This helped the political ‘imagining’ of Bulgaria’s 
697 10th Dec 1999 at the Helsinki European Council. 
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European prospects and greatly facilitated the empowerment of the Europeanization 
discourse. Europeanization was briefly destabilized by the moment of disenchantment 
related to the ‘lagging’698 behind the Visegrad states in their progress towards full 
membership and the inclusion of the Baltic states in the earlier enlargement wave699. But 
Bulgaria quickly resumed its Euro-enthusiasm as its efforts in the negotiation processes 
began to receive immediate feedback from the EU and access to pre-accession funds. The 
thorough reforms processes which the EU itself undertook in order to be able to cope with 
the future large-scale enlargement700 also asserted the prospect of Bulgaria’s membership 
as a tangible strategic goal.  
The discourse of Europeanization was empowered as a totalizing discourse capable of re-
organizing the entire political space, since it offered alternative meanings to key political 
categories. It began to appear on every level and every dimension of political life as a 
legitimizing strategy providing the norm. The prospect of EU membership as the ultimate 
positive affirmation of Bulgaria’s ‘European-ness’ gave it the credibility which maintained 
its power. This determined the political relevance of the meanings provided by 
Europeanization’s ‘floating signifiers’ of statehood and nationhood, which inevitably 
clashed with traditionally dominant nationalist interpretations. The interaction of these 
signifiers around the nodal points of the national identity construction ‘tied’ meanings in a 
different way and produced a modified pattern of national identity which was more 
compatible with the changing political contexts of empowering Europeanization. The new 
grand discourse did not dramatically re-arrange the identity narratives’ carrying signifiers. 
National community, territory, purpose continued to represent nodal points upholding key 
national identity narratives as their function in the structure of the nation-state had been 
historically conditioned as essential. In this sense, Europeanization could not break the 
supporting ‘web’ of nationalism because of its indispensability to statehood. What it did 
698 On the distinction between ‘leaders’ and ‘laggards’, see for instance, Charles Gati, ‘If not Democracy 
What? Leaders, Laggards and Losers in the Postcommunist World’ in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.), Post-
Communism Four Perspectives (Washington: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996). 
699 The Baltic states were not among the immediate referents of the 1993 Copenhagen Council appeal to the 
‘associated member states’ to join the Community, whereas Bulgaria was; see Asya Bocheva, ‘Bulgaria in 
Brussels’ Waiting Room: Enlargement Is Still Seen as Concerning Only Poland, Czech republic and Hungary’ in 
Capital newspaper, 2nd Jun 2000, or ‘The Day We Missed the Wave’ in Capital newspaper of 14th Dec 2002. 
700 See European Council in Nice 2000 at  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/nice1_en.htm. 
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was gradually marginalize nationalism’s key interpretations of national identity signifiers 
by emphasizing different dimensions, opening up new possibilities, and re-thinking 
established rules. It thus managed to modify the contents of each of the carrying signifiers 
and ultimately transform the entire construct. In the course of empowering 
Europeanization discourse, national identity appeared more positive, more inclusive, and 
less focused on the past. The following paragraphs highlight the key aspects of this 
transformation.  
Identity Narratives of National Community 
The interpretation of the signifier of the ‘nation’ in terms of ‘national unity’ had become so 
salient at the beginning of Bulgaria’s transition because it contained a formula for 
preserving the integrity of the national community in view of the inter-ethnic tensions 
which had marred the period. Towards the end of Bulgaria’s transition the issue was no 
longer on the urgent political agenda, so the idea of ‘national unity’ ceased to form the 
centre of political debate and was no longer the object of securitization practices. 
Recurrently present in official rhetoric from the early years of transition as a panaceaic 
legitimization strategy, towards 2005 it was only invoked in the specific minority-majority 
context which originally increased its salience and mostly in terms of historical self-
appraisal, not in view of everyday politics.701 This opened the political space for alternative 
articulations of the meaning of the nation. The hegemonic discourse of Europeanization 
provided the most relevant alternatives. 
Despite the continued validity of the constitutional prohibition of ethnic parties, for 
instance, which originated in the nationalistic idea of a monolithic nation and its political 
representation at a ‘national’ level, the locus of party activity was no longer limited within 
the nation. Political parties were increasingly being interpreted not as national formations 
per se, but as members of larger – European – political families. In a televised interview in 
one of the political weeklies, the prime minister discusses the reaction of the Bulgarian 
democratic formations (centre-right) to the impending EU membership in comparison with 
701 E.g. Lyutfi Mestan at the sitting of the National Committee for Celebrating Bulgaria’s Accession to the 
European Union, 8th Nov 2006. 
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the reactions of their European equivalent, the European People’s Party.702 In a different, 
printed interview, he clarifies the positions of his own party in a similar way:  
“The Bulgarian Socialist Party [..] is a full member of the Party of the European 
Socialists. This means that our ideology and policies should concur with the basic 
principles and values in the policies of the parties in this family.”703  
Insisting on the normative imperatives ensuing from membership in the European political 
family (‘our policies should concur’), the prime minister emphasizes this aspect of 
belonging. Membership in the European political community invokes not only privileges 
but duties. Shifting the boundaries of political party representation from the national to 
the European space is one way in which nationalist interpretations of national community 
were being challenged. The idea of the unity of the nation was marginalized to give way to 
alternative values, articulated at national level but linking the national to a community of 
nations. 
Key among these values are the imperatives of cooperation and tolerance domestically, 
and of partnership and dialogue externally. In contrast with the nationalist interpretation 
of a monolithic nation as a highest value, the discourse of Europeanization emphasizes the 
centrality of difference and interprets it as a context of opportunity. Inter-ethnic and inter-
religious differences and their successful accommodation acquire salience as a signifier of 
civilization. Among the main contributions which Bulgaria would make with its prospective 
bid for EU membership, the president highlights precisely this: 
“[..] Bulgaria will bring to the EU its example of cooperation and tolerance between 
ethnicities and religions. Our model of ethno-political accommodation is not new. [..] 
702 Sergey Stanishev, prime minister of the Republic of Bulgaria in an interview for the Bulgarian National 
Television Political Analyses Show ‘Panorama’ on 29th Sep 2006. Available at http://old.government.bg/cgi-
bin/e-cms/vis/vis.pl?s=001&p=0043&n=000003&g= together with the other texts by Stanishev as prime 
minister used here, unless otherwise specified.  
703 Stanishev, Trud newspaper, 4th Sep 2006. 
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Bulgaria can offer its European partners this experience, if you would allow me the 
immodesty.”704 
Implying lack of modesty in offering this contribution, the statement indicates the great 
value which is placed on the model of tolerance and cooperation. The stark contrast 
between the way Bulgarian national identity had been articulated at the beginning and 
towards the end of transition is visible on this point. The idea of ethnic tolerance is 
articulated as an essential characteristic of Bulgaria’s transition, even though the first post-
communist years had been strained precisely by inter-ethnic tensions caused by 
intolerance.  
 “The ethnic aspects of Bulgaria’s transition [cannot be] underestimated or 
unappreciated.”705 
“We have a great advantage. With all our defects, we kept the ethnic peace and 
tolerance, which is our great achievement.”706 
Marginalizing the idea of unity and emphasizing the formula of tolerance to difference and 
national cooperation, Bulgaria’s national identity construct appears much more inclusive 
towards the end of transition. This is demonstrated in the interpretation of external 
relations, where the values of tolerance and cooperation are translated into the 
imperatives of partnership and dialogue.  
“Characterized by intensive contacts at the level of all institutions, [...] Bulgarian-
Macedonian relations are European in the true sense of the word and are a good 
example for all nations and the whole region.”707 
704 President Georgi Pervanov, ‘Bulgaria at the Doorstep of the EU’, Lecture at the Friedrich Ebert Foundation 
24th Feb 2006. This text and the cited henceforward available online at 
http://www.president.bg/news_archive.php?from=news&type=3. 
705 Pervanov, ‘Bulgaria’s European Integration: Lessons and Challenges’, Speech at the University for National 
and World Economy conference ‘Bulgaria’s Road to Europe’ on 10th Nov 2004 at the National Palace of 
Culture. 
706 Stanishev, Bulgarian National Television, Kanal 1, 25th Mar 2006, ‘Media Control’ discussion with Milena 
Tsvetanska BNT, Tzvetanka Rizova Nova Television, Anna Tsolova BTV, Velichko Konakchiev Bulgarian 
National Radion, Mila Avramova Trud newspaper, Boryana Tsacheva 24 hours newspaper, Petyo Tsekov Sega 
newspaper. 
707 Pervanov, interview for the Macedonian Nation Radio on 4th Nov 2006. 
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“I have had more than 15 meetings with the president of Macedonia for the last four 
years. There is no other period in our history, so full of intensive political contacts at 
all levels with Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, and the rest of our 
neighbours.”708 
Interpreting bilateral and multilateral institutional dialogue as the European norm and 
claiming excellence in it (‘good example’, ‘no other period in our history’), this rhetoric 
positions Bulgarian national identity firmly within the Europeanization discourse. It also 
reveals the stark contrast with the previous decade, when silence in the bilateral relations 
was interpreted as defending national identity claims. 
The opening up of Bulgaria’s national identity construct to transcend the constraints of the 
nation-state is also visible in the new articulations of the notion of national interest. It is no 
longer formulated as referring strictly to the national space but is interpreted to include 
the well-being of the immediate neighbour states, the region and Europe in general: 
“[..] advocacy for the interests of our neighbours [..] is part of our national interest. 
Having stable neighbours. It is our national interest that our neighbours have a clear 
European perspective.”709 
Such interpretation of the national interest is significant because it implies a responsibility 
towards the immediate national ‘Other(s)’ which is no longer governed by the ‘Self’-‘Other’ 
dialectic of the nation-state. Responsibility for the well-being of the ‘Other’ and awareness 
of the intertwinement with the well-being of the ‘Self’ are indicative of a shift in the ‘Self’-
‘Other’ boundary beyond state borders. They are indicative of a sense of belonging to a 
community of states, expressed in a politically pragmatic way: through the common 
interest. The reference to the ‘European perspective’ of the immediate neighbours and its 
significance for the stability of the region clearly indicates this community.  
In general, the discourse of Europeanization modified interpretations of the signifier of the 
nation which did not dislocate but notably marginalized nationalist interpretations of unity 
708 Pervanov, ‘Bulgaria: Stabilizing Factor in South-Eastern Europe’, speech for the Association for South-
Eastern Europe on 25th Feb 2006. 
709 Pervanov, ‘Bulgaria: a Stabilizing Factor in South-Eastern Europe’. 
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and exclusivity. Emphasizing different national values, offering different opportunities for 
political action and articulating the national interest in a different manner, 
Europeanization interpreted the signifier of the nation in a more open, more inclusive, and 
more active manner, which notably transformed the contents of Bulgarian national 
identity towards the end of Bulgaria’s transition to give it more credibility in the new 
contexts. 
Identity Narratives of Territory 
Europeanization’s interpretation of the identity signifier of territory had a similar effect. 
Nationalism’s emphasis on the notion of territorial integrity as a highest national value 
gradually gave way to different interpretations of national territory. Perceiving territorial 
space in its entirety as a central aspect of Bulgarian national identity had not been 
replaced by a more flexible territorial arrangement in the short span of a decade and a 
half. But this perception had significantly been de-politicized. Domestic inter-ethnic 
relations and cross-border inter-national relations were no longer interpreted as a threat 
to the territorial integrity of the state. This allowed diminishing the political relevance of 
this interpretation of territory. At the same time, improved domestic inter-ethnic relations 
and regional inter-national relations had come to be recognized as a political resource of 
legitimacy and prestige. This enabled ‘imagining’ territory no longer as a fortress against 
the ‘Other(s)’ but as a bridge towards them. 
This transformation has been illustrated by the changed significance of borders. Political 
emphasis is no longer put on their maintenance as barriers (in terms of ‘barbed wire’ 
facilities, increased number of ‘border guards’, etc.). Quite to the contrary, concerted 
political effort is put in their opening towards the ‘Other’. Developing connecting railway 
and roadway infrastructure, establishing new commercial border control points, facilitating 
cross-border businesses, are some of the trends that testify to this change. They are all 
interpreted within the context of European integration and Europeanization of the 
Balkans: 
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“[When] all Balkan states, without exception, have their clear European perspective, 
[..] I personally believe this will happen in the foreseeable future, the borders 
between different Balkan states [..] will lose their specific practical significance.”710 
On a different occasion, upon opening a new border checkpoint, the president appeals for 
continuing efforts ‘for the true opening on both sides of the border’711. Interpreting the 
opening of borders as a benefit for the people and as an achievement for the state clearly 
demonstrates the contrast with earlier articulations of the significance of borders. 
Awareness of this change is confirmed in the reference to borders and border areas as 
‘doors’ to Europe.712 Rhetorically identifying the link between European integration and 
the decreased practical relevance of borders is an important political strategy. It aims at 
emphasizing the territorial commonality of European spaces as opposed to the 
separateness of national spaces. This facilitated the increased permeability of borders and 
put emphasis on their connecting (not separating) function. 
One aspect of the interpretation of borders and their significance in Bulgarian politics still 
perpetuated the function of border maintenance but it was directly linked to Bulgaria’s 
aspired belonging to the common European space. It is related to Bulgaria’s prospective 
role as the gatekeeper of European Union’s external border. In this sense Bulgaria is keen 
to demonstrate its capabilities in managing its borders even before actual membership: 
“Bulgaria already ambitiously and correctly fulfils its obligations as external border of 
the EU. [..] The reforms we are implementing [..] have a direct effect on the common 
European space because security in united Europe is undivisible. [..] Bulgaria can 
contribute to that.”713 
Thus, as much as borders continue to have a political relevance, it is defined in terms of 
protecting the common European space from external threats. This interpretation 
demonstrates in practice the dynamics of shifting the ‘Self’-‘Other’ dialectic from the 
710 Pervanov, Summit on Balkan Economy and Tourism in Duras, Albania on 28th Apr 2006. 
711 Pervanov, ‘Elhovo Becomes a Door to Europe’, speech during the president’s visit in the municipality of 
Elhovo on 25th Mar 2006. 
712 Ibid. 
713 Pervanov, Lecture on National Security on 23rd Jun 2006 at the National Palace of Culture. 
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national to the supra-national, which the Europeanization discourse puts into motion. The 
‘Other’ is a threat only as an outsider to the commonality of Europe.  
Translated into everyday politics, this awareness is also confirmed in the amendment of 
the constitutional provision prohibiting foreigners from land ownership rights in 
Bulgaria.714 True, the enforcement of the new text is postponed715 in time and subject to 
conditions716. But the fact that the sedimented quality of the constitutional arrangement 
had been successfully challenged by the demands of membership negotiations testifies for 
the power of the Europeanization discourse over nationalist interpretations of territory as 
exclusively national and undivisible. The normality with which the constitutional 
amendment was voted and approved is illustrative of that: 
“[amending the constitutional text on foreign ownership over land] is a natural 
change and we accept it. Giving up something we also receive a lot, as part of a 
political and economic community.”717 
Parliamentary debates on the change did not avoid references to preserving the traditions 
and independence of Bulgarian constitutionalism718 but they did not convincingly 
challenge the political priority of the imperatives of Europeanization.719 It is in this sense 
that nationalist interpretations of identity referring to the signifier of territory were 
marginalized in favour of interpretations of the national space as part of a larger, supra-
national community.  
Identity Narratives of Purpose 
The discourse of Europeanization also had transformative effect on the contents of the 
signifier of national purpose. Sedimented interpretations embedded into the discourse of 
nationalism revolved around the idea of centrality on the Balkans and fluctuated between 
714 Amended Art. 22, Para.2 in force from the enforcement date of Bulgaria’s accession treaty.  
715 Transition period of 7 years after accession. 
716 Ownership is legalized to EU citizens only (not any foreign national) and if they intend to settle in Bulgaria, 
see the Law on Land Ownership and Rights at http://lex.bg/laws/ldoc/2132550145. 
717 Stanishev at the National Assembly, 16th Apr 2004, 348th session. 
718 Ibid. 
719 Meglena Kuneva, ‘Constitutional Amendment Is Expected by the EU’ on BTV, ‘V Desetkata’ programme, 
2nd Apr 2006. 
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narratives of victimization and paternalistic visions of purpose based on stories of past 
grandeur and tragic glory. As early as the first half of the 1990s European interpretations of 
national purpose began to affect the idea of general direction at state level. A decade later 
they hegemonically articulated the meanings of national purpose as inseparable from the 
discourse of Europeanization.  
One of the most dominant narratives aimed to articulate Bulgaria’s role into the 
Europeanization project not simply as a beneficiary but as an active contributor who can 
add value to the community it aspired to join. The narrative served the dual purpose of a 
self-enhancement strategy (internally) and of a negotiation strategy (externally). Taken up 
at the highest political level – head of state and government – the narrative of Bulgaria’s 
value and contribution to Europe became increasingly salient during the membership 
preparations: 
“[W]e do not see EU membership as consummators, as a state which hopes to be 
receiving funds [..]. So far, and in even greater degree from now on, Bulgaria will be 
an active factor of stability in South-Eastern Europe, a state implementing policies of 
good neighbourly relations, developing the cooperation model in all areas among the 
states in the region, a state which will be one of the key generators of peace, 
democratization, effective market and social reforms.”720 
The narrative essentially tells the common story of Bulgaria’s transition: democracy, 
market liberalization, social reform, preserving the ethnic peace at home and improving 
bilateral relations with neighbours from the region. What enabled turning it into a story of 
uniqueness is its locus: against the background of the turbulent Western Balkans, 
Bulgaria’s transition seemed remarkable in its normality.  
“We have the self confidence of a factor of stability and peace for the whole region of 
South-Eastern Europe. Bulgaria will contribute to the EU its capital of excellent 
720 Stanishev, verbatim report from the public sitting of the European Integration Council chaired by the 
prime minister, 9th Jan 2006.  
 
270 
 
                                                            
N. Nancheva                                                                                                                                        Transforming Identities in Europe 
relations with its neighbours, [..] provide guarantee for the stability of the region, 
which the EU itself should seek.”721 
Pointing to the necessary dividends which Bulgaria can bring to the EU, the president 
effectively reverses the victimization rhetoric to demonstrate how Europe depends on 
Bulgaria’s role and not the other way around. This discursive strategy, though arguable in 
the validity of its claim, is important because it aims to provide a credible positive role for 
the state in the wider context of Europeanization, when nationalist narratives of past glory 
have been left behind. It is this interpretation of purpose that ensured the power of the 
Europeanization discourse in Bulgarian politics: 
“Today the Republic of Bulgaria is the most advanced candidate state from the region 
in its negotiations for EU membership. This fact imposes on us additional duties in 
advancing the processes of integration in South-Eastern Europe.”722 
Stabilizing Bulgaria’s place within the discourse of Europeanization, in its turn, enables 
perpetuating the ‘Europe’ narratives in the Balkans, as Bulgaria’s ‘European’ 
interpretations of purpose are closely linked to its position in the region: 
“Bulgaria’s EU membership will not only confirm our European identity. It will also 
send an important positive signal towards our neighbours for the irreversibility of the 
unification processes in Europe. [..S]ecurity, stability and prosperity of South-Eastern 
Europe [are only possible] through the European prospective of the region.”723 
Interpreting Bulgarian narratives of national purpose within the discourse of 
Europeanization provides Bulgaria with a credible positive role in the region and in Europe 
that is articulated in terms of ‘setting an example’ of peace, stability, prosperity.724 
Maintaining the credibility of this role posed certain imperatives on the state’s foreign 
policy behaviour, which in effect promoted regional cooperation and international amity. 
In view of Bulgarian-Macedonian relations, this was the indicator of ‘European-ness’: 
721 Pervanov, ‘Bulgaria at the Doorstep of the EU’. 
722 Pervanov, ‘Bulgaria’s New Regional Role after NATO Membership and Prospective EU Membership’, 
lecture on 12th May 2004 at the National Palace of Culture. 
723 Ibid. 
724 Pervanov, interview for the Macedonian National Radio on 4th Nov 2006.  
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“Bulgaria has never had such good relations either with Macedonia or with the rest of 
the states in the region. There has been an ongoing dialogue [..] which had not been 
seen before in the centuries long history of the region. Bulgarian-Macedonian 
relations set an example for [..] the future of the Balkans.”725 
In terms of solving the specific problems that had plagued Bulgarian-Macedonian relations, 
this interpretation of national purpose for Bulgaria in practice marginalized many of the 
points of conflictuality. Bulgaria insisted on maintaining a paternalistic tone in its dialogue 
with Macedonia.726 Its paternalism, however, was now not based on the assumption of 
inequality but on the degree of Europeanization. Bulgaria saw itself as an exporter of 
European experience and expertise727, and this is what determined its presumably more 
advantageous position. It is important to note that despite the paternalistic tone, 
Bulgaria’s interpretation of bilateral relations had changed in one significant way. It was no 
longer seen within the brotherhood dialectic (implying the superiority of the ‘older 
brother’ over the ‘younger brother). Within the Europeanization discourse Macedonia was 
seen as a friend: 
“We have achieved some serious progress and we are happy to share our experience 
with our Macedonian friends;”728  
“[W]ishing peace, stability and prosperity to our Macedonian friends.”729 
Given the high degree of conflictuality which the former interpretation had perpetuated, 
this change is significant. 
Overall, the discourse of Europeanization provided a credible positive interpretation of 
national purpose which in effect reduced national identity conflictuality. Its reading of 
Bulgarian national identity succeeded in articulating explicit nationalist interpretations as 
the aberration from normality. By emphasizing the centrality of dialogue, cooperation and 
725 Ibid. 
726 Briefing by the speaker of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Dimitar Tsanchev on 26th Jul 2006 at  
http://www.mfa.bg/en/news/category/4. 
727 Motif repeatedly occurring in the official bilateral communication in the period 2002-2007 at the level of 
heads of state and heads of governments. 
728 Pervanov, interview for the Macedonian National Radio on 4th Nov 2006. 
729 Pervanov, ‘Ten Years Later’, speech at the Macedonian parliament, Skopje, 27th Feb 2002. 
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mutuality, Europeanization discourse upheld the norm of ‘European-ness’ and positioned 
conflictuality in contravention to this norm. Thus it enabled the sustainable empowerment 
of European narratives of identity as hegemonic and re-affirmed the European perspective 
of Bulgaria and, through it, of the region. The hegemony of Europeanization, in turn, 
created the condition of possibility for the eventual marginalization of even implicit and 
legitimate nationalist interpretations of Bulgarian national identity.  
 
Modifications in the Macedonian National Identity Narratives of ‘Self’ 
The empowerment of the Europeanization discourse in Macedonia took a different course 
due to the different contexts which structured Macedonia’s transition. Breaking up from 
the federation and declaring independence posed the need for achieving international 
recognition. On the one hand it delayed Macedonia’s bid for (re-)turn to Europe by 
disabling its capacity to participate in European politics until recognized by all EU 
members. On the other hand it made the transition process more cumbersome by adding 
a new dimension to it – the need to re-affirm statehood.  
Macedonia’s Balkan context also impeded the empowerment of the Europeanization 
discourse because of the bilateral problems which it conditioned. Conflictuality in the 
relations with Bulgaria was contained. Other than numerous missed opportunities for 
increasing regional leverage, it did not involve serious impediments on Macedonia’s way to 
‘Europe’ mostly in line with Bulgaria’s declarative support for Europeanization of the 
region. But conflictuality in the relations with Serbia730 revolved around a long-standing 
border dispute in the north-west of Macedonia731 which, together with the unrest in 
Kosovo and the large numbers of Kosovo refugees, temporarily destabilized peace in the 
republic. After the change of power in Serbia the dispute was officially resolved in the 
beginning of 2001732 but the instability it brought to the country exacerbated domestic 
730 Then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and still under Milošević. 
731 Mostly but no exclusively along the border with Kosovo. 
732 Border Demarcation Agreement signed by Trajkovski and Kostunica on 23rd Feb 2001, see Mile 
Milenkovski and Jove Talevki, ‘Delineation of the State Border between the Republic of Macedonia and the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’, IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin (Summer 2001), appendix.  
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inter-ethnic tensions, thus perpetuating micro-nationalisms and preventing progress in the 
Europeanization processes. Conflictuality in the relations with Greece in its turn also had 
very serious consequences for the empowerment of the Europeanization discourse. Greek 
anxiety over Macedonia’s national flag and the interpretation of its constitutional 
provisions733 was mollified with the interim accord of 1995, which confirmed Greek 
recognition of Macedonian statehood and allowed Macedonia to formally initiate the 
process of its European integration. But Greek objections to the republic’s constitutional 
name and the ensuing name dispute negotiations proved more intractable.734 They 
delayed Macedonia’s progress towards association negotiations and consequently, 
Macedonia’s bid for full EU membership. But, most importantly, they affected the 
credibility of the Europeanization discourse in Macedonia because of Europe’s failure to 
exert pressure on Greece to reach an agreement. The fact that Greece instrumentalized its 
influence as a EU member for the purposes of the dispute to threaten Macedonia’s future 
membership and hinder Macedonia’s membership negotiations seriously compromised 
the European Community’s standing among Macedonian publics. In effect it questioned 
the ability of the Europeanization discourse to accommodate the increased salience of the 
central identity signifiers carried by the notion of ‘Macedonian-ness’ in the name of the 
republic. It thus challenged ‘Europe’s’ credible reading of Macedonian national identity.  
Macedonia’s Albanian context of minority-majority accommodation was another factor 
which distanced the republic from its European perspective and affected the 
empowerment of the Europeanization discourse. Indirectly linked to unrest in Kosovo, 
Albanian insurgency groups in Macedonia brought the republic to a state of civil conflict 
through most of 2001. Marginalizing the imperatives of everyday politics to give way to the 
urgent rhetoric of war and peace, the conflict exposed a serious inter-ethnic divide in the 
state. Reconciling domestic micro-nationalisms became a political priority, which 
destabilized Macedonia’s transition to democracy and postponed its active preparations 
for EU membership. EU’s active role in brokering the peace agreement, however, kept 
733 Significantly, Art.49 of the Macedonian Constitution.  
734 As confirmed publicly by Greece: 
http://umdiaspora.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=150&Itemid=76, also 
http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=24&article=18371. 
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Macedonia’s European perspective in sight and reinstated the relevance of 
Europeanization discourse to Macedonian politics.735 
So even though challenged by the specific Macedonian contexts invoking nationalist 
discourses on micro- and macro-levels, the empowerment of the Europeanization 
discourse did not cease. On the contrary, in the first years of the new millennium it was 
seen as a strategic goal and a wide political consensus maintained its domestic relevance. 
Macedonia’s formal application for EU membership submitted in 2004736 was positively 
decided on in the end of 2005, when Macedonia officially became a candidate state. In the 
course of empowering ‘Europe’ and marginalizing nationalism, the contents of 
Macedonian national identity acquired a modified reading which promised to decrease its 
conflictuality. 
Identity Narratives of Nationhood 
At the beginning of its transition Macedonia attempted to interpret the state community 
as organized around the notion of national tolerance. This interpretation was meant to 
reconcile the long-standing Macedonian aspiration for an independent national state with 
the political impossibility to establish the new state along ethno-national lines. In view of 
the domestic deterioration of inter-ethnic relations the salience of this signifier 
dramatically increased precisely because of its absence. It signified what the state 
community desperately needed in order to preserve its integrity. The centrality of the 
signifier of ‘the nation’ interpreted in terms of national tolerance is evident, in the first 
place, in the frequent and formulaic references to it as the solution of the exacerbating 
inter-ethnic tensions: 
“Everybody in Macedonia [..] should know that the success of ethnic extremism [..] is 
the end of peace and stability in the region. [..] This is a deadly blow over inter-ethnic 
735 Ohrid Framework Agreement and the EU, see Florian Bieber, ‘Conclusions: The Ohrid Framework 
Agreement after 7 years’, in Florian Bieber (ed.), Power-Sharing and the Implementation of the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement (Skopje: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung - Office Macedonia, 2008), 207-211. 
736 Just before entering into force of the Stabilization and Association Agreement. 
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relations. It can, in a very short time, turn the tolerance which took years to build up 
into destructive hatred.”737 
Securitizing tolerance as highest value (‘took years to build’) is achieved through 
establishing a discursive opposition between it and the obvious pernicious consequences 
of hatred (qualified as ‘destructive’). This opposition is re-enforced by announcing the 
incompatibility of the rhetorical antonym of tolerance – ethnic extremism – with peace 
and stability. Expanding the negative impact of abandoning national tolerance beyond the 
borders of the national space to include the ‘region’ emphasizes in a dramatic manner its 
central importance as a signifier of national identity. It determines both the domestic 
stability of the community (its absence is ‘a deadly blow over inter-ethnic relations’) and 
the international standing of the state as a key actor in the region.  
The salience of the signifier of ‘nation’ interpreted in terms of national tolerance is also 
evident in the post-conflict political rationalization of the civil unrest. The conflict is 
explained exclusively as an attempt to surrender this key signifier of ‘Macedonian-ness’: 
“The insurgents skilfully used some still open issues and stereotypes and shook the 
backbone of Macedonian stability, culture and history – inter-ethnic tolerance – to 
bring the state to the brink of inter-ethnic war.”738 
Repeated emphasis on tolerance as a core identity marker re-articulates the community of 
the Macedonian state in terms of what it lacks, which reveals the discursive centrality of 
the signifier. Ascribing the insurgency to the contingent instrumentalization of simple 
‘open issues’ and ‘stereotypes’ and not to deeper underlying problems in the construction 
of the state is an attempt to diminish its political relevance and re-establish normality. 
Reference to the intertwinement of inter-ethnic tolerance with the ‘backbone’ of 
‘Macedonian-ness’ re-enforces this attempt. The established chain of equivalence between 
the notions of stability, culture and history also serves this purpose. While the salience of 
culture and history in the construction of Macedonian national identity has been 
domestically undisputed, that of stability has not. Positioning stability on par with culture 
737 Trajkovski, parliamentary address on 6th Mar 2001. 
738 Trajkovski, parliamentary address on 21st Dec 2001. 
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and history is an act of identity constitution which re-affirms the discursive centrality of 
tolerance.  
The idea of national tolerance continues to be increasingly salient not only in the 
immediate post-conflict period but throughout the first decade of the new millennium. 
This has to do with the imperatives of national reconciliation and the construction of a 
credible collective identity at the state level. Upon its return to power in 2006, the 
democratic party appealed precisely to this imperative. The new prime minister declared 
his government’s priority as ‘leading Macedonia forward, in co-existance, tolerance and 
understanding’739.  
The salience of this interpretation of Macedonian national identity is upheld by the 
stronger emphasis placed on inter-ethnic ‘dialogue’, ‘good inter-ethnic relations’740 and 
overcoming inter-ethnic ‘divisions’741. Lending credibility to these notions logically puts 
forward the necessity of articulating the state community not along national but along 
civic lines.  
“We need to send a message that Macedonia is a civic community committed to 
tolerance and co-existence. We showed that we know our way in nurturing our [..] 
traditional tolerance, developing democracy, respecting human rights and 
transitioning to market economy.”742 
The awareness that the community of the state should be organized along civic lines is a 
major change from the uncertainty articulated at the beginning of Macedonian 
independent statehood. Connecting civic identity with the idea of tolerance and the key 
requirements of the transition (functioning democracy, human rights, market economy) 
enables Macedonia to re-claim its European-ness: 
739 Gruevski, Utrinski newspaper of 30th Oct 2006. 
740 Trajkovski, parliamentary address on 6th Mar 2001. 
741 Gruevski, Utrinski newspaper of 30th Oct 2006. 
742 Trajkovski, parliamentary address on 6th Mar 2001. 
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“Macedonia develops and supports the multi-culturality of its society within the 
framework of the [..] civic character of the state.”743 
The salience of the idea of national tolerance and its significance for the success of the 
transition ultimately serve the purpose of advancing Macedonia’s preparation for 
European integration. They attempt to prove that the state has managed inter-ethnic 
unrest and left it behind, and is ready to be included in the common European processes. 
This is how they are related to the empowerment of the discourse of Europeanization.  
 “In the end, we are all trying to join the European family, where we belong, with 
dignity.”744 
“Our duty is to overcome inter-ethnic [..] divisions and demonstrate that Macedonia 
is ready to take its due place in Europe.”745 
“Macedonia’s determination for European integration [..]has been a key element of 
its policies from the very start as a consensus among all political parties.”746 
 “We are working to fulfil specific standards from our European agenda.”747 
The repeated claim that Macedonia belongs to the European ‘family’ and has its ‘due 
place’ there, the reference to preparation for integration as a ‘key element’ of Macedonian 
politics, the suggestion that Macedonia’s bid for EU integration constitutes a clear 
‘European agenda’, demonstrate that the discourse of Europeanization is being 
consistently empowered at official state level. The appeal for  ‘duty’, the claim for 
‘determination’ and ‘consensus’, the notion of ‘dignity’ reveal elements of the political will 
which maintained the gradual empowerment.  
Attaching the interpretation of national tolerance to the signifier of the nation and 
discursively linking it to the signifiers of ‘Europe’ eventually produced a less conflictual 
national identity construct at state level. It emphasized Macedonian identity as ‘open to 
743 Trajkovski, parliamentary address on 21st Dec 2001. 
744 Trajkovski, parliamentary address on 6th Mar 2001. 
745 Trajkovski, parliamentary address on 21st Dec 2001. 
746 Lubisha Georgievski, speaker of parliament, 7th Sep 2006, 3rd Plenary session. 
747 Buckovski, 26th Aug 2006, 2nd Plenary session. 
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the world’748 and to life with ‘the others’749. In the bilateral relations with Bulgaria this is 
illustrated in the gradual normalization of political rhetoric on ‘otherness’. In terms of 
majority-minority relations it led to the gradual detabooization of the idea of a ‘Bulgarian’ 
minority, even if not to formal recognition of such. While at the beginning of the transition 
Bulgarians were never listed by the majority as one of the numerous ‘nationalities’ 
inhabiting Macedonia750, towards the mid-2000s occasional references to ethnic 
Bulgarians living in the state became a relatively safe political choice.751 This is significant, 
given the inevitable anti-Bulgarianism of Macedonian identity construction from the first 
years of Macedonian statehood. Uncovering the mechanism of stabilizing the idea of 
national tolerance as central in Macedonia’s national identity in view of Europeanization 
comes to address the modification.  
Identity Narratives of Territory 
As with the previous identity signifier, the interpretation of national territory was closely 
linked to the specific context of Macedonia’s transition. In the first years of independence 
and in view of the imperatives of launching the project of statehood, Macedonian identity 
politics revolved around the idea of belonging to ‘Macedonia’ as ‘land’ and, consequently, 
around the centrality of the ‘Macedonian’ denominator in domestic affairs. In the context 
of overcoming international isolation and inter-ethnic division, these interpretations were 
gradually marginalized to give way to less antagonistic narratives of identity. In order to 
stabilize Macedonia’s regional standing and in order to make progress in Macedonia’s 
European integration aspirations, Macedonia needed to send clear messages about its 
commitment to respecting the Balkan territorial status quo. Most significantly this implied 
a guarantee for non-intervention in the domestic affairs of neighbouring states in view of 
minority status promotion. The imperative of improving relations with neighbours led to 
providing such guarantees in the bilateral state communication with Greece752 and 
748 Trajkovski, parliamentary address on 21st Dec 2001. 
749 Trajkovski, parliamentary address on 21st Dec 2001. 
750 When they were mentioned, it was by Albanian minority representatives. 
751 26th Oct 2006 parliament (e.g. Vesna Janeska). 
752 The interpretation of Art.49 of the Constitution in the Interim Accords of 1995 with Greece. 
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Bulgaria753. Retreating from the vision of maintaining active links with adjacent parts of 
geographical Macedonia notably decreased the external conflictuality of Macedonian 
national identity. It shifted the focus on the current sovereign territory of Macedonia, 
marginalizing historical narratives of belonging, and re-interpreted Macedonian national 
territory in terms of completeness and integrity. 
The dynamics of bridging domestic inter-ethnic divides upheld a similar interpretation of 
territory. The problems along the north-western border and the Albanian insurgency put 
Macedonia’s territorial integrity under actual threat. In the prospect of having to surrender 
sovereignty over part of the state territory towards Kosovo or to profoundly transform the 
form of statehood to acknowledge internal divisions as autonomous territories or 
federation, Macedonian politics swiftly turned to securitizing territorial integrity as a 
priority. The suggestion that Macedonian statehood could renounce unitarism and devolve 
into a federation was interpreted as the worse-case scenario. It was articulated through 
the ideas of ‘fission’ and ‘breakdown’754. Unitarism, on the other hand, was articulated in 
terms of ‘security’ and ‘stability’755. Securitizing the form of statehood is re-enforced by 
another rhetorical strategy. Official Macedonian rhetoric consistently links unitary 
statehood to the individual as a referent object of security. It is repeatedly being suggested 
that surrendering unitarism should have serious negative impact on the ‘peace and 
serenity of all citizens of the Republic of Macedonia’756, on the ‘serenity of every 
household’ and on the ‘tranquility of our children’757.  By directly engaging the individual 
into the cause of defending unitary statehood and territorial integrity, Macedonian politics 
definitively articulated them as central in the national identity of the state.  
In view of Macedonia’s long-awaited and quite recent independent statehood, the 
increased salience of territorial integrity and unitarism is unsurprising. Preserving the 
integrity and the unitary form of the state, however, posed the imperative of national 
reconciliation. The successful accommodation of the demands of the Albanian political 
753 The provision in the same tone in the Joint Declaration of 1999 with Bulgaria. 
754 Radmila Shekerinska, 26th Aug 2006, parliament 2nd session. 
755 Buckovski, 26th Aug 2006, parliament 2nd session. 
756 Trajkovski, 71st  plenary session, 6th Mar 2001. 
757 Ibid. 
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representation for fair participation in the project of statehood demanded shifting the 
focus on ‘Macedonian-ness’ as a central signifier of state identity and emphasizing instead 
togetherness and participation.758 Such interpretation of state identity concurred with the 
signifiers of ‘Europe’. This ensured its salience in the course of empowering the 
Europeanization discourse. The significance of borders, for instance, was visibly 
transformed in this sense. Despite the insistence on their fixedness759, borders were re-
articulated in the context of national reconciliation and Europeanization as open and 
transparent.  
“In a time when all European borders are falling, [ethnic extremists] want to erect 
new, ethnic borders. [This] demand for ethnically pure territories is motivated by [..] 
racism and hatred.”760 
Renouncing the ethnic divisions in the state, the president uncovers the incompatibility of 
‘bordering’ Macedonia with its European orientation and the integration processes in 
Europe.  
 “The only option which we stand behind is European and transparent borders in the 
region.”761 
This declaration is sustainably maintained in the advancement of Macedonia’s transition. 
In the context of border control and border management as a prerequisite for EU 
candidacy, the legislative framework on the subject is over-determined in view of 
‘European standards’762 and the permeability of borders for ‘people, goods, and capital’763: 
“[The aim is to] ensure European standards and the conditions for having ever more 
open borders.”764  
758 Trajkovski, Buckovski, Gruevski. 
759 Trajkovski, parliamentary address on 21st Dec 2001. 
760 Trajkovski, parliamentary address on 21st Dec 2001. 
761 Trajkovski, 71st  plenary session, 6th Mar 2001. 
762 Discussion on the bill on police in its section on border police 26th Oct 2006, 6th plenary session. 
763 And impermeability for criminality, plenary session 3rd plenary session, 7th Sep 2006. 
764 Lubisha Georgievski, 3rd plenary session, 7th Sep 2006. 
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The idea of ‘open-ness’ towards the outside world is a significant transformation in the 
interpretation of Macedonian national identity. In stark contrast with the nationalist 
interpretations of ‘besieged’ territory from the early years of independence, Macedonia 
now articulated its statehood as open towards the immediate national ‘Other(s)’. This is 
evident it the way the neighbours are positioned in terms of Macedonia’s strategic future: 
“In its aspiration for EU membership [..] Macedonia is fortunate to soon have two 
neighbours, Greece and Bulgaria, who are EU members and should be able to help us, 
too, realize our objective, on which the political parties and the citizens of this state 
are in consensus.”765 
The rhetoric of bilateral partnership and mutual assistance in the preparations for EU 
membership has been an indispensible element of Bulgarian-Macedonian inter-state 
communication after 1999. Its appearance in Macedonia’s domestic discursive space has 
not been as frequent. Referring to Greece in terms of ‘good fortune’ has been even rarer. 
This is why the modification of the interpretation of borders as an opportunity to connect 
rather than as a dividing line is novel. It suggests a decrease in the conflictuality of the 
external projections of Macedonian national identity.  
Identity Narratives of Purpose 
The modified interpretation of the signifier of national purpose also opens up Macedonian 
national identity towards the ‘Other(s)’. Nationalist rhetoric of victimization and 
vindication through independent statehood, characteristic of the early transition, placed 
the political emphasis on the realization of the ‘Self’. The project of independence was 
meant to assert Macedonian national identity as a legitimate state. In contrast, the 
rhetoric of the late transition, already guided by the strategic goal of European integration, 
interpreted Macedonian identity through its role in the region. In this sense the 
articulation of national purpose included the immediate ‘Other(s)’ in a non-antagonistic 
manner, as participants in the regional community of states. Having achieved independent 
statehood and having preserved the integrity of the new state, Macedonia turned to 
‘Europe’ as a way to stabilize the fundament of its statehood project. European integration 
765 Vesna Janevska, 6th plenary session on 26th Oct 2006. 
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offered a model of non-national governance which the post-Ohrid Macedonian state could 
subscribe to.766  
In order to articulate this inherent compatibility, Macedonian politics had to marginalize 
internal conflictuality and emphasize stability and predictability.767 Thus the interpretation 
of national purpose began to focus on Macedonia’s role as a key to the stability of the 
region.  
“Macedonia acquired broad international support for its policies and re-affirmed 
itself as a pivot of stability in the region.[..] Destabilizing Macedonia will challenge 
the new climate and legitimate aspirations for peaceful and prosperous Balkans.”768 
At the level of head of government, this interpretation remained a central theme in the 
articulation of national purpose. Upon his stepping in office, the new Macedonian prime 
minister from the right is being advised by his predecessor from the left to ‘continue 
building up the image of Macedonian as a factor of stability and a regional leader’769. 
Announcing Macedonia’s regional standing as a factual confirmation of identity building 
rhetoric (‘continue building up the image of [..] a regional leader’) serves the purpose of 
increasing its credibility. This discursive strategy is applied consistently in the period in 
order to essentialize the assumption of leadership: 
“Never has Macedonia been as respected as now because we had a stance, we had 
an active policy, we had an active position [on Kosovo].”770 
The articulation of Macedonian national identity in the region in terms of agency also 
increases the credibility of the particular interpretation of purpose. This is in contrast with 
the passivity of the victimization discourse from the beginning of transition. Macedonia’s 
leadership positions the state as a master of its own destiny. This interpretation is 
emancipatory and optimistic – it is oriented towards the future: 
766 This idea is more frequently voiced by the Albanian political representation, see for instance Azis 
Polozhani during the 12th parliamentary seesion on 9th Nov 2006. 
767 Often constructed as a ‘predictable partner’ in the rhetoric of the prime-minister. 
768 Trajkovski, 6th Mar 2001. 
769 Buckovski towards Gruevski in his address in parliament on 26th Aug 2006. 
770 Ibid. 
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“Everything is in our hands. We should try to see not what the international 
community can do for us [but what we can do for ourselves]. We are members of the 
international community. We have the chance but time does not wait – the decision 
of the European Union will not wait.”771  
Already as an EU candidate state, Macedonia asserts its interpretation of national purpose 
in a forward manner and in optimistic terms. Positioning itself as a full member of the 
international community, the republic demonstrates detachment from the frustrations of 
the past. Historically antagonistic relations are now interpreted as opportunities. Albania, 
Greece and Bulgaria are seen as a bridge towards realizing Macedonia’s European 
aspiration: 
“[The new government] should promptly establish contacts with both Berisha and 
Stanishev, it should also try again with Karamanlis, perhaps to better ends.”772 
Seeing the prime ministers of neighbouring states in terms of pragmatic politics and not as 
adversaries, despite the various degree of conflictuality which still strained bilateral 
relations, is an indication of the transformation in the interpretation of national purpose. 
Macedonian national identity has been determined by its European orientation, so 
conflictual interpretations of nationalism should be transcended. It is this articulation of 
purpose that enabled the process of marginalizing nationalism from the Macedonian 
national identity construction.  
In view of this modification, the uniqueness of Macedonian identity is over-determined in 
positive terms. The historical myths of uniqueness give way to a new mythologization of 
Macedonia’s regional standing. It is centred around the story of ‘the most successful 
fairytale on the Balkans’ and the ‘small regional miracle’773. What enabled the upholding of 
these new myths was Macedonia’s claim for having preserved ‘the peace’774. Against the 
background of war-torn Kosovo, and previously Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, this claim sounds 
credible. Even though not entirely correct, it allowed the re-narration of Macedonian 
771 Ibid. 
772 Ibid. 
773 In the words of the prime minister Buckovski in parliament on 26th Aug 2006. 
774 Lubisha Georgievski, parliamentary address on 7th Sep 2006. 
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identity as unique and positive. In this narrative, the 2001 inter-ethnic turmoil is re-told 
not as a ‘conflict’ but as a ‘crisis situation, resolved politically’775. The incompatibility of 
ethno-political conflict with the discourse of Europeanization determined this narrative 
turn.  
The modification of the interpretation of national purpose in the late Macedonian 
transition is closely linked to Macedonia’s strategic objective of European integration. The 
imperative of making sense of the most recent event in the chronology of the Macedonian 
state – inter-ethnic conflict – in view of Macedonia’s European aspirations produced a 
more open, more optimistic, and less nationalistic interpretation of national purpose. 
Unlike Bulgaria, where the aspiration for integration came with the inertia of the 
‘refolutions’776 in the rest of Central and South-Eastern Europe, Macedonia turned to 
‘Europe’ after the first wave of applicant states had launched their negotiations. This had 
to do with the delay in achieving recognition. In the meanwhile, it got caught in the turmoil 
of inter-ethnic tension, which seriously destabilized its statehood project from within. 
While attempting to restore stability, Macedonia’s leadership cultivated the awareness 
that the painful process of re-constituting statehood and transcending nationalist 
interpretations of national identity were meant to reform the state as truely ‘European’. In 
this sense, European incentives in the form of declarations of support777 or visa 
liberalization agreements778 significantly re-enforced the power of the Europeanization 
discourse in Macedonia. Failure to provide such incentives, on the other hand, promised to 
affect the credibility of the ‘European’ reading of Macedonian identity.  
 
Comparing Modifications in Identity Narratives of ‘Self’ 
As demonstrated above, modifications in national identity patterns and transformations of 
national identity narratives in the two states are linked to understanding the contingent 
775 Ibid. 
776 Timothy Garton Ash, The Magic Lantern (NY: Vintage Books, 1993). 
777 Such as the declarations of Germany’s support, Deutsche Welle quoting Angela Merkel’s declaration of 
support: ‘Germany is very interested in the successful outcome of Macedonia’s application’ on 17th Oct 2006.  
778 As expected by Macedonia by the end of 2006, ibid. 
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political contexts in which they operated. Contexts were very different in Bulgaria and in 
Macedonia, and so were the national identity patterns they produced. Despite the often 
similar contents of identity signifiers, the discursive positions of the national subjects 
differed significantly (Table 13). The different relations established between the various 
discursive elements in the two identity constructions re-produced different outcomes. The 
notion of ‘territorial integrity’, for instance, appears as a central interpretation of the 
signifier of national territory at the beginning of Bulgaria’s transition and towards the end 
of Macedonia’s. Its implications, however, are very different in the two cases. While in 
Bulgaria territorial integrity was upheld as a signifier of nationalist discourse, in Macedonia 
it signified Europeanization and detachment from nationalism. Similar dynamics is 
detectable in the changed interpretations of nationhood (in terms of ‘unity’ and 
‘tolerance’) and national purpose (in terms of ‘centrality’ and ‘contribution’). This 
observation confirms the validity of the assumption that the specific contents of the 
signifiers of identity is contingent and ultimately accidental. Its meaning emerges on the 
basis of relations to other signifiers within the discursive limits, established through 
hegemonic articulations. This assumption points to the direct dependency of national 
identity narratives on the political and sees identity change as a function of that. From this 
perspective national identity change is not only conceivable, it is inevitable in a changed 
discursive context. The empowerment of Europeanization invoked such a change.    
What enabled this outcome was placing strategic priority in both Bulgaria and Macedonia 
to inclusion into the dynamics of European integration and the subsequent empowerment 
of the Europeanization discourse. In this context nationalist reading of identity lost 
relevance and credibility. Embarking upon the road to ‘Europe’, the two states re-
articulated their national identities in such a way, that nationalist interpretations were 
gradually marginalized. Over-determining national identity within the discourse of 
Europeanization positioned the state as a participant in a supra-national community of 
states. This challenged the constraining power of nation-state borders and offered national 
identity a significantly wider and more inclusive discursive space. The position of 
constitutive ‘otherness’ shifted from the immediate national ‘Other(s)’ to the projected 
borders of the community. In view of this re-positioning, the salience of certain 
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interpretations of identity signifiers which had been centred around difference, such as the 
notion of national unity, the narrative of vindication, the encapsulating role of state 
borders, gradually decreased. It was substituted by an increased emphasis on commonality 
and tolerance, and accentuating inclusive dimensions of difference. Accommodated within 
the discourse of Europeanization, national identity narratives appeared less antagonistic, 
more optimistic, and more positive. The credibility of this interpretation and its self-
enhancing function in turn stabilized the hegemony of Europeanization as the discourse 
which upheld the new reading of national identity.  
State 
Community 
National Identity Narratives of Self 
Nation  Territory Purpose 
Bulgaria National unity: 
-ethnic→national→ 
European political parties;  
-increased salience of 
‘national’ values such as 
good neighbourly relations, 
cooperation, trust; 
-re-definition of the 
‘national interest’ to 
include well-being of 
neighbours, the region and 
Europe. 
Territorial integrity: 
-decreased salience of 
national borders as a 
barrier; 
-increased salience of 
borders as a ‘door’ to 
Europe; 
-negotiability of the 
Constitution; 
-selling land to 
foreigners. 
 
Centrality on the 
Balkans: 
- contribution; 
-stability factor; 
-exporter of stability; 
-dialogue; 
-example ; 
-re-negotiation of the 
brothers/friends 
relationship with 
Macedonia. 
 
Macedonia National tolerance:  
-increased salience of the 
signifier of tolerance as the 
pivot of Macedonian 
stability; 
-civic community, emphasis 
on dialogue, good inter-
ethnic relations, 
overcoming inter-ethnic 
divisions; 
-openness to the world. 
Territorial belonging: 
-territorial integrity; 
-unitary state; 
-gradual detachment 
from the notion of 
‘severed whole’; 
- relaxation of the 
insistence on 
‘Macedonian-ness’ in 
domestic politics; 
-borders: transparent 
and European BUT 
-fixed and unchanging. 
Victimization 
narrative: 
-Sovereignty; 
-the most successful 
fairytale; 
-key to stability in the 
region; 
-maintaining peace. 
Table 13. Changed Patterns of National Identity: Bulgaria and Macedonia. 
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CHAPTER IX  
EUROPEANIZATION AND NATIONAL IDENTITY CHANGE 
 
This study of national identity in Europe and its transformation within the discourse of 
Europeanization was originally inspired by an empirical puzzle: the perpetual salience of 
national identity narratives in the realm of European politics. Against the background of 
deepening, widening, and expanding integration in Europe, it appears somewhat 
paradoxical that the stories of the nation should maintain their salience. The paradox 
comes from the inherent tension that seems to exist between the discourse of 
Europeanization as a space of commonality of many nations, and narratives of national 
identity dividing the common space into many separate ‘national’ spaces.  
 
Argument 
But approaching national identity from the theoretical and meta-theoretical perspective of 
poststructuralist discourse theory points to its central position within the grand discourse 
of nationalism – the totalizing system of meaning which stabilizes our political world and 
our collective identities as national subjects in it. Discourse theory allows an understanding 
of nationalism that is far from the traditional view of it as an ideology of extremism. 
Positioning nationalism as a grand discourse upheld by the story of the nation as the story 
of the state, discourse theory reveals the relevance of nationalism to all politics in Europe 
(and beyond). It suggests that in the world of nation-states national identity will always 
function as an overarching background identity whose salience is related to the 
imperatives of political mobilization. Linking the individual to sovereign power in a way 
that is pre-given and binding, national identity enables the interpellation of national 
subjects for the purposes of national politics. The ‘national’ stories repeatedly told about 
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the people and the world they inhabit essentialize this link, providing legitimacy to 
sovereignty emanating from the nation to the state. 
The project of integration in Europe set out to change this order. It significantly modified 
the principles of sovereign power. As a consequence, the human collectivity which 
sovereignty governed began to transform. The stories told about it imagined it no longer as 
a nation but as a community of nations. These stories emphasized commonality and 
fostered unity in difference. Their (re-)production articulated political reality as a shared 
discursive space no longer threatened by ‘otherness’. The ‘Other(s)’ were pushed beyond 
its boundaries and outside the discursive space of commonality they demarkated. This 
shared discursive space, however, continued to be inhabited by national subjects because 
integration continued to occur within the constraints of the sovereign nation-states. 
Sovereignty was only pooled to the extent to which nation-states negotiated it. So the 
national stories – the narratives of national identity – remained within the discursive limits 
of Europeanization. In the changing discursive contexts they also began to transform in 
order to re-position the national subjects and over-determine their identities. The progress 
of European integration and the empowerment of the Europeanization discourse in this 
sense re-activated their political relevance. Nationalist discourse, whose centre they 
formed, clashed with the discourse of Europeanization precisely in its divergent 
interpretations of national identity. This is how national identity appeared to be a central 
element of the European project. The outcome of the hegemonic struggle over its 
meanings has the potential to determine the future of European integration by either 
asserting Europeanization’s discursive power to tell a new story or compromising it. Thus, 
the reading of national identity narratives within the discourse of ‘Europe’ becomes the 
touchstone of Europeanization.  
 
Methodology 
It is on the basis of this assumption that the current dissertation turned to explore national 
identity transformation in Europe. The investigation focused on the context of EU 
Enlargement because of the significant changes which it invoked within the limits of the 
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discourse of Europeanization and within the limits of the discourse of nationalism. Change 
in discursive contexts re-activates identity articulation practices and highlights the political 
relevance of national identity narratives. This dynamics would not have been as visible in 
traditional EU member-states, even though the context of EU Enlargement significantly 
impacted their national identity (re-)production practices, too. But because of the 
particular historical context in which the European integration project was conceived, the 
core of integrating Europe had marginalized ‘nationalism’ as illicit. ‘Nationalism’, as 
interpreted by the classical works in the field, had ceased to be a legitimate political 
project in the European Community (even though nationalism, as seen here through the 
lenses of poststructuralist discourse theory, never lost political relevance). But in the 
periphery of Europe where the fall of communism produced a normative void in the 
organizing principles of statehood, ‘nationalism’ became a legitimate, oppositional, 
emancipatory agenda for re-building statehood from the rubble of the totalitarian state. At 
the same time, the former communist states denounced communism as the ‘wall’ that had 
separated them from ‘Europe’. They were eager to catch up with the common European 
processes and ‘return’ to Europe, which opened up their national spaces to the discourse 
of Europeanization and stimulated its empowerment. In this sense, the hegemonic struggle 
over the purpose of statehood (and the meaning of social reality) between the discourse of 
nationalism and the discourse of Europeanization occurred there in a much more open and 
visible manner than it was occurring at the time in traditional Europe. In many ways this 
struggle resembled the early years of the European project and pointed to the underlying 
principles of European integration. The clashes of this discursive struggle became a central 
part of the complex democratic transition and a legitimate element of the political process. 
Therefore, the dynamics of reading national identity and reproducing its narratives in the 
hegemonic struggle over meaning appeared much more visible in the context of EU 
Enlargement, outside the discursive space of the traditional Community. This is what 
pointed to it as a context for the current investigation. 
From the realm of post-communism and in the context of EU Enlargement, the 
investigation turned to the Balkan region. This analytical choice was prompted, again, by 
the visibility of national identity re-negotiation in the Balkans, but also by the presumably 
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heightened antagonistic potential of national identity there. The region is widely seen as 
offering most difficult cases of Europeanization of national identity. This is important 
because the dissertation is ultimately framed within a wider research interest: exploring 
the possibility of marginalizing identity-based conflictuality in Europe. Therefore, studying 
a habitually conflictual region to investigate the discursive effects of Europeanization 
promises more relevant conclusions about the mechanism of identity change, than a 
historically peaceful region relatively free of identity-based antagonisms.  
At the same time, studying the extreme cases of (inter-)national conflict would be counter-
productive for the above purposes because the politics of conflict differ significantly from 
the course of the political process under the condition of formal peace. They characterize a 
crisis situation and are not necessarily symptomatic of the re-negotiation of the meaning 
of identity under ‘normal’ politics. This is why the analysis selected two Balkan states 
which, even though caught in an antagonistic relationship, did not come into violent 
conflict. In this sense, the political function of national identity narratives studied in 
Bulgaria and in Macedonia is more similar to that in the rest of the European states. The 
analysis should therefore have wider applicability than a study of extreme cases of identity 
conflict. 
Methodologically, the investigation was constructed as a comparative case study over two 
states. This choice was analytically justified in view of the complexity of the identity-
building dynamics. The dissertation aimed to enhance understanding of national identity 
transformation at the macro-level – the state. Isolating one axis from the ‘Self’-‘Other’ 
dialectic in which identity emerges enabled a reasonable balance between feasibility and 
detail. Focusing on one state only would have been insufficient in view of exploring the 
discursive positions of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ at the level of the state. Selecting more than two 
states, on the other hand, would have significantly complicated the task of incorporating 
the identity-building dynamics into a methodologically viable research design. This is what 
suggested working with two states. For the purposes of understanding the effects of 
Europeanization on the divisive potential of national identity narratives, however, these 
two states could not have been selected randomly. In the construction and articulation of 
national identity, some ‘Others’, often the immediate ‘Others’, play more central roles 
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than the rest. Thus, certain axes in the ‘Self’-‘Other’ dialectic would be more salient than 
others. Selecting one of these central axes, therefore, promised to reveal more about 
identity than the infinite number of possible others which account for the identity 
construction. In view of the particular historical contexts which shaped them, Bulgarian-
Macedonian relations happened to delineate one such central axis in the identity building 
dynamics. Studying national identity narratives along these relations formed the empirical 
part of the dissertation.  
The investigation looked at the most salient stories told about the nation and its subjects 
in the context of Bulgarian-Macedonian relations, and selected six narrative groups which 
were identifiable in both states. They also form, predictably, part of most national identity 
constructs: stories about nationhood, territory, purpose, statehood, language, minorities. 
Despite the very specific local contexts in which these narrative groups uphold national 
identity, their almost universal presence in the construction of the ‘nation’ points to the 
basis of comparability and inference from the conclusions of this investigation. Applying 
discourse analysis, the investigation attempted to break down the selected narratives into 
their constitutive elements. It identified their structuring centres – territory, language, 
minority – and aimed to capture the dynamics of fixing their meanings. Inevitably, 
articulation of meaning is made possible in establishing relations between the various 
discursive elements. In national identity narratives this dynamics generates discursive 
practices of articulating the discursive positions of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ in relation to each 
other. Attempting to deny the contingent nature of such identity articulation requires 
perpetual over-determination of the subject positions through continuous re-narration of 
the story. Unsurprisingly, changing political contexts, actors and imperatives affect the 
process of re-narration. Identifying these was thus the analytical starting point of de-
constructing the narrative.  
Focusing on one discursive element at one point in time, the investigation attempted to 
follow the ‘Self’-‘Other’ dialectic which eventually produced the meaning of identity 
narratives. It looked for hegemonic articulations of the subject positions in view of that 
discursive element. The meaning of nationhood, for example, was partially fixed in 
discursive practices of categorization, exclusion, subordination: ‘We are brothers’, ‘They 
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are occupiers’, ‘They forgot who they were’. Interested in the function of national identity 
as collective state identity, the analysis looked for such articulations at the macro-level. It 
aimed to establish what could legitimately be said about national identity by the state.  
This dissertation studied what happened to national identity with integration in Europe. It 
aimed to explore how national identity narratives changed with the empowerment of the 
Europeanization discourse and how this affected the way the community of the state was 
being imagined. In order to determine the transformation, the analysis attempted to 
identify differences in the stories told before and after the empowerment of 
Europeanization. The process of empowering ‘Europe’ began during the post-communist 
transition. The analyzed points in time are selected within its timeframe. The selection was 
guided by the increased political salience of certain discursive elements from the national 
identity narratives. Articulating the meaning of language in the national story, for instance, 
was more intensive in the period of the so called language dispute between Bulgaria and 
Macedonia. Looking at interpretations of language when the dispute began and after its 
resolution revealed different subject positions linked to changed discursive contexts. 
Highlighting the discursive dynamics of subject re-positioning pointed to the mechanisms 
of identity change in the process of empowering Europeanization discourse.  
To be able to draw valid conclusions about these mechanisms, the investigation followed 
the dynamics of subject re-positioning around six key discursive elements from the 
national identity constructs. To be able to fully grasp the implications of this dynamics, it 
traced variations in interpretations both within and across the narrative unit. Identifying 
differences in the interpretation of the analyzed elements pointed to modifications in the 
national identity narratives. These modifications revealed how imagining the state 
community had changed in the course of Europeanization. Three aspects of the change 
stood out. 
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Conclusions 
The first significant aspect concerns the general re-orientation of the national identity 
construct. Traditionally, national identity narratives are discursively bound to the stories of 
the past. By upholding a particular version of history, they attempt to mythologize the 
emergence of the nation, essentialize its boundaries and articulate it as primordial and 
organic. But Europeanization is not concerned with the history of national communities. Its 
political focus is the prospects for cooperation between them in the present and for the 
future. Its discursive space is centred around the possibilities of the future. The national 
stories it tells are therefore inherently optimistic: they are looking into the realm of the 
achievable. National identity within the discourse of Europeanization is open for re-
negotiation, it is not pessimistically bound to the past. Examined in its inward effects, this 
discursive feature of Europeanization has at least two significant implications for the self-
enhancement function of national identity narratives. First, it adds credibility to the belief 
that the traumas of the past can be healed. In the context of decommunization (and 
decades earlier in the aftermath of Nazi atrocities) this discursive feature accounted for 
the increased political relevance of the European project and its political appeal. Looking 
into the wider context of European politics, this feature of the Europeanization discourse 
also determines its political relevance to re-building post-conflict societies from the ‘New’ 
Europe, which still stand outside the active realm of Europeanization. Second, the relative 
detachment of the European discourse from past dependencies expands the scope of the 
politically possible: despite failures in the past, Europeanization points to a prosperous, 
secure future that is achievable now, through political decisions in the present. This 
optimistic narrative has a visible self-enhancement effect on the national stories, which 
proves particularly appealing in times of political change, insecurity and crisis. Unlike 
pessimistic nationalist interpretations which constantly revert back to the past, national 
identity within the discourse of Europeanization seems significantly more credible as a 
source of collective identification with the state. Moreover, this interpretation makes the 
integration project an indispensible element of the political future of the state. 
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Re-orienting national identity narratives from the past to the present and future highlights 
the second aspect of the transformation induced with the empowerment of 
Europeanization, this time pointing outwards to the space of ‘otherness’. By de-
emphasizing the political relevance of the stories of the past, the discursive space of 
‘Europe’ enables transcending historical antagonisms through their gradual discursive 
marginalization. Directing political debate to the possibilities of the future and the 
consequences of missing them facilitates the detachment of everyday politics from their 
dependency upon past conflicts. This allows the gradual re-positioning of the previous 
malevolent ‘Other(s)’ as participants in a common undertaking. Dressed in the language of 
the national interest and the common good, this re-positioning in effect changes the ‘Self’-
‘Other’ dialectic of identity narration. The discursive space of Europeanization imagines an 
inclusive community of nations freed from the burden of conflict. Most importantly, 
Europeanization sees the boundaries of this community as open to (re)negotiation. In the 
context of (ethno-)national tension (just as in the post-war division of Europe), the 
possibility of negotiating differences and leaving them behind promises closure to past 
antagonisms. Nationalism as a grand discourse is unable to make such promise. Within its 
hegemony, the divisions between former antagonists often seem unsurmountable. State 
behaviour governed by the meanings of nationalism is constrained by past antagonisms 
and bound to reproduce the divisions. The possibility offered by the Europeanization 
discourse to break these constraints accounts for much of the appeal of European 
integration as a political project.  
European integration’s focus on negotiating differences accounted for the third dimension 
of the discursive effects induced by ‘Europe’. It highlighted pragmatic interpretations of 
commonality over ideational interpretations of difference. This discursive re-construction 
is significant in at least two ways. First, it shifts the normative focus of politics. Nationalism 
often operates in the normative spectrum of right and wrong. It attaches political 
meanings to ideas about justice, mission, and vindication. These ideas can easily be 
translated into the language of politics in times of crisis but sit uncomfortably in the 
routine of everyday politics. Europeanization, on the other hand, predominantly occupies 
the normative field of what is rationally beneficial. Its normative focus is mutual benefit 
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seen in pragmatic terms. Interpreting political meanings in the pragmatic language of 
mutual benefit has the advantage of signifying normality: politics no longer revolves 
around defeating adversaries or averting crises; it is predictable and institutionalized. 
Second, the discursive re-construction induced by the empowerment of Europeanization 
permits radical repositioning of the national subjects. Subverting nationalism’s discursive 
logic of identity articulation which attempts to essentialize uniqueness, the discourse of 
Europeanization is empowered through discursive practices of emphasizing similarities. In 
the context of deepening, widening and expanding integration, this discursive feature 
prompts, and indeed requires, the marginalization of antagonistic interpretations of 
identity and decreases the political relevance of nationalist discourse which upholds them. 
Advancing pragmatic politics of cooperation based on commonality interprets similar 
national identities as a source of political agency in the project of European integration. In 
this sense national identity narratives of commonality become a central discursive element 
of Europeanization and increase its political relevance. Europeanization’s effect on national 
identity is thus very emancipatory. It liberates the national subjects from the normative 
constraints imposed on them by the stories of the past and enables them to act in the 
name of their own good as they see it today.  
Empowering the Europeanization discourse significantly re-structured the discursive 
contexts of identity articulation. Nationalism had articulated national identity as 
deterministic, conflict-driven and disabling long-term cooperation. Upholding such an 
identity as the central source of political agency had significantly compromised it as a 
source of collective identity at state level, revealing its antagonistic, divisive potential. In 
Europe, this had been acknowledged in the conception of the project of integration, which 
challenged the way nationalism interpreted the political world. Establishing the key 
aspects of the discursive transformation induced by the discourse of Europeanization on 
the interpretation of national identity confirmed the central argument of this dissertation. 
National identity narratives read within the discursive contours of Europeanization appear 
more credible as stories of the state because they uphold a self-enhancing, non-
antagonistic, emancipating vision of national subjectivity, framed within an optimistic 
vision for the future. Moreover, this reading of national identity appears as a central 
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signifying element of the discourse of Europeanization, determining its discursive 
hegemony. Indeed, where the credibility of ‘European’ interpretations faltered, 
nationalism restored its hegemony and challenged the political relevance of the 
integration project. In this sense, the ability of the Europeanization discourse to capture 
the central signifiers of nationalism and fill them with its own meanings, determines its 
credibility in reading national identity. The current dissertation aimed to investigate the 
mechanisms of this discursive transformation and seek its implications for European 
politics. The analysis of the empirical findings indicated the discursive logic which enabled 
the transformation. 
 
Discursive Logic of Accommodation 
Working in the context of EU Enlargement, the dissertation traced Europeanization’s 
‘reading’ of national identity in six narrative groups over two states. It selected states 
which had just shed their totalitarian regimes and had turned to the project of European 
integration as an overarching strategic goal of their democratic transitions. It is setting up 
this goal that initiated the empowerment of the discourse of Europeanization in the first 
place. Inevitably, Europeanization’s ability to articulate alternative meanings to the central 
elements sustaining the national narratives depended on the structural features of the 
changing discursive contexts which characterized the transitions in the two studied states. 
A variety of factors, both domestic and external, influenced the progress of the transition 
and the pace of the process of Europeanization in the two states. It is beyond the 
epistemological purpose of this dissertation to explore causality in them, since the 
explanatory value of such undertaking is deemed to stretch little beyond the specific 
context. This dissertation focused instead on understanding the discursive logic behind 
upholding one interpretation of meaning over another and what they told us about 
nationalism, about Europeanization, about integration and about the nation. Nevertheless, 
identifying the various elements which conditioned the varying discursive power of 
Europeanization in the studied states seems relevant as a contribution to understanding 
this particular fragment of Balkan politics.   
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Tracing the interpretation of similar elements in the discursive patterns of identity 
diachronically in the two states demonstrated that variations were linked to the formal 
progress of integration. The meaning of national territory, for example, transformed 
significantly with the advancement of membership negotiations in Bulgaria. The idea of a 
closely guarded territory whose integrity was to be protected at any cost was gradually 
replaced with the belief in open borders and the aspiration to guard a much larger 
territorial space: ‘Europe’. In Macedonia, the interpretation of national territory as part of 
a ‘severed whole’ was gradually marginalized to emphasize the legitimacy of the current 
territorial status quo and to protect it. Very different in themselves, the variations in the 
national narratives in both states eventually upheld a less antagonistic national identity 
story in terms of the internal and external ‘Others’. The formal progress of integration, 
however, took different courses in the two states.  
This, in its turn, was linked to a combination of domestic and international factors, among 
which the political configuration in power, the modalities of majority-minority 
accommodation, the problems arising from the regional context (Figure 6). These factors 
ultimately determined the political consensus on ‘Europe’, as well as the specific incentives 
provided by ‘Europe’ to stimulate such consensus. Where the domestic political outcomes 
did not favour immediate progress in the process of integration, the credibility of 
Europeanization’s reading of national identity decreased. Comparing the two states under 
study here, the problem of Macedonia’s international legal subjectivity impeded by Greek 
non-recognition stands out as one such outcome. Significantly slowing down Macedonia’s 
integration efforts, it reduced the political relevance of integration and re-enforced the 
credibility of nationalist interpretations of identity. The prolonged stay in power of the 
former communists in Bulgaria, compromising the legitimacy of the post-communist 
transition, stands out as another example of such domestic outcome. Impeding successful 
reforms, it prevented progress towards membership negotiation and decreased the 
political relevance of Europeanization. As soon as membership negotiations began after a 
domestic change of power, the discourse of Europeanization began to stabilize and was 
able to produce more credible readings of national identity narratives.  
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Figure 6. Credibility of National Identity Narratives within Europeanization: Discursive Logic. 
 
Having established the logic of this discursive dynamics, the investigation then followed it 
synchronically in the two states in the interpretations of one and the same discursive 
elements structuring bilateral relations. Identifying variations in the articulation of their 
meanings in Bulgaria and in Macedonia enabled checking these variations against the 
progress of integration in the two states. The analysis largely confirmed the discursive logic 
presented in Figure 6 above. Where political consensus on the relevance of 
Europeanization failed – in the context of staggering integration efforts – nationalist 
interpretations resumed their salience and re-produced antagonisms in the bilateral 
relations. Detached from the discourse of Europeanization, Bulgaria’s recognition of 
Macedonian statehood, for instance, was interpreted as a national threat in both Bulgaria 
and Macedonia. With the opening up of the national spaces towards the integration 
processes in Europe, however, this interpretation was marginalized to give way to 
constructive articulations on the act of recognition. But while in Bulgaria this happened 
almost immediately with the first ‘European’ steps of the state, Macedonia had to wait in 
isolation before it could initiate inter-state dialogue with the European states. The 
remarkable domestic silence on Bulgaria’s presumably amicable act of recognition testifies 
to this discursive vacuum. Against its background, the only interpretations of it, though 
irrelevant, were provided by the discourse of nationalism, which asserted its hegemonic 
presence in Macedonian politics. Very similar discursive dynamics characterized 
interpretations of language in the different stages of the bilateral language dispute. At the 
very beginning of Europeanization in the region, language was interpreted as a central 
feature of national identity and compromises with it were seen as an immediate identity 
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threat. With the gradual empowerment of Europeanization, marked most significantly by 
the election of democratic governments in both states, the European interpretation of 
culture as a field of commonality and mutual complementation affected the salience of 
language as an identity signifier and facilitated the resolution of the language dispute. 
‘European’ reading of national identity enabled reconciliation, thus increasing the 
credibility of identity as the story of the state and stabilizing the discursive space which 
upheld it.  
This outcome was observed despite the divergent interpretations of the identity narratives 
in the specific national/state contexts. Subscribing to the discourse of Europeanization 
resulted in different, often even contradictory, meanings attached to one and the same 
discursive element in the two states. But the implications of these meanings for the way 
the national/state community was being seen were generally quite similar: decreased 
antagonism along national lines, increased relevance of the integration project. This is 
significant not only because it empirically supports the central argument of this 
dissertation. It also points to a novel approach to understanding European politics, both 
within and outside the realm of the European project. More on this will be said towards 
the end of this chapter. 
Despite the accelerated progress of integration and the visible salience of Europeanization 
discourse, however, the credibility of ‘European’ interpretations remained low around 
certain discursive elements. This empirical finding seemed to contradict the logic of the 
discursive dynamics described above. It suggested that Europeanization’s reading of 
national identity did not depend only upon empowering Europeanization discourse. 
Detecting increased salience of nationalist interpretations of identity around one and the 
same discursive element suggested ways to interpret this apparent contradiction. 
Determining the subject positions of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ around the discursive element of 
minorities proved particularly resistant to the meanings upheld by the Europeanization 
discourse. Tracing variations both within and across this narrative unit (in the narratives of 
nationhood and in the narratives on mutual recognition of minorities, respectively) 
confirmed this finding. The weakness of the Europeanization discourse around this 
discursive element not so much contradicted the discursive dynamics confirmed in the 
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reading of all the other elements, than pointed back to the assumption which the whole 
investigation started from. Europeanization needs to be able to read national identity in a 
credible manner because European integration occurs within the constraints of the nation-
state. The discourse essentializing the nation-state as the natural organizational unit of the 
political world is nationalism. Its upholding centre – national identity – has historically 
been interpreted within nationalism in such a hegemonic manner that its most sedimented 
articulations proved particularly difficult to challenge in a changing discursive context.  
It is not coincidental that European integration had not concerned itself with the 
normative regulation of national minorities for the first decades of its life. The problem of 
(ethno-)national minorities pertains to the discursive realm of nationalism. In no other 
discursive space would it represent a problem. National minorities as a discursive element 
are an aberration from the structuring rule of nationalism: parts of the nation left outside 
the nation-state borders. In order to close its totalizing space despite the aberration, the 
discourse of nationalism perpetually re-produces intensive practices of articulation and 
over-determination of the meaning of national minorities as upholding, not violating the 
rule. By interpreting national minorities as representing abnormality, nationalism 
securitizes their existence and demands special protection. Within the discourse of 
Europeanization, however, the discursive element of national minorities loses its meaning 
in view of the cancelled political relevance of nation-state borders. It ceases to represent 
abnormality, because all national subjects share the same common space. The issue of 
national minorities’ special protection can therefore be taken off the political agenda. The 
fact that European integration did eventually approach national minorities as a problem in 
this sense signifies a discursive victory for nationalism. It signals increased salience of 
nationalist interpretations of identity.  
Attempting to rectify its presumed omission and provide its own articulation of the 
meaning of minorities, Europeanization discourse referred to a ‘European’ framework of 
minority protection. It was based on its open, inclusive and negotiable vision of national 
identity. But in the context of nationalist hegemony over the discursive element, the 
‘European’ interpretation of national minorities had questionable credibility. It had not had 
the time to challenge the historically sedimented narratives articulating the meaning of 
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national minority in a hegemonic manner. In this sense the credibility of Europeanization’s 
reading of national identity does, indeed, depend on the discursive power of 
Europeanization in the particular political environment. However, in the context of EU 
Enlargement, the power of the Europeanization discourse is linked not only to domestic 
political outcomes in Europe’s periphery but also to political outcomes in the discursive 
space of traditional Europe. To acknowledge this specificity in the discursive dynamics 
illustrated in Figure 6 above, it should be clarified that the credibility of Europeanization’s 
reading of national identity is linked not only to the progress of integration as EU 
enlargement. It is also linked to its progress as deepening and widening integration 
processes within traditional Europe.  
Establishing credible ‘European’ readings of national identity in the narratives studied in 
the two states is empirically linked to marginalized nationalist interpretations and re-
enforced discursive power of Europeanization. To the contrary, where Europeanization 
discourse does not succeed in providing credible alternative interpretations of national 
identity signifiers, the political relevance of nationalism as hegemonic discourse is 
increased. The hegemonic clash between the two discourses over the same discursive 
space is determined by the centrality of national identity in legitimizing sovereign power. 
In this sense the credibility of identity interpretations has the potential to transform the 
political order by upholding one vision of legitimate power or another. Ultimately, this is 
what the future of the integration project is about.  
 
Research Contribution 
The results of this investigation of national identity in Europe contribute to expanding 
existing academic knowledge in three ways. In the first place, its contribution relates to the 
methodological novelty of the approach. The study offers an original theoretical and meta-
theoretical framework, combining poststructuralist discourse theory with reflectivist 
strands from three academic (sub-)disciplines, whose mainstreams are widely rationalist. 
International Relations, European Studies and Nationalism Studies have each in their own 
ways approached national identity and attempted to explain its political relevance. 
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Constrained by the limitations of their rationalist epistemologies and of their own 
disciplinary agendas, however, their accounts have been challenged on many grounds: 
level of analysis, area focus, ontological assumptions. Looking at national identity from the 
cross-section of three academic fields concerned with exploring the subject of national 
identity, on the other hand, permits a much broader and fuller understanding. It allows for 
the incorporation of various theoretical approaches (securitization theory, normative 
theories of Europeanization, critical approaches to studying nationalism), various levels of 
analysis (seeing the macro-level not as a system or state level but as embedded in both the 
international and the domestic contexts), various qualitative methods (comparative 
analysis over a small number of cases carried out through discourse analysis of official 
publicly produced texts). Placing this investigation within the wider framework of 
poststructuralist discourse theory enhances existing understanding of many aspects of the 
political relevance of national identity in Europe and promises to open compelling new 
ways to studying the political phenomena associated with it.  
The second contribution which this dissertation aimed to make concerns its main 
argument. The claim it makes about the discursive centrality of national identity in the 
project of Europeanization is novel and original. Because of the particular historical 
contexts in which the idea of integration was conceived, national identity has traditionally 
been relegated to the margins of European politics as anachronistically linked to the 
questionable ethics of nationalism. National identity’s salience in Europe has therefore 
often been approached as an aberration from the normative space of Europeanization and 
interpreted in relation to the ‘non-European’ elements in ‘Europe’. Against the recurring 
political salience of national identity, another analytical strand has begun to see it as 
incompatible with the integration project altogether, proclaiming the limits of integration. 
This dissertation claims, to the contrary, that national identity is a central element within 
the discursive space of Europeanization whose interpretation can determine the future of 
the European project. Inextricably linked to the notion of sovereignty in the political world 
of national subjects, national identity narratives never left the discursive space of ‘Europe’. 
They were re-told in a particular way with the progress of integration and the 
empowerment of the Europeanization discourse, which marginalized previously dominant 
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nationalist interpretations. But they continued to form the basis of the interpellation of the 
national subjects for the purposes of political mobilization and action. Furthermore, this is 
not incompatible with the European idea. Quite to the contrary, it is the ability of 
Europeanization to uphold identities in its particular manner that stabilizes its discursive 
space and ensures its political relevance. Thinking about Europeanization in those terms is 
significant because it addresses in a novel and challenging way many of the central debates 
in Europeanization studies. In view of the discussion on an emerging European identity and 
how it relates to national identity, for example, this claim suggests that the two are neither 
mutually exclusive nor antagonistic. In fact, what is seen as a ‘European identity’ is a 
particular interpretation of the national identity narratives within the discursive space of 
‘Europe’. Questioning the limits of integration in terms of the deepening and widening 
dynamics is also tightly linked to this understanding of the European project. As long as it 
continues to produce credible readings of the national narratives, accommodating national 
identities in an optimistic, positive, emancipatory manner, integration can maintain its 
political relevance: it will provide the link between the individual and sovereign power, 
ensuring the legitimate basis of political action. The integration dynamics then will face no 
fixed limits. The study of the normative power of Europeanization and the role of the 
European project in Europe outside the current EU, another important discussion in 
Europeanization Studies, can also be seen in a new light. The hegemonic struggle between 
discourses of nationalism and of Europeanization is ongoing in the periphery of Europe, 
and as the current dissertation established in the context of EU Enlargement, its outcome 
is crucial for the success of integration. Outside the borders of the EU and the scope of the 
enlargement process, as well, the ‘European’ reading of national identity can have 
significant implications for politics in Europe and has the potential to empower the 
discourse of Europeanization even beyond the borders of the integration project. This is, 
indeed, an entirely new direction for research.   
Finally, the specific regional focus of the current dissertation is an original contribution to 
existing academic knowledge. Among the many Balkan states, Bulgaria and Macedonia 
have not attracted significant academic interest because of their relative stability as 
compared to the (rest of the) Western Balkans. When they have been studied at all in 
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modern academic literature, it has often happened from a Western-European perspective 
detached from the specific local experiences, or in a language not readable in the ‘West’. 
This dissertation addresses both omissions. Bulgarian-Macedonian relations, in particular, 
have been even more understudied. They have extensively been discussed in the 
respective national academic communities during the time of the totalitarian state. These 
discussions, outdated and tainted by the ideological struggles of the time, at present fail to 
provide an accurate idea of the complex layers of conflictuality which strain these 
relations, and an accurate understanding of the political implications of it. Freed from the 
ideological constraints of these traditional accounts, the current dissertation offers a 
modern – postmodern, in fact – approach to understanding a particular fragment of Balkan 
politics which has not been widely explored. Even if constrained by other ideological 
assumptions and unable to cross their limits, the investigation offered here is a novel 
contribution because its findings, made on the basis of the specific regional and historical 
contexts, enhance existing academic knowledge of the complex relationship between two 
Balkan states. It tells a ‘small story’ about a small part of Europe but it points to many 
‘bigger’ stories in European politics. In this sense it opens an interesting agenda for future 
research.  
 
What Next? 
One of the items on this agenda concerns exploring the power of the Europeanization 
discourse over antagonistic politics in other regional contexts. An obvious area of interest 
here would be the (rest of the) Western Balkans and the post-conflict reconstruction of 
statehood there. Detaching the analysis from the euphoric context of the breakup of 
communism in Europe and its immediate normative effect on politics in the post-
communist states will point to a characteristically new discursive environment in which the 
central argument put forward in this dissertation can be applied and explored. The change 
will affect the power of the Europeanization discourse, the pace of integration, and the 
structural features of conflictual politics.  
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Another important item on the research agenda opened by this dissertation represents the 
discursive effect of Europeanization over the re-narration of national identity along the 
relations between a EU member state and a non-member state. The investigation offered 
here was able to establish decreased conflictuality and reduced divisive potential of 
national identity narratives re-told within the discourse of Europeanization. But its 
methodological frame did not allow including the period after Bulgaria’s joining the EU. 
Studying the way conflictuality evolves in the ‘Self’-‘Other’ dialectic of identity narration 
from the more advantageous position of a member of the Community, and particularly 
with regard to a non-member, would add important insights to further developing the 
argument presented here. This is significant because antagonistic politics is not a 
prerogative of states outside the EU. The Greek position on Macedonia in that same 
context of Balkan politics is an illustration. Thus, studying the effect of Europeanization 
over antagonistic national identity narratives in Bulgarian-Macedonian relations after 
2007, and perhaps in comparison with Greek-Macedonian relations, is a logical next step in 
the research agenda proposed by this dissertation.  
The implications of membership in the Community in view of the post-communist 
Enlargements is in itself a central problem on the research agenda of Europeanization 
Studies and one to which the findings of this investigation relate to. Membership 
preparation and joining not only affected the way national identity was being upheld in the 
respective national communities. It also affected the way the supranational community 
was being imagined and sustained as a politically viable project. Opening up to Europe’s 
previous ‘Others’ radically transformed the way the EC/EU had captured and 
accommodated the key discursive element of ‘national interest’. It challenged the existing 
balance between commonality and difference and destabilized the hegemony of the 
Europeanization discourse altogether. Exploring the ‘Self’-‘Other’ dialectic inside the 
supranational community, therefore, appears, in view of this dissertation’s main argument, 
as an imperative to understanding the current dynamics of European integration. This 
dialectic seems to have implications for the widening of the integration process, for the 
sustainability of enlargement of the community, for the nature of the neighbourhood 
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policies on the European continent, as well as for EU’s outreach beyond the borders of 
Europe.  
Pointing to this exciting research agenda, the current dissertation aimed to make its 
contribution by framing a much repeated concept – national identity – into an original 
research context and analyzing it in a novel and challenging way. 
 
 
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